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 Changes in economic and business practices around the globe and the rapid reform 
movement in developing counties require a sound corporate governance structure to be 
implemented in Saudi Arabia. A winning reform agenda has to take national factors into 
consideration. Agency problem types (controlling shareholder v. minority shareholders) and a 
weak external enforcement mechanism (especially judiciary) in the Saudi system suggest that 
immediate reform of corporate governance should focus on internal corporate governance, 
namely shareholder position including minority shareholders protection and the board of 
directors. Such a strategy of reform does not intend to undermine the importance of 
administrative and judicial reforms to corporate governance efficiency in the country, but rather 
offers fast-track reform proposals that may boost the corporate governance system until a full 
development of strong external structure in the country is established. Well-structured internal 
corporate governance is expected to comply with a number of comparative benchmarks that may 
reduce agency cost problem and observe the Saudi moral systems, particularly ones related to 
Islam. Linking corporate governance to the country’s moral system will more likely facilitate 
legal transplant of corporate governance standards into the Saudi system. Overall, the adoption 
of the proposals recommended in this dissertation is imperative to achieving the goals of 
improving corporate governance in Saudi Arabia and attracting greater investment in the 
country's capital market.   
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
1.1 GENERAL REMARKS 
Saudi Arabia is currently witnessing an economic boom due to both high revenues from 
petroleum sales and legal reforms that King Abdullah is implementing.1 In a 2013 World Bank 
Doing Business Report, Saudi Arabia ranked 26 at the ease of doing business worldwide.2 
Moreover, Saudi Arabia is one of the most attractive Middle Eastern countries for foreign direct 
investment: in 2010 the inward FDI reached over $36 billion dollars.3 Additionally, Saudi Arabia 
recently became part of the G-20.4 However, Saudi Arabia is still a rentier state by which oil 
represents most of the county’s income.5 To avoid possible ramifications of an economy based 
1 For example, the new Law of judiciary and King Abdullah Project for Improvement of Judiciary. 
2 See World Bank, Doing Business Report 2013, available at http://www.doingbusiness.org/Rankings 
(accessed on Jan. 20, 2014). Saudi Arabia was ranked 13 in 2010. Id. 
3 See Table A: Distribution of FDA Flows among Economies by Range, 2012 and Annex Table 1. FDI by 
Reagan and Economy. 2007–2012, in World Investment Report (2013): Global Value Chains: Investment and Trade 
for Development, available at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2013_en.pdf (accessed on Jan. 20, 2014). 
4 For information about the G-20 group see Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
homepage, available at http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/g20/ (accessed on Jan. 20, 2014). 
5 Government Spending represents more the third of the country GDP. See Heritage, 2014 Index for 
Economic Freedom, available at http://www.heritage.org/index/country/saudiarabia (accessed on Jan. 20, 2014). 
According to the originator of this concept “Rentier Sates are defined … as those countries that receive on a regular 
basis substantial amounts of external rent. External rents are in turn defined as rentals paid by foreign individuals, 
concerns or governments to individuals, concerns or governments of a given country.” See H. Mahdavy, The Pattern 
and Problems of Economic Development in Rentier States: The Case of Iran, in STUDIES IN THE ECONOMIC HISTORY 
OF THE MIDDLE EAST: FROM THE RISE OF ISLAM TO THE PRESENT DAY 428 (M.A. Cook ed., Oxford University 
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on only one revenue source, the Saudi government launched ambitious projects and announce 
further plans to diversify the economy.6 
At the top of the reform agenda is economic reform. Accordingly, many laws and 
regulations have been enacted or amended – most notably in matters related to trade and 
investment – especially in corporate governance. One of the most notable steps was the creation 
of the Saudi Capital Market Authority (CMA) in 2003 and the enactment of the Capital Market 
Law to complement the Companies Law of 1965.7 The newly established Capital Market 
Authority enacted several regulations that were transplanted, mostly from Anglo-American 
tradition, to regulate the Saudi capital market.8 
Despite that, a massive capital market crash occurred two years later (2006), with the 
result that savings of middle class investors vanished. Although the capital market crash was 
mainly related to the unreasonable increase in share prices, many voices at all levels of public 
and private sectors attributed such a crisis to the weak corporate governance structure in Saudi 
Arabia.9 Even the King himself was displeased with the middle class’s collective losses in the 
Press, 1970). Moreover, Mahdavy notes that “the oil revenues received by the governments of the oil exporting 
countries have very little to do with the production processes of their domestic economies.” Id. at 429. 
6 For example, Saudi Arabia is building four huge economic cities which cost $60 billion dollars. See 
http://www.sagia.gov.sa/en/Why-Saudi-Arabia/Economic-cities/ (accessed on Oct. 27, 2010). 
7 Until 2004 the Companies Law was the only statutory source of corporate governance in the country. 
8 Professor James Cox of Duke Law School is the chief drafter of the Saudi Capital Market Law. See 
Joseph W. Beach, The Saudi Arabian Capital Market Law: A Practical Study of the Creation of Law in Developing 
Markets, 41 STAN. J. INT’L L. 307, 308 (2005). 
9 See Institute of International Finance, Inc. & The Institute for Corporate Governance, Corporate 
Governance in Saudi Arabia: An Investor Perspective 1 (2006) which describes the situation of the Saudi capital 
market: 
[T]he equity culture in Saudi Arabia Remains weak as investors lack sophistication. The bulk of 
investors manage their own portfolios, usually without access to investment research, and much of 
their activity is driven by incomplete information and rumor. During the bull market of 2004 and 
2005, many non-professional investment management firms were set up, which charged lower fees 
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capital market. Appearing on national television, he (the King) promised to indemnify the 
affected small investors by allowing them to invest in a government-managed risk free fund.10 In 
the same year, a group of international experts concluded that “Saudi Arabia’s corporate 
governance framework complied with only one-half of guidelines recommended in the [Institute 
of International Finance’s (IIF)] Policies for Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets.”11 In 
response to this obvious corporate governance issue, the Capital Market Authority CMA 
announced new corporate governance principles based on best corporate governance practices.12 
Nonetheless, Saudi corporate governance system still has not been compliant with best practices. 
In 2009, for instance, a World Bank assessment of the Saudi corporate governance, including the 
corporate governance principles, indicated that Saudi corporate governance falls behind 
international best practice standards, namely the OECD Principles. 
Changes in economic and business practices around the globe and the rapid reform 
movement in developing counties, however, require that a sound corporate governance structure 
to be implemented in Saudi Arabia. In other words, Saudi Arabia has to compete effectively in 
the “race to the top” for corporate governance reform, in part to attract national and international 
portfolio investors.13 A well-structured corporate governance model is necessary to attract more 
compared to established and reputable financial institutions. Poor monitoring by the authorities of 
these companies allegedly allowed them to make profit by front-running. 
10 Nothing has yet been set in this regard. 
11 Institute of International Finance, Inc. & the Institute for Corporate Governance, Corporate Governance 
in Saudi Arabia: An Investor Perspective 11 (2006). 
12 Its official name is “Corporate Governance Regulation in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia” issued by the 
Board of Capital Market Authority resolution No. 1/212/2006 dated 21/10/1427 (corresponding to 12/11/ 2006), 
available at http://www.cma.org.sa/En/Documents/CORPORATE%20GOV.pdf (accessed on Oct. 28, 2010) 
[hereinafter SCGR]. 
13 This phrase is bowered from “the race to the top” phrase in American corporate law literature referring to 
the competition among U.S. states for increasing the corporate law standards to attract more incorporation in their 
states. This view is adopted as a counter argument against an older view that argued states are racing to the bottom 
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investors to the capital market as well as to open a new venue of low cost financing for national 
companies. 
1.2 THE DISSERTATION HYPOTHESES 
More reforms have to be implemented to improve the Saudi corporate governance. However, a 
reform plan should not merely be about blind compliance with international best practices. 
Corporate governance reform is more than a cut and paste process. A winning reform agenda has 
to take national factors into consideration, as Professor Bernard Black and Reinier Kraalman had 
noted that “emerging economies cannot simply copy the corporate laws of developed economies. 
These laws depend upon highly evolved market, legal and governmental institutions and cultural 
norms that often do not exist in emerging economies.14 
The Saudi economy represents a concentrated ownership system with a controlling 
majority shareholder(s) v. minority shareholders agency problem.15 Moreover, Saudi Arabia 
lacks the prerequisite institutions that are able to support efficient corporate governance.16 For 
by lowering their governance standards instead. For more information about the race to the bottom and the race to 
the top  See generally William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflection upon Delaware, 88 YALE L.J. 
663 (1974) FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 5–6 
(1991). 
14 Bernard Black & Reinier Kraalman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1911, 
1913 (1995–1996). 
15 See John Armour et al., Agency Problems and Legal Strategies, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: 
A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 35, 36 (Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., 2d ed. 2009). Also, see the 
World Bank, Corporate Governance: A Framework for Implementation 29 (2002) (“[t]he ownership structure in 
corporate sector and its financing sources have a defining impact on the design of corporate governance systems.”). 
Id. 
16 See generally Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets, 
48 UCLA L. REV. 781 (2000–2001). 
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example, the judiciary is underdeveloped and extremely slow: if someone has a judgment to 
enforce, he will wait a long time to see enforcement enacted. Also, the administrative authority, 
required by law to oversee companies, is not able to do so efficiently because of the lack of 
qualified people to enforce relevant laws and the shortage of staff. As the General Director of the 
Companies Directorate at the Saudi Ministry of Commerce and Industry has said, “We cannot 
keep up. I work day and night just to finish the necessary work.”17 Having well functioning 
institutions represents a backbone for external corporate governance.18 However, achievement of 
such a thing by developing countries needs a very long and complex process of reform which 
may not always succeed. 
Agency problem type and a weak external enforcement mechanism in the Saudi system 
suggest that immediate reform of corporate governance should focus on internal corporate 
governance, namely shareholder position including minority shareholders protection and the 
board of directors.19 Internal governance is based mostly on the quality of the mentioned organs 
of company governance, as Professor Arthur Pinto put it, “[i]nternal corporate governance looks 
at the allocation of power and internal mechanism designed to protect shareholders without 
undermining those who need to manage the corporation.”20 Such a strategy of reform does not 
17 Personal interview in Saudi Arabia (Sept. 2010). 
18 External corporate governance refers to “[f]orces from outside the corporation exercise a disciplining 
influence on management as well, in particular various markets such as takeover.” (Footnote omitted.) Klaus J. 
Hopt, Comparative Corporate Governance: The State of the Art and International Regulation, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 
8 (2001). 
19 Internal governance is connected to the power within the corporation and the interaction between the 
board of directors and shareholders. See Hopt, supra note 18. The drafters of the new Russian joint stock companies 
statute had considered the issue of weak external governance in Russia. The Russian statute is based mainly on 
enfacement of corporate governance through checks and balance between internal governance mechanisms and less 
discretionary legal provisions (Bright-Line Rules). See Black & Kraalman, supra note 14, at 1911. 
20 Arthur R. Pinto, An Overview of the United States Corporate Governance in Publicly Traded 
Corporations, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 257, 264 (2010). 
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intend to undermine the importance of administrative and judicial reforms to corporate 
governance efficiency in the country, but rather offers fast track reform proposals that may 
increase the corporate governance system until a full development of strong institutional 
structure in the country is hopefully established. Well-structured internal corporate governance is 
expected to comply with a number of comparative benchmarks that may reduce agency cost 
problem and observe the Saudi moral systems, particularly ones related to Islam. Linking 
corporate governance to the country’s moral system will more likely facilitate legal transplant of 
corporate governance standards into the Saudi system.21 
1.3 THE METHODOLOGY 
This study uses analytical and comparative law methodologies. Comparative law methods will 
serve this dissertation from several different sides. One example is to understand the nature of 
corporate governance problems under the Saudi system.22 The second example is to determine if 
the solutions that are found in other legal systems – whether legislative, non-binding principles, 
and other comparative corporate governance literature – offer insight for improving the Saudi 
corporate governance.23 In this context, Professors Zweigert and Kotz have remarked that 
21 See Denial Berkowitz et al., The Transplant Effect, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 257, 163 (2003) (“for the law to 
be effective, it must be meaningful in the context in which it is applied so citizens have an incentive to use the law 
and to demand institutions that work to enforce and develop the law”). Id. at 167. 
22 See generally Hiram E. Chodosh, Comparing Comparisons: In Search of Methodology, 84 IOWA L. REV. 
1025, 1073–74 (1999). 
23 See generally Chodosh, supra note 22, at 1025, 1074–77. 
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“[l]egislators all over the world have found that on many matters good laws cannot be produced 
without the assistance of comparative law.”24 
1.4 THE SOURCES 
Generally speaking, the Saudi library lacks a wealthy secondary source on corporate law and 
governance. Moreover, secondary sources in other Arab countries with regard to corporate 
governance theory and reform debate are rare, thin and descriptive in nature.25 Consultation of 
such sources does not normally provide insight into reforms but rather furnish a better 
understanding of legal issues at hand in a similar way hornbooks work in the U.S. legal system. 
Therefore, comparative corporate governance literature represents an indispensable source for 
accomplish the goal of this dissertation. 
Saudi Arabian case law relating to company law and governance has still not been 
published. An insistent investigation (with special approval) has revealed that few cases were 
filed with regard to corporate governance matters, especially derivative lawsuits in which no 
single case has been located.26 Thus, Saudi court decisions will contribute little to this research. 
24 K. ZWEIGERT & H. KOTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 16 (3d ed. 1998). 
25 An exception to this statement is the work of Dr. Almajid, providing a general overview of Saudi 
corporate governance. See Fahad Mohammad Almajid, A Conceptual Framework for Reforming the Corporate 
Governance of Saudi Publicly Held Companies: A Comparative and Analytical Study from a Legal Perspective 
(Ph.D.) (2008) (unpublished dissertation University of Manchester). Allmajid’s work mainly provides an extensive 
evaluation of the external and internal Saudi corporate governance structures against the U.S. and U.K. structures. 
Conversely, this dissertation argues for reforming Saudi corporate governance through internal corporate 
mechanisms. Most of the discussions related to external governance mechanisms were to support that hypothesis. 
26 I could not locate a single case. In fact, I do not know if this is related to poor record keeping or, in fact, 
is true. 
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The study will consult a number of unpublished or not widely circulated administrative 
decisions, circulars and legal memos. Such documents (especially the ones issued by the 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry) play a crucial role in understanding the nature of Saudi 
corporate governance and to define a number of issues that affect the efficiency of that system. 
1.5 VALUE AND AIMS OF THE DISSERTATION 
Generally, there are few studies about the Saudi legal system and fewer still about Saudi 
company law or governance in English and Arabic. Accordingly, the dissertation hopefully will 
fill in some gaps relating to Saudi company law and corporate governance that English-speaking 
and future Saudi scholars interested in corporate governance, in general, or internal corporate 
governance in Saudi Arabia, including minority shareholders’ protection, in particular, will find 
helpful. 
The dissertation will contribute to a better understanding of Saudi company law and 
Saudi corporate governance. Comparing our structure of corporate governance with the 
governance structure of other countries carries a great deal of importance for better 
understanding of our law.27 Last and most importantly, the dissertation is intended to present to 
Saudi policy makers and future drafters of new company law and governance guidelines with a 
clear insight and wisdom needed to implement legal reform. 
27 See Chodosh, supra note 22. 
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1.6 STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION 
To achieve its objectives, apart from this introduction chapter, the dissertation is divided into 
eight chapters. Chapter Two provides the necessary background of Saudi Arabian history, 
economy and legal system with illustration of the constitutional structure. The chapter illustrates 
sources of the legal rules, both positive and religious. As well the chapter will then shed light on 
the important forms of business organizations under Saudi law: general partnership, limited 
partnership, Limited Liability Company, and Joint Stock Company. 
Chapter Three will discuss the concept of corporate governance by summarizing 
different points of view attempting to define this illusive concept. One of the chapter goals is to 
show that corporate governance can be defined in different ways depending on perspective. 
Then, the chapter will address factors that made corporate governance a globally important topic, 
such as market crashes, globalization, foreign direct investment, sovereign creation of wealth 
funds and privatization. 
Chapter Four will review two important philosophical questions whose answers will 
weigh heavily on the entire structure of the country involved. The first question is: what is the 
nature of the public company? The second question is: for whose interest should the public 
company be run? Finally, the chapter will be shed light on ownership and control theory as 
originally formed Berle and Means’ seminal book, “The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property.”28 Then the chapter will provide a brief survey of agency cost problem  in dispersed 
and concentrated models of ownership and what different problems each model may have. 
28 ADOLF A. BERLE JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 
(1933). Although Berle and Means were not the first to recognize the separation of ownership and control in 
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Chapter Five will examine Islamic views on corporate governance. It will first illustrate 
Islamic views on governance, then illustrating the interactions and implications of the Islamic 
system with respect to modern corporate governance ideology. 
Chapter Six will be dedicated to examining the general framework of corporate 
governance in Saudi Arabia. The chapter will shed light on the Saudi capital market including 
the ownership pattern of publicly held companies. Moreover, the sources of corporate 
governance will be listed. The legal framework governing disclosure systems will be explored. 
Finally, this chapter will assess the ability of the Saudi judicial system to support corporate 
governance. 
Chapters Seven and Eight will be devoted to evaluating internal corporate governance 
in Saudi Arabia. Chapter Seven will be devoted to the examination of the board of directors. In 
this chapter, the board structure, formation, directors’ duties and remuneration will be discussed. 
Chapter Eight will focus on shareholders’ position – particularly their rights, collective decision 
making (general meeting), and minority shareholders protection. Specific comparative points 
will be raised in these chapters. Moreover, through all parts of the chapter alternative 
arrangements will be proposed. 
publicly held corporations; however, they did shed light on this matter. Historically, Adam Smith noted this problem 
in his seminal work: 
The directors of such companies, however, being the manager rather of other people’s money than 
of their own, it cannot well be expected, that they should watch over it with the same anxious 
vigilance with which the partners in private copartnery frequently watch over their own. Like the 
stewards of a rich man, they are apt to consider attention to small matters as not for their master’s 
honour, and very easily give themselves a dispensation from having it. Negligence and profusion, 
therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the management of the affairs of such a company. 
It is upon this account that joint stock companies ... have seldom been able to maintain the 
competition against private adventurers. 
ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 941 (Bantam Classic ed. 2003). 
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Chapter Nine will provide the reader with the conclusion of this dissertation, listing the 
main recommendations for reform of the Saudi internal corporate governance. 
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2.0  SAUDI ARABIA: HISTORY, ECONOMY, AND LEGAL SYSTEM 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides the necessary background of Saudi Arabia beginning with the 
contemporary history and economy. Then brief view of Saudi legal system will be delineated of 
the State and the relationship between religion and politics from inception until present day. The 
chapter then explores the constitutional arrangement and structure of power in the country. The 
chapter will explain the sources of legal rules in Saudi Arabia namely, first the positive sources 
which are legislations and regulations. Second, the chapter will provide a brief background of 
Islamic law sources such as the Koran and the Sunna (Prophet Mohammad’s traditions). The end 
of the chapter will provide a brief background of business organizations under Saudi legal 
system. 
12 
2.2 THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA 
2.2.1 Introduction 
Saudi Arabia is situated in Jazirat Al-Arab (Arab Peninsula or Island)1 with a size of 2,149,690 
SQ KM,2 around 20% of the United States of America in size3 and nearly the same size as 
Western Europe.4 In the early seventh century, in the Hejaz region, the western part of Saudi 
Arabia, the Islamic faith was introduced in Mecca by the Prophet Mohammad.5 Soon after, the 
Prophet had established the first Islamic state in another Hejazi city, Medina.6 Muslims around 
the world are obligated to pray, Assalah, toward Mecca (Qibla)7 five times per day and to visit 
Mecca twice in their life time: one time for the Hajj (pilgrimage)8 and the other for the Umrah (a 
1 Jazirat Al-Arab size is 2,590,000 square kilometers. Jazirat Al-Arab literally means “Arab Island” while 
its true meaning refers to the Arab Peninsula because it is surrounded by only three seas: the Red Sea from the west, 
Arabian Gulf from East, and Arabian Sea from the south. The northern side of Arab Peninsula is bordered by the 
Fertile Crescent including Mesopotamia. The Arab peninsula is on the western end of the Asian continent at the 
heart of the so called “Middle East” region. The Arab Peninsula contains several Arab countries: Saudi Arabia, 
Yemen, Oman, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, UAE and parts of Jordan and Iraq. For general information on the 
geography of the Arab peninsula, see, e.g., Fathi Mohammad Abu Ainah, Drasat fi jugrafiaht shibh jazeerat alarab 
(1994). (Studies on the Geography of Arabian peninsula). 
2 U.S. Department of State website, available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3584.htm (accessed on 
Apr. 18, 2012). 
3 Id. 
4 ALAN RICHARDS & JOHN WATERBURY, A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE MIDDLE EAST 37–__ (3d ed. 
2008). 
5 See, e.g., FOUD AL-FARSY, MODERNITY AND TRADITION: THE SAUDI EQUATION 36 (1994); ALBERT 
HOURANI, A HISTORY OF THE ARAB PEOPLES 14–15 (1991). 
6 See AL-FARSY, supra note 5. 
7 Qibla is an Arab word that “... refers to the proper direction for prayer.” The direction has to be toward the 
Kaaba, which is located in Mecca. RAJ BHALA, UNDERSTANDING ISLAMIC LAW (SHARI’A) 362 (2011). 
8 Allah orders every eligible muslim to perform the Hajj, as Allah said in the Koran: “And pilgrimage to the 
House is a duty unto Allah for mankind, for him who can find a way thither. As for him who disbelieveth, (let him 
know that) lo! Allah is Independent of (all) creatures.” (Koran: Surat Al-Emran, Verse number 97).The Hajj and 
prayer are part of Islam’s five pillars of faith: Asshahada (to testify that “there is no god but Allah and Muhammad 
is His prophet); Assalah (prayer); Assiyam (fasting during the month of Ramadan); Azzakat (religious tax spent in 
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mandatory visit to Mecca in the life time).9 Such a position has privileged Saudi Arabia with a 
special importance in the Islamic world and with significant value in the hearts of Muslims 
around the globe. 
The majority of the country’s land consists of rough and rugged typography. Infertile 
deserts form nearly all of Saudi Arabia’s vast territory where neither rivers nor lakes exist. The 
annual rainfall average in most Saudi lands is less than (50.8 cm) making non-irrigated 
agriculture a challenging activity in most parts of the country.10 27,136,977 people inhabit Saudi 
Arabia,11 the sixith most populous Arab state.12 Only eighteen million are Saudi citizens: the rest 
of the population mostly are expatriate laborers and their dependents.13 All Saudi citizens are 
prescribed charitable purposes); and the Hajj. For a brief overview of the pillars see generally AL-FARSY, supra note 
5, at 32–35. 
9 The Koran provides that the faithful should “Perform the pilgrimage and the visit (to Mecca) for Allah” 
(Koran: Surat Al-Baqara, Verse number 196). 
10 RICHARDS & WATERBURY, supra note 4, at 44. However, agriculture is widespread in al-Hasa oasis in 
the eastern part and in the rainy southwestern region of Asir. See TIM NIBLOCK & MONICA MALIK, THE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF SAUDI ARABIA 35 (2007). 
11 The Saudi Central Department of Statistics and Information, Key indicators, http://www.cdsi.gov.sa/ 
(accessed on Apr. 18, 2012). 
12 Egypt is the most populous Arab county with about 83 million people. The CIA World Factbook, 
available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/eg.html (accessed on Apr. 25, 2012). 
Algeria is the second populous Arab state with around 35 million inhabitants. The CIA World Factbook, available at 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ag.html (accessed on Apr. 25, 2012). The third 
most inhabited Arab state is Sudan with a population of around 34 million. The CIA World Factbook, available at 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/su.html (accessed on Apr. 25, 2012). 
13 The Saudi Central Department of Statistics and Information, Key indicators, http://www.cdsi.gov.sa/ 
(accessed on Apr. 18, 2012). The county’s early development plans necessitate hosting foreign workers and highly 
skilled professionals to live and work in the country for all endeavors. However, this shortage of workforce is not a 
problem anymore due to the massive increase in the Saudi population in the last few decades. Available statistics did 
not indicate how many workers’ dependents are in-country and there is no estimate of the illegal immigrants who 
usually come to visit (for Hajj or Umrah) the Islamic Holy Cities (Mecca and Madina) and decide not to return to 
their home countries or formerly legally hosted workers who remain in the country after the expiration of their work 
permit. For the illegal workforce in Saudi Arabia see RODNEY WILSON ET AL., ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN SAUDI 
ARABIA 98 (2004). 
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Muslims; 90% of them are of Arab origin.14 Sunni Muslims form the majority of Saudi citizens 
with the remainder chiefly Shiite Muslims.15 Saudi Arabia is a young country with only 3% of 
the county’s population above the age of 65.16 
Table 1. Population of the Eight Most Populous Arab States in 2011 
No. Country Population (Million) 
1 Egypt 82,536 
2 Algeria 35,980 
3 Sudan 34,318 
4 Iraq 32,961 
5 Morocco 32,272 
6 Saudi Arabia 28,082 
7 Yemen 24,799 
8 Syria 20,820 
 Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators. 
Since its beginning, Saudi Arabia has been an active member of the international 
community. For instance, in the wake of World War II, Saudi Arabia was one of the subscribers 
to the United Nations’ (U.N.) Declaration and hence joined allies at The San Francisco 
conference to sign the U.N. Charter.17 Also, Saudi Arabia has membership in many international 
originations and agencies, most importantly the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World 
Bank, World Trade Organization (WTO), and most recently the G-20 group. Additionally, Saudi 
14 CIA, World Factbook, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/sa.html (accessed on Mar. 15, 2012). 
15 There is no available Saudi official record indicating the percentage of Shiite Muslims in Saudi Arabia. 
However, studies suggest that they are between 10 to 15 percent of the Saudi population. See Crisis Group Middle 
East Report N. 45, The Shiite Question In Saudi Arabia, 19 September (2005), p. 1, available at 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iran%20Gulf/Saudi%20Arabia/The
%20Shiite%20Question%20in%20Saudi%20Arabia.pdf (accessed on Apr. 20, 2012). 
16 CIA, World Factbook, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/sa.html (accessed on Nov. 20, 2011). 
17 The History of The United Nation Charter of the United Nations, on the U.N. website, available at 
http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/charter/history/declaration.shtml (accessed on Apr. 20, 2012). 
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Arabia is a member and has a very influential role in other international and regional 
organizations and institutions such as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC),18 the 
League of Arab States (LAS),19 and the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf 
(GCC).20 In 1960s, Saudi Arabia and other oil-producing countries founded the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC),21 an intergovernmental organization whose chief 
responsibility is to coordinate oil production policies of its member oil-producing countries and 
to represent their interests in front of oil consumers.22 
18 The organization was founded in 1969 and consisted of 57 states (those states were a mixture of Islamic 
states and states having Islam as an influential presence on Muslim citizens. For member states see the OIC website 
available at http://www.oic-oci.org/member_states.asp (accessed on Apr. 22, 2012). The main objectives of OIC, 
inter alia, is “[t]o enhance and consolidate the bonds of fraternity and solidarity among the Member States; [and] [t]o 
safeguard and protect the common interests and support the legitimate causes of the Member States and coordinate 
and unify the efforts of the Member States in view of the challenges faced by the Islamic world in particular and the 
international community in general.” The OIC Charter Article 1 paragraphs 1 and 2, available at http://www.oic-
oci.org/english/charter/OIC%20Charter-new-en.pdf (accessed on Apr. 22, 2012). 
19 The League of Arab States [hereinafter LAS] is an intergovernmental organization whose concerns are 
the 22 Arab states’ affairs. The LAS was established in 1945. For more information about LAS website, available at 
http://www.arableagueonline.org/wps/portal/las_en/home_page/!ut/p/c5/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP0os3g
Xy8CgMJMgYwOLYFdLA08jF09_X28jIwN_E6B8JG55C3MCuoNT8_TDQXbiNwMkb4ADOBro-3nk56bqF-
RGVHjqOioCAKQoUKM!/dl3/d3/L2dBISEvZ0FBIS9nQSEh/ (accessed on Apr. 22, 2012). 
20 The Gulf Cooperation Council [hereinafter GCC] The GCC was founded in 1981 in accordance to its 
Charter. The GCC consists of the six Arab states, including Saudi Arabia, which are adjacent to the Arabian Gulf: 
Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emiratis, and Oman. The GCC is advancing toward creating a free trade union 
among its members. See the GCC Charter, available at http://www.gcc-sg.org/eng/indexfc7a.html?action=Sec-
Show&ID=1 (accessed on Apr. 22, 2012). 
21 See Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries [hereinafter OPEC] Statute, available at OPEC 
website http://www.opec.org/opec_web/static_files_project/media/downloads/publications/OS.pdf (accessed on 
Apr. 22, 2012). For an overview of OPEC foundation and the reason for its creation, see AL-FARSY, supra note 5, at 
118–19. 
22 OPEC statute provides that “[t]he principal aim of the Organization shall be the coordination and 
unification of the petroleum policies of Member Countries and the determination of the best means for safeguarding 
their interests, individually and collectively.” OPEC Statute Article (2) paragraph (A). 
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2.2.2 The History of the State 
The Arab Peninsula became part of an Islamic state in the early history of Islam as the majority 
of the inhabitants of that region converted to Islam. However, throughout the history of Islamic 
rule in the middle of the Arab Peninsula, an area known as the Najd, that part did not play a vital 
role in the emerging Islamic state in any political, economic, cultural fashion, or in any manner 
regarding Islamic jurisprudence.23 The status of the Najd continued to be a “non-entity” even at 
the peak of the Ottoman (Islamic) Empire which rendered the middle of the Arab Peninsula a 
political vacuum: the region was governed by a primitive form of governance whereby every 
village or town was ruled by one of its inhabitants.24 In other words, there was no central 
government in existence.25 Accordingly, poverty and illiteracy covered the heart of Arab 
Peninsula (the Najd). The state of ignorance in the Najd facilitated the spread of paganistic 
behaviors among some Muslims including the worshiping of trees and the supplicating of 
tombs.26 In contrast, the opposite side of the Peninsula, an area known as the Hejaz which 
included two of the three holy Mosques of Islam, had a centralized management due to the area’s 
religious importance.27 Consequently, cultural and economic conditions in the Hejaz were much 
23 See UWAIDAH M. AL JUHANY, NAJD BEFORE THE SALAFI REFORM MOVEMENT: SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND 
RELIGIOUS CONDITIONS DURING THE THREE CENTURIES PRECEDING THE RISE OF THE SAUDI STATE 2 (Ithaca Press 
2002). 
24 The method of assuming leadership in those settlements varies from one place to another and from time 
to time was decided through force or choice. See ABDULAH SALAH ALAUTHIMEEN, TAREEK ALMAMLAKAH 
ALARABIAH ALSAUDIAH vol. 1, 46 (1999). For more information about the economic, social, and political situation 
in Najed before the establishment of the first Saudi state. See id. at 35–38. 
25 See MADAWI ALRASHEED, A HISTORY OF SAUDI ARABIA 13 (2010). 
26 See generally UTHMAN IBN BISHR, UNWAN AL-MAJD FI TARIKH NAJD 81. vol. 1 (Dar al-Habeib 2008). 
27 ALAUTHIMEEN, supra note 24 at 23–24. 
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better than its counterpart conditions in the Najd.28 However, the Islamic faith in Hejaz too was 
mixed with some Hippocratic rituals which deviated from pure Islamic faith.29 
2.2.2.1 The First Saudi State (1745-1818) 
In the 18th century, Mohammad bin Abdulwahhab,30 a son of an Islamic judge and scholar,31 
openly rejected the deterioration of the Islamic faith in the Arab Peninsula.32 To purify the 
Islamic religion from the biddah (heterodoxies), Sheik Mohammad bin Abdulwahhab requested 
military support from the regional rulers in the Najd.33 All of those rulers denied his request for 
assistance34 except for Mohammad bin Saud, the ruler of the tiny Najdi village of Aldiriyah, who 
agreed to support the sheik by launching a jihad (holy war or mission).35 This alliance is later 
called The Aldiriyah Pact.36 
28 From all of the Islamic territories, Islamic jurists (Ulima) came to stay around Islam’s two holy mosques 
in the Hejaz where they taught and wrote Islamic shariah. See ALAUTHIMEEN, supra note 24, at 23–24. 
29 See id. at 24–25. 
30 He was born in (1703) in the town of Aluyanah in the Najd, near Riyadh. 
31 His name is Abdulwahhab bin Sulaiman bin Ali al-Tamimi. For his complete name, see IBN BISHR, supra 
note 26, at 198. 
32 See id. at 86. 
33 See id. 
34 In fact, ibn Muamar was enthusiastic in supporting Sheik Mohammad’s cause to reform all the aspects 
that contradicted pure Islamic beliefs. Sheik Mohammad instituted capital punishment by stoning an adulterous 
woman. This action elicited much opposition from the leader of Bani-Khalid tribe who had ultimate control of all 
the Najd region, including Aloyana. To appease the Bani-Khalid leader, ibn Muamar asked Sheik Mohammad to 
flee the area to safeguard him and his people. 
35 See IBN BISHR, supra note 26, at 89. 
36 In this agreement, Mohammad Bin Saud stipulates that the rule of the intended state stays in his hand and 
those of his descendants as long as they respect and uphold the principles of the Sheik Mohammad bin 
Abdulwahhab in protecting Islam from biddaa and govern in accordance with Islamic law (Shariah). 
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This allegiance surprisingly created a very strong state that spread and ruled most of the 
Arab Peninsula37 while its military operations reached north to the Islamic Shiite Holy City in 
Iraq (Alnajaf).38 This expansion precipitated fear throughout the Ottoman Empire as such growth 
jeopardized the Empire’s control of the region.39 Consequently, the Empire dispatched its army 
to the capital of the state, Aldiriyah, to subvert the movement and regain control over that 
region.40 The Ottoman army accomplished its mission by destroying Aldiriyah41 and killed or 
exiled many members of both the al-Saud and Sheik Mohammad bin Abdulwahhab families.42 
2.2.2.2 The Second Saudi State (1840-1891) 
Several years after the destruction of first Saudi state, Imam Faisal bin Turki, the grandson of 
Mohammad bin Saud, the founder of the first state, reestablished the Saudi state in Riyadh.43 
However, shortly after the death of Imam Faisal,44 an internal struggle over the rule occurred 
37 The first Saudi state was bigger than its current predecessor, “The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,” wherein at 
its peak the state ruled Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, most of Oman, and some parts of modern Yemen. See 
ALAUTHIMEEN, supra note 24, at 149–50. 
38 Also, the Saudi army raided Basrah and Zubair; however, no part of Iraq was annexed by the Saudi state. 
See ALAUTHIMEEN, supra note 24, at 162–63. 
39 See ALRASHEED, supra note 25. 
40 See IBN BISHR, supra note 26, at 350. 
41 See id. at 89. 
42 In 1818, see id. at 381. 
43 AMEEN AL-RIHANI, TAREEK NAJD AL-HADEETH 94 (the Arab Institute of research and publication: 1980). 
Some historians attribute the reestablishment of the second Saudi state to Imam Faisal’s father, Turki, who assumed 
the power of the state for a short period before he was assassinated by his nephew, Mashari, a member of the Al-
Saud family, see, for example, ALAUTHIMEEN, supra note 24, at 219–34. However, other historians have more 
compelling points of view for not regarding Imam Turki as the first founder of the Saudi second state. As Professor 
Abu Aliyah argues, all attempts by Al-Saud family members at that period were merely part of a revolutionary 
movement against the Ottoman influence. The goal of such movements was achieved only during the period of 
Imam Faisal Bin Turki’s rule after the withdrawal of the Othman army in 1840 from the Arab peninsula. See 
ABDULFATAH ABU ALIYAH, ALDAWLAH ALSAUDIYAH ALTHANIYAH 33 (1980). 
44 Imam Faisal died in 1865; however, his rule of the Najd was not constant were the Ottoman Empire 
exiled him twice into Egypt. See AL-RIHANI, supra note 43, at 94-95. 
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between the Al-Saud family members, namely the sons of Imam Faisal bin Turki.45 
Consequently, Prince Mohammad bin Rasheed, the governor of Hail and the head of the Al-
Saud’s rival family, the Rasheed’s, decided to overthrown the Saud family and sent his army to 
conquer the region.46 His military brought the leaders of the Al-Saud family to Hail to live under 
the rule and watchful eye of Prince Mohammad bin Rasheed.47 
2.2.2.3 The Modern Saudi State (1932) 
At the beginning of the twentieth century,48 Abdulaziz Bin Abdurrahman Al-Saud, a grandson of 
the founders of the first and second Saudi states, attempted to reestablish the Saudi state for the 
third time. His mission started from when he left his father’s exile in Kuwait49 with a few 
companions to recapture Riyadh from the rule of the Rasheed family.50 In 1902 he invaded 
Riyadh and started building his new state upon the same pure Islamic principles upon which his 
grandfather and Sheik Mohammad bin Abdulwahhab built the first Saudi state.51 However, the 
creation of the Saudi state under the guise of Abdulaziz required more than thirty years of war,52 
45 See AL-RIHANI, supra note 43, at 97. 
46 Alrasheed Family is from Shammar tribe. For more information about the history of Al-Rasheed family 
see ABDULLAH SALAH ALAUTHIMEEN, NISHAAT AMART ALRASHEED (Riyadh: H 1411 [1990]). 
47 See AL-RIHANI, supra note 43, at 103. 
48 In 1901 Abdulaziz launched his first attempt to invade Riyadh and was not successful. 
49 He was living with his father, Abdurrahman, who was one of the fighting brothers whose efforts 
contributed to the end of the second Saudi state. 
50 They were about forty persons see AL-RIHANI, supra note 43, at 7. 
51 See ALAUTHIMEEN, supra note 24, at 49–55. 
52 For more details about Imam Abdulaziz’s efforts to unify the Kingdom, see generally AL-RIHANI, supra 
note 43, at 103. 
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most of which was with the Rasheed family.53 After a long struggle of strife on both sides of the 
Arab peninsula, Imam Abdulaziz acquired full control of what is known today as Saudi Arabia.54 
Upon the unification of all Abdulaziz’s intended territories, he named the newly unified state 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and declared himself its king.55 To the present day, the Kingdom 
still exists in the same shape established by King Abdulaziz. After his death,56 his sons 
succeeded him in ruling the Kingdom.57 
2.2.3 The Saudi Economy 
2.2.3.1 Overview 
In 1932, modern Saudi Arabia emerged into a rough economic and socio-political environment. 
Each societal community had its own nearly self-contained closed economy and independent 
political order.58 Saudi Arabia was one of the poorest countries in the world with a primeval 
economy that was based mainly on agriculture and trade (largely through barter).59 The country 
53 Alrasheed family ruled the Arab peninsula for about one hundred years. At the zenith of their power, the 
state ranged from the southern part of current Syria southward to the northern part of current Yemen. See generally 
ALAUTHIMEEN, supra note 24. 
54 This occurred in 1930 upon the annexation of Jazan province in the southern region of modern Saudi 
Arabia and the northern part of modern Yemen. See ALAUTHIMEEN, supra note 24, at 207. 
55 In 1932. 
56 On November 9, 1953. Today, Saudi Arabia includes the historically important regions in the Arab 
peninsula which are the Najd (middle), the Hejaz (west), the Aseir (south), the Ahsa (east), and the Juff (North). 
57 Kings of Saudi Arabia: King Saud from 1953 to 1964, King Faisal from 1964 to 1975, King Khalid from 
1975 to 1982, King Fahad from 1982 to 2005, and King Abdullah from 2005 to present. 
58 See HELEN LACKNER, A HOUSE BUILT ON SAND: A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SAUDI ARABIA 2–3 (1978). 
59 NIBLOCK & MALIK, supra note 10, at 35 (2007) (they described the economic situation of pre-modern 
Saudi state by saying: “inhabitants of the interior of the country were mainly pastoralists, raising goats, sheep, and 
camels. Settled agriculture was present in Asir and in the oasis areas of al-Hasa. Inhabitants of the small towns were 
mainly engaged in commercial and artisanal activities. There was virtually no industry. The traditional economy was 
generally based on a complex of small, self-sufficient units, the largest boundaries of which were those of oasis, 
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neither had a basic infrastructure of roads, hospitals, and formal schools nor modern government 
structures, including a professional judicial system and organized bureaucracy.60 Quite simply, 
people were living a primitive life that was comparable to their ancestors’ life in antiquity.61 
Most of the government’s income came from foreign aid and taxes levied upon visitors to 
the two holy cities, Mecca and Medina.62 The discovery of oil in the late 1930s provided the 
newly-founded state with extra income to finance its treasury.63 However, in the 1970s, the price 
of a barrel of oil leaped enormously from around $2.50 to $9.50. The massive increase in oil 
prices turned the whole economic situation in the Kingdom upside down.64 Currently, Saudi 
Arabia possesses around 25% of the Earth’s proven oil reserves and is the world’s highest oil 
producer.65 Most of the oil revenue since then has been channeled toward building the country’s 
infrastructure,66 and expanding public institutions and social welfare programs.67 Saudi Arabia is 
village or tribe. The social characteristics which accompanied this form of economic life were those of relative 
poverty, a high level of illiteracy, and substantial isolation from developments outside of the local area.” Id. 
60 See NIBLOCK & MALIK, supra note 10, at 32. 
61 See id. at 35. 
62 See id. at 37. 
63 See id. 
64 The first oil well was drilled in 1938 by an American company. This happened after King Abdul Aziz 
granted a British company concession to search for oil in the eastern part of country in 1924. However, the British 
company failed to fulfill its part of the agreement with the Saudi king. Accordingly, the King repudiated the British 
company concession and then decided to move in another direction by which he granted the new concession to an 
American company, “The Standard Oil Company of California” in 1933, which was renamed several years later to 
the Arab-American Oil Company (ARAMCO). See the Saudi Arabia Development March: Excerpts, Saudi Arabian 
Ministry of Economic and Planning, 15–16 (2009). In fact, the British company was not interested in exploring oil 
in the Saudi territory but rather acquiring the concession to prevent others from doing so to keep the supply of oil to 
the market as low as they could, thus maintaining oil prices. See LACKNER, supra note 58, at 33. 
65 Also, Saudi Arabia is considered a reliable source of oil to the industrialized world. 
66 Giacomo Luciani, From Private Sector to National Bourgeoisie: Saudi Arabian Business, in SAUDI 
ARABIA IN THE BALANCE: POLITICAL ECONOMY, SOCIETY, FOREIGN AFFAIRS 158–59 (Paul Arts & Gerd Nonneman 
eds., 2005). 
67 LACKNER, supra note 58, at 137–39. 
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the world’s largest oil producer (10,520,000 BBL/Day)68 and the second largest proven oil 
reserves holder.69 The Saudi economy is one of the largest economies in the Middle East70 and 
the largest in Arab countries, with a GDP of $711 billion and a GNI per capita $21,210 in 
2012.71 The size of the country’s economy qualified it to join the G-20 economic group.72 
Table 2. Comparison of GDP of the Five Largest Middle Eastern Economies 
No. Country GDP in 2012 (Billion US$) 
1 Turkey 789 
2 Saudi Arabia 711 
3 Iran 514 
4 UAE 348 
5 Egypt 262 
  Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators. 
  * The GDP of Iran and UAE are according to (2011) data. 
Since its foundation, “Saudi [Arabia] ... economic policy [has been] based on the 
principles of comprehensive social welfare and a free-market economy open to all goods, 
services, products, and capital.”73 In 2011, Saudi Arabia ranked 54th worldwide in economic 
68 CIA, World Factbook, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/rankorder/2173rank.html (accessed on Apr. 20, 2012). 
69 In 2011, Venezuela replaced Saudi Arabia as the World’s long known highest proven oil reserve holder. 
See OPEC, Annual Statistical Bulletin 2010/2011, table 3.1.page 22, available at 
http://www.opec.org/opec_web/static_files_project/media/downloads/publications/ASB2010_2011.pdf (accessed on 
Apr. 25, 2012). 
70 It is the second largest economy in the Middle East after Turkey (Turkey’s GDP is about $789 billion), 
http://data.worldbank.org/country/turkey (accessed on Apr. 1, 2014). 
71 The World Bank Data, available at http://data.worldbank.org/country/saudi-arabia (accessed on Feb. 10, 
2014). 
72 For brief historical background on G-20, see the G-20 website, available at 
http://www.g20.org/en/g20/the-origins-and-evolution-of-the-g20 (accessed on Apr. 22, 2012). 
73 The supreme economic council article (1), http://www.sec.gov.sa/Council-Regulations.aspx?lang=en-
US&Page=2 (accessed on Oct. 14, 2011). In fact, Saudi Arabia was always committed to free economy principles 
since its inception. The first five year development plan affirmed this position at a time when the wave of socialism 
overreached many countries in the world including many Arab countries such as Egypt, Yemen, Syria (etc.) by 
stating that: 
The commitment of Saudi Arabia to a free economy derives from the teachings of the nation’s 
religious code and its long-standing social traditions. It is supported by growing evidence that 
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freedom according to the Heritage Foundation’s Economic Freedom Index.74 The Saudi 
economy attracted $35.5 billion of foreign direct investment in 2009 (FDI).75 
Although Saudi economy has been growing steadily since 2001,76 a high unemployment 
rate among citizens still persists (10.5%).77 The Saudi government, in the wake of recent 
revolutions in some Arab countries (e.g. Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya) and the significant political 
pressure from unemployed Saudis, granted every unemployed citizen a monthly unemployment 
allowance.78 The government attempted to implement measures to increase citizens’ 
economic and social change cannot be imposed on the country by the actions of the Government 
alone; but must come about through increasing participation of all elements of society in both the 
process of development and its benefits. Only by continuously encouraging private enterprise—
large and small companies, family businesses, and individuals—to pursue those activities that they 
can undertake more effectively than government agencies, will the economy be able to benefit to 
the full from the ability and initiative of all its people. 
Saudi Arabia’s Central Planning Organization, the First Development Plan (1970–1975), p. 21 (1970). 
74 2011 Index of Economic Freedoms, p. 355, available at 
http://www.heritage.org/Index/pdf/2011/Index2011_Full.pdf (accessed on Oct. 23, 2011). Economic freedom is 
described as follow: 
Economic freedom is the fundamental right of every human to control his or her own labor and 
property. In an economically free society, individuals are free to work, produce, consume, and 
invest in any way they please, with that freedom both protected by the state and unconstrained by 
the state. In economically free societies, governments allow labor, capital and goods to move 
freely, and refrain from coercion or constraint of liberty beyond the extent necessary to protect and 
maintain liberty itself. 
2011 Index of Economic Freedom, http://www.heritage.org/Index/ (accessed on Oct. 23, 2011). 
75 Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority (SAGIA), Annual FDI Report on Saudi Arabia 2 (2010), 
available at http://www.saudincc.org.sa/CMSPages/GetFile.aspx?guid=877012e0-c352-483b-b6de-3ef276cc68a3 
(accessed on Oct. 23, 2011). 
76 For example, the growth rate in the Saudi economy reached 6.77% in 2011. The Saudi Central 
Department of Statistics and Information, Key Indicators, http://www.cdsi.gov.sa/english/ (accessed on Apr. 25, 
2012). 
77 The Saudi Central Department of Statistics and Information: Key indicators, http://www.cdsi.gov.sa/ 
(accessed on Apr. 25, 2012). In fact, there are no reliable sources that could provide for an accurate percentage of 
unemployment. See DARYL CHAMPION, THE PARADOXICAL KINGDOM: SAUDI ARABIA AND THE MOMENTUM OF 
REFORM 193 (2003) (he noted that: “[t]he uncertainty surrounding unemployment statistics is indicative of a 
systematic lack of reliable socioeconomic data and general lack of sociopolitical-economic transparency”). Id. 
78 See Royal order number (a/30) in (20/3/1432) correspondent to (4-23-2011). The program named 
“Hafiz” which means in English “motivation” The scheme is designed to help unemployed citizens find jobs 
through training and pressure on private sector to employ Saudi citizens instead of foreign workers. To this point the 
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employment percentage in the private sector through a process called ‘Saudization.’79 To the 
present, Saudization policies have never reached their intended targets.80 The Saudi private 
sector normally prefers a foreign workforce which commonly comes from low income countries 
(e.g. India, Bangladesh, and Egypt) over its own national work force, mainly because of the 
immense difference between the two groups’ salaries. Saudi workers would normally cost 
businesses over four times the salary of their foreign counterparts.81 Because businesses greatly 
depend on such low cost foreign labors, Saudi private actors have always attempted to avoid the 
implementation of the Saudization policies.82 
The Saudi nascent private sector greatly “depends,” directly or indirectly, on the 
government’s support through subsidies or “contacts.”83 The private sector’s weak role in the 
economy may increase in the future if the implementation of the ambitious national strategy of 
privatization is accomplished.84 The Supreme Economic Council is responsible for supervising 
the implementation of this strategy. The Council has declared the intention to privatize nineteen 
program will pay every unemployed Saudi about $500 per month. For more information about this program, see 
Hafiz website, https://www.hafiz.gov.sa/HRDFWeb/ (accessed on Mar. 19, 2012). 
79 For critical overview on Saudization and Unemployment among Saudi citizens, see RAMADY, THE SAUDI 
ARABIAN ECONOMY 361–93 (2010). 
80 For a general overview of impediments of the Saudization program’s success in Saudi private sector, see 
RAMADY, supra note 79, at 368–69. 
81 See RAMADY, supra note 79, at 368–69. 
82 WILSON ET AL., supra note 13. 
83 See id. at 127. 
84 Some economic sectors have been privatized, but at a very slow pace since the beginning of the 
implementation of the strategy. Also, for the last decade the government has started working (although at a slow 
pace) to increase the private sector role in the economy and to improve the public sector’s efficiency. For 
privatization in Saudi Arabia, see generally RAMADY, supra note 79, at 323–37. 
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economic sectors such as telecommunications, rail and air transportation, hotels, sport clubs, and 
state ownership in publicly-held corporations.85 
Economic policy and planning are shaped through varies governmental agencies. Most 
important is the Supreme Economic Council, the highest ranking86 economic advisory body.87 
The chief goal of the Council is the provision of better economic coordination among 
government agencies. The preamble of the Council Regulation highlights the purpose behind 
establishing the Council: 
85 See the Supreme Economic Council: Public Utilities and Activities targeted by privatization, 
http://www.sec.gov.sa/getdoc/47215a65-b78d-4598-8d7a-2e597e5c1815/List_of_Utilities.aspx (accessed on 
Apr. 25, 2012). 
86 The Supreme Economic Council is chaired by the King. The Supreme Economic Council Regulation 
article § (4) issued by the Royal Order No. A/ 111 in 17 Jumada al-Akirah  1420 H corresponding to 28 August 
1999. 
87 Under its regulation the Council does not have executive power. The Supreme Economic Council 
Regulation article § (1). This article sets precise objectives to a achieve its policy: 
1- Ensuring the security, welfare, and prosperity of the society while preserving Islamic values, 
the environment, and the country’s natural resources, taking into consideration both present 
and future needs. 
2- Steady economic growth at an appropriate level to achieve a real increase in per capita 
income. 
3- Price stability. 
4- Providing opportunities for productive work and optimal employment of the work force. 
5- Controlling the public debt and keeping it within acceptable limits. 
6- Ensuring a fair distribution of income and opportunities for employment and investment. 
7- Expanding the economic basic and increasing the sources of government revenues. 
8- Increasing savings and developing additional savings and sound investment opportunities. 
9- Increasing government revenues and linking them to the country’s economic growth; thus 
allowing the government to carry out its responsibilities with respect to national development 
and comprehensive social welfare. 
10- Increasing capital investment and domestic savings in the national economy in an effective 
manner, supporting the government’s privatization program, and developing The Offset 
Program. 
11- Increasing the participation of the private sector in developing the national economy through 
the government’s privatization program. 
12- Strengthen the economy’s ability to react effectively and flexibly to changes in the 
international economic environment. 
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In view of the large number of government agencies and institutions concerned 
with economic affairs and the wide range of their responsibilities, it is essential to 
develop an organizational structure and management system that encompasses all 
of these entities, based on sound research and analysis, to ensure coordination 
among the various agencies and integration of their activities, and to facilitate 
effective decision-making with respect to economic issues.88 
The Ministry of Economy and Planning is another economic policy maker which has 
been entrusted with preparing the Five Year Development Plans since 1970.89 Currently, “the 9th 
Five Year Development Plan” is under implementation.90 On the other hand, the Ministry of 
Finance is in charge of implementing financial policies, formulating the government’s budget 
and supervising its implementation.91 Monetary policies are formulated and implemented by the 
Ministry of Finance and the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), which also serves as the 
country’s central bank.92 
Beside commercial banks, there are several government development banks (funds) in 
charge of providing interest-free long term and medium term financing, such as the Agricultural 
Bank,93 the Industrial Development Fund,94 the Credit and Saving Bank,95 the Public Investment 
Fund,96 and the Real Estate Development Fund.97 
88 See the preamble of Supreme Economic Council Regulation, available at 
http://www.sec.gov.sa/Council-Regulations.aspx?lang=en-US (accessed on Oct. 14, 2011), 
http://www.sec.gov.sa/Council-Regulations.aspx?lang=en-US&Page=2 (accessed on Oct. 14, 2011). 
89 The Ministry of Economic and Planning webpage, 
http://www.mep.gov.sa/index.jsp;jsessionid=CFCFADB81A6EFAB579A3507A1D4FF40D.beta?event=ArticleVie
w&Article.ObjectID=1 (accessed on May 2, 2012). 
90 See Ministry of Economic and Planning, About Us, available at http://www.mep.gov.sa (accessed on 
May 2, 2012). 
91 See the Ministry of Finance webpage, 
http://www.mof.gov.sa/English/MinistryProfile/Pages/OurGoals.aspx (accessed on June 6, 2012). 
92 See the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) webpage, 
http://www.sama.gov.sa/sites/samaen/AboutSAMA/Pages/SAMAFunction.aspx (accessed on June 6, 2012). 
93 Established in 1963 by the Royal Decree number (58). 
94 Established in 1974 by the Royal Decree number (M/3). 
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Saudi Arabia has robust economic relations with various develop and developing 
economies. The U.S. is one of the most important economic partners to Saudi Arabia.98 
Moreover, the U.S. is the top exporting country to Saudi Arabia99 and the second largest country 
receiving Saudi exports.100 Accordingly, Saudi Arabia has pegged its currency (Riyal) to the 
U.S. dollar.101 Moreover, Saudi Arabia has solid economic relations with various other 
developed and developing nations, including both Asian102 and EU countries.103 
2.2.3.2 Rentierism Ramifications 
Rentierism is an old concept that regained currency with the discovery of oil in the Middle 
East.104 Rentier states, according to Mahdavy’s, refer to “those countries that receive on a regular 
basis substantial amounts of external rent.”105 However, receiving a huge amount of exterior rent 
95 Established in 1971 by the Royal Decree number (M/44). In 2006, a new law enacted by the Royal 
decree number (M/34) which abrogated the 1971 decree. 
96 Established in 1971 by the Royal decree number (M/24). 
97 Established in 1974 by the Royal Decree number (M/23). 
98 Economic relations followed the political alliance between both countries, initiated in a February 14, 
1945 summit held between King Abdul Aziz, the founder of the new Saudi state, and the American President 
Roosevelt on board the USS Quincy. See David E. Long, US-Saudi Relations: Evolution, Current Conditions, and 
Future Prospects, 15 MEDITERRANEAN Q. 24, 27 (2004). 
99 In 2010, the U.S. exported 13.2% of Saudi imports. The Ministry of Economic and Planning, Statistical 
Yearbook, Table 14-10: Top (15) Trading Countries to Saudi Arabia by Value of imports in 2010. 
100 13% of Saudi exports are imported U.S. Ministry of Economy and Planning, Export Statistics of 2010, 
12 (2010). 
101 A U.S. Dollar is worth 3.75 Saudi Riyals. 
102 55% of Saudi exports are sent to various Asian counties (excluding Arab and Islamic states) such as 
Japan, South Korea and China. Ministry of Economy and Planning, Export Statistics of 2010, 12 (2010). 
103 10% of Saudi exports are sent to various EU countries. Ministry of Economy and Planning, Export 
Statistics of 2010, 12 (2010). 
104 Hazem Beblawi, The Rentier State in the Arab World, in THE ARAD STATE 85, 85 (Giacomo Luciani ed., 
1990). 
105 H. Mahdavy, The Pattern and Problems of Economic Development in Rentier States: The Case of Iran, 
in STUDIES IN THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE MIDDLE EAST: FROM THE RISE OF ISLAM TO THE PRESENT DAY 428 
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is not per se enough to categorize a country as a rentier state. Other factors have to be present to 
consider a country as rentier state. First, only a small percentage of the population in a rentier 
economy can participate in originating the “wealth” of the nation, while at the same time “the 
rest of the society is only engaged in the distribution and utili[z]ation of this wealth.”106 
Secondly, the state is the main receiver of the exteriorly generated wealth.107 Thirdly, the 
external revenue represents a high percentage of the country’s wealth.108 
Under this economic paradigm, the role of the conventional government shifted from 
being a redistributor of the wealth, generated by national productive capitals by “taxation” and 
economic interaction among national factors (a production state),109 to merely a distributor of the 
externally acquired rent to various economic sectors (an allocation state).110 Externally-attained 
wealth tends to equip ruling authority with strong political influence over its subjects, as Hazem 
Beblawi noted: “the ‘economic power’ ... bestowed upon the few would allow them to seize 
(M.A. Cook ed., Oxford University Press 1970). Moreover, Mahdavy defines external rent by stating that: “External 
rents are in turn defined as rentals paid by foreign individuals, concerns or governments to individuals, concerns or 
governments of a given country.” Id. at 428. In the same juncture, Mahdavy notes that “the oil revenues received by 
the governments of the oil exporting countries have very little to do with the production processes of their domestic 
economies.” Id. at 429. 
106 Beblawi, supra, note 104, at at 85, 87. 
107 Id. at 85, 88. 
108 See Giacomo Luciani, Allocation Vs. Production States: A Theoretical Framework, in THE ARAD STATE 
65, 72 (Giacomo Luciani ed., 1990). 
109 See id. at 65, 71. 
110 See id. (he noted that: “[a] rentier ... state will inevitably end up performing the role of allocating the 
income that it receives from the rest of the world. It is free to do so in a variety of ways; among the various purposes 
for which money is spent, the strengthening of domestic economic base may be included, but not necessarily so. 
Even if this happens to be one of the goals of the state, as long as the domestic taxation is not tapped to raise further 
income through domestic taxation, the strengthening of the domestic economy is not reflected in the income of the 
state, and is therefore not a precondition for the existence and expansion of the state.”). Id. at 71. 
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‘political power’ as well, or else induce the political elite to take over the external rent from them 
without major political disruption.”111 
Rentierism forms a “rentier mentality” among the citizens.112 A society with such a 
mentality does not always believe that the wealth is generated through hard work and 
“risktaking” but through “chance and situations.”113 Such mentality motivates laziness (or high 
wage expectation)114 and shopping for effortless income opportunities.115 Public employment is 
perceived to be a privilege to every citizen, as a part of dividing external rent pie.116 
Accordingly, “[c]ivil servant productivity is, understandably, not very high and they usually see 
their principal duty as being available in their offices during working hours (Al Dawam).”117 
Unluckily, rentierism’s characteristics and syndromes are easily traceable in Saudi 
Arabia. For instance, 90% of the government’s budget is financed by oil exports,118 and oil rent 
111 Beblawi, supra, note 104, at at 85, 88. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 For example over a million are unemployed, while around five million foreign workers find jobs in 
Saudi Arabia. 
115 For instance, many Saudis allow foreign persons to illegally open enterprises under their names for 
monthly or annual fixed incomes. In such a scenario the citizen does not do anything and does not know about the 
business. This practice is not only confined to small business but sometimes reaches other respectful businesses and 
professions such as law firms. Many internationally recognized firms conducting business in Saudi Arabia under the 
name of a Saudi licensed lawyer may be asked for a royalty for the usage of the Saudi in some cases. This amount 
requested covers most of his firm’s expenses and provides him with a good amount of profit which lets him relax his 
legal practice with other customers to the minimum. 
116 See, e.g., Beblawi, supra note 104, at 85, 91 (he noted that: “[e]very citizen – if not self – employed in 
business and/or not working for a private venture – has a legitimate aspiration to be a government employee; in most 
cases this aspiration is fulfilled.”). Id. 
117 Beblawi, supra note 104, at 85, 91. 
118 Ministry of Economic and Planning, Statistical Yearbook of 2010, Table 11-1: Actual Revenues and 
Expenditures for Saudi Arabia General Budget for years 2006–2010. 
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composes around 57% of the country’s GDP.119 In addition, no personal income taxation is 
imposed on citizen or foreigners,120 while Saudi enterprises only pay Zakat (a form of religious 
tax that is only allowed to be spent mostly on particular charitable matters), and foreign 
companies pay taxes.121 If “no taxation without representation” has become a long accepted 
pillar of modern democracies,122 then in Saudi Arabia this concept implies a different meaning: 
“no representation if no need for taxation.”123 This implied perception is confirmed by the 
constitutional arrangement of the Saudi government whereby the approval and supervision of 
state income and spending, including the government budget, are excluded from the Shura 
Council’s (legislative Council) command.124 
2.2.3.3 Reform Agenda 
Oil is an exhaustible natural resource: its contribution to the Saudi economy is limited to a 
specific period of time.125 In addition, oil might be replaced by alternative energy sources 
(cheaper or cleaner) at any point in the near future, at which time the market demand will vanish 
119 Ministry of Economy and Planning, the Central Department of Statistics and Information, Economic 
Indicators of the Saudi Arabian Economy in 2011, Table (6). 
120 See Article (2) of Income Tax Law which issued the Royal Decree No. (M/1) in Muharram 15, 1425 H, 
Corresponding to March 6, 2004. 
121 There is no personal income tax system in Saudi Arabia legal’s system. Foreign corporations pay 
taxation, while Saudi private associations pay Zakat. For Zakat in Saudi Arabia, see generally Abdullah Wahib 
AlLami, Zakat as Islamic Taxation and Its Application in the Contemporary Saudi Legal System, 5 J. ISLAMIC ST. 
PRAC. INT’L L. 83 (2009). For tax imposed on non Saudis see the Income Tax Law issued by Royal Decree No. 1 in 
15 Muharram 1425 H corresponding to March 6, 2004. 
122 See Luciani, supra note 108, at 65, 75. 
123 For political implications of rentierism including political legitimacy and tax imposition, see Luciani, 
supra note 108, at 65, 75–78. 
124 See CL. § (15). 
125 Saudi oil reserves are expected to be depleted in the next five to six decades. RAMADY, supra note 79, at 
15. 
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or decrease.126 Undoubtedly, if one of the expected scenarios materialized, the Saudi economy 
would be in a great danger of losing oil rent as it is the main driving force of the country’s 
development. Eventually, the standard of living in the country would dwindle to an unthinkable 
level. At this juncture, the Saudi economist and former deputy Minister of Finance, Abdulaziz al-
Dukheil, depicted national sentiments toward this upcoming catastrophe by saying: 
My mind and comprehension have difficulty to live with this leniency toward oil 
depletion in Saudi Arabia, while economic and geological facts screech in my 
head all day and night, especially when I look at sulking or pregnant women with 
an expected arriver to this life.127 
Escaping this eminent calamity requires Saudi Arabia to diversify its economy. 
Theoretically, diversification of the economy has been on the top of the Saudi government’s 
economic agenda since the first Five Year Economic Development Plan in the 1970’s.128 
However, to this moment, very little advancement on this direction has been achieved; oil is still 
the main source of national income.129 Saudi needs to direct oil rent towards “productive capital 
formation” sectors which would ensure sustainable development for the young and coming 
generations,130 such as petrochemical and pharmaceutical industries and services (e.g. tourism, 
health care, and education). In this context, Professor Geoffrey Heal suggested that oil rent 
should be channeled “[t]hrough trade and capital markets ... or through use as an input into 
126 See id. at 16. See also YOUSEF KHALIFA AL-YOUSEF, MAJLIS AL-TAAWIN AL-KALIJI FI MUTHALATH AL-
WIRATHAH WA AL-NAFIT WA AL-GUA AL-ODMA 176 (2011). 
127 See ABDULAZIZ M. AL-DUKHEIL, AL-TANMIA AL-QTISADIAH FI ALMAMLAKAH ALARABIYA ALSAUDIAH: 
QIRAHAH NAQDIYAH 875 (2012) (translated by the author). 
128 See the goals of the first Five Year Development Plan (1970–1975) which states that one of the goals of 
the plan is to decrease dependency on oil as a main source of national income. 
129 AL-DUKHEIL, supra note 127, at 886. 
130 See id. at 28. 
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domestic production, it can be converted to a stock of wealth of another sort, which generates 
income and can in principle be preserved indefinitely.” 
The Saudi government has launched ambitious projects and plans to fulfill the 
diversification strategy. For instance, in the 1970’s, the Saudi government built two successful 
industrial cities, Jubail and Yanbu, which have attracted a total of over $65 billion in investments 
and employ 107,000.131 Recently, Saudi Arabia has been building four huge economic cities 
which, thus far, have cost a total of $60 billion dollars.132 However, most of those ambitious 
projects may never see the light of the day.133 
Moreover, in the last decade, the Saudi government has worked diligently to attract 
foreign direct investments (FDI). In 2000, the Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority 
(SAGIA) was founded as a specialized government agency with the primary goal of promoting 
and supervising investment inflow and post entry affairs of investment in Saudi Arabia. A few 
years after its inception, SAGIA’s efforts, in conjunction with the economic boom that Saudi 
Arabia is witnessing due to both the massive increase of the price of oil in the international 
markets and legal reforms King Abdullah has implemented, yielded pivotal results for the Saudi 
economy.134 For instance, Saudi Arabia is ranked 11th regarding the ease of doing business 
131 The Royal Commission of Jubail and Yanbu website, available at http://www.rcjy.gov.sa/en-
US/AboutUs/Pages/default.aspx (accessed on May 2, 2012). 
132 For example, Saudi Arabia is building four huge economic cities which cost $60 billion dollars. See 
http://www.sagia.gov.sa/en/Why-Saudi-Arabia/Economic-cities/ (accessed on Oct. 27, 2010). 
133 None of those cities has been completed yet and their foundations have yet to be started, such as Hail 
Economic City. Hail’s Governor’s (Prince Saud bin Abdulmohsen) press release about Hail economic city noted 
“there are bureaucratic and financial impediments to Hail Economic City.” Al-Riyadh Newspaper, Issue (16038) in 
May 22, 2012. 
134 For example, the new Law of Judiciary. 
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worldwide in the 2011 World Bank Doing Business Report.135 Moreover, Saudi Arabia has 
become one of the most attractive countries for foreign direct investment: in 2008/2009 the 
inward FDI reached almost $35 billion dollars.136 
The fairly high wage of Saudi (citizen) workers makes it difficult for the Saudi economy 
to be globally “competitive” in labor intensive industries such as agriculture and textile.137 
Accordingly, Saudi Arabia’s long term plan is to redirect its economy to be a “knowledge-based 
economy.”138 Thus, the Saudi government has spent a significant part of its oil income on Saudi 
citizens’ education and technical training. Recently, Saudi Arabia inaugurated the King Abdullah 
University of Science and Technology (KAUST) as one of the world’s state of the art research 
institutions.139 KAUST’s main goal is to link the Saudi economy to the developed world’s 
innovation-driven economy.140 In the same vein, the number of universities in Saudi Arabia has 
jumped tremendously from seven public universities at the end of the millennium to over thirty 
universities at the present time.141 The Saudi government has also made available a generous 
135 See World Bank, Doing Business Report (2010), available at 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/saudi-arabia/ (accessed on June 7, 2012). 
136 See Figure 1.4. in World Investment Report (2010): Investing in a Low-carbon Economy, available at 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir2010_embargo22_en.pdf (accessed on Oct. 27, 2010). 
137 See WILSON ET AL., supra note 13. 
138 See the Ministry of Economy and Planning, the (9th) Five Year Development Plan, 87–105 (2010–
2014). 
139 For more information about the King Abdullah University of Science and Technology (KAUST) at its 
webpage, http://www.kaust.edu.sa/ (accessed on Apr. 18, 2012). 
140 See the missions of the King Abdullah University of Science and Technology (KAUST) at its webpage, 
http://www.kaust.edu.sa/ (accessed on June 7, 2012). 
141 See the Ministry of Higher Education webpage, http://www.mohe.gov.sa/ar/default.aspx (accessed on 
June 7, 2012). There are twenty four public universities which have nine hundred thousand students and forty-five 
thousand faculty members. Id. 
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scholarship opportunity which currently is sponsoring more than 130,000 young Saudis to study 
in 46 countries.142 The U.S. is host to most of them, around 47, 000 students in 2009.143 
Saudi Arabia has launched a series of legal reforms related to trade and investment in 
recent years. These steps of reform, which in fact were initiated during Saudi Arabia’s 
negotiations when joining the WTO, are expected to strengthen Saudi Arabia’s position in global 
competition regarding foreign investment attraction.144 For example, the Saudi judicial system is 
undergoing reform which includes enactments of new statutes concerning the judiciary.145 The 
new framework of the judiciary is intended to create specialized court systems such as those 
regarding commercial affairs: first instance courts and appellate circuits. This step, if completed 
and properly implemented, would enhance the efficiency of Saudi’s legal system, including the 
current weak area of contracts enforceability, which is considered a noticeable deficiency.146 
Moreover, in 2011, the Saudi King established a high ranking anti-corruption administrative 
agency to combat corruption in the country and to work on strengthening the legal, financial, and 
administrative framework to reduce corrupt actions. High expectations are anticipated from this 
nascent agency by the King and Saudi people, especially since the country’s has a solid 
reputation in this regard. For instance, in 2011, Transparency International ranked Saudi Arabia 
142 Deputy Minister of the Saudi Ministry of Higher Education, Press release number (992581) to the Saudi 
Press Agency, in April 26, 2012, http://www.spa.gov.sa, 19:10 (Saudi local time). 
143 Ministry of Higher Education: Study Abroad Enrolment (scholarships) by Cultural Missions and Level 
of Study (1431–1432), available at http://www.mohe.gov.sa/ar/Ministry/Deputy-Ministry-for-Planning-and-
Information-
affairs/HESC/Ehsaat/Docs/%E2%80%AB%E2%80%AB%E2%80%AB%E2%80%AB%E2%80%AB%E2%80%A
B%E2%80%AB%E2%80%AB%E2%80%ABB1431-1432-%208-5.html (accessed on Dec. 23, 2012). 
144 For the Saudi Arabia accession to the WTO story and imposed reforms, see generally STEFFEN HERTOG, 
PRINCE, BROKERS, AND BUREAUCRATS: OIL AND THE STATE IN SAUDI ARABIA 232–45 (2010). 
145 See infra chapter (VI). 
146 The Heritage Foundation, 2012 Index of Economic Freedom, PP (362), available at 
http://www.heritage.org/index/pdf/2012/countries/saudiarabia.pdf (accessed on Apr. 17, 2012). 
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(57) out of (183) measured countries regarding corruption in the public sector.147 However, 
combating corruption in Saudi Arabia may not be an easy task due to the wildly accepted and 
appraised “nepotism,” as a western observer noted: “what we in the west consider to be nepotism 
is understood in the Saudi Arabian context as the traditional fundamental duty of any individual 
to look after the members of his family and tribe before anyone else.”148 
Strong connection among large sized families and tribes may explain part of the picture, 
but the other part may be connected to the weak legal system and enforcement institutions in the 
country, which allow such practices to find a suitable environment in which to grow. 
2.3 STRUCTURE OF POWER IN THE KINGDOM 
2.3.1 Constitutionalism in Islam149 
After the death of the Prophet Mohammad,150 the rule of the Islamic state was passed to the 
caliphs (rulers) following the Prophet. The caliph was responsible for enforcing Islamic law 
(Shariah) and managing the affairs of the Islamic state according to the provisions of the 
Shariah.151 Under this arrangement, the caliph or Imam was the supreme authority of the Islamic 
147 Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2011, available at 
http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011/results/ (accessed on Apr. 17, 2012). 
148 LACKNER, supra note 58, 147. 
149 For comprehensive discussion of this topic, see Abdullah Abdul Aziz Al-Munifi, The Islamic 
Constitutional Theory (S.J.D) (1973) (unpublished dissertation University of Virginia Law School). 
150 In 632 AD. 
151 See ABI YALA ALFRA, ALAHKAM ALSULTANAIH 27–28 (Dar Alkutb Alalimaih 2000). 
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state. Accordingly, the Imam could appoint governance of Islamic provinces, and ministers and 
Judges.152 However, the legislative function was for God (Allah) whereas an Imam was only 
entrusted to implement Allah’s rules and supplement them in the area where no applicable rules 
existed. Therefore, the separation of power (legislative, executive and judicial) as it is known in 
modern western thinking was not known in the original Islamic political literature and 
practice.153 
2.3.2 Constitutionalism in Modern Saudi State 
The aforementioned old Islamic practice of political governance was the foundation of ruling 
Saudi Arabia until the formation of present-day Saudi Arabia by King Abdulaziz Al-Saud in 
1932. Accordingly, King Abdulaziz and his ancestors (rulers) from the Al-Saud family were 
called Imams.154 The name Imam conveyed two functions: religious leader of Muslim citizens 
and political leader of the state.155 However, Imam Abdulaziz – on the wake of the capture of the 
Hejaz region – changed his name and upon the unification of the other regions declared himself 
as King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The name of the country changed; however, its 
practices remained the same. The King is the supreme authority in the Saudi Islamic state which 
is evident in the Saudi Basic Law of Governance: all state authorities report to the King.156 
152 This called al-Wlayat see IBN TIMYAH, AL-SIYASAH AL-SHARIAH FI ISLAH AL-RAAI WA AL-RAAYAH 7–
16 (Dar Alim Alfouad for publication and distribution). 
153 Much of modern literature not only accepts the principle of separation of power but also praises it as a 
compatible principle with Islamic Shura principles or a new application of it. 
154 Abdulaziz was the first ruler in the Al-Saud family who changed the title of Imam to other royal names, 
such as Sultan and, finally, King. 
155 See ALFRA, supra note 151. 
156 B.L.G. § (44). 
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One should bear in mind that the King is not the source of the state powers – as in old 
western monarchies where the King is sacrosanct – but instead the King is merely the original 
holder of these functions by Islamic law (shariah).157 Thus, according to the Saudi model, the 
King delegates some of his functions to separate institutions to facilitate the accomplishment of 
his job in more efficient ways which superficially mimic to some degree the political models of 
other states in the West or those influenced by the western political thinking and practice. 
 Thus, shariah is the sanctum and not the king, as Abdulaziz Al-Fahd noted: “[t]he Basic 
Law [of Governance] acknowledges the sacrosanct nature of the shariah, and when it provides 
that the King may suspend the Basic Law, it specifically subordinates this power to the Islamic 
authority granted in Article 7 [of the Basic Law of Governance].158 For a better understanding of 
Saudi Arabia’s legal structure, it is critical to understand the aforementioned non-separation of 
“Mosque and State”159 because to citizens of Saudi Arabia, Islam includes not only their 
government and spiritual devotion but also an entire way of life.160 
2.3.2.1 The Basic Law of Governance  
As noted earlier, the Basic Law of Governance (BLG)161 is not the supreme law in Saudi Arabia; 
however, in a much broader meaning it is the highest legal enacted document that supersedes all 
157 See ABI ALHASAN ALMAWARDI, ALAHKAM ALSULTANIYAH WA ALWILAIYAT ALDINIYAH 51–52 (Dar 
alkitab alarabi 1994). 
158 Abdulaziz H. Al-Fahad, Ornamental Constitutionalism: The Saudi Basic Law of Governance, 30 YALE 
J. INT’L L. 375, 386 (2005). 
159 Phrase borrowed from Al-Munifi, supra note 149, at 287. 
160 For a brief discussion of the relationship between politics and faith in Islam, see Al-Munifi, supra note 
149, at 287–99. 
161 Royal Order No. (A/91) 27 Sha’ban 1412H – 1 March 1992 Published in Umm al-Qura Gazette No. 
3397 2 Ramadan 1412H – 5 Mar. 1992 [hereinafter B.L.G.]. 
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other acts and regulations.162 Even though this law states clearly that the constitution of Saudi 
Arabia is the Koran and Sunnah,163 The BLG resembles other countries’ constitutions in form 
and to some degree  substance.164 Accordingly, the basic law divides the state authority into 
three divisions: executive,165 judiciary,166 and regulatory.167 These authorities derive their 
legitimacy from the King who is the last resort of those authorities.168 
More importantly, the BLG provides that Saudi Arabia is a monarchy where the throne is 
assumed by the descendants of King Abdulaziz al-Saud, the founder of the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia.169 The election of a new king is vested in the allegiance commission which consists of a 
representative from all the existing branches descended from the founder of the third Saudi state, 
King Abdulaziz Bin Abdurrahman al-Saud.170 
The justice, shura, and equality are the foundation of governance in the Kingdom.171 The 
Basic Law also guarantees several rights and liberties for all people in the Kingdom, such as the 
protection of private property,172 individual security,173 privacy174 and from arbitrary 
162 See MOHAMMAD ABDULAH ALMARZUGI, ALSULTAH ALTANDIMIHA FI ALMAMLIKAH ALARABIA 
ALSUADIAH 85 (Maktabat Alubikan 1424). 
163 B.L.G. § (1). 
164 See KHALID ALRWAIS & RIZG ALRAYIS, ALMADKAL LEDRAST ALAULUM ALQANONIAH 101 (maktabit 
alshugri 2002). 
165 B.L.G. § (44). 
166 Id. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. 
169 Id. § (5). 
170 Id. 
171 Id. § (8). Worth mentioning, the last part specified that those norms are implemented according to the 
Islamic law (Shari’a). 
172 B.L.G. § (18). 
173 Id. § (36). 
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punishment.175 In addition, the Basic Law embraces social welfare by providing, for instance, 
that “[t]he state shall guarantee the right of the citizen and his family in emergencies, sickness, 
disability, and old age, and shall support the social security system and encourage institution and 
individual to participate in charitable work.”176 Moreover, according to The Basic Law, the state 
is responsible to provide health care to every citizen177 and provide citizens with general 
education.178 
2.3.2.2 The Shura Council 
In March 1992, the promise of the reestablishment of the Shura Council179 was fulfilled by King 
Fahd.180 The Council consists of 150 members181 who represent the different regions and fabric 
of Saudi society and who are appointed directly by the King182 for four year terms.183 The newly-
formed branch of states resembles in its façade a parliament in democratic countries. Upon closer 
174 Id. § (37) and § (40). 
175 Id. § (38). 
176 Id. § (27). 
177 Id. § (31). 
178 Id. § (30). 
179 Islamic literature is full of describing the shura concept, which basically means the Islamic duty 
imposed upon the ruler to seek his citizens’ advice in all (important) matters related to governing the society. 
However, there is a division among Islamic jurists whether the ruler is obligated to follow such advice or merely 
take it into consideration. For a full discussion about Shura theory in Islam, see Hani Ahmad Abdulfatah, Nizam 
Alshura Alislami Muqaranan bi Aldimucratia Alniabiah Almuasira (PhD) (1990) (unpublished dissertation Ain 
Shams University law department Egypt)). In the English language, also see Al-Munifi, supra note 149, at 366–71. 
180 The Shura Council Law issued by the Royal Order No. A/91 27 Sha’aban 1421/1 March 1992 
[hereinafter SCL.]. 
181 CL. § (3). 
182 The King appoints the members of the shura Council and the only legal constraint on his authority is the 
general requirement stated in Article (4) of the council. However, the practice is that most members are chosen from 
graduate degree holders from all regions in Saudi Arabia. 
183 See CL. § (12). 
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inspection, the Council is a new creation in Islam and rooted in shura principle.184 The Council 
model is based on the early Islamic political principle called shura which imposes a duty upon 
the Islamic ruler to always consult with his people (citizens) about all matters related to the 
governance of the state.185 However, Islamic jurists are divided about whether the opinions of the 
jurists are obligatory or merely consultative. The Shura Council in Saudi Arabia is based on the 
opinion that the shura is not binding (consultative) on the King.186 Although the decisions of the 
Shura Council are deemed merely advisory, they in fact carry a great political weight. 
The role of the Shura Council includes participating in the formation of the country’s 
general plans of economic and social development,187 reviewing acts, regulations,188 
international treaties and agreements,189 concessions,190 interpreting of acts,191 and discussing 
annual reports submitted by ministries and other government agencies.192 Moreover, the Council 
can express its position on the general policies of the Kingdom.193 Any member of the Council 
may propose draft new legislation to the Shura Council or for the amendment of existing law.194 
184 The main sources of Islam (Koran, Sunnah, and Ijma) recognize the necessity of the Shura as main pillar 
of Islamic political theory and practice. 
185 There is disagreement between jurists regarding the meaning of “Ahl al-Hal wa al-Agd”. Some jurists 
confine this concept to a specific group in Islamic society such as leaders, Islamic jurists, and all other well- known 
members of the society who are entrusted with the full faith of the people. Additionally, jurists take liberal views by 
interpreting this concept as including all persons who may be eligible to enter a contract. 
186 Thus, many people when they translate the Arabic word “shura” to consultation by which the translate 
the “Shura Council” the to the consultative council. 
187 CL. § (15)(a). 
188 Id. § (15)(b). 
189 Id. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. § (15)(c). 
192 Id. § (15)(d). 
193 Id. § (15). 
194 Id. § (23). 
41 
                                                 
However, the Council differs from the parliament by not having the authority to discuss or 
approve the government’s annual budget and does not have the authority to question executive 
power or withdraw confidence from them. In fact, the supervisory role of the Council is modest 
in comparison to its legislative role where its position is equal to the position of the Council of 
Ministers.195  
2.3.2.3 The Council of Ministers 
The Executive branch of the state is vested in the hands of the Council of Ministers196 which is 
chaired by the King197 and membership of approximately thirty members.198 The Council is 
composed of its president199 (the King), the deputies of the president,200 ministers with 
portfolios,201 ministers of state,202 and advisors of the King who are appointed as members of the 
Council.203 The Council has full power over all executive and administrative affairs,204 inter alia, 
the authority of monitoring the implementation of laws, regulations and resolutions,205 creating 
195 A recent amendment to the Shura Council Law affords the Council final decision making power when 
its opinion conflicts with that of the Council of Ministers. The practice exemplifies that Saudi kings – in many cases 
– adopt the proposals of the Shura Council even if such proposals contradict actions of the Council of Ministers, 
which is headed by the King. 
196 S.B.L.G. art. § (44). 
197 S.C.M.L. art. § (12)(a). 
198 There are no prescribed minimum or maximum numbers of the size of the membership of the Council of 
the Ministers. 
199 S.C.M.L. art. § (1). 
200 Id. § (12)(b). 
201 Id. § (12)(c). 
202 Id. § (12)(d). 
203 Id. § (12)(e). 
204 Id. § (24). 
205 Id. § (24)(1). 
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and reorganizing public institutions,206 observation of the implementation of a general 
development plan,207 forming committees to review the conduct of ministries and other 
government instrumentalities,208 preparing the state’s budget,209 and studying and adopting drafts 
of laws and regulations.210 
The chairman of the Council is responsible for guiding public policy of the state and 
assuring cooperation and coordination among the different government authorities to guarantee 
harmony and unity in the council of ministers.211 On the other hand, each minister with portfolio 
is considered to be the ultimate authority in running the affairs of his respective ministry.212 
Regarding the Council meetings, ordinary meetings require two-thirds of the Council 
members be present for a quorum unless exceptional circumstances necessitate convening by 
half of the members.213 For decisions to be rendered valid, the majority of the attending members 
must be in agreement in normal meeting circumstances and, in cases of extraordinary meetings, 
two-thirds of attending members must be in agreement.214 However, the enactment of the 
Council’s decisions is always conditioned upon the approval of the king.215 
206 Id. § (24)(2). 
207 Id. § (24)(3). 
208 Id. § (24)(4). 
209 Id. § (26). 
210 Id. § (21). 
211 Id. § (29). 
212 Id. § (10). 
213 Id. § (14). 
214 Id. 
215 Id. § (7). 
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2.3.2.4 The Judiciary 
The judicial system in Saudi Arabia is a dual judicial system similar to other civil law countries 
such as France and Egypt where dual court systems exist.216 The first part of this system, which 
is called the ordinary (general jurisdiction) judiciary, is responsible for civil and criminal 
disputes while the second part of judicial system is the Board of the Grievances (Diwan al-
madalm), a court which has exclusive competence over all disputes involving the administration. 
The Basic Law of Governance assures the independence of the judiciary by stating that “[t]he 
judiciary shall be an independent authority. There shall be no power over judges in their judicial 
function other than power of the Islamic Shari’a.”217 Also, the newly enacted judiciary code 
provides that “no one shall interfere in the judicial affairs.”218 To embrace this independence, the 
Supreme Judicial Council is equipped with all authority related to non-judicial matters of the 
judges such as appointments, promotions, removals, inspections, training, and disciplinary 
actions. The council, which is composed of eleven members including the President of the 
Supreme Council, does not have any other judicial functions and remains as it was before the 
enactment of the new judicial code. However, in Saudi Arabia there is no constitutional court. 
Instead, all courts are eligible to abstain from applying legislation as being non-compliant with 
Islamic law. However, no court has the authority to strike down any legislation upon the finding 
of un-constitutionality. 
 
216 Napoleon established the “Council of the State” in 1799 which made France the mother of the dual legal 
system in many civil law countries which follow the French experience of having separate administrative courts. For 
a general overview of the French judicial system, see JOHN BELL ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF FRENCH LAW 37–54 (1998). 
217 B.L.G. § (46). 
218 Judiciary Law § (1) [hereinafter J.L.]. 
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i. The Ordinary Court System 
As noted earlier, the first component of the Saudi judicial system is the general or ordinary 
judiciary where all disputes between civil (private) parties and criminal case and charges are 
referred.219 This judicial system is a three-tiered system.220 At the apex of the pyramid resides 
the Supreme Court.221 However, the court’s function in those situations is mostly to review the 
proper application of shariah or the “anzimah” (enacted statutes).222 In other words, it is a court 
of law and not facts. The Court of Appeals is the middle level court in the general judicial 
hierarchy.223 The Court of Appeals is composed of specialized circuits such as commercial 
circuits,224 labor circuits,225 personal status circuits226 and criminal circuits.227 Cases in the Court 
of Appeals are heard and decided by a panel consisting of three appellate judges.228 The Court of 
Appeals is a court of law and fact.229 At the lowest level of the Saudi judicial system are the 
219 The new law of judicial reform was recently enacted through a new judicial law issued by royal decree 
M/78 (19 Ramadan in 1428 H). 
220 J.L. § (9). 
221 J.L. § (9)(1). The Supreme Court located in the capital city of Riyadh is a newly established court in the 
Saudi judicial system. Its competence was vested under the Supreme Judicial Council. The court is composed of 
several circuits created by the Supreme Judicial Council. The high court has a mandatory and optional jurisdiction 
and has to review specific criminal punishment inflicted on the body of the accused, such as the death penalty. All 
other case reviews are optional to the litigants. 
222 J.L. § (11). At least one Court of Appeals has to be established in each of the thirteen Saudi provinces. 
223 J.L. § (9)(2). 
224 Id. § (16)(4). 
225 Id. § (16)(5). 
226 Id. § (16)(3). 
227 Id. § (16)(2). 
228 Id. § (15)(1). However, in cases of capital punishment, five judges must decide the case. 
229 Where the case will be heard and decided upon as if it had never been initially heard by the court of first 
instance. 
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courts of first instance.230 These courts have limited jurisdiction based on the nature of the 
subject matter, such as Commercial Court,231 Labor Court,232 Criminal Court,233 Personal Status 
Court,234 and the General Court.235 Cases in the Court of first instance are heard and decided 
generally by one judge.236 
ii. The Board of Grievances (Diwan al-Madalim) 
The other second wing of the Saudi judicial system is Board of Grievances (Diwan al-
Madalim).237 The BLG provides that: “[t]he Law shall set forth the structure and jurisdiction of 
the Board of Grievances.”238 Accordingly, the statute of the Board states that “[t]he Board of 
Grievances is an independent administrative judicial commission responsible directly to the 
King.”239 The Board is composed of a three-tiered administrative court.240 At the top of this court 
system is the High Administrative Court which is a court of law only.241 Below the High Court, 
resides the Administrative Court of Appeals, the second level of adjudication, and the 
Administrative Courts at the bottom of the administrative judiciary pyramid. As mentioned 
earlier, the jurisdiction of the Board is limited to administrative disputes where a governmental 
230 J.L. § (9)(3). 
231 Id. § (9)(3)(d). 
232 Id. § (9)(3)(e). 
233 Id. § (9)(3)(b). 
234 Id. § (9)(3)(c). 
235 Id. § (9)(3)(a). 
236 However, criminal courts require more than one judge. See J.L. § (20). 
237 The Board of Grievances Law issued by Royal Decree No. (M/79) [hereinafter B.G.L.]. 
238 B.L.G. § (53). 
239 Id. § (1). 
240 Id. § (8). 
241 Thus, this court does not review facts when deciding the matter of the pending case. 
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entity is part of the dispute, that is, disputes related to administrative contracts,242 decisions,243 
rights of public employees244 and government tortuous acts.245 However, the jurisdiction of the 
Board does not include the review the acts of states’ decisions which renders by the government 
in its sovereign power not the administrative one.246 
2.4 SOURCES OF LEGAL AUTHORITY 
2.4.1 Legislations 
Not until King Abdulaziz’s conquest of the Hejaz247 had the country experienced kind of positive 
legislations whatsoever.248 The un-codified rules of Islamic law (Shariah) were the sole law of 
the land.249 Hejaz, as mentioned earlier in this thesis, had a form of modern governmental 
242 B.G.L. § (13)(d). 
243 Id. § (13)(b). 
244 Id. § (13)(a). 
245 Id. § (13)(c). 
246 Id. § (14) which provides: “It shall not be permissible for the Board of Grievances to look into 
applications relating to questions of sovereignty .…” However, there is no clear distinct line separating an act of 
state from other administrative acts. For further discussion about acts of state in Saudi Arabia, see Mohamed 
Abdullah Al-Jerba, The Board of Grievances: A Study of the Institution of Diwan Al-madhalim of Saudi Arabia 
with Particular Emphasis on its Administrative Jurisdiction 211–16 (PhD) (1992) (unpublished dissertation 
University of Essex (U.K.)). Moreover, see Ayoub M.A. Al-Jarbou, Judicial Review of Administrative Actions: A 
Comparative Study between the United States and Saudi Arabia 334–46, vol. II (S.J.D.) (2002) (unpublished 
dissertation University of Virginia Law School). 
247 In 1924. 
248 See MOHAMMAD ABDULJAWAD MOHAMMAD, AL-TATWER AL-TASHRI’E FI AL-MAMLAKH AL-ARABIA AL-
SAUDIAH 40 (Dar al-Ma’rif publisher, Alexandria, Egypt 1997). 
249 See id. 
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organization due to Ottoman control and influence of that region.250 Accordingly, King 
Abdulaziz issued an order to recognize all pre-capture laws in the Hejaz region only.251 It could 
be asserted that the evolution of positive law in the kingdom emerged from that early recognition 
of positive law in one part of the newly established state. Currently, legislations in Saudi Arabia 
are of different forms, generally categorized into laws (statutes) and regulations. The distinction 
is based on the authority issuing them and their subject matter. It is worth noting that Arab 
countries use the Arabic word qanun for “law” but Saudi Arabia – for policy reasons – chose the 
word nizam. Technically, those two words convey the same meaning: law.252 The reason behind 
this word usage was to bypass the opposing social and religious views of applying non-Islamic 
codified rules imported from a non-Muslim (western) country’s legal traditions.253 
2.4.1.1 Statutes (anzima) 
i. Types of anzima 
Saudi legal system observes two kinds of anzima. First, the basic laws include the Basic Law of 
Governance, Council of Ministers Law, Shura Council Law, Law of Providences, and the Law of 
the Allegiance Commission. These laws generally regulate the constitutional foundation of the 
state powers and the fundamental rights and liberties of the citizens. Thus, they reside at the top 
of the codified legislations hierarchy by Royal Order of the King as the supreme last resort of all 
250 See id. at 40. In fact, Hejaz declares its independence from Ottoman Empire in 1916, a few years before 
its capture by king Abdulaziz in 1925. For more information about this era of the Hijaz independent state, see 
JOSHUA TEILTELBAUM, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF THE HIJAZ (2001). 
251 See id. at 44. 
252 See id. at 13. 
253 See id. 
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state powers (the Imam).254 Accordingly, basic laws stem from the King’s absolute authority: no 
institution has legal power to review the King’s order before its issuance nor competence to 
rescind the order’s content as long as the anzima (statutes) are compatible with Sharia. 
The second anzima form is the ordinary laws issued by Royal Decree after the study and 
review of the bill in both Councils the Shura255 and the Ministers.256 The King has full discretion 
to enact the bill or not. In short, neither time constraints nor constitutional mechanisms (by 
which the parliament could pass the law without his approval by special voting quorum) has an 
effect on the King’s power. Furthermore, ordinary laws must comply with Sharia and Basic 
Laws which both supersede all other laws and regulations in the Kingdom.257 Some scholars 
rank the BLG at the top of the basic laws thereby prevailing over the other basic laws.258 
According to this point of view, the lower status basic laws must not contradict the BLG. 
However, this argument does not find a basis in the constitutional practices in Saudi Arabia 
where all Basic Laws are treated equally. 
254 For the King’s authority see article § (44) of B.L.G. However, the Law of Allegiance Commission is the 
only law the King cannot modify without the consent of the allegiance commission according to commission law. 
See Article § (25) in the law of allegiance Commission. 
255 CL. art. § (18) which states that: “[l]aws … shall be issued and amended by Royal Decrees after review 
by the Shura Council.” 
256 C.M.L. art. § (20) which states that: “laws … shall be issued and amended by Royal Decrees after being 
reviewed by the Council of Ministers.” 
257 Neither basic law of governance nor the other basic laws state that. However, in the Royal Decree No. 
(M/23) dated 26/8/1412 H the word law (regular) does not apply to the Basic law of governance, Council of 
Ministers Law, Shura Council Law, and the Law of Providences. Accordingly, this exception of these laws indicates 
its higher status, most especially its constitutional nature. 
258 See ALRWAIS & ALRAYIS, supra note 164. 
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ii. Legislative process 
The traditional way to enact a new ordinary law or to amend an existing one259 is proposing the 
bill to the Council of Ministers by the relevant administrative organ. Upon receiving the bill, the 
Council refers the bill to its legal wing, the Bureau of Experts.260 In the Bureau, all relevant 
governmental and nongovernmental institutions are invited to study the proposed draft in free 
and democratic deliberations.261 The bill is put in its final shape by the legal advisors of the 
Bureau to assure its compatibility with the Saudi legal system.262 The Bureau then returns the 
revised bill to the Council of Ministers for voting on the adoption of the bill. If the Council of 
Ministers adopts the proposed bill, the Council will refer the bill to the Shura Council to study 
and vote on the proposed bill. The Shura Council then submits the bill to the King who decides 
either to refer the bill again to the Council of Ministers or to enact the law as it comes from the 
Shura Council.263 if the King sends back the bill to the Council of Ministers to review the bill as 
it is amended by the Shura Council, two scenarios might emerge from this referral:264 in the first, 
the Council of Ministers issues a resolution containing the adoption of the Shura amended bill by 
259 This part is concerned with the ordinary legislative process of laws which were enacted by royal 
decrees. But laws that were enacted by extraordinary ways, i.e., based on the will of the King exclusively and issued 
by royal order, are not discussed here due to the lack of codified legislative process. 
260 Currently, the Bureau of Experts consists of about thirty legal advisors (most have at least an LL.M. 
from the U.S.). See the Bureau of Experts homepage [http://www.boe.gov.sa/Manswbeen.aspx] (accessed on 
Feb. 20, 2014). 
261 Decision is taken by voting; the minority may attach their opinion or reservation to the Council of 
Ministers to decide on the matter. 
262 The legal advisor of the Bureau does not review technicalities of the studied matter but instead puts the 
substance in a legally acceptable matter. Also, the Bureau has the right to amend or ring a bell about any decision 
that contains a violation of the law of the land or international obligation. 
263 CL. art. § (17). 
264 Id. 
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which the King issued a Royal Decree to enact the law based on the Shura Council version.265 In 
the other scenario, the Council of Ministers disagrees with all or some of the provisions in the 
Shura Council’s proposed amendment of the bill which is then referred back to the Shura 
Council for a second review. The Shura Council submits its decision on the matter to the King to 
enact the law in the form he sees more proper.266  
 The other method of proposing law is that the proposed bill starts from the Shura Council 
directly.267 The newly amended law of the Shura Council grants the Council right of proposing a 
new bill or amendment of existing law.268 Accordingly, the Shura Council will submit the draft 
to the King under the same process stated for the first mentioned method. Clearly, the legislative 
process in Saudi legal system is a triangle in which the King resides in the apex. 
2.4.1.2 Regulations 
Regulations are the other kind of legislation which take different forms but are enacted by 
executive power. Regulations may be used for supplementing an existing statute (implementing 
regulations),269 or independent regulations directed to safeguard public order (police 
regulations),270 or organizing public institutions (organizing regulations).271 First, Implementing 
regulations usually contain technical and procedural rules necessary for the proper 
265 Id. 
266 Id. 
267 This usually happens rarely. 
268 CL. art. § (23). 
269 See ALMARZUGI, supra note 162, at 91–93. 
270 See ALRWAIS & ALRAYIS, supra note 164, at 111. 
271 See ALMARZUGI, supra note 162, at 90–91. 
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implementation of the relevant statute it supplements.272 Thus, the implementing regulations are 
limited to the scope of the relevant statute and cannot exceed proper limits of that statute or 
contradict or modify any of its provisions.273 In addition, implementing regulations are not 
authorized to regulate matters linked to individual’s rights and liberty, such as crime and 
punishment274 or the imposition of taxation.275 Secondly, the independent regulations are a set of 
rules initiated directly without depending on or supplementing an existing statute. Thirdly, police 
regulation, is directed to safeguard the public health, morals, and peace (tranquility).276 Fourthly, 
organizational regulation, allows the administration to establish public institutions (ministries 
and instrumentalities) and reorganize them.277 All regulations occupy the bottom of the 
legislation hierarchy after the basic and regular laws.278 
272 See ALRWAIS & ALRAYIS, supra note 164, at 110. 
273 See id. 
274 B.L.G. art. § (38) which provides that “punishment shall be carried out on a personal basis. There shall 
be no crime or punishment except on the basis of a Shari’ah or a statutory provision and there shall be no 
punishment except for deeds subsequent to the effectiveness of a statutory provision.” 
275 B.L.G. art. § (20) which provides that “taxes and fees shall be imposed only if needed and on a just 
basis. They shall be imposed, revised, abolished, or exempted only in accordance with the statute.” 
276 See ALRWAIS & ALRAYIS, supra note 164, at 111. 
277 See id. at 110 [the introduction to study legal sciences]. 
278 See id. at 111. However, some legal scholars argue that organizational regulations have the same legal 
rank as regular law in their constitutional rank with regard to their specified legal scope. Thus, these regulations may 
amend or abrogate any legal provisions provided by regular law that concern the establishment or organization of 
public institutions or bodies such as ministries or an independent authority, i.e. the Capital Market authority. See 
Esam Bin Sayd, alrgabh alla amal alsulth altanfithiah fi almamlakah alarabiyah alsaudiah (PhD) (2010) (unpublished 
dissertation Cairo University Law school (2010)). 
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2.4.2 Islamic Law Sources 
Islamic jurisprudence has divided sources of legal authority (law) into primary and 
supplementary sources. The primary sources consist of the textual authorities: the Koran and the 
Prophet Mohammad’s Sunna (traditions or teachings). The supplementary sources encompass an 
array of authorities (e.g. custom,279 equity,280 and the revelation of pre-Islamic holy texts281), 
with the foremost two being ijma (consensus) and qias (analogy). 
2.4.3 Primary Sources 
2.4.3.1 Koran 
The Koran is the supreme source of Islamic authority and is believed (by Muslims) to be the true 
words of God (Allah) revealed in Arabic to his last Prophet to humanity, Mohammad.282 The 
revelation came to the Prophet Mohammad when he was in his forties in a gradual manner over 
twenty years.283 This piecemeal revelation facilitates its understanding and memorization by the 
Prophet’s companions.284 
279 Urf (customs) are recognized as a source of legal authority which is defined as “recurring practices that 
are acceptable to people of sound nature.” MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI, PRINCIPLES OF ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE 
368 (2003). For urf in Islam see id. 368–82. For detailed study on the legal framework of customs in Islam see 
AYMAN SHABANA, CUSTOM IN ISLAMIC LAW AND LEGAL THEORY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPTS OF URF 
AND ADAH IN THE ISLAMIC LEGAL TRADITION (2010). 
280 For Equity as Islamic sources of authority see KAMALI, supra note 279, at 323–48. 
281 The Koran provides that: “He hath ordained for you that religion which He commended unto Noah, and 
that which We inspire in thee (Muhammad), and that which We commended unto Abraham and Moses and Jesus, 
saying: Establish the religion, and be not divided therein.” (Koran: Ash-Shura: verse 13). 
282 See MOHAMMAD ABU-ZAHRA, USUAL AL-FIGH 75 (Cairo: Dar Alfiker Alarabi 2006). 
283 See KAMALI, supra note 279, at 19. 
284 See id. at 323–48. 
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While the Koran contains more than 6,000 verses, only 500 are of a legal nature.285 An 
Islamic scholar described the Koran’s content through a modern lens, noting: 
It is the fundamental and paramount source of the creed, rituals, ethics, and laws 
of Islamic religion. It is the book that ‘differentiates’ between right and wrong, so 
that nowadays, when the Muslim world is dealing with such universal issues as 
globalization, the environment, combating terrorism and drugs, issues of medical 
ethics, and feminism, evidence to support the various arguments is sought in 
Koran [sic].286 
Extracting a legal rule from the Koran is not an easy task for ordinary persons because 
the Koran was revealed in the classical form of the Arabic language.287 The rules stated in the 
Koran are intentionally divided into two kinds: rules with clear meaning of application 
(definitive) and others with probable meanings, as the Koran provides: 
He it is Who hath revealed unto thee (Muhammad) the Scripture wherein are clear 
revelations – they are the substance of the Book – and others (which are) 
allegorical. But those in whose hearts is doubt pursue, forsooth, that which is 
allegorical seeking (to cause) dissension by seeking to explain it. None knoweth 
its explanation save Allah. And those who are of sound instruction say: We 
believe therein; the whole is from our Lord; but only men of understanding really 
heed.288 
Probable rules provide flexible interpretation that may fit generational needs in different 
times and venues.289 Since the Koran was revealed gradually over an extended period of time,290 
various verses were abrogated by a latter revelation.291 Both the abrogating and abrogated verses 
285 The Holy Quran consists of thirty chapters which include one hundred and fourteen suras (verses). Its 
transmission spanned twenty three years and was divided between the two Islamic holy cities of Mecca and Madina. 
The Meccan suras were mostly directed tenets and rituals, whereas the Madinian Suras contain legal rules related to 
many aspects of legal subjects. See Abu-Zahra, supra note 282, at 76. 
286 M.A.S. ABDEL HALEEM, THE QURAN: A NEW TRANSLATION IX (N.Y. Oxford Univ. Press 2008). 
287 See IMRAN AHSAN KHAN NYAZEE, ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE 157 (2003). 
288 Holy Quran: Verse (7) in sura Al-Imran. 
289 See KAMALI, supra note 279, at 27–46. 
290 See id. at 20. 
291 See id. at 209. 
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compose the final version of the Koran. However, only the first (the abrogating) convey valid 
legal rules.292 Knowing abrogated rules are integral prerequisites of Islamic jurists.293 
2.4.3.2 Sunna 
Allah orders all Muslims to follow the commands of the Prophet Mohammad by saying 
“[w]hoever obeys the Messenger obeys God.”294 Consequently, the Prophet Mohammad’s 
”words, acts, and (tacit) approvals” or, in other words, the Sunna, are the second source of 
Islamic law.295 In the Arabic language, “Sunna” means the “well-trodden path.”296 Although the 
Sunna sometimes contain rules not mentioned directly in the Koran, many of its rules “restrict, 
qualify, or elaborate” on general rules of the Koran.297 For example, the Koran commands all 
Muslims to pray to God but did not specify the way of conducting this prayer. Accordingly, this 
procedure was then defined by the Sunna.298 
2.4.4 Supplementary Sources 
Alongside the primary sources, there is a wide range of other supplementary sources of Islamic 
law. These sources are considered to be supplementary because they do not contain independent 
292 In regards to abrogation, Allah said: “Such of our revelation as We abrogate or cause to be forgotten, but 
we bring (in place) one better or the like thereof. Knowest thou not that Allah is Able to do all things? (106)” 
(Koran: Al-Baqara verse 106). 
293 For a detailed treatment of the abrogation in Islamic jurisprudence see John Burton, the Sources of 
Islamic Law: Islamic theories of Abrogation (1995). 
294 Holy Quran: Verse (80) in sura Al-Nisa. 
295 NYAZEE, supra note 287, at 163. 
296 Id. at 162. 
297 Id. at 177. 
298 See MUSTAFA AHMAD AL-ZARQA, AL-MADKHAL AL-FIQHI AL-AAM, vol. 1, 74 (1998). 
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legal authority; however, they do depend on the two primary sources. The chief supplementary 
sources, which are agreed upon by the four sunni mathahib, are ijma and qias. 
2.4.4.1 Ijma 
Ijma is the third source of Islamic law, meaning “consensus” in Arabic. The technical meaning 
of ijma, however, refers to “[t]he consensus of mujtahids (independent jurists) from the ummah 
[nation] of [prophit] Muhammad, after his death, in a determined period upon a rule of Islamic 
law.”299 The opinions of the mujahidun (knowledgeable or independent jurists) are only counted 
when in ijma formation, at which time the opinion of muqalidun (ordinary scholars) is excluded 
from this process.300 Due to the strict conditions regarding the formation of ijma, rules derived 
from this source are rare and limited to the early era of Islam that directly followed the death of 
Prophet Mohammad.301 However, when an Ijma is reached in a specific matter, the rule 
stemming thereof may not be amended or abrogated by a later ijma.302 
2.4.4.2 Qias 
Qias is the fourth chief Islamic source of authority. Qias is defined as “the extension of Shariah 
value from an original case, or asl, to a new case.”303 In other words, Islamic jurists (mujtahid) 
apply a rule stated in the Koran or Sunna to a new case that is not directly mentioned in this 
299 NYAZEE, supra note 287, at 183. 
300 KAMALI, supra note 279, at 233. 
301 For the Islamic jurist opinions over the formation of ijma see generally MOHAMMAD RAZI, 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE, vol. 3, 63–64 (2007). 
302 ABDULWAHHAB KHALLAF, ELM USUL AL-FIGH 46–47 (8th ed.: n.d.). 
303 KAMALI, supra note 279, at 263. 
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source, due to similarity of reason between the original situation and the new one.304 For 
instance, the prohibition of intoxicants consumption is stated clearly in the Koran: “[y]ou who 
believe, intoxicants and gambling, idolatrous practices and [divining with] arrows are repugnant 
acts – Satan’s doing – shun them so that you may prosper,”305 while the prohibition of smoking 
marijuana is not mentioned literally in the Koran nor Sunna. Islamic jurists’ prohibition of 
marijuana use is based on the prohibition of intoxicants consumption due to an analogy between 
the reason of the prohibition of intoxicants consumption – which is the impairment of a person’s 
cognition – and the effect of marijuana consumption on the brain.306 In contrast to ijma, Qias has 
played a major role in forming many Islamic rules through Islamic history and will contribute to 
the future rulemaking of the Islamic legal system.307 
2.4.5 Legal Rules in Islam 
2.4.5.1 Introduction 
A legal rule in Islam conveys one of following legal instructions to the peoples’ actions: 
obligatory (e.g., fulfilling contracts), recommended (e.g., charitable contributions), reprehended 
(e.g., extravagance), and prohibited (e.g., usury), and permissible (e.g., commerce and sport).308 
Since the death of the Prophet Mohammad and the end of revelations, Islamic jurists, called 
fuqaha (singular. faqih), especially the premier ones, mujtahidun (singular. mujtahid), play an 
304 ABU-ZAHRA, supra note 282, at 200. 
305 Koran: Verse (90) in sura Al-Ma’ida (The Feast). 
306 For prohibition of narcotics in Islam see generally 179–80. See RAZI, supra note 301, at vol. 2, 179–80. 
307 See AL-ZARQA, supra note 298, at 79. 
308 See NYAZEE, supra note 287, at 51–52. 
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exclusive role in determining the rules applicable to all sorts of life occasions. This rulemaking 
function assumed by Islamic jurists through Islamic history led a prominent orientalist, Bernard 
Weiss, to label Islamic law a “jurist law” like the ancient Roman legal system.309 He said, 
“[b]oth in Rome and in Islam the authority to expound law belonged to lay specialists rather than 
to the courts, as is the case in the Common Law.”310 
2.4.5.2 The Rule Making Process in Islamic Legal System 
Islamic law is extracted from the divine sources of Islam through a mechanism of Ijithad. 
“Because [Islamic] Law is buried ... within the (legally) imprecise and sometimes ambiguous 
language of sacred texts, it is said to be extracted from the text; and it is for this reason that the 
texts are to be considered sources of Law rather than the Law itself.”311 Ijitihad refers to “the 
process of reasoning that jurists employed in order to arrive at the best guess of what he thought 
might be the law pertaining to particular case.”312 Mujtahid (a jurist conducting ijtihad) utilizes a 
complex methodology, “usul al-figh,” to extract the legal rules from various Islamic sources.313 
Usul al-figh refers to the “body of principles of interpretation by the help of which the mujtahid 
is able to derive the law from the detailed evidence in the Koran [sic], the Sunna, ijma, and qias 
[sic].”314 A mujtahid has to observe the hierarchy in Islamic law sources under which he has to 
309 Bernard Weiss, Interpretation in Islamic Law: The Theory of Ijtihad, in ISLAMIC LAW AND LEGAL 
THEORY 199, 201 (Ian Edge ed., 1996). 
310 Id. at 199, 201. 
311 Id. at 199, 199. 
312 WAEL B. HALLAQ, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAW 27 (2009). 
313 Imam al-shafi considered to be the founder of this field of knowledge in his a seminal monograph, “al-
Risala.” See MAJID KHADDURI, ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE: SHAFII’S RISALA (1961). 
314 NYAZEE, supra note 287, at 37. 
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search for the rule in the Koran first, and then search for it in the Sunna. If there is no direct rule 
in the primary sources, the jurist has to consult the two chief supplementary sources, the ijma 
first and the qias second. In other words, the four chief sources of Islamic law sources have to be 
utilized sequentially.315 
A mujtahid has three main functions: to locate applicable rules in the primary sources, to 
expand the application of rules enclosed in primary sources to new situations not mentioned 
directly in the primary sources, and to formulate new rules based on the general guidance of 
Islamic sources when a matter is not directly or indirectly ruled on by the primary sources, and 
not the two chief supplementary sources (Ijma and Qias).316 Because ijtihad involves application 
of a complex methodology and demands strict prerequisites, most Islamic law jurists do not 
satisfy the conditions of ijtihad.317 Non-mujtahid jurists, called muqallidun (singular. muqallid), 
have to follow the opinions of the mujtahhidun.318 
2.4.6 Juridical Schools in Islam 
In Sunni jurisprudence, non-mujtahid jurists are normally adherent to one of the four Sunni figh 
(juridical) schools (maddahib):319 al-Madhab al-Hanafi,320 al-Madhab al-Maliki,321 al-Madhab 
315 Id. at 145. 
316 See NYAZEE, supra note 287, at 264. 
317 Id. at 25. 
318 This process called Taqlid which “in the legal sense following the opinion of anther.” NYAZEE, supra 
note 287, at 25. For general background about taglid see RAZI, supra note 301, at vol. 3, 108–09. 
319 Madahi defined as “the doctrine legacy that binds members of a school together.” Bernard Weiss, The 
Madhhab in Islamic Legal Theory, in THE ISLAMIC SCHOOL OF LAW: EVOLUTION, DEVOLUTION, AND PROGRESS 1, 1 
(Peri Bearman et al. eds., 2005). For historical background on the Islamic madahhibs see WAEL B. HALLAQ, THE 
ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF ISLAMIC LAW 150–177 (2005). For general overview of juridical principles of these 
madahhibs see RAZI, supra note 301, at vol. 1, 248–96. 
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al-Shafi,322 and al-Madhab al-Hanbali.323 The heritage of those scholars was preserved by 
students of the original schools’ founders.324 The schools were later named after their respective 
founders.325 These maddahib agree on the authority of Koran, Sunna, Ijma, and qias.326 
However, the maddahib utilize a slightly different ijtihad process which is connected to the 
authority and hierarchy of the less authoritative supplementary sources, such as custom, equity, 
and public policy. Currently, each school has an enormous juridical literature, figh, documenting 
legal rules reached by the school’s founder and students starting from the school’s inception. 
The existence of several juridical schools has enriched Islamic jurisprudence and 
encourages the utilization of a comparative study approach of these schools. The Islamic legal 
system is one of the earlier legal systems that recognized the importance of comparative studies. 
Since the ninth century AC, Islamic scholars have devoted a great deal of their time to 
comparative studies of madahhib. In the twelfth century AC, for instance, the eminent Hanbali 
jurist, Ibn Qudamah, authored one of the early comprehensive comparative monographs, al-
320 al-Madhab al-Hanafi was founded by Abu Hanifa who died in 767 AC. See generally DAVID WAINES, 
AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAM 66 (2d ed. 2003). 
321 Id. at 66–67. 
322 Mohammad bin Idris al-Shafi (died in 820 AC.) was the founder of al-Madhab al-Shafi. See generally 
WAINES, supra note 320, at 67–70. 
323 Id. at 70–71. 
324 In fact, school founders did not know or intending to form their own school. See Majid Khadduri, 
Nature and Sources of Islamic Law, 22 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 3, 18 (1953). 
325 See HALLAQ, supra note 312, at 31. One the other hand, due to lack of documentation, several important 
madahhib had faded away such as the sufiyan al-Thory and al-Awzai madahhib. See generally STEVEN C. JUDD, AL-
AWZA’I & SUFYAN AL-THAWRI: THE UMAYYAD MADHHAB, IN THE ISLAMIC SCHOOL OF LAW: EVOLUTION, 
DEVOLUTION, AND PROGRESS 10, 10–25 (Peri Bearman et al. eds., 2005). 
326 See, e.g., NYAZEE, supra note 287, at 144. 
60 
                                                                                                                                                             
Mughni,327 which, to the present time, has upheld its value as a primary source of Islamic 
jurisprudence.328 
The influence of the four maddahib is not equal in all Islamic countries. For instance, 
North African countries (i.e. Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania, and Tunisia) are dominated by the 
al-Madhab Maliki,329 while Egypt adheres to al-Madhab al-Shafi .330 al-Madhab al-Hanafi was 
the official Madhab of the Ottoman Empire331 and has retained its heavy influence on Turkish 
people since then.332 Saudi Arabia and Qatar are the only states which have adopted the al-
Madhab al-Hanbali.333 In comparison to other madahib, the al-Madhab Hanbali pursues an 
orthodox approach with regard to faith and worship subjects, and a very “liberal” approach in 
“commercial” matters.334 
327 For Ibn Qudamah al-Maqdisi, see generally MAKDISI, G. “IBN KUDAMA AL-MAKDISI.” ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF ISLAM (2d ed.). Brill Online, 2013. Reverence, 28 Apr. 2013, http://www.encquran.brill.nl/entries/encyclopaedia-
of-islam-2/ibn-kudama-al-makdisi-SIM_3262?s.num=3. 
328 Other important early comparative monographs carry similar value of the al-Mughni such as Bidayat al-
Mujtahid wa Nihayat al-Muqtasid; al-Hidayah fi Sharh Bidayat al-MuMubtadi. 
329 See MANSOUR H. MANSOUR, THE MALIKI SCHOOL OF LAW: SPREAD AND DOMINATION IN NORTH AND 
WEST AFRICA, 8TH-14TH CENTURIES 6 (1995). 
330 See HALLAQ, supra note 312, at 36. 
331 See generally Rudolph Peters, What Does It Means To Be An Official Madhhab? Hanafism and the 
Ottoman Empire, in THE ISLAMIC SCHOOL OF LAW: EVOLUTION, DEVOLUTION, AND PROGRESS 147, 147–58 (Peri 
Bearman et al. eds., 2005). 
332 See HALLAQ, supra note 312, at 36. 
333 “Hanbali School of Law,” in THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ISLAM (John L. Esposito ed.), Oxford Islamic 
Studies Online, http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e799 (accessed on Feb. 12, 2013). 
334 Id. 
61 
                                                 
2.5 BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS IN SAUDI ARABIA 
The Companies Law of 1965 (CL) is one of the oldest acts in Saudi Arabia.335 The CL follows 
the Civil law tradition in form and substance where the law requires incorporation of all business 
organizations, other than joint venture companies. Accordingly, all these business forms enjoy 
legal personalities.336 The various incorporated business vehicles are all called companies and, in 
some cases, share common attributes. 
2.5.1 The Evolution of Business Organizations’ Regulations in Saudi Arabia 
As mentioned earlier, life in the Najd region was simple. Economic activities between businesses 
also followed an uncomplicated style. Islamic jurists developed un-codified Islamic partnerships 
that governed business relationships.337 The Hejaz region, conversely, witnessed a relatively high 
rate of economic activity due to its proximity to the Red Sea and the resulting money influx from 
Muslim visitors to the two Holy Cities (Mecca and Medina). The Hejaz had a special connection 
to the central government of the Ottoman Empire which applied Ottoman Commercial Code to 
the region.338 
As mentioned, King Abdulaziz captured the Hejaz region in 1925 but kept this region 
independent from the other parts of the country. Consequently, the King recognized most of the 
335 The law was enacted more than forty-five years ago by royal decree No. M/6 dated 6th of Rabi’ al-
Awwal in (1385 H) corresponding to (1965). 
336 With exception to the joint adventure company.  
337 See MOHAMMAD, supra note 248, at 52 (Dar al-Ma’rif publisher, Alexandria, Egypt, 1997). 
338 See id. In 1916, the Hejaz declared its independence from the Ottoman Empire and became the 
Kingdom of Hejaz (1916-1824). 
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existing (pre-capture) laws of the Hejaz region.339 Several years later, the government introduced 
new commercial law there shortly before integrating the region with other parts of the state.340 
Commercial Law consisted of six hundred and thirty three articles; however, only seven were 
about business organizations (companies).341 
In 1933, a year after the unification of the Hejaz region with the rest of the country and 
the declaration of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,342 the Saudi government granted California 
Arabian Standard Oil Company (CASOC, now ARAMCO) rights for prospecting oil in the 
country.343 However, it was not until 1938 that the American company discovered oil in the 
eastern part of the kingdom: such a discovery would transform the entire portrait of the country 
in every aspect of life, including those of social, economic, political and legal significance.344 
Consequently, the oil revenue-generated economic boom attracted the formation of many 
companies intent on building the country’s infrastructure.345 All of these changes outdated the 
339 Before King Abdulaziz captured the Hejaz region, it was newly independent from the Ottoman Empire. 
340 Enacted in (1350 H) correspondent to (1931). This law is, also, called “the Law of Commercial Court.” 
341 See arts. §§ (11–17) of the Commercial Law. 
342 In 1932. 
343 This oil company has a history closely linked to Saudi Arabia’s history and development. This 
relationship began when the Saudi government granted prospecting concessions to the company in 1933. See 
www.saudiaramco.com (accessed on Oct. 9, 2010). 
344 For detailed discussion of those aspects, see Saud A. Al-Mashari, The Influx of Oil Wealth and the 
Resultant Socio-Economic Development in Saudi Arabia: The impact of the Petrodollar on the Legal System of the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (J.S.D.) (1996) (unpublished dissertation, Washington University in St. Louis School of 
Law) (on filed with author). 
345 There was almost no modern infrastructure in the country. The National Joint Stock Company for auto 
operations in the Hejaz and the Najd Kingdom was the first joint stock company. See MOHAMMAD, supra note 248, 
at 51. Also see the Explanatory Memorandum of the Saudi Companies Law which states: 
Modern renaissance [in] the kingdom has embarked ... since the reign of H M King Abdulaziz ... a 
great effect in stimulating trade and increasing large development projected, such as the opening 
of roads and the construction of airports, dams, and government and private establishments.... 
Consequently, the number of companies has risen by leaps and bounds in a few years from a few 
score to several hundred, and is still constantly increasing. 
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shorthanded regulation of companies in Commercial Law and necessitated, as the explanatory 
note justifies, drafting: 
[C]omprehensive regulations for companies, to set forth provisions to be observed 
upon their incorporation, dissolution, and liquidation and ... to determine the 
extent of supervisory and control power of Ministry [of Commerce and Industry] 
over that companies to safeguard the public interest and protect individuals’ 
investment.346 
In 1965, accordingly, King Faisal responded to the call of modernization by enacting a 
new company law which is still in effect.347 Although the Companies Law is based on French 
civil law model, Saudi business culture is clearly American-oriented, due mainly to the pioneer 
oil prospecting concession granted to the American oil company and the unique political alliance 
and economic partnership between the United States and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. As a 
result, the Saudi government has sponsored and supported a large number of Saudi citizens to the 
U.S. for education, from the early days of the oil discovery to the present.348 American-educated 
Saudis in both public and private sectors are expected to consider their American experience 
when debating any calls for reform in the country. 
346 The Explanatory Memorandum of the Saudi Companies Law. 
347 This new companies law is at a final stage of enactment and will replace the former law. However, the 
general framework and foundation of both are similar. 
348 See, e.g., Saudi Cultural Mission to the U.S., Dirctory of Dissertations of Saudi Graduates from U.S. 
Universities between 1964-2005 (2006), available at http://www.sacm.org/Publications/56090_phd_complete.pdf 
(accessed on Jan. 30, 2014). 
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2.5.2 Law Sources for Business Organizations 
The Companies Law of 1965 (CL) is the primary source of company law in Saudi Arabia and 
regulates all business association forms.349 Accordingly, all business associations, other than 
joint venture companies, are incorporated forms and enjoy legal personality.350 The CL contains 
233 articles divided into fifteen sections. Section One has general provisions applicable to all 
company forms,351 which are covered in Sections Two through Nine. Other chapters are devoted 
to regulate mergers, liquidation, and criminal sanctions. 
Most importantly, CL designates more than a third of Section five to regulate joint stock 
companies. Consequently, this section states all provisions related to a joint stock company 
incorporation, governance (board of directors and the general meetings), finance, financial 
matters (accounting and auditing), alteration of the company’s capital and, finally, the 
dissolution of the company. However, CL authorizes the Minister of Commerce and Industry to 
issue supplementary regulations to implement company law provisions.352 For example, the 
Minister issued a resolution requiring all joint stock companies to establish auditing 
committees.353 Joint stock companies are required to adopt the standardized form of joint stock 
company bylaws354 unless there is a compelling reason to derogate from the terms stated in the 
349 Enacted for more than forty-five years by the Royal No. M/6 dated 6th of Rabi’ al-Awwal in (1385 H) 
correspondent to (1965). 
350 With exception to joint venture company. C.L. art. § (13). 
351 C.L. arts. §§ (1–15). 
352 CL. art. § (233). 
353 Ministerial Resolution No. (903) dated in (1414 H) corresponding to (1993). 
354 CL. art. § (51). 
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Ministry form.355 Thus, the standardized approach taken by Saudi authorities has led to a similar 
legal framework among most Saudi joint stock companies even when circumstances and 
business factors required otherwise. 
In addition to those legal sources, the relatively new (2003) Capital Market Law (CML) 
regulates many legal aspects related to publicly traded joint stock companies such as disclosure, 
securities listing, offering and distribution, market integrity, and underwriters’ businesses.356 
More importantly, this law established a governmental body (Capital Market Authority “CMA”) 
to supervise and regulate the Saudi capital market. Accordingly, the CMA implemented several 
regulations to assure market fairness and integrity for all participants, especially small investors. 
These regulations include listing rules, market conduct, corporate governance, merger and 
acquisition, and securities offering.  
2.5.3 Business Organization Forms 
There are several forms of business organizations under CL such as general partnership 
company, limited partnership company, joint stock company, and limited liability company.357 
To conduct business through association, the choice of one of the legally prescribed forms is 
mandatory. No other form is possible; otherwise, the law deems the business void. Saudi CL 
provides that: “any company that does not assume one of the [companies]-mentioned forms shall 
355 Id. 
356 See The Capital Market Law (SCML) that the enacted by the royal decree number (M/30) in Jumada al-
Ahkirah 2, 1424 correspondent to (July 31, 2003). 
357 CL. art. § (2). In fact, only the first six forms are true forms as the last two types listed are not true forms 
but a structure of doing business. In addition, state-owned companies do not abide by company law provisions as 
long as a royal decree is issued to authorize its business. 
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be (considered) null and void, and the persons who have made contracts in its name shall be 
severally and jointly liable for the obligations arising from such contracts.”358 Civil law jurists 
categorize forms into three types according to main attributes. The first type, the personal 
companies (partnership, joint venture, and limited partnership), denotes when personal relations 
between partners matter the most. Thus, a legal response to such relations is prominent in the 
provisions related to formation, name, management, and dissolution. In the U.S., such forms are 
termed “partnerships” (general and limited). 
The second type is a financial company, which is a joint stock company or, more 
accurately, a publicly traded joint stock company. In financial companies, the identity of the 
persons participating in the enterprise does not affect the business of the company because these 
persons, the shareholders, change instantly with the transfer of stockholdings without any effect 
on the corporation’s business, especially its creditors.359 The third type is a hybrid company – a 
limited-by-shares partnership and a limited liability company, which have characteristics of both 
personal companies and financial companies. For instance, the identities of shareholders in a 
limited-by-shares partnership do not matter as in the case of a shareholder in a joint stock 
company; however, a general partner identity is very important to another partner in the case of a 
general partnership. 
This section will briefly discuss the main forms of business organization under Saudi 
Legal System. 
358 CL. art. § (2). There an exception to this provision regarding companies known in Islamic jurisprudence. 
359 In contrast, a close joint stock company has some features of a partnership where interrelationships 
between shareholders matter and in which some restrictions on share transferability exist. For instance, many family 
companies elect the form of the joint stock company but still restrict transferring shares to a third party before 
satisfying some requirements. 
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2.5.3.1 General Partnership Company360 
Retaining its traditional form since the Roman Empire,361 a general partnership is a company 
formed between two or more partners362 who are severally and jointly liable for a company’s 
debts and obligations.363 The name of the partnership must contain the name of one or more of 
the partners.364 As with any company under the CL, a general partnership must have capital that 
is divided into non-assignable interests.365 
A general partnership is managed by one or more managers who must be appointed in the 
company contract or in a separate contract.366 The manager does not necessarily have to be a 
partner.367 However, if the partners do not appoint a manager by either of the aforementioned 
ways, the partners have the right to manage the partnership.368 The general partnership dissolves 
upon the death of any partner, adjudged legal incapacity or declaration of bankruptcy, insolvency 
360 Called in France (societes en nom collectif). See French Commercial Code art. § (L221-1). 
361 See generally SCOTT ROWLEY, THE MODERN LAW OF PARTNERSHIP, vol. 1, 5–6 (1916). 
362 CL. art. § (16). The meaning of persons here is not clear regarding covering natural persons only or 
including juridical persons such as partnerships and companies. Article § (28) of Omani commercial company law 
specifies that inclusion of both the natural and juridical person. 
363 CL. art. § (16). Creditors need to claim their money first from the partnership and, if the partnership 
does not respond after a given notice, the creditors can collect their debt from the partners. See Article (20) of Saudi 
company law which states that: 
A partner may not be required to satisfy a debt of the partnership out of his own money unless the 
partnership’s liability for the debt has been established, either by virtue of the acknowledgment of 
those responsible for its management or by decision of the Commission for the Settlement of 
Commercial Companies’ Disputes, and after partnership has been duly called upon to effect 
payment. 
364 CL. art. § (17). It appears that the goal of this requirement is related to the historical evolution of 
partnership from a sole proprietorship where the name of the partner is an indicator of trust and personal liability of 
the partnership debts. 
365 CL. art. § (18). 
366 Id. § (27). 
367 Id. 
368 Id. § (28). 
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of one of the partners, or withdrawal of a partner from the partnership unless the partnership is a 
not-at-will partnership.369 
2.5.3.2 Limited Partnership Company370 
A limited partnership is an incorporated form of business (company) that consists of two 
categories of partners: the first includes at least one general partner who is severally and jointly 
liable for the debt of the partnership; and the other includes at least one limited partner who is 
liable for the partnership’s debt and obligations only to the extent of his contribution to the 
capital of the company.371 The name of limited partnership must not contain a name of any 
limited partner.372 If a name of a limited partner appears in the name of the partnership, the law 
regards this limited partner as a general partner vis a vis third parties.373 
General partners manage the limited partnership. Hence, the law does not allow a limited 
partner to interfere in any managerial activity of the partnership.374 If the limited partner, to the 
contrary of this ban, does participate in management, he is personally responsible for the 
transaction.375 However, if his participation in management causes or creates an impression to 
third parties that he is a general partner, he will be regarded as a general partner and thus be 
severally and jointly liable for all of the company’s debts and obligations.376 Other than the 
369 Id. § (35). 
370 Called in France (societes en commandite simple). See French Commercial Code art. § (L222-1). 
371 CL. art. § (36). 
372 Id. § (37). 
373 Id. 
374 Id. § (38). 
375 Id. 
376 Id. 
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aforementioned legal framework, the general partnership provisions govern the assignment of 
interests,377 governance,378 and dissolution379 of the limited partnership. 
2.5.3.3 Limited Liability Company380 
A limited liability company381 is the most popular form of all Saudi companies. A limited 
liability company (L.L.C) is formed by two or more persons who are responsible only for the 
debts and obligations of the company to the extent of their contribution to the company 
capital.382 The number of partners in this company is limited to fifty.383 The company may chose 
its name from the names of one or more of the partners, or it may chose a name derived from its 
purpose.384 Regardless of the manner of naming, a limited liability company must always print 
its limited liability legal form beside its name.385 A limited liability company may elect any 
lawful purpose of business to pursue other than the businesses of insurance, savings, or 
banking.386 
377 Id. 
378 Id. 
379 Id. 
380 Called in France (societes a responsabilite limitee). See French Commercial Code Article § (L223-1). 
381 Limited liability company is the most popular business form in Saudi Arabia ever since the enactment of 
company law more than four decades ago. 
382 CL. art. § (157). 
383 Id. This number attempts to convince a large group of partners to choose or transfer to a joint stock 
company (either close or public). However, the law has given some exceptions to family owned limited liability 
companies to exceed the maximum number of partners (fifty partners) which circumvents the mentioned legal policy 
intended by the legislation. For instance, Saudi Binladin Group (L.L.C.) where the company granted a special 
exception to exceed the stator prescribed number. 
384 CL. art. § (160). 
385 Id. § (12). Nevertheless, the company could use the short form of a limited liability company: L.L.C. 
386 Id. § (159). 
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The CL has eliminated the minimum capital requirement for this company form: 
company promoters now determine necessary capital based on actual financial needs.387 The 
company gathers its capital only through non-public offerings because the law prohibits a limited 
liability company to make public offerings, either to raise or increase its capital.388 The company 
then divides its capital into equally valued, non-negotiable interests.389 Any partner may assign 
his interests to another partner or third party according to the terms of the company contract.390 
Nevertheless, those terms cannot prevent any partner from transferring his complete interest to a 
third party. The only remedy the other partners have, in this situation, is to use their preemptive 
right to retain that interest.391 
With regard to company governance, partners make decisions in general meetings; thus, 
no decision is valid unless partners who own at least fifty percent or more of the company’s 
capital vote in favor of that decision.392 One or more managers393 retains the company’s 
managerial power; and that manager may be removed for legitimate (proper) cause.394 In 
addition, when partners in a limited liability company number more than twenty, the company 
must form a supervisory board and execute decisions reserved for the board by the company’s 
387 Id. § (158). 
388 Id. 
389 Id. 
390 CL. art. § (165). 
391 Id. 
392 Id. § (172). 
393 Id. § (167). 
394 Id. § (168). 
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contract.395 Unlike partnerships, a limited liability company does not dissolve upon the 
withdrawal of any partner or upon legal incapacity, insolvency, or bankruptcy of any partner.396 
2.5.3.4 Joint Stock Company397 
The CL does not define a joint stock company directly but instead indirectly lists some of its 
main characteristics: “[t]he capital of a corporation shall be divided into negotiable shares of 
equal value. The members thereof shall be responsible only to the extent of the value of their 
shares, and their number shall not be less than five.”398 However, in practice there are two types 
of joint stock companies: closed and publicly traded. In the closed joint stock company the 
capital of the company is formed not by a public offering but rather through private placement. 
In addition, there is no trading of the company shares in a capital market. Conversely, a public 
offering raises, at least, part of a publicly traded joint stock company’s capital. In addition, the 
capital market lists the company’s shares. Accordingly, thousands, if not millions, of people hold 
its shares. The minimum capital of this corporation is 10,000,000 (SAR).399 
Publicly traded joint stock companies share common characteristics: 
1. Limited Liability: 
395 Id. § (170) and § (153). 
396 Id. § (178). The provisions of this article are default rule. It is important to note this Article does not 
mention the death of a partner. The Saudi Company Law drafter apparently forgot to include this cause of 
dissolution especially in regards to other Arab law company laws stating that the death of one of the partners in 
limited liability is a cause of dissolution. In addition, the reasoning behind not dissolving the company upon the 
death of a partner is analogous to other causes mentioned in the article. Anyway, under Saudi company law the 
death of any partner does not dissolve the limited liability company unless stated in the article of the association. 
397 Called in France (societes anonymes). See French Commercial Code art. § (L225-1). 
398 CL. art. § (48). 
399 CL. art. § (48) which states, also, that two million Riyals is the minimum capital requirement for a 
closely-held joint stock company. 
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Limited liability is an integral attribute of a joint stock company. Limited liability shields 
shareholders in joint stock companies from any personal liability, as the only risk they face is 
losing the amount of money they advanced to the company. This attribute enhances equity 
finance because risk-averse investors are hesitant of exposing “all of their assets to the risks of 
the business enterprise.”400 The CL provides that the shareholders in a joint stock company “are 
liable only to the extent of the value of their shares.”401 Similarly, American corporate law 
provides for the same limitation, as the Model Business Corporation Act states: “a shareholder of 
a corporation is not personally liable for the acts or debts of the corporation.”402 Law, in fact, is 
not the only available option to have limited ability; for example, an agreement between 
shareholders and lenders may achieve the same result but at a high “cost.”403 Professor Frank 
Gevurtz notes: 
If owners who want limited liability must go out and negotiate non-recourse loans 
with all of the business’ creditors, they may need to spend more money on 
attorneys, no mention of spending extra time dickering with each creditor. 
Making limited liability available through the corporate form allows owners to 
400 ARTHUR R. PINTO & DOUGLAS BRANSON, UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE LAW 37 (Lexis Nexis 2004). 
401 CL. art. § (48). At the enactment time almost all Islamic jurists in Saudi Arabia and other countries 
believed that limited liability contradicts Sharia; however, recent developments in Islamic jurisprudence approve 
compatibility of limited liability with Sharia. Professor Chibli Mallat noted this state of contradiction: 
Yet neither law nor the business world has fully digested the separation, and some courts are 
reluctant to stop at the company’s assets in case of unpaid debt. This phenomenon is difficult to 
document in the absence of systematic law reporting, particularly in the Gulf states, where the size 
and importance of the companies in the era of oil is evident. Legal practice, as far as can be 
ascertained from lawyers and businessmen, confirms the difficulty, in countries where the persona 
of the directors and major shareholders of the companies is paramount, in limiting liability to the 
capital and assets of the company, without touching upon the personal property of the decisive 
actors in such business ventures. 
CHIBLI MALLAT, INTRODUCTION TO MIDDLE EASTERN LAW 329 (Oxford Univ. Press 2009). 
402 MBCA § 6.22(b). 
403 See FRANK EASTERBROOK & DANIEL FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 41 
(1991). 
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save this time and money. Hence, providing limited liability though the corporate 
form seems socially useful, if it not earth shattering in its importance.404 
Thus, the statutory creation of limited liability in a joint stock company enables a 
company to secure low cost finance because the company’s financial performance and potential 
are what matter to creditors, not the personal “wealth” of the shareholder.405 Limited liability 
also encourages shareholders to diversify their investment without exposing themselves to a 
great liability, as in other non-limited liability business vehicles.406 Diversification also leads to 
more separation of ownership and control where an apathetic shareholder will shy away from 
interfering in managerial matters.407 Consequently, shareholders’ apathy caused by limited 
liability “reduces the cost of operating the corporation.”408 Without limited liability share 
liquidity would be a myth. If the personal wealth of shareholder matters, then no transferring of 
shares would occur unless presumably a creditor grants his approval to the transaction in which 
the liquidity of shares is different from what it is currently.409 Thus, “limited liability saves all 
parties these investigation costs.”410 
On the other hand, some scholars undermine the importance of limited liability by stating 
that “[l]imitations on liability turn out to be pervasive”411 because “creditors” usually avoid the 
“risk” by asking the shareholder for either a “personal guarantee” or “higher interest on 
404 FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 29 (West Group 2000). 
405 See id. at 32. 
406 See id. 
407 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 403, at 42. 
408 Id. 
409 See GEVURTZ, supra note 404, at 31. 
410 Id. 
411 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 403. 
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loans.”412 In addition, “[l]imited liability induces managers of incorporated entities to take risks 
or to tolerate an overall level of risk he otherwise would avoid.”413 Regardless of those assumed 
drawbacks of limited liability, modern practice shows that “legislatures view the benefits of 
limited liability as outweighing the costs.”414 
2. Ease of Share Transfer: 
Joint stock company Common shares are the most liquid of equity interests existent, as 
the shareholder of a public joint stock company could sell his shares directly to the buyer without 
consent of the company or other shareholders. Professors Henry Hansman and Reinier Kraakman 
note that this distinctive feature “enhances the liquidity of shareholders’ interests [,] mak[ing] it 
easier for shareholder to construct and maintain diversified investment portfolios.”415 It also 
facilitates financing the company through public or private placements.416 
However, legal and contractual measures sometime hinder the full transferability of 
public joint stock company shares. The statutory restrictions on share transfer are usually for 
protecting third parties from fraudulent money collection by unsophisticated investors. Saudi CL, 
for example, provides: 
Cash shares subscribed for by the founders and shares for contributions in kind, as 
well as founders’ shares shall not be negotiable before the publication of the 
balance sheet and the profits and losses statement for two complete financial 
412 GEVURTZ, supra note 404. 
413 PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 400. 
414 Id. at 41. 
415 Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, What is Corporate Law?, in HENRY HANSMANN & REINIER 
KRAAKMAN, THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW, A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 10 (Reinier 
Kraakman & Henry Hansmann et al. eds., 2004). 
416 See id. 
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years, each consisting of at least twelve months as from the date incorporation of 
the company.417 
This legal restriction applies only to transferring shares to a third party during the 
suspension period; however, founding subscribers can transfer their shares among themselves.418 
On the other hand, shareholders – at any time – may include in the company’s bylaws some 
restrictions of share transferability, a practice called “contractual restrictions.” This contractual 
restriction varies from one company to another. However, in any event the statutory and 
contractual restrictions on share transferability have not reached the point of depriving the 
shareholder from transferring his shares: the law considers that action a fundamental right of the 
shareholder.419 
3. Independent Management: 
Public joint stock companies usually conduct business on a large scale and collect money 
from many people who may lack the technical capacity to run the business efficiently. Thus, 
those people like to place their money in the hands of professional management. Professors 
William Klein and John Coffee note that “[i]ndividual shareholders may rationally conclude that 
they would not want important decisions affecting their investment to be made by people like 
themselves.”420 Accordingly, law delegates the task of managing public companies to specialized 
professionals that is a board of directors. Saudi company law states that “[a] joint stock company 
shall be managed by the board of directors”421 as does the Model Business Corporate Act 
417 CL. art. § (100). 
418 Id. 
419 See id. § (101). 
420 WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE 110 (2007). 
421 CL. art. § (66). 
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(MBCA).422 This structure of power in some ways resembles the constitutional structure of 
government.423 In fact, concentration of decision-making power in the hands of management is a 
very important attribute in publicly held companies where some scholars believe it is “[t]he 
single most important fact of corporate law”424 which enhances “specialization” of functions425 
and eases the interaction and supervision in the company.426 
4. Perpetual Life: 
The CL is silent about the duration of the joint stock company, which implies that a joint 
stock company may specify its lifespan in its contract. However, the mandatory bylaws form of 
the joint stock company has set a limit for the life this company for a maximum of 99 year, 
which could be extended for one or more of the same period.427 
A joint stock company is supposed to live an indefinite life due to the non-importance of 
the shareholder personality; in fact, the ease of shares transfer reflects this fact along with the 
separation of ownership from management attributes.428 Professor Robert Clark’s comments 
422 MBCA § 8.01(b) which states that: “[a]ll corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority 
of directors of the corporation, and the business and affairs of the corporation shall be managed by or under the 
direction, and subject to the oversight, of its board of directors....” See also Del. § 141(a); Cal. § 300(a). 
423 See GEVURTZ, supra note 404, at 4, where he said “[p]resumably drawing from ideas of republican 
government, control over the corporation resides in board (the board of directors). The shareholders elect the board 
of directors each year. The board then appoints officers to carry out day-to-day management.” 
424 ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 21 (1986). Professors Henry Hansmann and Reinier 
Kraakman compare centralized management in a public company with management structures in other business 
forms: “[t]his is not to say that other legal entities, such as partnerships, business trusts, or limited liability 
companies, cannot have a board structure similar to that of a typical corporation; in fact, they often do. But those 
forms, unlike the corporation form, do not presume a board of directors as a matter of law.” See Hansmann & 
Kraakman, supra note 415, at 11 n.23. 
425 See CLARK, supra note 424, at 23. 
426 Id. at 24. 
427 Article (4) of the Mandatory Bylaw Form of the joint stock Companies. 
428 See CLARK, supra note 424, at 19. 
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regarding the relation of the shares transfer mechanism in publicly held companies and the 
continuous life of public company: 
Rarely do common shareholders in public corporations have a right to force the corporation to buy 
back their shares. Nor are they able, on their own initiative, to force the company to liquidate and 
thus pay all the shareholders. Consequently, there is no risk, as there is in a general partnership, 
that the joint exercise of such a right by a number of investors will kill the enterprise. Corporations 
have a more stable existence. They are more likely to preserve the going concern value of large 
projects.429 
Similarly, but more clearly, American corporate law provides that “every corporation has 
perpetual duration.”430 Professors Gower and Davis note about the perpetual life of a publicly 
held corporation that “[t]he death of a member leaves the company unmoved; members may 
come and go but the company can go for ever.”431 
Both Saudi and American publicly held forms are supposed to exist for generations so 
long as no reason for dissolution has occurred. Generally, dissolution in a Saudi joint stock 
company occurs either voluntarily by shareholders,432 or involuntarily by legal dissolution in the 
case of capital’s decreasing by seventy-five percent,433 or by judicial order.434 
5. Strict Formalities: 
429 Id. at 19. 
430 MBCA § 3.02, in this juncture, Sir William Blackstone, long time ago, compared a corporation to a 
river. Just as the water constantly changes, the river remains the same. The same applies to publicly held joint stock 
companies. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, vol. 1, 456 (A Reprint of First 
edition with supplement Dawsons of Pall Mall: London, 1966) (he said “for all the individual members that have 
exi[s]ted from foundation to the pre[s]ent time, or that [s]hall ever hereafter exi[s]t, are but one per[s]on in law, a 
per[s]on that never dies: in like manner as the river Thames is [s]till the fame river, though the parts which 
compo[s]e it are changing every in[s]tant.”). Id. 
431 GOWER & DAVIS, PRINCIPLE OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 42 (8th ed. 2008). 
432 See CL. art. § (15). In American law voluntarily dissolution by the recommendation of the board and the 
approval of the shareholders meeting. See MBCA § 14.02. 
433 CL. art. § (15). 
434 Id. § (148). For Judicial dissolution under American law. See MBCA § 14.30. 
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Until the early 1980’s, there were only five joint stock companies in Saudi Arabia.435 
This evidences how difficult it was to form a joint stock company in Saudi Arabia; in fact, 
businessmen often did not even attempt such an action. However, the law introduced some 
amendments to the provisions of incorporation to facilitate the formation of a joint stock 
company that in fact raised that small number to more than one hundred joint stock companies at 
the end of the last century. The establishment of the Saudi capital market in 2004 contributed to 
the spread of public joint stock companies; however, most of the new public joint stock 
companies436 were originally family,437 state-owned companies438 or companies required by law 
to be a public joint stock company, such as banks439 and insurance companies.440 
2.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter was dedicated to furnishing an introduction to the history, economy, and legal 
system of Saudi Arabia. The Saudi Arabian government is working on diversifying its economy 
and reducing its reliance on oil which its revenue represents the main driving force of Saudi 
435 See MOHAMMAD HASAN AL-JABOR, SAUDI COMMERCIAL LAW 287 (4th ed. 1996) 
436 For more improation about economic strucutre of saudi publicly traded companies, see chapter VI. 
437 There are many listed companies that still bear the name of the founding family business, such as al-
Othiam, Shaker, al-Rajhi (bank), al-Babtain, al-Abdullatif, al-Hokair, Fitaihi, and al-zamil. 
438 For example, Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (SABIK), Rabigh Refining and Petrochemical 
Company (Petrorabigh), Saudi Kayan Petrochemical Company (Kayan), and Yanbu National Petrochemical 
Company (YANSAB). 
439 There are eleven listed banks which are all required to be listed according to Saudi Banking Control 
Law [hereinafter B.C.L.] which requires all licensed banks in Saudi Arabia to be joint stock companies. See B.C.L. 
art. § (3)(1). 
440 About thirty one insurance companies were established after 2003, the year of regulating and 
legitimizing the insurance industry in Saudi Arabia. It is noteworthy that the law compelled insurance company 
promoters to form publicly held joint stock companies to conduct insurance activities in Saudi Arabia. 
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economy. Theoretically, the Saudi government comprises three branches: administrative, 
legislative and judiciary. However, the King is the true holder of the mentioned powers. In other 
words, the modern constitutional concept of separation of power is not recognized under the 
Saudi constitutional system. Saudi Arabian Legal authority found its sources in Islamic law and 
legislations enacted by the government. Rules in Islamic law are deduced from either the primary 
sources, that is the Koran and Sunna, or supplementary sources such as Ijma and Qiace. Islamic 
law, also, is complemented by modern legislations enacted by the Saudi government. However, 
Islamic rules have a supremacy over all forms of legislations, including the Basic Law of 
Governance. A notable legislation is the Companies Law of 1965, which recognizes a number of 
business organization forms, including joint stock companies, as the only available legal vehicles 
for publicly traded companies in Saudi Arabia. 
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3.0  CORPORATE GOVERNANCE I: CONCEPT AND VALUE 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter will discuss the concept of corporate governance by summarizing the different 
point of views attempting to define this controversial concept. One of the chapter’s goals is to 
show that corporate governance can be defined in different ways, depending on the perspective. 
The chapter also moves to shed light on the sources of corporate governance. Corporate 
governance players such as stakeholders and gatekeepers will also be discussed. Finally, the 
chapter will address the driving factors of implementing and reforming corporate governance, 
such as securing low cost external finance, market crashes, globalization, and privatization. 
3.2 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ORIGIN 
Corporate governance is an old concept in modern clothes because conventionally, the essence of 
corporate governance is centered on the diversion of interest between the principal and the agent: 
the agency cost problem.1 Accordingly, the agency cost problem has, presumably, existed hand 
1 For more detailed discussion of agency cost problem see chapter IV. 
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in hand with the first agency relation formed in history.2 Through business history, sole 
proprietorships and then partnerships were the main forms of business vehicles, but agency costs 
did not pose a real problem to the business world due to the heavy involvement of the principal 
in management or the supervision of business affairs.3 
However, the western renaissance coupled with industrial revaluation induced the 
formation of large publicly traded corporations with thousands of small, fragmented, and passive 
investors. The first notable example was the British company, East India, which had a legal 
structure similar to the publicly traded corporation  in our modern time.4 This business form 
caused a serious agency cost problem which is likely the starting point of modern corporate 
governance literature. Adam Smith was one of the pioneer scholars who shed light on the agency 
cost problem associated with large publicly traded corporation s.5 Although corporate 
governance as a concept had existed for ages, its distinctive name was produced recently (1962) 
in Richard Eells book “The Government of Corporations” in which Eells titles one the book 
chapters “The Study of Corporate Governance.”6 The etymology of the phrase “corporate 
governance” is traced to old European languages. The word “corporate” is derived from the 
Latin word “corpus” which means “body” or a “body of people.”7 “Governance” comes from the 
old Greek word, Kybernao, which means “to steer.”8 
2 No one can specify when that took place. All that can be asserted is that agency costs happened a very 
long time ago. 
3 See chapter IV. 
4 See chapter IV. 
5 See chapter IV. 
6 See RICHARD EELLS, THE GOVERNMENT OF CORPORATIONS 3 (1962). 
7 THOMAS CLARKE, INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH 1 (Routledge 
2007). See also JOHN FARRAR, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THEORIES, PRINCIPLES, AND PRACTICE 3 (2d ed. Oxford 
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3.3 CONTEMPORARY MEANING OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Currently, the corporate governance concept has transcended its literal meaning and become a 
global phenomenon that attracts the attention of diverse groups of researchers and policy 
makers.9 Although the study of this concept is fairly current,10 the divergence in literature with 
regard to its definition is notorious.11 Some of the definitions are wide while some are concise 
and narrow. Professor John Farrar said corporate governance “is a fashionable concept [which] 
... is somewhat ambiguous and a bit of a cliché.”12 For contemporary scholars the concept is 
clear; however, framing a well-rounded definition for it is still lacking effort and luck. Thus, to 
some degree we may agree with some scholars’ description of corporate governance as “an 
indefinable term, something – like love and happiness – which essentially know the nature of, 
but for which words do not provide an accurate picture.”13 
One of the most widespread definitions, for instance, is one of Sir Adrian Cadbury’s 
inaugural attempts to define corporate governance: “[c]orporate governance is the system by 
Univ. Press, N.Y. 2005) (“The etymology of ‘governance’ comes from the Latin words gubernare and gubernator, 
which refer to steering a ship and to the steerer or captain of the ship. This is the origin of the word ‘governor.’”). 
8 CLARKE, supra note 7. See also FARRAR, supra note 7 (“The word ‘governance’ comes from the old 
French word ‘gouvernance’ and means control and the state of being governed.”). 
9 See FARRAR, supra note 7. 
10 JILL SOLOMON, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 12 (John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., 2d ed. 
2007). 
11 Id. 
12 FARRAR, supra note 7. 
13 JEAN JACQUES DU PLESSIS, JAMES MCCNVILL & MIRCO BAGARIC, PRINCIPLES OF CONTEMPORARY 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 1 (Cambridge Univ. Press, N.Y. 2005). 
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which companies are directed and controlled.”14 The Organization of Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) formed a more detailed definition which states: 
Corporate governance ... involves a set of relationships between a company’s 
management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate 
governance also provides the structure through which the objectives of the 
company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring 
performance are determined.15 
However, this definition does not include the nonbinding forces of corporate governance, 
as Professor Jonathan Macey offers in his definition of corporate governance: 
Corporate governance describes all of the devices, institutions, and mechanisms 
by which corporations are governed. Anything and everything that influences the 
way that a corporation is actually run or mechanism that exercises power over 
decision-making within a corporation is part of the system of corporate 
governance for that firm.16 
On the other hand, some definitions intertwine corporate governance with good corporate 
governance attributes. For instance, some scholars define corporate governance as: 
[T]he process of controlling management and balancing the interests of all 
internal stakeholders and other parties ... who can be affected by the corporation’s 
conduct in order to ensure responsible behaviour [Sic] by corporations and to 
achieve the maximum level of efficiency and profitability for a corporation.17 
Similarly, other scholars’ definitions reflect their views on the optimal corporate 
governance model: 
[C]orporate governance is ... the system of check and balances, both internal and 
external to companies, which ensures that companies discharge their 
14 Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, Para (2.5) (Gee Publishing 
Ltd. 1992). 
15 OECD PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 11 (2004). 
16 JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES BROKEN 2 (Princeton 
Univ. Press 2008). 
17 DU PLESSIS ET AL., supra note 13, at 6–7. 
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accountability to all their stakeholders and act in socially responsible way in all 
areas of their business activity.18 
This attempt to define corporate governance encapsulated the concepts of efficiency, 
profitability, accountability to stakeholders, and behaving with social responsibility. Obviously, 
those words are beyond the scope of the corporate governance definition but they are a 
theoretical foundation of the national corporate governance system which varies from one 
country to the other. For example, for some countries the protection of the interest of part of the 
stakeholders – such as workers – is more important than achieving the ultimate economic 
efficiency and profitability when a compromise of one has to be made to secure the other.19 
In short, the corporate governance literature and practice reveal that “[t]here is no single, 
accepted definition of corporate governance. There are substantial differences in definition 
according to which country is considered.”20 Clearly, corporate governance definition “depend[s] 
on the viewpoint of the policy maker, practitioner, researcher or theorist.”21 Some scholars 
confuse the corporate governance concept with corporate law and many times use them 
interchangeably. Nonetheless, corporate governance has a wider scope than corporate law.22 
18 SOLOMON, supra note 10, at 14 (emphasis omitted). 
19 See generally Marleen O’Connor, Labor’s Role in the American Corporate Governance Structure, 22 
COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 97 (2000). 
20 SOLOMON, supra note 10. 
21 Id. 
22 Corporate governance is about binding legal rules and non binding ethical standards, whereas corporate 
law is primarily devoted to binding rules. Moreover, corporate governance intertwines with multiple disciplines in 
contrast to corporate law. 
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3.4 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SOURCES 
3.4.1 Hard sources 
Corporate governance hard sources are “traditional black-letter law”23 which normally consists 
of binding legal rules such as laws, regulations, and case law (in common law tradition countries 
as U.S. and U.K.)24 The Corporate Acts (statutes) are the oldest hard source of corporate 
governance wherein most of the corporate governance norms were prescribed.25 Currently, this is 
still the case at least for developing countries that have underdeveloped governance enforcement 
institutions.26 In modern era capital markets, regulations and acts are becoming very important 
sources of corporate governance authority, especially in developed economies. For example, the 
U.S. capital market regulations and law play a role that exceeds the role of corporate law.27 
23 JEAN JACQUES DU PLESSIS ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CONTEMPORARY CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 162 
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2d ed. 2011). 
24 See FARRAR, supra note 7, at 3–4. However, case law is not always true to be a hard source of corporate 
governance because case law plays fewer roles in civil law tradition countries than common law tradition countries 
since it does not constitute a binding rule of law. It is merely an authoritative or secondary source. See, e.g., PETER 
DE CRUZ, COMPARATIVE LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD 68–69 (2d ed. 1999). See also Arthur R. Pinto, An Overview 
of United States Corporate Governance in Publicly Traded Corporations, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 257, 261 (2010) (he 
states that: “[t]he common law system in the United States allows the courts to create law along with the 
legislatures. While there are significant federal and state statutes and rules which apply to publicly traded 
corporations, case law created by the state and federal judiciary plays a significant role in both the interpretation and 
creation of law.”) (footnote omitted). 
25 In fact, there is an inverse proportion between the development of corporate governance enforcement 
institutions’ capacity and the degree corporate law plays as a source of corporate governance in a country. In other 
words: the more that external mechanisms of governance are efficient, the less corporate law is important to 
corporate governance. 
26 See Bernard Black & Reinier Kraalman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 HARV. L. REV. 
1911, 1913 (1995–1996) (he noted that: “emerging economies cannot simply copy the corporate laws of developed 
economies. These laws depend upon highly evolved markets, legal and governmental institutions and cultural norms 
that often do not exist in emerging economies.”). 
27 See Pinto, supra note 24 (“the public markets drive much of the regulation and issues of corporate 
governance”). 
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Moreover, the case law plays a critical role in gap filing the corporate governance norms, 
especially in the common law tradition systems. In those systems, courts invented the fiduciary 
duties of the board of directors.28 Such an invention has contributed to the corporate governance 
structure of common law tradition countries29 and has affected recent legal reform in other civil 
law tradition countries through the transplantation of those fiduciary duties.30 
Other disciplines contribute more importantly to the corporate governance norms such as 
bankruptcy, labor, and environment. Bankruptcy law, for instance, became a cornerstone for 
corporate governance norms at the time of corporate reorganization and liquidation by shifting 
the fiduciary duty of the board of directors from maximizing shareholders’ value (or 
stakeholders’ value in other models) towards the protection of the interests of the corporation 
creditors.31 Moreover, Labor law interacts with corporate governance32 – especially at the stage 
of reorganization, downsizing, and consolidation – and most likely such actions will cause a 
28 See Troy A. Paredes, A Systems Approach to Corporate Governance Reform: Why Importing U.S. 
Corporate Governance Law Isn’t the Answer, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1055, 1075 (2003–2004) (he noted that: “To 
the extent substantive corporate law matters in the United States, it is not the law on the books but the common law 
of fiduciary duties that judges craft. Billions of shares exchange hands daily on the New York Stock Exchange and 
NASDAQ, not because of strong laws on the books that favor shareholders, but despite weak ones.”). There are two 
stages of judicial analysis with regard to the directors’ duties: the first is duty of care and second is duty of loyalty. 
Pinto, supra note 24, at 257, 278. For an overview of fiduciary duty in U.S. Law see ARTHUR R. PINTO & DOUGLAS 
BRANSON, UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE LAW 215–39 (3d ed. 2009). See alsoFrank H. Easterbrook, International 
Corporate Differences: Markets or Law, in GLOBAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 47 (Donald H. Chew & Stuart L. 
Gillan eds., 2009) (“Indeed, I think that the influence of law on corporate governance and structure is far less in the 
United States than in Europe and Japan. Perhaps the courts play a larger role in the United States, in the course of 
enforcing contracts and fiduciary duties, but law plays less.”). 
29 See Easterbrook, supra note 28 (“I think that the influence of law on corporate governance and structure 
is far less in the United States than in Europe and Japan. Perhaps the courts play a larger role in the United States, in 
the course of enforcing contracts and fiduciary duties, but law plays less.”). 
30 See generally Lynn A. Stout, On the Export of U.S. – Style Corporate Fiduciary Duties to Other 
Cultures: Can a Transplant Take?, in GLOBAL MARKETS, DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS: CORPORATE LAW AND 
GOVERNANCE IN A NEW ERA OF CROSS-BORDER DEALS 46–76 (Curtis J. Milhaupt). 
31 See generally MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RETHINKING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 23–26 (1995). 
32 FARRAR, supra note 7, at 4. 
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termination of countless employees’ contracts. In this juncture, some countries’ labor laws are 
strict in allowing the corporation to terminate the contract of workers even if the result of 
allowing such action against workers is not efficient.33 In other words, some legal systems are 
prone to elevate the right of the workers above the interest of the shareholders. In addition, 
environmental laws and regulations impose a social responsibility on the corporation that affects 
the way of governing the corporation. 
3.4.2 Soft Sources 
Corporate governance soft sources comprise “voluntary sources of corporate governance 
standards that companies have the freedom to adopt or not”34 which are found in non-binding 
norms and principles that are adopted by corporate governance interested institutions.35 For 
example, (OECD)36 and (UNCTAD)37 intend to promote good corporate governance culture 
within the world’s business society. Recently, most developing countries have adopted corporate 
33 For example, “Iranian labour laws are very employee-friendly and make it extremely difficult to lay off 
staff. Employing staff on consecutive six-month contracts is illegal. So is firing staff unless a serious offence can be 
proved. Labour disputes are settled by a special labour council, which usually rules in favour of the employee. As 
such, a small problem can turn into a major issue, taking a lot of an expatriate manager’s time and energy to solve.” 
Available at http://www.ftz-services.org/map/Challanges.htm (accessed on May 15, 2011). 
34 DU PLESSIS ET AL., supra note 23. 
35 See, e.g., American Law Institute (ALI) Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and 
recommendations. 
36 The Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Principles of Corporate 
Governance (2004), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf (accessed on May 15, 2011). 
37 The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Guidance on Good Practices in 
Corporate Governance Disclosure (2006), available at 
http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/un_cgdisclosure_guidance_2006_en.pdf (accessed on May 15, 2011). 
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governance principles that are heavily influenced by international best practices.38 Conducting 
business in several jurisdictions forced multinational corporations to elect globally accepted 
corporate governance (soft) standers rather than the governance structure of corporate origin 
(headquarter location).39 
Moreover, religious values and commands play a crucial role in many corporate 
governance systems, especially in religious attached societies.40 Moreover, society’s general 
values and culture affect corporate governance practices and limits in that some behavior might 
be promoted and otherwise restrained.41 For instance, Indonesian culture is promoting a 
collective value when rendering a decision within the corporation in which the consideration and 
approval of all involved parties are encouraged by culture and corporate law.42 By contrast, 
western democracies are culturally linked to the background of the rule of majority and the 
respect for minority rights,43 whereas Islamic core values in Indonesian corporate governance to 
38 See, e.g., The Guidance of Corporate Governance in Yemen Arab Republic (2010) which cited and 
referred to several international corporate governance best practices documents and other literature, available at 
http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/cg_guidelines_yemen_mar2010_ar.pdf (in Arabic) (accessed on May 15, 
2011). 
39 See Douglas Branson, Teaching Comparative Corporate Governance: The Significance of “Soft Law” 
and International Institutions, 34 GA. L. REV. 669, 670 (1999–2000). 
40 For example, Arab countries are influenced heavily by Islamic Principles. See, e.g., Arab Republic of 
Yemen Corporate Governance which clearly states in the Guidance goals that corporate governance main principles 
such as accountability and transparency coincide with Islamic religious principles prescribed by The Koran and 
Prophet Mohammad’s tradition. The Guidance of Corporate Governance in Yemen Arab Republic 9 (2010), 
available at http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/cg_guidelines_yemen_mar2010_ar.pdf (in Arabic) (accessed on 
May 16, 2011). 
41 See FARRAR, supra note 7, at 6 (he said: “[e]very country approaches corporate governance from the 
background of its own distinctive culture”). 
42 See Article § (87)(1) of Indonesian Limited Liabilities Companies Law of (2007) (“GMS [General 
Meeting of Shareholders] resolution shall be adopted on the basis of deliberation to reach consensus.”), available at 
http://mutiaraconsultantbali.com/company-law-uu-40-2007.pdf (accessed on Dec. 28, 2011). See also Douglas M. 
Branson, The Very Uncertain Prospect of “Global” Convergence in Corporate Governance, 34 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 
321, 346 (2001). 
43 For the rule of majority, see generally John Gilbert Heinberg, History of the Majority Principle, 20 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 52 (1926). 
89 
                                                 
act collectively is more likely not observed in corporate practices.44 On the other hand, some 
corporate governance rules are clearly not hard laws or soft laws, too, like “listing rules ... and 
Statements of Accounting Practice,” which Professor Farrar called “hybrids or ... hard soft 
law.”45 
3.4.3 Corporate Law Role in Corporate Governance 
Corporate law used to be the main source of corporate governance rules in all national corporate 
governance systems. However, constitutional and institutional variations among nations have 
played a part in undermining corporate law’s role in corporate governance. For instance, 
corporate statutes in the U.S. do not play an essential part in corporate governance fabric46 due to 
the U.S. federal nature under which each of the fifty states has its own corporation act.47 This 
regulatory framework caused a “race to the bottom” in corporate acts in the U.S. among 
American states.48 This race is not a new phenomenon.49 Decades ago, Justice Brandies, in his 
dissenting opinion, commented on that by saying: 
Lesser states, eager for the revenue derived from the traffic in charters, had 
removed safeguards from their own incorporation laws. Companies were early 
formed to provide charters for corporations in states where the cost was lowest 
44 For Islamic perspective on corporate Governance, see infra chapter (V). 
45 FARRAR, supra note 7, at 4. See also DU PLESSIS ET AL., supra note 23 (he said that: “‘hybrids fall 
somewhere between the two [categories of governance sources]: neither mandatory nor purely voluntary”). 
46 See Easterbrook, supra note 28. 
47 See Pinto, supra note 24, at 257, 262. 
48 For the race to the bottom theory, see, e.g., William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections 
Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1973–1974) (he proposed for federal intervention on corporate law matters 
instead of keeping them to states standards). Id. at 663. 
49 New Jersey was the first state adopting a liberal structure of corporate law for the sake of attracting more 
chartering. See Cary, supra note 48, at 663, 663. 
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and the laws least restrictive. The states joined in advertising their wares. The race 
was one not of diligence but of laxity.50 
Theoretically, corporation promoters or manager opt to “incorporate” or reincorporate in 
the best jurisdiction for shareholders.51 Delaware is the most notorious state which succeeded in 
lowering the standard of protection to shareholders commonly provided by the corporate statutes 
of other states.52 Accordingly, the winner of this race is the state which could attract more new 
corporations to incorporate, or existing corporations to reincorporate, according to the board of 
director friendly regulatory framework.53 In other words, the “race to the bottom” generates a 
jurisdictional arbitrage between the U.S. states to host businesses for several reasons, but mainly 
taxation and allowing directors to follow their favorite legal structure within which to operate 
which in turn depends upon a state’s limitation of the directors’ liability. This legislative contest 
among states’ legislatures has motivated the transformation of U.S corporate statutes from 
mandatory to default structure.54 Accordingly, the comparative advantages in those acts herein 
50 Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 518, 557–59 (1933) (Brandies, J., dissenting). 
51 FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 5–6 
(1991). 
52 See Pinto, supra note 24, at 257, 262. 
53 Cf. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 51, at 5 (“[t]he founders of the firm will find it profitable to 
establish the governance structure that is most beneficial to investors, net of the cost of maintaining the structure. 
People who seek resources to control will have to deliver more returns to investors. Those who promise the highest 
returns – and make the promises binding, hence believable-will obtain the largest investments.”). 
54 See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 28, at 49–50 (he noted that: “[o]ne may ask how corporate law came to 
be enabling rather than directory in the United States. The answer lies in competition among jurisdictions-still 
another form of investor protection. States that tried inefficient regulation would drive capital and corporate 
structures out of their jurisdictions. Ease of movement within the large U.S. market made this possible. So states lost 
the ability to do substantial injury. Could they do good? Well, they could be more hospitable to competition, and the 
structure of federalism in the United States made this possible. Courts restricted states’ ability to discriminate 
against corporations that had their headquarters in other states. Firms could move their charters without moving their 
operations – quite unlike the “real seat” doctrine in Europe, which was created by France in the 19th century to block 
completion from England! And it happened that Delaware was small enough to make a binding commitment to have 
an efficient law. It gathers about 20% of the state budget from corporate charter fees, a bond of good faith toward 
corporations that lack votes in the legislature. No surprise when the head of the committee that drafted the most 
recent version of the Delaware Code become Chief Justice of Delaware.”). See also Jonathan R. Macey, Institutional 
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are centered on the extent a state act differs from other states acts by trying to furnish more 
efficient default rules, as if contracting out of them by corporate constituencies is costly.55 
Nonetheless, not just a few scholars have taken issue with the “race to the bottom” hypothesis. 
They have asserted that U.S. states regulatory contest are more likely to lead to a “race to the 
top” rather that to the bottom, as incorporating in shareholder low protection states will not 
attract investors to the new enterprise. Thoughtful judge and scholar Frank Easterbrook argued: 
Managers in the United States must select the place of incorporation. The fifty 
states offer different menus of devices (from voting by shareholders to fiduciary 
rules to derivative litigation) for the protection of investors. The managers who 
pick the state of incorporation that is most desirable from the perspective of 
investors will attract the most money. The states that select the best combination 
of rules will attract the most corporate investment (and therefore increase their tax 
collections. So states compete to offer – and manager to use – beneficial sets of 
legal rules. These include not only rules about governance structures but also 
fiduciary rules and prohibitions of fraud.56 
Conversely, in unitary non-federal states the corporate law is the umbrella for all 
operating corporations. Moreover, the vital role of corporate law to corporate governance in 
developing countries is attributed to the weakness of other corporate governance external 
enforcement institutions.57 Accordingly, the corporate law is the only mechanism available to 
Investors and Corporate Monitoring: A Demand-Side Perspective in a Comparative View, in COMPARATIVE 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE STATE OF THE ART AND EMERGING RESEARCH 907 (Klause et al. eds., 1998) (she 
noted that: “while there is robust debate about whether the missing terms [of corporation incomplete contract] 
supplied by the legal system should be mandatory or enabling, there is no debate that corporate governance systems 
should supply the missing terms”). 
55 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 51, at 34 (he said that: “corporate law is a set of terms 
available off-the-rack so that corporate ventures can save the cost contracting”). 
56 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 51. 
57 See Black & Kraalman, supra note 26, at 1911, 1924 (he described the underdeveloped corporate 
governance structure in developing countries by saying: “in emerging economies, where informational asymmetries 
are severe, markets are far less efficient, contracting costs are high because standard practices have not yet 
developed, enforcement of contracts is problematic because of weak courts, market participants are less experienced, 
reputable intermediaries are unavailable or prohibitively expensive, and the economy itself is likely to be in flux”). 
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enforce the corporate governance norms.58 Yet, enforcement institutions in the developed world 
are solid enough to perform an equal role support the national framework of corporate 
governance.59 The Securities Exchange Commission’s (SEC) nationwide regulatory authority in 
the U.S. plays a role with regard to the binding corporate governance norms as in the recently 
enacted Sarbanes-Oxley Act.60 
58 This model is called the self-enforcing model. See Black & Kraalman, supra note 26, at 1911, 1924. 
59 See, e.g., Paredes, supra note 28 (he noted that: “[t]o the extent substantive corporate law matters in the 
United States, it is not the law on the books but the common law of fiduciary duties that judges craft. Billions of 
shares exchange hands daily on the New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ, not because of strong laws on the 
books that favor shareholders, but despite weak ones.”). 
60 The STC established according to the Securities Act Of 1934 which provides in Section § 4 (a): 
There is hereby established a Securities and Exchange Commission (hereinafter referred to as the 
“Commission”) to be composed of five commissioners to be appointed by the President by and 
with the advice and consent of the Senate. Not more than three of such commissioners shall be 
members of the same political party, and in making appointments members of different political 
parties shall be appointed alternately as nearly as may be practicable shall be members of the same 
political party, and in making appointments. 
Currently, the SEC is implementing many important acts that are (listed chronologically) the Securities Act 
of 1933, the Securities Act of 1934, the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, the Trust Indenture Act of 
1939, the Investment Company Act of 1940, the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, and the Sarbanes – Oxley Act of 
2002. Moreover, the (SEC) has a role under the Securities Investors Protection Act of 1970 and Bankruptcy Reform 
Act of 1978. For a general overview of those acts, see LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELINGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF 
SECURITIES REGULATION 45–71 (5th 2004). See also Jennifer G. Hill, Regulatory Responses to Global Corporate 
Scandals, 23 WIS. INT’L L.J. 367, 377 (2005) (“[a] global trend has emerged for stock exchanges to be more 
involved in corporate governance regulation”). 
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3.5 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PLAYERS 
3.5.1 Stakeholders 
The word “stakeholders” may cover a broad variety of “interests,” as it could be attached “to any 
individual or group on which the activities of the company have impact.”61 Stakeholders are 
generally defined as “[a]ll persons and institutions that have an interest in seeing a venture or 
company succeed.”62 In fact, stakeholders are the corporate governance ends and means because 
various portions of the corporation wealth or loss will be distributed to (or inflected on) them in 
one way or other. Three scholars described this scenario as follows: 
The flows between the firm and its stakeholders run in both directions; each 
stakeholder is perceive[ed] as contributing something and receiving something 
from [the] corporation (even involuntary and essentially passive stakeholders 
contribute by tolerating the existence and operation of the firm, and receive some 
combination of benefits and harms as a result).63 
Shareholders, who reside at the top of the stakeholders list, supply the equity finance to 
the corporation and are also the ultimate claimants of the corporation’s residual assets.64 
Shareholder stakes reside mainly in receiving dividends, selling their shares for profit in the 
stock market, or in the worst situation, receiving something back from their investment if the 
61 CHRISTINE MALLIN, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 49 (2d ed. 2007), cited in DU PLESSIS ET AL., supra note 
23, at 23. 
62 See the definition of stakeholders in “the Free Dictionary,” available at http://financial-
dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Stakeholders (accessed on Mar. 3, 2001). 
63 J.E. POST, L.E. PRESTON & S. SACHS, REDEFINING THE CORPORATION: STAKEHOLDER MANAGEMENT 
AND ORGANIZATIONAL WEALTH 22 (2002), quoted in DU PLESSIS ET AL., supra note 23, at 23. 
64 See DU PLESSIS ET AL., supra note 23, at 35. For a general overview of shareholders’ role in publicly 
traded corporation  see PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 28; JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, CORPORATIONS 
327–81 (2d ed. 2003); ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 93–105 (1986). 
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company is liquidated.65 The corporation’s directors66 and officers67 are the integral decision-
making authority whereby the eventual success or failure of the corporation will be attributed to 
them. 
Moreover, creditors of the corporation have a stake in the corporation to the extent they 
are expecting the corporation to meet its obligation to pay back the contracted amount in 
return.68 Suppliers want the corporation to expand or at least keep its business as a source of 
profit.69 Workers, also, are a vital part of the corporation as their interests are in the corporation’s 
keeping their employment contracts at the corporation and, at a time of corporate prosperity, they 
perhaps will receive raises, bonuses and other “employee benefits, including securing retirement 
benefits from the company.”70 Otherwise, if the corporation did not do well it might go out of 
business, or at least shrink by downsizing, thus making the corporation compelled to lay off 
many (or few) employees. In some countries, workers’ stakes in the corporation are protected by 
granting employees participation power in corporate decision making.71 
The corporation’s customers have an interest in the corporation to the extent of its 
product quality and safety.72 The community in general also has stake in the corporation 
65 See DU PLESSIS ET AL., supra note 23, at 35. 
66 For functions and powers of directors, see, e.g., PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 28, at 131–33; COX & 
HAZEN, supra note 64, at 135–81; CLARK, supra note 64, at 105–13. 
67 For general overview of officers’ positions in a publicly traded corporation  see PINTO & BRANSON, 
supra note 28, at 134–36; COX & HAZEN, supra note 64, at 117–30; CLARK, supra note 64, at 113–23. 
68 DU PLESSIS ET AL., supra note 23, at 35. For an overview of publicly traded corporation  obligations 
towards its creditors, see CLARK, supra note 64, at 35–92. 
69 DU PLESSIS ET AL., supra note 23, at 35. 
70 See id. 
71 For example Germen Publicly traded corporation  law granted the worker the power of decision. See, 
e.g., The Germen Codetermination Act; The Germen Coal and Steel Codetermination Act. 
72 See DU PLESSIS ET AL., supra note 23, at 35. 
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whereby the corporation’s success is ultimately reflects on that community’s inhabitants in terms 
of job creation and raising the standards of living, especially with regard to “the corporations 
adhere[nce] to good practice in corporate governance and do[ing] business in an environmentally 
friendly manner.”73 Governments are interested in the success of national corporations as they 
generate revenues to states directly through taxes, fees, and royalties and indirectly to be a 
wealth-creating engine for the benefit of that state’s general public.74 Standard examples of such 
a government interest are Delaware and the small countries in the world that generate most of 
their public income from incorporation and its resulting revenue, such as the Cayman Islands.75 
3.5.2 Gatekeepers 
Gatekeepers76 are “private parties who are able to disrupt misconduct by withholding their 
cooperation from wrongdoers,”77 or “the independent professionals who serve investors by 
preparing, verifying, or assessing the disclosures that they receive.”78 Normally, a good 
“reputation” is the gatekeeper’s indispensable capital so “that they will not sacrifice that 
73 Id. 
74 See id. at 35–36. 
75 In the Cayman Islands, there are no corporate taxes nor income taxes and no restrictions on ownership of 
land by foreigners. See http://www.gov.ky/portal/page?_pageid=1142,1481212&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL 
(accessed on May 23, 2011). 
76 Gatekeeper is a new concept in corporate law. See generally Peter B. Oh, Gatekeeping, 29 J. CORP. L. 
735 (2003–2004). 
77 Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third – Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. 
& ORG. 53, 53 (1986). 
78 John C. Coffee, Jr., The Attorney as Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1293, 
1296 (2003) (footnote omitted). 
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reputation to assist a client in wrongdoing.”79 It seems that the more professional gatekeepers are 
in doing their jobs, the more trustworthy the corporate governance system becomes and the 
higher the investor confidence is of that governed system. Gatekeepers include auditors, rating 
agencies, securities analysts,80 investment bankers, and underwriters.81 Auditors confirm that the 
corporation’s financial statements are prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting 
principles (GAAP).82 Securities analysts provide investors with information about the 
corporation’s prospects and “competitiveness.”83 Credit rating agencies appraise the securities’ 
“issuer’s credit-worthiness.”84 Investment bankers provide a “fairness opinion” with regard to 
valuation “of a merger.”85 Underwriters have to carry out “due diligence” if they are 
underwriting a corporation’s “initial public offering.”86 
Lawyers are similar to “gatekeepers” in that they care about maintaining their “reputation 
capital.” They also, have the ability to bar deals or decelerate public authority consent for deals 
that are critical to their business patrons.87 For example, in a securities-related transactions, 
79 Pinto, supra note 24, at 257, 274. 
80 See Section 501 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. 
81 See Coffee, supra note 78, at 1293, 1296–97. 
82 For detailed discussion of the auditors as a gatekeeper in publicly traded corporation s see JOHN C. 
COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 108–91 (2006). 
83 Coffee, supra note 78, at 1293, 1296–97. For detailed discussion of the securities analyst as a gatekeeper 
in publicly traded corporation s, see COFFEE, supra note 82, at 245–82. 
84 Id. For a detailed discussion of the rating agencies as a gatekeeper in publicly traded corporation s, see 
COFFEE, supra note 82, at 283–14. 
85 See Coffee, supra note 78, at 1293, 1296–97. See also Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The 
Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 620 (1984) (they said that: “the critical role of the investment 
banker as a reputational intermediary becomes clear. In essence, the investment banker rents the issuer its reputation. 
The investment banker represents to the market (to whom it, and not the issuer, sells the security) that it has 
evaluated the issuer’s product and good faith and that it is prepared to stake its reputation on the value of the 
innovation.”). Id. 
86 See Coffee, supra note 78, at 1293, 1296–97. 
87 Id. at 1293, 1298. 
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lawyers could interfere with a deal “simply by signaling their displeasure” to the capital market 
authority.88 A commentator draws comparison between the function of lawyers and auditors in 
securities transactions by saying: 
I would suggest that in securities matters (other than those where advocacy is 
clearly proper) the attorney will have to function in a manner more akin to that of 
auditor than to that of the attorney. This means several things. It means that he 
will have to exercise a measure of independence that is perhaps uncomfortable if 
he is also the close counselor of management in other matters, often including 
business decisions. It means he will have to be acutely cognizant of his 
responsibility to the public who engage in securities transactions that would never 
have come about were it not for his professional presence. It means that he will 
have to adopt the healthy skepticism toward the representation of management 
which a good auditor must adopt. It means that he will have to do the same thing 
the auditor does when confronted with an intransigent client—resign.89 
The expansion of the lawyer’s role to be gatekeeper has created controversies in the 
literature.90 The most authoritative one that critics have noted is that the statutory imposed duty 
88 Id. 
89 A.A. Sommer, Jr., The Emerging Responsibilities of the Securities Lawyer, Address to the Banking, 
Corporation & Business Law Section, N.Y. State Bar Ass’n (Jan. 24, 1974), in LARRY D. SODERQUIST & THERESA 
GABALDON, SECURITIES REGULATION 617–19 (4th ed. 1999), cited in Coffee, supra note 78, at 1293, 1299. See also 
id. at 1293, 1309–10 (he noted that: “the principal practical effect of imposing gatekeeper obligations on attorneys is 
that a client who has been advised by an attorney that contemplated action is unlawful now has greater reason to 
heed that attorney’s advice – again precisely to the extent that the client believes that the attorney may be under a 
legal obligation to report material misconduct (either within the corporation or outside to the SEC). Thus, even if it 
were true that clients would consult their lawyers less often, this impact could be more than fully offset by the fact 
that it would become more dangerous to disregard the lawyers’ advice. Add to this mix the likelihood that ex ante 
advice will not be chilled, and the net impact is to increase the attorney’s leverage over the client by making it more 
dangerous to ignore the attorney’s advice. If law compliance is the goal, such an impact seems socially desirable. 
Put simply, the logical remedy for gatekeeper failure is to empower the gatekeeper, and a noisy withdrawal 
obligation makes it more costly for the client to ignore the lawyer.”). 
90 Professor John C. Coffee, Jr. presented an eloquent summary for both sides of argument by stating that: 
[N]ontrivial arguments can be advanced that securities attorneys will not make good gatekeepers. 
Chiefly, skeptics object either that (1) the responsibilities of a gatekeeper conflict with the 
traditional obligations of loyalty that attorneys owe to their clients, or (2) imposing gatekeeping 
obligations on attorneys will chill attorney-client communications that also serve to promote law 
compliance. In response, ... that: (1) securities attorneys have long recognized gatekeeper-like 
obligations (and thus differ from their litigator colleagues in a profession that is considerably more 
heterogeneous than is generally recognized); (2) the differences between attorneys and auditors are 
less fundamental and more marginal than opponents of the SEC’s proposed noisy withdrawal 
standard have recognized; (3) in some respects, it may be easier to impose gatekeeper obligations 
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on a lawyer to be a gatekeeper contradict, or at least narrow, the scope of the “policy” 
encouraging lawyer-client arms-length interaction.91 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act settled this 
controversy by imposing a statuary obligation on lawyers – besides their traditional role of being 
“advocate and transaction engineer”92 – to be whistleblowers (gatekeepers) for capital markets 
and stewardships of corporate governance’s integrity.93 
3.6 GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AGENDA 
Corporate governance can be viewed in two different dimensions. First to be considered is the 
national corporate governance structure of a country. The second is the governance structure of 
each individual corporation operating within that national system. In other words, a national 
governance system is the forest and individual corporations are the trees in that forest. In such a 
framework, those two models of governance coexist and complement each other to the extent 
benefiting both of them. But in both cases it is easily recognized that “[t]here is no single model 
of good corporate governance.”94 Both structures of governance opt to be tailored to match the 
country or the corporation’s wants and goals. National governance in fact is more critical to the 
on attorneys than on auditors; and (4) imposing gatekeeper obligations on attorneys is likely 
neither to chill socially desirable client communications nor to reduce attorneys’ influence over 
their clients, but may actually increase attorneys’ leverage over their most intransigent clients. 
Coffee, supra note 78. 
91 Coffee, supra note 78, at 1293, 1302. 
92 Id. 
93 See Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. For a detailed discussion of the lawyer as a 
gatekeeper in publicly traded corporation s see COFFEE, supra note 82, at 192–244. 
94 OECD PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 13 (2004). 
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study of corporate governance because it delineates the narrow governance model of the 
individual corporation. 
Well-designed national corporate governance encompasses some flexibility to allow 
different corporations to adjust their particular governance models within its broad framework. 
In addition and most importantly, a good national corporate governance system takes into 
account national factors of such as “legal, regulatory, and institutional environment.”95 For 
instance, most of American “corporate governance focuses on balancing the costs and benefits of 
... separation [of ownership from control] and utilizing different monitoring devices available to 
protect shareholders from losses resulting from ... [this] separation.”96 By contrast, for the 
majority of other countries, except the U.K., corporate governance is (or in some cases should 
be) devoted to “address how the legitimate interests of minority investors are both protected and 
promoted.”97 Overall, there are common goals most corporate governance systems desire to 
secure, generally speaking, the promotion of economic efficiency and social values by skillfully 
reducing agency costs and raising accountability. In this juncture, Sr. Adrian Cadbury held: 
Corporate governance is concerned with holding the balance between economic 
and social goals and between individual and communal goals. The governance 
framework is there to encourage the efficient use of resources and equally to 
require accountability for the stewardship of those resources. The aim is to align 
as nearly as possible the interests of individuals, corporation and society.98 
Moreover, an efficient corporate governance model has to “promote [a] transparent and 
efficient market, be consistent with the rule of law and clearly articulate the division of 
95 Id. at 11. 
96 Pinto, supra note 24, at 257, 260. 
97 J. MARK MOBIUS, ISSUES IN GLOBAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: AN ASIA-
PACIFIC CRITIQUE 40 (Low Chee Keong ed., Sweet & Maxwell 2002). 
98 Sir Adrian Cadbury, Forward, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A FRAMEWORK FOR IMPLEMENTATION VI 
(Magdi R. Iskander & Nadereh Chamlou eds., World Bank Group 2000). 
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responsibilities among different supervisory, regulatory and enforcement authorities.”99 This 
model, also, should be fair to all stakeholders, especially minority shareholders.100 A promising 
corporate governance model has to “provide proper incentives for the board and management to 
pursue objectives that are in the interests of the company and its shareholders and should 
facilitate effective monitoring.”101 Not to be forgotten, good governance structure surpasses the 
mentioned economic factors with psychological ones by “attempt[ing] to rebuild society’s trust 
in companies, investment institutions and other organizations.”102 To be sure, securing good 
corporate governance does not happen overnight, or by merely transplanting corporate 
governance related legislations and codes. Rather, it is a product of ongoing effort from private 
and public sectors, in any country, which diligently rely on the best available external and 
internal governance mechanisms to bring accountability and efficiency to the implementing 
country.103 
99 OECD PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Principle (I) (2004). 
100 See MOBIUS, supra note 97, at 41. 
101 OECD PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 11 (2004). 
102 SOLOMON, supra note 10, at 5. 
103 External mechanisms include hostile takeovers and public enforcement including that by the judiciary. 
But internal mechanisms are related to the corporation bodies – mainly the board of directors and shareholders 
general meeting. See generally CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A FRAMEWORK FOR IMPLEMENTATION VI, at 22, 40-42 
(Magdi R. Iskander & Nadereh Chamlou eds., World Bank Group 2000). 
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3.7 DRIVING FORCES OF IMPLEMENTING GOOD CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 
3.7.1 Introduction 
Implementation of sound corporate governance has become a goal for most countries of the 
world and publicly-held corporations. The constant quest for an optimal corporate model is 
motivated by several factors. First of all, a good corporate governance structure – whether at the 
national level or at the corporate level – pays back clearly with regard to offering a competitive 
external finance cost, not only from local finance suppliers but international institutional ones as 
well. Second, a good corporate governance structure facilitates the integration of standards, 
devices, and practices emanating from ongoing globalization. Good corporate governance is not 
static; instead, it is subject to a constant reform and modification often triggered by corporate 
scandals and capital markets crises. Third, economic reform in the last three decades necessitated 
the transfer of state-owned enterprises to private owners, wherein the success of the privatization 
programs required a strong corporate governance system. 
3.7.2 External Finance 
External finance is not a new factor; however, it may be considered the primary factor driving 
for implementing good corporate governance. Basic finance dictates that companies need money 
to conduct operations and further expansions. The company manages to supply the needed 
money from either its retrained earnings (internal finance) or through external finance (debt or 
102 
equity).104 Commonly, internal finance will not suffice for all of a corporation’s projects or 
expansions or, in many cases cover the costs of its operations. Thus, external finance is the ideal 
source of finance for companies. But external finance providers (financiers) want to ensure that 
they will not only get their money back but also receive a return either as provided in the contract 
in debt finance or as reasonable expectations in equity finance. In layman’s terms: in the business 
world there is no free lunch; people expect to get profits from their invested money. 
Accordingly, well-implemented corporate governance “enhance[s] investor confidence” 
to invest in the capital market.105 Without a solid governance structure, investors will be hesitant 
to “provide capital,” an action which will deter the development of “capital markets.”106 Sound 
corporate governance system offers national enterprises low-cost finance due to the chance of 
such a system’s fostering higher performance and integrity.107 Conversely, in ill-functioning 
corporate governance system, investors most likely “lack control over the corporation [in which 
they] find it risky and costly to protect themselves from the opportunistic behavior of managers 
or controlling shareholders.”108 The elevated risk assessment of ill-governed capital markets 
tends to make the investors discount the share price in equity finance, raise the interest on debt 
finance, or decline to make the investment under any circumstance. For instance, if the fair 
104 External finance comes from two main sources: equity finance and debt finance. Equity finance comes 
either through public offering of the corporation’s shares or venture capital. For public offering, see generally EILIS 
FERRAN, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE LAW 409–73 (2008). For venture capital, see generally RICHARD A. 
BREALEY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 408–12 (9th ed. 2008). There are various methods of securing 
external finance, most notably bonds. See generally id. at 313–45. 
105 OECD PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 11 (2004). 
106 MAGDI R. ISKANDER & NADEREH CHAMLOU, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A FRAMEWORK FOR 
IMPLEMENTATION 2 (The World Bank Group 2000). 
107 Art Durnev & E. Han Kim, Explaining Differences in the Quality of Governance Among Companies: 
Evidence from Emerging Markets, in GLOBAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 53, 54 (Donald H. Chew & Stuart L. 
Gillan eds., 2009). 
108 ISKANDER & CHAMLOU, supra note 106. 
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market value of a share is $10.00 but investors believe that the management of the corporation 
may exploit some part of the corporate profit, the investor more likely will buy the share at a 
lower price than the $10.00 fair market value to equalize the expected exploitation, for the cost 
of financing the corporation is higher than it would be if the corporation would operate in a 
sound corporate governance system. This scenario is plausible in a dispersed ownership model. 
But, in concentrated ownership patterns, this scenario is different, at least to the controlling 
shareholder(s), where the price of his share may be sold above its fair market value as a 
“premium” of the de facto entitlement to the corporation and minority shareholders assets. In 
either case, both scenarios raise the cost of the corporation’s external finance regardless of who 
is in control or in a position to exploit the corporation’s resources. 
Good corporate governance will attract both national and international investors to supply 
the capital market with equity and debt finance. Some studies suggest that national investors may 
be more eager to invest in their national capital market as “domestic investors are often captive 
to the system and face greater risks.”109 However, good corporate governance will attract foreign 
investors to invest in the national capital market as well. Attracting foreign investment 
precipitates a race for reforming corporate governance systems, especially in developing 
countries which normally have weak corporate governance structures. To invest in a country’s 
capital market, international institutional investors assess the strength and weakness of the 
nation’s corporate governance structure. No doubt, the framework of corporate governance plays 
an important role in guiding international investors to the right place to put their money and how 
much they should invest. 
109 Id. 
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Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs)110 have become a new and important external finance 
provider.111 Good corporate governance will of course attract those funds managers’ attention. 
Most especially, SWFs provide corporations with “long-term” equity finance.”112 Assets under 
the control of SWFs amount to almost $3 trillion.113 Most likely this number is going to jump 
massively,114 particularly if the price of oil stays (or rises above) the current level.115 However, 
110 Sovereign Wealth Funds vary from each other. Accordingly, it is burdensome to define them by one 
definition. As Professors Gilson and Milhauot said regarding FWFs: 
[S]overeign wealth funds defy attempts at straightforward definition. In essence, they are equity 
investment vehicles established by and under the control of sovereign states. The key 
characteristic is government ownership of the fund, but this characteristic is shared by a host of 
other entities. 
Ronald Gilson & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Sovereign Wealth Funds and Corporate Governance: A Minimalist 
Response to the New Mercantilism, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1354 (2007–2008). Moreover, Generally Accepted 
Principles and Practices “Santiago Principles” (Oct. 2008) [hereinafter GAPP] defines SWFs as: 
[S]pecial purpose investment funds or arrangements that are owned by the general government. 
Created by the general government for macroeconomic purposes, SWFs hold, manage, or 
administer assets to achieve financial objectives, and employ a set of investment strategies that 
include investing in foreign financial assets. SWFs have diverse legal, institutional, and 
governance structures. They are a heterogeneous group, comprising fiscal stabilization funds, 
savings funds, reserve investment corporations, development funds, and pension reserve funds 
without explicit pension liabilities. 
International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds, Sovereign Wealth Funds: Generally Accepted 
Principles and Practices “Santiago Principles,” 3 (Oct. 2008). For comprehensive treatment of SWFs economic and 
governance framework. See EDWIN M. TRUMAN, SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS: THREAT OR SALVATION? (2010). 
111 See Shams Butt et al., Sovereign Wealth Funds: A growing Global Force in Corporate Finance, in 
Global Corporate Governance 327 (Donald H. Chew & Stuart L. Gillan eds., 2009). 
112 Id. at 344 (“SWFs are, by their nature, long-term investors who are likely to stick with asset allocation 
choices, perhaps even in the event of short-term losses. This can be an important stabilization factor for companies 
and financial markets. Unlike private equity and hedge fund investors, SWFs do not usually rely on high leverage, 
do not face capital requirements, and are not likely to face pressures to rapidly liquidate positions based on 
withdrawals – all of which can make them more stable investors.”). 
113 This number is according to the end of 2007 data, see Butt et al., supra note 111, at 331. 
114 In 2007, one of Morgan Stanley’s economists (Joachim Fels) projected that SWFs assets will reach $12 
trillion in 2015. Joachim Fels, How Big Could Sovereign Funds Be in 2015? (May 4 2011), available at 
http://www.morganstanley.com/views/gef/team/index.html#anchorstephenjen (accessed on May 6, 2011). Another 
projection by the International Monetary Fund estimated that the assets of SWFs may reach $10 trillion in 2013. 
International Monetary Fund, Sovereign Wealth Funds – a Working Agenda, Prepared by Monetary and Capital 
Markets and Policy Development and Review Departments 6 (Feb. 29, 2008). 
115 Brent Crude Oil barrel price on May 6, 2011 was about US $109, http://www.oil-price.net/ (accessed on 
May 6, 2011). Most SWFs are owned by oil exporting countries who will ultimately reinvest the surplus of that 
revenue or part of it into its own SWFs. See also Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 110, at 1345, 1358 (“The sudden 
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developed countries have recently shown some distress about SWFs,116 especially since the 
SWFs are not transparent concerning “their ultimate objectives, institutional structure, 
investment policies, and risk management.”117 More significantly, developed countries fear 
political factors may intertwine with (or effect) SWFs investment decisions.118 For example, a 
SWF may buy a block of stock in a corporation to have access to its trade secrets or know how, 
only to be transferred to the SWF’s controlling state.119 No evidence has been shown yet that 
SWFs have done this but the justification for such fear might be that, as two scholars framed it, 
“the debate takes the potential (and the logic) for such behavior extremely seriously.”120 In any 
situation, international institutional investors, including SWFs, may push the agenda of 
reforming corporate governance, particularly to developing countries, to attract investment to 
their capital mark and publicly traded corporation s. However, the potential of SWFs as a new 
external finance supplier of stable and low cost finance will more likely face a strong reluctance 
by developed economies,121 which may either hinder the SWF’s agenda for expansion in low-
risk developed countries, or confine SWFs’ investment in high-risk developing countries. 
emergence and growth of SWFs as players in the global capital markets are due to several interrelated factors. One 
is the spike in world oil prices, which has brought massive revenues to oil exporters such as Norway, Russia, and the 
Middle East. A second factor is the enormous accumulation of foreign-exchange reserves by Asian central banks, a 
portion of which has been split off and invested separately in SWFs.”). 
116 See, e.g., Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 110, at 1345 (proposing the issuance of nonvoting shares for 
SWFs to eliminate any concern associated with their ownership); Joel Slawotsky, Sovereign Wealth Funds as 
Emergence Financial Superpowers: How U.S. Regulations Should Respond, 40 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1239 (2009). 
117 Butt et al., supra note 111. Although the majority of SWFs are not transparent, there are some 
differences among those funds: their “disclosures.” Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 110, at 1345, 1355. 
118 See, e.g., Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 110, at 1345, 1361–62 (“A fair reading of the current SWF 
debate strongly suggests that the principal concern with SWF equity investments is that they may have a significant 
strategic element driven by self-interest.”). 
119 Id. 
120 Id. at 1345, 1362. 
121 The concerns stems from the lack of transparency in SWFs business. See LIXIA LOH, SOVEREIGN 
WEALTH FUNDS: STATES BUYING THE WORLD 34 (2010). For the position developed countries toward SWIFs. See 
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However, it should be noted that foreign capital does not always bring positive outcomes. 
Sometimes foreign external finance hurts the host countries’ economies, making some 
economies worse off – as in the case of developing countries. For instance, two decades ago, 
East Asian countries’ capital markets crashed one after another like a fall of a “domino” stone 
wall122 due to foreign investors’ rapid withdrawal from those countries’ capital markets. The 
abrupt liquidation was ignited by fear of those countries’ market collapses. In many instances, 
foreign investments fled without consideration of the economic, political, social impacts such 
withdrawal might inflict on those countries.123 In other words, it is not always true that the 
accumulation of foreign investments carries with it good news. Indeed, sometimes it carries 
unpleasant ramifications due to its opportunistic, un-embedded nature. On the other hand, studies 
suggest that individual corporations could secure low-cost finance even if the national structure 
of corporate governance is lagging.124 Good corporate governance in such cases is sometimes 
more noticeable and awarded, especially by local finance suppliers.125 
ALBERTO QUADRIO CURZIO & VALERIA MICELI, SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS: A COMPLETE GUIDE TO STATE-
OWNED INVESTMENT FUNDS 157–75 (2010). 
122 See Hwa-Jin Kim, International Corporate Governance: A Selected Bibliography, 8 J. KOREAN L. 201, 
203 (2008–2009) (“a corporation’s governance is no longer a domestic issue but rather an international one, which 
may provide a starting point for domino effect, where weakness in a single national or regional economy can cause a 
world financial crisis”). 
123 This abrupt liquidation of securities and withdrawal from capital market by foreign investors called “hot 
money” problem. See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 17 (2002) (“the influx of hot 
money into and out of the country that so frequently follows after capital market liberalization leaves havoc in its 
wake. Small developing countries are like small boats. Rapid capital market liberalization, in the manner pushed by 
the IMF, amounted to setting them off on a voyage on a rough sea, before the holes in their hulls have been repaired, 
before the captain has received training, before life vests have been put on board. Even in the best of circumstances, 
there was a high likelihood that they would be overturned when they were hit broadside by a big wave.”). 
124 See Durnev & Kim, supra note 107, at 54 (“companies with better governance and more transparency 
should be valued more highly in the stock market because of investors’ greater confidence that they will end up with 
their fair share of firm profits. And, as stated, this positive effect of good governance on firm value is likely to be 
stronger in countries with weak legal systems. To put it another way, good corporate governance should be valued 
more highly in countries where it is scarce – namely, in weaker legal regimes.”). 
125 See Durnev & Kim, supra note 107, at 54. 
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In short, external finance is critical for corporations’ operations and expansion. Without a 
good corporate governance system at the national level, or at least for the individual corporation 
alone, it would be more expensive to operate and secure low cost finance. Accordingly, 
Developed and developing countries must engage in corporate governance dialogue, hoping that 
talk may lead to attracting new capital market investors who “base their decisions not only on a 
company’s outlook, but also on its reputation and its governance.126 If corporate governance 
structure is crafted wisely and effectively, it will ultimately make the investors in capital market 
investing more confident and encourage low-cost finance through the capital market; thus, the 
entire national economy will harvest the benefits. In other words, the World Bank is correct 
when it stated: 
Countries wishing to attract investment need to convince potential investors 
that reliable governance structures are in place, both at the state and corporate 
level. The other side of the same coin is that institutional investors, who can 
invest anywhere in the world, will look to place their funds where their 
standards of disclosure, of timely and accurate financial reporting, and of 
equal treatment of all shareholders are met.127 
126 ISKANDER & CHAMLOU, supra note 106. 
127 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CHAIRMANSHIP: A PERSONAL VIEW BY ADRIAN CADBURY 13 (N.Y. 
2002). Also see MOBIUS, supra note 97, which noted that: “With markets becoming increasingly sensitive to 
company misbehavior [Sic] and corporate governance violations, reports of abusive behavior [Sic] often quickly 
result in price crashes. The most unfortunate aspect of all this is that it is often the small retail investors that get hurt 
the most. For fund management companies with billions of dollars to allocate around the world, diversification 
strategies serve to minimize the exposure to any one single company. However, for the small retail investors, the 
quick and drastic erosion of share’s value is all too often financially crippling.” 
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3.7.3 Globalization 
The last century witnessed an unprecedented revolution of communication and transportation, a 
phenomenon called “globalization.”128 Technically speaking, “globalization” signifies “the 
removal of barriers to free trade and the closer integration of national economies.”129 
Globalization is a product of two main elements: technological advancement and free trade. 
Money and labor in a globalized economy have a better chance to produce “sophisticated work” 
at a lower price.130 Globalization, accordingly, allocates production and resources to “the 
smartest or the cheapest producer, or both.”131 Accordingly, globalization not only “make[s] the 
world smaller,”132 but also “flat.”133 
The root of globalization is traced to a new economic order incepted in the wake of the 
World War II at the Bretton Woods Convention.134 Bretton Woods’ agenda created a triangle of 
128 There is voluminous literature on globalization see, for example, STIGLITZ, supra note 123; THOMAS L. 
FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2005). 
129 STIGLITZ, supra note 123. According to Merriam Webster Dictionary “Globalization,” a word known in 
1951, means “the development of an increasingly integrated global economy marked especially by free trade, free 
flow of capital, and the tapping of cheaper foreign labor markets.” Available at http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/globalization (accessed on May 2, 2011). 
130 FRIEDMAN, supra note 128, at 21. Developed countries argue against some aspects of globalization such 
as using cheap child labor in developing countries to manufacture products that are sold mainly in the west and other 
rich countries, but this argument depicts the truth from a developed country’s perspective which disregards the real 
situation of those children before globalization forces reached their location, as Dr. Stiglitz notes: “People of the 
west may regard low-paying jobs at Nike as exploitation, but for many people in the developing world, working in a 
factory is a far better option than staying down on the farm and growing rice.” STIGLITZ, supra note 123, at 4. 
131 FRIEDMAN, supra note 128, at 14. 
132 JAMES D. COX, ROBERT W. HILLMAN & DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 98 (16th ed., Aspen Publishers 2009). 
133 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 128, at 7. In a globalized world the earth community “are ... connecting all 
knowledge centers on the planet together into a single global network ....” Id. at 8. 
134 The convention was held in Bretton Wood in New Hampshire, U.S.A. The convention concluded with 
the international agreement called “Bretton Wood Agreement,” signed in 1944. See MITSUO MATSUSHITA ET AL., 
THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LAW PRACTICE, AND POLICY 1–2 (2003). 
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international economic institutions: the World Bank, International Monetary Fund,135 and the 
International Trade Organization.136 The goal intended was to entrust those institutions with the 
supervision of the post World War II economic order.137 Shortly after that, in 1947 the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was signed.138 However, the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services came to force in 1995 as a result of the Uruguay Round which began in 1986. 
Since 1995, the World Trade Organization (WTO) has been in charge of the administration and 
implementation of the international free trade agreements (GATT and GATS).139 Currently, 153 
out of 195 countries of the world are members of World Trade Organization (WTO).140 The 
WTO’s chief goal is to enhance free trade among members in goods and services.141 Although 
there is no international investment agreement that could legally facilitate the flow of cash over 
the globe in contrast to GATT and GATS’ multilateral agreements,142 modern “technology ... 
135 For the Bretton Woods’ system, see generally BARRY EICHENGREEN, GLOBALIZING CAPITAL: A 
HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM 90–133 (2008). 
136 The ITO did not come to the existence as was planed. See generally MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 
134. 
137 The World Trade Organization (WTO) was established in (1995) as a successor of the intended but 
failed to be established International Trade organization (ITO) at the middle of the last century. See MATSUSHITA ET 
AL., supra note 134, at 2 n.2. 
138 For general overview of GATS see MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 134. 
139 WTO’s existence can be traced to the time of GATT’s entering the force as a de facto administrative 
deciding body for that agreement. See the WTO website, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact1_e.htm (accessed on May 4, 2011). 
140 153 members are in the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (accessed on Apr. 30, 2011). The world consists of 
195 countries: all of them are members of the United Nations except for Kosovo, Taiwan, and Vatican City. 
141 There is no comprehensive multilateral agreement on investment under the supervision of the WTO or 
anywhere else. See generally Dr. Rainer Geiger, Towards a Multilateral Agreement on Investment, 31 CORNELL 
INT’L L.J. 467 (1998). 
142 Investments are still governed by customary public international law principles and bilateral and 
regional agreements. 
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allow[s] money to move quickly throughout the world ... [which] has contributed mightily to 
globalization of capital markets.”143 
In our modern era, not only does globalization have a positive impact on the world’s 
“standard of living”144 and “knowledge” accessibility,145 but also on businesses around the world 
which are “compet[ing] with one another.”146 In such an advanced state of affairs the winner is 
whomever can produce and sell the most efficiently – which is not easy to secure without good 
corporate governance in place. The loser has two options: either to lose under its current out 
moded governance model and practices, or reform its governance model to rejoin the 
competition. Put differently, high-quality corporate governance is a vital part of being a 
competitor; otherwise and eventually, the globalized economic forces will drive the 
uncompetitive firm outside the market.147 Accordingly, firms around the world have to 
restructure their governance model to minimize costs, elevate performance and increase revenue. 
In this juncture, Professor Jeffery Gordon noted: “as trade barriers erode, the locally protected 
product marketplace disappears. A country’s firm’s performance is more easily measured against 
global standards. Poor performance shows up more quickly when a competitor takes away 
market share, or innovates quickly.”148 
143 COX ET AL., supra note 132. 
144 See STIGLITZ, supra note 123, at 4, where he remarks that “Because of globalization many people in the 
world now live longer than before and their standard of living is far better.” 
145 Id. (“Globalization has reduced the sense of isolation felt in much of the developing world and has given 
many people in the developing countries access to knowledge well beyond the reach of even wealthiest in any 
country a century ago.”). 
146 Jeffrey N. Gordon & Mark J. Roe, Introduction, in Convergence and Persistence in Corporate 
Governance 1 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Mark J. Roe eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2004). 
147 See id. 
148 See id. 
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On the other hand, globalization poses a special problem for developing economies if 
those countries do not plan wisely how, in what order and to what level the elevation of the 
restrictions on trade in goods and services will be. Otherwise, “open[ing] up [markets] for 
competition too rapidly ... [leads] to rising unemployment and increased poverty.”149 In short, 
corporate governance structure is becoming an important topic now more than any other time in 
history. Now competition has moved from a national level to an international level and the future 
promises more integration. In this changing globalized world, the state and individual firm’s 
governance structure do make difference. Put simply, the more the world economy is integrated, 
the more corporate governance structure matters to individual firms and to the national and 
(ultimately) global economy at large. 
3.7.4 Capital Market Crisis and Corporate Scandals 
3.7.4.1 Capital Market Crisis 
The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis (ECMH) theorizes that the index price of a stock 
“reflects” the share’s true value.150 There are three levels of market efficiency: weak, semi-
strong, and strong.151 Most capital market’s price efficiency is either weak or semi-strong.152 In a 
weak form of efficiency, the market price of a share reflects the share’s related historical 
149 STIGLITZ, supra note 123, at 18. 
150 Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Reviewer of Theory and Empirical Work, vol. 25, No. 2 J. 
FINANCE 388 (1970). For general discussion of Efficient Market Hypothesis, see JAMES H. LORIE, PETER DODD & 
MARY HAMILTON KIMPTON, THE STOCK MARKET: THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 55–87 (2d ed. 1985); HENDRIK S. 
HOUTHAKKER & PETER J. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCIAL MARKETS 130–140 (1996). 
151 Fama, supra note 150. 
152 Id. (he noted that “there is no important evidence against the [Efficient Market] hypothesis in the weak 
form and semi-strong form tests). Id. at 88. 
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information.153 In a semi-strong market efficiency market prices reflect both historical and 
newly-available public information.154 For example, if corporation (X) discloses its financial 
results and the corporation’s share price changes the next day, that means the capital market 
absorbed the new information and incorporated it into the share price. Thus, in this situation, the 
capital market is considered semi-strong. However, if in the next day’s trading the stock price 
did not change or took a long period to do so, then the market is a weak efficient capital market, 
or demonstrates weak efficiency as to that stock. On the other hand, a strong efficiency form 
reflects all corporation information which either is publicly disclosed or held by privileged 
persons.155 Nonetheless, the widespread strong form efficiency is not plausible due to its 
contradiction with most capital markets’ regulations, which prohibit non-disclosed information, 
notoriously known as “insider trading prohibition.”156 
To the contrary of the ECMH premise, historical records indicate that capital markets 
tend to be inflated to a point that does not reflect the true value of the share: a capital market 
bubble.157 In other words, an injection of enormous amounts of money into the capital market 
causes a greatly overpriced stock market. Capital market bubbles, like other financial bubbles, 
are temporary: sooner or later they burst and cause a financial crisis.158 For example, in 1636 the 
first recorded financial crisis occurred in the Netherlands due to the crash of tulip bulb prices 
153 Id. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. 
156 The prohibition of insider trading is considered a good corporate governance practice. See THE OECD 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES 44 (2004) which states that “[i]nsider trading ... should be prohibited.” For 
the Economic Justification for the Prohibition of insider trading, see Hayne E. Leland, Insider Trading Should It Be 
Prohibited?, vol. 100, No. 4 J. POL. ECON. 859–87 (1992). 
157 See generally HAROLD L. VOGEL, FINANCIAL MARKET: BUBBLES AND CRASHES 121–23 (2010). 
158 See CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER & ROBERT ALIBERT, MANIAS, PANICS, AND CRASHES: A HISTORY OF 
FINANCIAL CRISES 11–12 (15th ed. 2005). 
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shortly after the price had jumped dramatically.159 Since that event, the history of inflation 
bubbles and their bursting has repeated itself. For instance, in the last hundred years, the United 
States’ capital market has undergone three major crises: the Great Depression (1929),160 the 
dot.com (2000),161 and subprime mortgages (2008).162 The effects of capital market crises 
usually exceed national borders to reach other, interconnected capital markets163 such as those in 
East Asian countries in the 1990s.164 Consequently, their capital markets fell like “dominoes.”165 
Economic booms appear and fade periodically as no recession or expansion lasts forever 
due to the business cycle.166 Usually, economic expansion stimulates capital markets and other 
financial bubble formations. During this period, investors from all walks of life, including “the 
widows and orphans,” rush hysterically to invest their savings in the stock market.167 The 
temptation of prospective wealth during a capital market bubble is not held exclusively by lay 
investors but is also shared by many sophisticated investors. Sophisticated investors know that 
after every bubble there follows an imminent collapse; however, they do not know exactly when 
such a collapse will occur. Two scholars envisaged the early stage of bubble development by 
159 See VOGEL, supra note 157, at 27–29 (2010). 
160 See id. at 32–34. 
161 See generally KINDLEBERGER & ALIBERT, supra note 158, at 7. 
162 See VOGEL, supra note 157, at 42–47. For a detailed exploration of the 2008 financial crisis in the 
U.S.A. See The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report: The Final Report of the National Commission on the Causes of The 
Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States (2011). 
163 See KINDLEBERGER & ALIBERT, supra note 158, at 125–27. 
164 See id. at 156–58 (East Asian financial crisis ignited first in Thailand and then spread like a fire to the 
rest of the other countries’ markets.). 
165 For the “domino” simile see Kim, supra note 122, at 201. 
166 See KINDLEBERGE & ALIBERT, surpa note 158, at 24. See also the U.S.A business cycles expansions and 
contractions information (1854–2009) in the National Bureau of Economic Research website, available at 
http://www.nber.org/cycles/US_Business_Cycle_Expansions_and_Contractions_20100920.pdf (accessed on Jan. 2, 
2012). 
167 See KINDLEBERGER & ALIBERT, supra note 158, at 118. 
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saying “[t]he economic situation in a country after several years of bubble-like behavior 
resembles that of a young person on a bicycle; the rider needs to maintain the forward 
momentum or the bike becomes unstable.”168 At the time of a bubble, investors assume 
economic prosperity will last forever, so they keep pushing the prices up to the market’s limit;169 
ultimately, “the greatest fool” eventually will endure all sorrows and lose when the bubble 
implodes.170 An economist illustrated this situation by saying “[b]ubbles are wonders to behold. 
They take your breath away and make your pulse race. They make fortunes and – just as fast or 
faster, in the inevitable stomach-churning crash aftermath – destroy them too.”171 
A stock market bubble tends to negatively affect other economic sectors by redirecting 
various sectors’ resources toward the inflated capital market. For instance, many people will 
abandon businesses that yield financial returns less than the return the capital market would 
offer.172 Put simply, stock market investors, at the time of bubbles, are tempted by capital 
markets’ high returns (greed) and convenience. The more people invest in capital markets, the 
greater the consequences for that capital market and national economy if the bubble implodes. 
168 Id. at 11. 
169 Robert W. Hamilton, The Crisis in Corporate Governance: 2002 Style, 55 ME. L. REV. 351, 352 (2002–
2003) (“optimism was fueled by the quite mistaken belief that the rise in securities prices would continue 
indefinitely”). See also KENNETH L. FISHER & MEIR STATMAN, BUBBLE EXPECTATIONS, THE JOURNAL OF WEALTH 
MANAGEMENT 17, 17 (Fall 2002) (“Investors form expectations as if they believe that inflated bubbles will continue 
to inflate while deflated bubbles will continue to deflate.”). 
170 KINDLEBERGER & ALIBERT, supra note 158, at 13 (“[t]he bubble involves the purchase of an asset, 
usually real estate or security, not because of the rate of return on the investment but in anticipation that the asset or 
security can be sold to someone else at an even higher price; the term ‘the greater fool’ has been used to suggest the 
last buyer was always counting on finding someone else to whom the stock or the condo apartment or the baseball 
cards could be sold.”). Id. 
 See also STATMAN, supra note 169, at 17, 19. From risk management point view see Neil A. 
O’Hara, The Greater Fool Theory: Managing and Modeling Risk, J.N.Y. SOCIETY OF SECURITY ANALYSTS 29–33 
(The Investment Professional) (2009), available at http://www.theinvestmentprofessional.com/vol_2_no_1/TIP-Vol-
2-No-1.pdf (accessed on Jan. 1, 2012). 
171 VOGEL, supra note 157, at xiii. 
172 See KINDLEBERGER & ALIBERT, supra note 158, at 11. 
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Real estate and capital market bubbles are two normally interlinked phenomena.173 People use 
the wealth acquired by the increase in real estate to invest in the stock market and vice versa.174 
So, the collapse of either market will bring the other down with it. For instance, in the 1980s, real 
estate prices collapsed in Japan after tremendous increases, a situation which led to a financial 
crash in the Japanese capital market.175 
3.7.4.2 Publicly traded corporation s’ Scandals 
Throughout history, financial crisis have caused a great deal of public attention, rage176 and 
governmental reaction.177 In most cases, a capital market crisis uncovers fraudulent conducts by 
directors and officers of publicly traded corporation s.178 Historically, one of the earliest capital 
market collapses was caused by two European public companies in 1720 – the British South Sea 
Company179 and the Mississippi Company180 – that lead the vibrant Irish poet Jonathan Swift to 
say of the former: 
173 Id. at 117. 
174 Id. 
175 See generally VOGEL, supra note 157, at 34–38; KINDLEBERGER & ALIBERT, supra note 158, at 145–56. 
176 For example occupy Wall Street movement in the U.S. mainly triggered by the 2008 financial crisis. 
177 For example government normally launches investigation for any criminal misconduct or loopholes in 
governance structure. 
178 Klaus J. Hopt, Comparative Corporate Governance: The State of the Art and International Regulation, 
59 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 16–17 (2011). 
179 See generally VOGEL, supra note 157, at 29–30. 
180 “Mississippi Company” was enjoying trading “privileges” (concession) between France as a colonial 
power and its new territory in the newly discovered land of Louisiana in America. The company created a scheme 
where people bought the company stock and bonds in return for cash. People rushed to underwrite this company not 
only in France but also from other parts of Europe due to the expectation of the wealth that this company might 
generate, especially with regard to discovering gold and silver in the new world (America). Accordingly, in 1719, 
the price of the company share jumped massively from 500 to 1,000 livres (the French currency at that time). 
However, the bubble imploded due to the vast sale of the company shares by stock holders. At the end of 1720, the 
share price of the company declined to 500 livres. Jon Moen, John Law and the Mississippi Bubble: 1718–1720 
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One fool may from anther win, 
And then get off with money stored; 
But if a sharper once comes in, 
He throws at all, and sweeps the board, 
As fishes on each other prey 
The great ones swallowing up the small; 
So fares it in the Southern See; 
But, whale directors eat up all ... 
The nation then too late will find 
Computing all their cost and trouble, 
Directors’ promises but wind, 
South Sea at best a mighty bubble.181 
Recently, the American capital market crash at the beginning of the millennium was 
followed by a great deal of public corporate scandals, most notoriously the Enron scandal.182 
Enron’s collapse shocked not only the American corporate governance system but also the global 
corporate governance system.183 Enron began as a classical energy corporation which then 
transformed its business structure and operation line to be a “virtual [holding] corporation”184 
that specialized in energy trading.185 At the end of the last century, Enron reached the zenith of 
its success when it was ranked as one of the top ten companies in the nation.186 Enron’s 
(Oct. 2001), available at http://mshistory.k12.ms.us/articles/70/john-law-and-the-mississippi-bubble-1718-1720 
(accessed on May 12, 2011). 
181 Jonathan Swift, Upon the South Sea Project, in Jonathan Swift: The Complete Poems 209–14 (Pat 
Rogers ed., 1983) (emphasis omitted). 
182 Literature discussing Enron scandals is voluminous, see, e.g., William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark 
Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1275 (2001–2002). Corporate scandals had occurred after scandals in 
WorldCom, Tyco, Adelphia are other corporations. For discussion of the U.S. corporate governance shortcoming 
that might not prevent those scandals including Enron from happening, see John C. Coffee, Jr., What Cause Enron? 
Capsule Social and Economic History of the 1990s, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 269 (2003–2004). 
183 See generally Hill, supra note 60, at 367; Douglas M. Branson, Enron-When Systems Fail: Creative 
Destruction or Roadmap to Corporate Governance Reform?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 989 (2003); Paul Davies, Enron and 
Corporate Governance Reform in UK and the European Community, in AFTER ENRON: IMPROVING CORPORATE 
LAW AND MODERNIZING SECURITIES REGULATION IN EUROPE AND THE U.S. 415–44 (Johan Armour & Joseph A. 
McCahery eds.). 
184 See Bratton, supra note 182, at 1275, 1288–94. 
185 C. William Thomas, The Rise and Fall of Enron, J. ACCOUNTANCY 41, 41 (Apr. 2002). 
186 See Bratton, supra note 182, at 1275–76. 
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management, in complicity with its auditing and consulting firm, Arthur Andersen, had managed 
for years to conceal the company’s liabilities.187 Enron and Andersen pushed off balance sheet 
liabilities previously listed on Enron’s financial statements.188 The fraud was facilitated by the 
unique structure of the company, which was a conglomerate consisting of numerous special 
purposes entities whose financial statements were not consolidated with Enron’s as required by 
accounting standards in the case of a parent-subsidiary financial relation.189 After Enron’s 
managerial misconduct had been exposed publicly, the price of its shares dropped 
precipitously.190 Enron shares become worthless. The company filed for bankruptcy in 
December 2001.191 Unfortunately, the most affected parties among the corporation stakeholders 
were the employees, shareholders, and creditors,192 and not, unbelievably to some, the 
malfeasors (the board, the management, and gatekeepers.) 
In conclusion, reoccurring crises and scandals in various capital markets prove that no 
corporate governance model may prevent capital market crises or scandals, no matter how well-
governed a market may be. Indeed, the only difference between a good and a weak governance 
system may be that the good system opts to respond to crises and scandals in a more efficient 
manner by allowing for less damage to investors and to the national economy, in general, in 
comparison to the response of the weak governance system. Moreover, a good corporate 
governance system has mechanisms to constantly modernize (adapt?) itself: one of the main 
187 See Thomas, supra note 185, at 41, 47–48. 
188 See id. at 41, 43. 
189 Id. 
190 Id. at 41, 44. 
191 Id. 
192 See Bratton, supra note 182, at 1275, 1277. See also ALAN CALDER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A 
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE LEGAL FRAMEWORKS AND INTERNATIONAL CODES OF PRACTICE 2 (2008). 
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forces behind such modernization is a capital market crisis or scandal. From the 1720 British 
Bubble Act to the 2002 U.S. Sarbanes Oxley Act, bubbles and corruption have played vital roles 
in developing and enhancing corporate governance and have provided a real life “test drive” for 
the installed reform. In some cases, however, the will of reform triggers an “over reactive”193 and 
“rushed” regulatory response.194 
3.7.5 Privatization 
The last century was affected by two contradictory economic trends toward ownership of 
economic activities: nationalization and privatization.195 At the beginning, the state 
“nationalized” many economic enterprises.196 For example, roads, trains, airlines, electricity, 
banking and other industries were mostly owned and managed by the state.197 Government 
193 Hopt, supra note 178, at 1, 17 (he remarked about government responses to governance scandals by 
saying that: “experience shows that legislators and rule makers tend to overreact to these events, as scandal-driven 
legislation often goes a step too far”). Id. 
194 See Bratton, supra note 182, at 1275, 1277 (he said about Enron scandal that: “[c]orporate failures as 
big and fast as this one tend to be held out as example for future business regulation. Enron’s failure is no exception, 
implicating a long list of regulatory topics well before completion of formal investigations into the company’s 
management and the collapse’s cause.”). See also Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of 
Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005). 
195 See Pierre Guislain, The Privatization Challenge: A Strategic, Legal, and Institutional Analysis of 
International Experience, WORLD BANK REGIONAL AND SECTORAL STUDIES 3 (1997). However, the expansion of 
SWFs may have contrary effects on the privatization program. See Butt et al., supra note 111, at 328 (“worrisome to 
some, acquisitions by entities supported by foreign government appear to have the potential to reverse a trend 
toward privatizations that has occurred in many economies and would possibly undo some of the economic benefits 
that prompted these privatizations”). 
196 Guislain, supra note 195. See also William L. Megginson & Dario Scannapieco, The Financial and 
Economic Lessons of Italy’s Privatization Program, in GLOBAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 177, 177–78 (Donald H. 
Chew & Stuart L. Gillan eds., 2009) (“The modern Italian state is less than 150 years old, and extensive state 
ownership of business and finance was not part of the nation’s founding ideology. Instead, state ownership 
principally grew out of the need to rescue very large numbers of failing banks and industrial firms during the great 
Depression.”). 
197 IAN DUNCAN & ALAN BOLLARD, CORPORATIZATION & PRIVATIZATION: LESSONS FROM NEW ZEALAND 
7 (Oxford Univ. Press 1992). 
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ownership existed through two avenues: production through one of its departments or agencies, 
or by state-owned enterprises. In both cases, the free market’s “invisible hand” was not 
traceable.198 Non-efficient production was the result and was accompanied, in most cases, by the 
waste of national resources, or non-efficient allocation of them. To fill in the gap created by the 
absence of the free market’s control forces, governments enacted laws to ensure proper levels of 
production and efficiency of its controlled production units. However, the enlargement of public 
sectors led to counterproductive consequences. Inefficiency and low quality production of the 
state-owned enterprises led governments to rethink the viability of continuing ownership and 
control over of production units. In this juncture, Nobel Prize laureate Joseph Stiglitz remarked: 
The problem is not so much that the government is too big, but that it is not doing 
the right thing. Governments, by and large, have little business running steel 
mills, and typically make a mess of it ...[.] In general, competing private 
enterprises can perform such functions more efficiently. This is the argument for 
privatization – converting state-run industries and firms into private ones.199 
Clearly, the states’ relinquishment of their control of economic sectors and enterprises 
became eminent. Consequently, at the beginning of the 1980’s the prime minister of Great 
Britain, Margaret Thatcher, launched a “privatization” program, the first in its kind in a 
198 “Invisible hand” is an economic concept formulated in the eighteen century by Adam Smith where he 
depicted it as follows: 
As every individual ... endeavours as much as he can both to employ his capital in the support of 
domestic industry and so to direct the industry that its produce may be of greatest value; every 
individual necessarily labours to render the annual revenue of the society as great as he can. He 
generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is 
promoting it. By preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign industry, he intends only his 
own security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest 
value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible 
hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. Nor is it always the worse for the 
society that it was no part of it. By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the 
society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it. 
ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 572 (Bantam Dell 2003). 
199 Stiglitz, supra note 123, at 52. 
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developed economy, and such a policy spread to other developed countries.200 Transition and 
developing economies have pursued the trend of privatization.201 Nonetheless, America was the 
least affected of the developed countries regarding the wave of privatization.202 Privatization 
basically signifies a “transfer of ownership right from a public agency to one or more private 
parties.”203 Currently, privatization provides the private sector with an opportunity to deal with 
economic sectors that were once confined to the public sector such as “infrastructure and natural 
resources.”204 
The chief goal of privatization plans is increasing “economic efficiency;” because 
government has to take into account other “political, social, and financial” factors.205 At some 
point, those factors – including the economic ones – contradict each other.206 A privatization 
agenda in most countries is associated with “deregulation” of the privatized sector, then to be 
governed by the market economy forces.207 In such “deregulated” business environments, the 
rules of the game are mostly articulated by the “private” sector instead of the government, as was 
formerly done.208 Consequently, corporate governance problems arise as to “how the newly 
200 See Marko Becht, Patrick Bolton & Alise Roel, Corporate Governance and Control, Finance Working 
Paper N. 02/2002, at 4, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=343461 (accessed on May 20, 2011) (“The 
privatization ... in the UK ... was responsible for 58% of OECD and 90% of European Community privatization 
proceeds in 1991. Since 1995 Australia, Italy, France, Japan and Spain alone have generated 60% of total 
privatization revenue.”). 
201 See id. 
202 Guislain, supra note 195. 
203 Id. at 10 (footnote omitted). 
204 Gordon & Roe, supra note 146, at 2. 
205 See Guislain, supra note 195, at 17. 
206 Gordon & Roe, supra note 146, at 2. 
207 See id. 
208 Id. 
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privatized corporations should be owned and controlled.”209 Accordingly, good corporate 
governance is essential to any successful privatization program.210 On countries with developed 
institutions the matter might be simpler as the government has to more or less just transfer state 
ownership to the private sector and deregulate the privatized sector, as done in the UK and the 
U.S. But in most developing and transition economies the matter is more complex than just 
privatizing and deregulating: it requires external and internal governance mechanisms to monitor 
the newly-launched companies out of the state-controlled enterprises.211 In other words, “there 
are preconditions that have to be satisfied before privatization can contribute to an economy’s 
growth.”212 Also, it requires finance where private actors need to raise money to buy enterprises 
from the state. 
For instance, in the aftermath of the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, Russia had 
undertaken massive privatization programs to promote efficiency and was inclined to a market 
economy. Nonetheless, Russia’s experiences encompassed a failed privatization model.213 A 
major factor undermining Russian privatization programs, apparently, was the lack of well-
developed corporate governance systems.214 Russian weak corporate governances lead to the 
209 Becht et al., supra note 200. 
210 See Megginson & Scannapieco, supra note 196 (“A complete system of corporate governance laws, 
regulatory bodies, and self-regulating institutions – should be constructed before large-scale divestments begin.”). 
211 See id. at 192. 
212 STIGLITZ, supra note 123, at 52. 
213 See Bernard Black, Reinier Kraakman & Anna Tarassova, Russian Privatization and Corporate 
Governance: What Went Wrong?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1731 (1999–2000). For a brief study of several privatization 
programs launched in some transition economies, see Curtis J. Milhaupt, Privatization and Corporate Governance 
in a Unified Korea, 26 J. CORP. L. 199 (2000–2001). 
214 See Black et al., supra note 213 (he concluded that “[a] weak government can’t build the institutions that 
are needed to control self-dealing and support a complex market economy. Yet without that infrastruture, rapid 
large-firm privatization won’t help the economy much if it at all). Id. 
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exploitation of the newly privatized corporations’ assets by the company management and 
controlling shareholder(s). Professor Bernard Black’s described the Russian privatization 
program by saying that: 
Russian privatization was dirty. On the whole, the bigger the stakes, the dirtier the 
deal. Its advocates hoped that even if manner of distributing the state’s wealth was 
regrettable, the outcome would be salutary. New owners, motivated by profit, 
would improve the privatized companies’ operations. The new owner would get 
rich, perhaps undeservedly, but the whole country would benefit from the 
productivity gains. These hopes have not been fulfilled.215 
In short, a successful privatization program should start with focusing first on 
establishing a good corporate governance system; otherwise privatization programs will not 
achieve their intended economic and social goals.216 The newly privatized firms in a deregulated 
legal environment create a set of governance problems, especially in developing and transition 
economies. Accordingly, the privatization programs in those weak governance countries may 
lead the newly-privatized to be worse off in efficiency and accountability than before 
privatization was launched and not solve the low-efficiency problem of public ownership of the 
means of production and the control of its owned enterprises.217 In this context, economist 
Joseph Stiglitz notes: 
Perhaps the most serious concern with privatization, as it has so often been 
practiced, is corruption. The rhetoric of market fundamentalism asserts that 
privatization will reduce what economists call the ‘rent-seeking’ activity of 
For the relation between corporate governance structure and privatization. See John C. Coffee, Jr., 
Privatization and Corporate Governance: The Lessons from securities Market Failure, 25 J. CORP. L. 1 (1999–
2000). 
215 Black et al., supra note 213, at 1731, 1750. 
216 See Megginson & Scannapieco, supra note 196, at 192. 
217 See Milhaupt, supra note 213, at 199, 200 (“simply moving assets from the state to private hands does 
not ensure a climate conductive to growth, and investment, and effective corporate governance.). Id. 
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government officials who either skim off the profits of government enterprises or 
award contracts and jobs to their friends.218 
Truly, because of the lack of a good corporate governance system, a privatization 
program is more likely to be a failed attempt, even leading to “worse” economic conditions at the 
privatized firms than before the privatization.219 Before engaging in any privatization program, 
policy makers have to assess the existing corporate governance system of the relevant country 
and take the level of corporate governance framework into consideration on top of all other 
factors. Otherwise, the entire situation might be “briberization” – as once sarcastically 
described.220 
3.8 CONCLUSION 
There is no single, agreed-upon definition of corporate governance. However, corporate 
governance is mainly concerned with answering two questions: 1) who directs the company, and 
2) toward whose interests is the company directed? The manner in which such questions are 
answered depends on the philosophical foundations of governance adopted within a specific 
company or by a certain country. Notwithstanding these differences, all corporate governance 
systems aim to reduce agency cost problems. Corporate governance rules are not limited to 
binding legal provisions but also include advisory and moral standards related to the 
218 STIGLITZ, supra note 123, at 58. 
219 Id. 
220 Id. at 58 (“in contrast to what it was supposed to do, privatization has made matters so much worse that 
in many countries today privatization is jokingly referred to as ‘briberization.’ If a government is corrupt, there is 
little evidence that privatization will solve the problem. After all, the same corrupt government that mismanaged the 
firm will also handle the privatization.”). 
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aforementioned questions. The recent global financial crisis, along with scandals and 
privatization programs around the world, has increased interest in corporate governance. 
Implementing sound corporate governance significantly improves the likelihood of decreasing 
the costs of external finance for national companies. Furthermore, for a country such as Saudi 
Arabia, sound corporate governance will facilitate integration into the global economy and 
attract foreign investments. 
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4.0  CORPORATE GOVERNANCE II: THEORY OF THE FIRM AND 
OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter addresses fundamental theories of the publicly traded corporation. First, the nature 
of the publicly traded corporation (theory of the firm) will be discussed including various 
descriptive theories. Secondly, it will shed light on theories that address the questions of for 
whom the corporation is operated; in other words, who should be the ultimate beneficiaries of the 
publicly traded corporation? The last part will be devoted to examining ownership patterns in the 
publicly traded corporations and different agency cost problems arising accordingly. 
4.2 THE NATURE OF THE PUBLICLY TRADED CORPORATION  
4.2.1 Traditional theory1 
Based on historical wisdom, a corporation under this theory is defined as a “limited liability 
partnership”2 by which the corporation is regarded as “the private property of its” shareholders.3 
1 This theory is also called property or ownership theory. 
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Thus, it “is a thing ... owned”4 like any other property or asset in life.5 Property law provides the 
basis for this theory. The nature of the corporation itself as real or personal property does not 
play any role in altering this view. Moreover, the corporation represents an entity “separate” 
from its shareholders and other stakeholders.6 Some scholars view this distinction as no more 
than “a special form” of shareholder.7 In W. Clay Jackson Enterprises, Inc. v. Greyhound and 
Financial Corp., the court characterizes the separate legal entity of a corporation in a very 
extreme situation by observing that “[e]ven when all stock is owned by a sole shareholder, there 
seems no adequate reason to depart from the general rule that the corporation and its 
shareholders are to be treated as distinct legal persons.”8 
Noble Laureate Milton Friedman, a strong advocate of this traditional ownership theory, 
argued that “[t]he whole justification for permitting the corporate executive to be selected by the 
stockholders is that the executive is an agent serving the interest of his principal.”9 Some 
scholars went even further in defending this theory by claiming that “[t]he principle that 
shareholders own the companies in which they invest – and are the ultimate bosses of those 
running them – is central to modern capitalism.”10 Under this point of view, stockholders who 
2 William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 
267 (1992). 
3 Allen, supra note 2, at 264–65. 
4 STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 28 (2002). 
5 For example movable property. 
6 Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of the Shareholder, 40 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 407, 437 (2006). 
7 Allen, supra note 2, at 267. 
8 W. Clay Jackson Enterprises, Inc. v. Greyhound and Financial Corp., 463 F. Supp. 666 (1979). 
9 Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 
13, 1970. 
10 Arthur Levitt, Jr., How to Boost Shareholder Democracy, WALL ST. J., July 1, 2008, at A17 (Mr. Levitt 
was the Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) from 1993 to 2001). 
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are the owners of the corporation chose a group of agents, termed the board of directors, to 
manage the corporation on their behalf. 
An agency relation is defined in the Restatement (Third) Agency as “the fiduciary 
relationship that arises when one person (a “principal”) manifests assent to another person (an 
“agent”) that the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and is subject to the principal’s 
control.”11 Thus, shareholders are in full control of their assets (which are essentially the 
corporation) and the management of the corporation conducts itself under the direct control of 
shareholders as principal. According to agency law, not only management actions but also any 
wrongful acts by the management within the scope of the agency relation would be attributed to 
the principal.12 
This theory, however, has faced much criticism from legal scholars. Professor Richard 
Booth notes that the theory “does not ... address many of the most important questions that arise 
these days.”13 First, a board of directors in a publicly held corporation is not an agent of the 
shareholders because the latter does not have the legal mandate to control the former’s actions.14 
In fact, the members of the board of directors act as fiduciaries for the shareholders, not agents 
for them. For instance, case law is not in favor of agent-principal relations between shareholders 
and a board of directors, stating that the authority of the board is “original and undelegated.”15 
11 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006). 
12 For example, the management of a corporation works similarly to the owner of a shop or restaurant. The 
shop owner hires employees to help run the business. As the business grows, the owner delegates authority and 
discretion to employees in order to help the owner properly manage the growing business; however, responsibility 
for the shop or restaurant will always lie with the owner, no matter how much the owner has delegated power. 
13 Richard A. Booth, Symposium: Theory Informs Business Practice, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 147, 150 
(2001). 
14 ARTHUR R. PINTO & DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE LAW 106 (2004). 
15 Manson v. Curtis, 119 N.E. 559, 562 (1918). 
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Second, a corporation owns the “assets” of the corporation, not stockholders.16 The 
shareholder (as owner under this theory) does not possess the legal authority to sell or use the 
assets of the corporation. In fact, such acts may be regarded as unlawful.17 In W. Clay Jackson 
Enterprises, Inc. v. Greyhound and Financial Corp., the court provides that “even a sole 
shareholder has no independent right which is violated by trespass upon or conversion of the 
corporation’s property.”18 Thus, for example, a shareholder has no right to use or claim corporate 
assets. 
Accordingly, the principle right a shareholder has is the right to sell his shares. Thus, it is 
clear that a shareholder’s right is in many ways different from the traditional ownership of 
property in which a person has the full right entitled by ownership that is, specifically the control 
over the owned property.19 As Professors Blair and Stout note: 
Milton Friedman is a Nobel Prize-winning economist, but he obviously is not a 
lawyer. A lawyer would know that the shareholders do not, in fact, own the 
corporation. Rather, they own a type of corporate security commonly called 
“stock.” As owners of stock, shareholders’ rights are quite limited. For example, 
stockholders do not have the right to exercise control over the corporation’s 
assets.20 
16 Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 
25051 (1999). 
17 It will be regarded as stealing or trespass of corporate property. 
18 W. Clay Jackson Enter. Inc. v. Greyhound and Fin. Corp., 463 F. Supp. 666, 670 (1979). 
19 Common law of property grants the owner a bundle of rights such as the right to use, transfer, possess 
and exclude others. 
20 Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1191 
(2002). 
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However, according to corporate law, shareholders to some degree have an “indirect” 
effect on the corporate wealth through management based on shareholders’ power of electing 
and removing the board of directors.21 
Truly, the property “model” reflects a far-fetched view of the nature of a corporation,22 
which distant from the reality of the publicly traded corporation. Thus, the property theory is no 
longer widely held legal theory of publicly traded corporation.23 Nonetheless, the theory still 
exists, accepted by many non-corporate law scholars and the majority of ordinary people.24 
4.2.2 The Nexus of the Contracts Approach 
Under the nexus of contracts approach,25 a corporation is “an aggregation of people banded 
together for longer period – permit[ing] greater use of specialization.”26 The corporation is not 
21 Id. 
22 Allen, supra note 2, at 265. 
23 Because Professor Friedman is the most famous advocate ownership theory professor, critics have 
discredited this theory by saying “we can throw Friedman’s concept of ownership out the window, along with its 
associate economic and ethical baggage.” See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of 
Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 565 (2003). 
24 If one were to ask ordinary people, or even lawyers not practicing corporate law, “Who owns a 
corporation?,” they would probably answer: the shareholders. See LYNNE L. DALLAS, WORKING TOWARD A NEW 
PARADIGM, IN “PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW” 38 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., Westview Press 1995). Furthermore, 
there is a high chance in receiving the same answer from most stakeholders if they, too, were asked the same 
question. 
25 Some scholars name the contract approach the contract theory or contract model. Likewise, Professor 
Hamilton has noted that “[i]t is not clear whether the nexus of contracts model should be viewed as essentially 
normative, or as descriptive, or as both. Its proponents have used it in both contexts.” ROBERT W. HAMILTON, THE 
LAW OF CORPORATIONS IN A NUTSHELL 58 (5th ed. 2000). 
26 FRANK EASTERBROOK & DANIEL FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 8 (1991). 
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an entity separate from its stakeholders “but rather a nexus or web of explicit and implicit 
contracting establishing rights and obligations among the various inputs making up the firm.”27 
The nexus of contracts approach does not accept the ownership theory of the corporation. 
Instead, the shareholders are just a party to multi-contractual relationships among many 
stakeholders.28 Shareholders, thus, are just “[i]nvestors (who) bear the risk of failure ... and 
receive the marginal rewards of success.”29 Moreover, an investor is called the “residual” 
claimant because he only gets “what is left over” after creditors have been paid.30 
Nonetheless, “[c]ontract law” is the basis for viewing the “corporation” as a nexus of 
contracts31 yet the meaning of nexus of contract “is not self-explanatory,”32 especially in regard 
to “what a corporate nexus is supposed to be.”33 In fact, the meaning of a contract under this 
approach is very broad, differing from its meaning in the contract law context. Professor 
Bainbridge described this by noting: 
The name ‘nexus of contracts,’ is somewhat unfortunate ... the term carries ... two 
Hi okay. problematic features. First is the focus on legal notions such as 
consideration and mutuality. Second, the paradigm seems to be on transactions on 
markets that are thick and relatively untroubled by asymmetrics.34 
27 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 4, at 27. 
28 Id. at 28. 
29 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 26, at 10–11. 
30 Id. at 11. 
31 PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 14, at 104. 
32 William W. Bratton, Jr., The “Nexus of Contracts” Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 4 CORNELL L. 
REV. 407, 412 (1989). 
33 Id. 
34 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 4, at 27. 
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For example, under this approach stockholders and bondholders are regarded as 
contracting parties, despite any trace of legal intent to contract with each others.35 Based on that, 
the only variations between the shareholder and the creditor are the provisions of their 
agreements.36 However, under this theory, a stockholder is in a more endangered position than 
other stakeholders, such as creditors, because the former are merely “residual” claimants of 
corporate “profits” but the latter are entitled to a predetermined “return.”37 
The proponents of this approach argue that “[t]he role of corporate law ... is to adopt a 
background term that prevails unless varied by contract. And the background term should be the 
one that is either picked by contract expressly or is the operational assumption of successful 
firms.”38 In other words, under this theory, corporate law should contain default rules only, not 
mandatory ones.39 In the proponents’ opinion, “corporate law is a set of terms available off-the-
rack so that corporate ventures can save the cost contracting.”40 Therefore, it is more efficient for 
contracting sides not to “bother with excessive negotiations; they can be confident that, if some 
unanticipated event were to occur, the law ensures a reasonable outcome.”41 
However, opponents disagree with the nexus of contracts approach because its 
proponents disregard shareholders’ lack of bargaining power in a separated ownership and 
control pattern.42 Under a diluted ownership pattern, shareholders do not have the ability to tailor 
35 Id. at 28. 
36 Velasco, supra note 6, at 407, 443. 
37 Id. 
38 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 26, at 36. 
39 Velasco, supra note 6, at 407, 445. 
40 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 26, at 34. 
41 Velasco, supra note 6, at 407, 445. 
42 PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 14, at 104. 
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default rules to their best interests. The lack of bargaining power is not confined to shareholders: 
other stakeholders do not have any mechanism whatsoever to participate in the corporate 
decision-making paradigm. The default rule model does not always serve the interest of either 
shareholders or other stakeholders. 
In addition, it has been noted that not all corporate rules are default rules: some of them 
are “mandatory.”43 Mandatory rules should not be remolded to be default rules because as 
Professor Douglas Branson indicated, “[t]here must be standard terms that can protect the weaker 
party who negotiated badly or to protect the minority from being contracted out of existence 
(steamrolled) by the majority.”44 Some legal scholars go further by arguing that “[e]limination of 
all mandatory rules would certainly create the likelihood of much greater fraud than occurs 
today.”45 Keeping some mandatory rules is good public policy; however, mandatory rules must 
be restricted unless the non-mandatory provisions obviously cause a sphere of “negative 
externalities.”46 An example of this would be the statutory right of appraisal which is intended to 
protect minority shareholders from being ripped-off (cheated) by the majority shareholders, 
especially at the time of merger or acquisition.47 
43 Douglas M. Branson, The Death of Contractarianism and the Vindication of Structure and Authority in 
Corporate Governance and Corporate Law, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 95 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995). 
44 Branson, supra note 43, at 94 (Professor Branson relied on comparative to support this argument by 
providing that “[e]verywhere in the world company law is moving toward mandatory structure ... for corporations); 
id. at 95, 95 
45 HAMILTON, supra note 25, at 60. 
46 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 4, at 32. 
47 See, for example, the Model Business Corporate Act (MBCA) § 13.02(a) which provides that “[a] 
shareholder is entitled to appraisal rights, and to obtain payment of the fair value of that shareholder’s shares...” 
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Regardless of the rejection of some scholars of the Nexus of Contract Approach, it 
remains the dominant theory of the “legal academy.”48 Moreover, it has been noted that 
discussion over this approach has ended not because of the invalidity of other points of view but, 
as Professor Bainbridge articulated, it “has been fully played out.”49 Therefore, the focus of 
proponents of this theory should shift to “using it as heuristic for exploring the nooks and 
crannies of corporate law.”50 
4.2.3 Entity Theory 
Under this theory, the corporation is neither an aggregate of co-owners nor a nexus of contracts: 
it is an independent organization that is not real but “artificial.”51 This artificial entity is 
responsible for its liabilities, not the stockholders.52 The stakeholders do not have a direct legal 
relationship with each other, but each of them has his own “contract” with this artificial person.53 
In fact, the principal independent personality is rooted in “Anglo – American” corporate 
48 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 4, at 33. Professor Bainbridge foresaw that the nexus of contracts approach “is 
steadily working its way into judicial decision-making.” Id. Justice Veasey believes that: “[a]lthough the contract 
analogy is imperfect, it comes reasonably close to a working hypothesis. I think court might consider using as a 
point of departure – but not necessarily a controlling principle – what they perceive to be the investors’ reasonable 
contractual expectations.” (footnote omitted); E. Norman Veasey, An Economic Rationale for Judicial Decision-
making in Corporate Law, 53 BUS. LAW. 681, 684 (1998). In addition, Professor Hamilton noted “that most teachers 
of corporation law today accept it as a useful approach in evaluating legal principles, and some certainly accept it as 
an appropriate normative model for corporation law.” HAMILTON, supra note 25, at 61. 
49 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 4, at 31. Also, he said (“Contractarians and noncontractrians no longer have 
much of interest to say to one another; indeed, they barely speak the same language”); id. 
50 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 4, at 31–32. 
51 HAMILTON, supra note 25, at 46. 
52 Id. at 47. 
53 STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 25 (2008). 
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legislation. It is interesting, however, that no corporate law of Anglo – American countries 
provides clearly that the corporation is only responsible for its debt and not its stockholders.54 
This independent artificial personality has only acquired a “privilege,” “concession,” 
“franchise,” or “grant” from the state that permits the owners and investors to conduct business 
as a corporation.”55 It is settled in Anglo – American legal practice that people do not have the 
ability to form a “corporation” on their own.56 State enfranchisement or approval is always 
necessary but, modern general corporation statutes have become a ministerial act. In any event, 
under the worse scenario, “[a] corporation, at least its legal form, is a creation of the state.”57 
Nonetheless, the personality of a corporation is not real but rather a mere legal “fiction,” 
recognized in the eyes of the law.58 However that fiction may be practical.59 It is difficult to 
imagine the conduct of huge “business” projects, or even may be similar ones, without using a 
corporation,60 not for limited liability but for other purposes as well. Professor Bainbridge 
provides an example for the utility of the legal personality of the corporation where stating: 
Consider a large forestry company, owning forest land in many states. If the 
company were required to list all of its owners – i.e., every shareholder – on every 
deed recorded in every county in which it owned property, and also had to amend 
those filings every time a shareholder sold stock, there would be an intolerable 
burden not only to the firm but also on government agencies that deal with the 
firm.61  
54 HAMILTON, supra note 25, at 47. 
55 Id. at 50. 
56 Larry D. Soderquist & A.A. Sommer Jr., Understanding Corporation Law, Practicing Law Institute, New 
York City, 2 (1990). 
57 Id. 
58 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 4, at 7. 
59 See id. 
60 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 53. 
61 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 4, at 7 (footnote omitted). 
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Some scholars contend that the entity theory is “unrealistic”62 and that “an artificial entity 
has no will of its own and no arms, legs, mouth, or eyes that permit it to take action.”63 On the 
other hand, a “more realistic view, [is] that a corporation is but a group of individuals associated 
under legal sanction, eliminate[ing] the difficulties arising from the alleged difference between 
the physical characteristics of an individual and the nonphysical charter of a corporation.”64 In 
any event, it is not clear from this position why the law should be prohibited from permitting the 
creation of such an artificial useful form of business.65 
In the end, the entity theory provides an “explanation of what a corporation ... is.”66 
Clearly, the entity theory provides justification for the concept of limited liability, namely that, a 
separate juridical person should be liable for its own debts.67 In addition, Professor Hamilton 
notes that “the artificial entity concept gives no indication of the goals or objectives of a 
corporation. It does not address the role of corporations in modern society or the complex 
interrelationships of persons who participate in, profit from, or are affected by, the 
corporation.”68 Also, this theory plays a role in the facilitation of doing business which of course 
“will enhance the economic productivity of the corporation.”69 However, an artificial entity is a 
62 HAMILTON, supra note 25, at 48–49. 
63 Id. 
64 ROBERT S. STEVENS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 52 (1936). 
65 This artificial person enjoys many constitutional rights, such as citizenship and liberty, which in fact 
were historically intended to be for human beings. See generally JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, 
CORPORATIONS 4–6 (2d ed. 2003). 
66 HAMILTON, supra note 25, at 52. 
67 It is important to note that limited liability does not mean no liability. Investors (shareholders) 
contributed to the corporation but, because of limited liability, the risk will not extend to their personal assets. See 
chapter three. 
68 HAMILTON, supra note 25, at 50. 
69 Allen, supra note 2, at 261, 272. 
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creature of law, useful as a legal concept, not an economic one, as in economics such a notion 
does not exist.70 
4.2.4 Team Production Theory 
Professors Blair and Stout provide legal literature with a new school of thought regarding the 
nature of the publicly traded corporation : the Team Production Theory.71 In fact, the Team 
Production Theory is well known in economic literature where it laid the foundation for 
Professors Blair and Stout to build their legal theory.72 The Team Production Theory provides an 
explanation of the tendency for people to form a corporation to conduct business as follows: 
[A] number of individuals come together to undertake a team production project 
that requires all to make some form of enterprise – specific investment. Perhaps 
one individual brings critical technical skills to the table, while another has a 
talent for management, and a third provides marketing insights. They may lack 
financial capital, however, so they seek out wealthy friends or family members to 
put up initial funding. Thus, a team is born. Undertaking team production, 
however, requires each of the members to make irrevocable investments that 
leave them vulnerable to opportunistic exploitation by other team members .... 
Despite their mutual vulnerabilities, the team members expect for the most part to 
be able to get along with each other and figure out how to allocate tasks and 
divide up rewards as they go. When disputes arise, however, they want a decision 
making procedure in place that all believe will be fair. The solution? They form a 
public corporation.73 
According to this theory, a “public corporation is a team of people who enter into a 
complex agreement to work together for their mutual gain. Participants – including shareholders, 
70 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 4, at 8. 
71 Blair & Stout, supra note 16, at 247. 
72 See Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demesetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 
62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 779–81 (1972). 
73 Blair & Stout, supra note 16, at 276. 
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employees, and perhaps other stakeholders such as creditors or the local community – enter into 
a ‘pactum subjectionis’.”74 Therefore, a corporation is not just a “bundle of assets” owned in 
aggregate by shareholders75 but a bundle of efforts presented by a group of persons for their 
mutual benefit. Accordingly, the Team Production Theory negates ownership of the corporation 
for one member of the team: the shareholders. Thus, the wealth of the corporation is the property 
of the firm.76 
Professors Margaret M. Blair and Lynn A. Stout argue that “public corporation law can 
be best explained in terms of the mediating hierarchy model.”77 Under this model, “team 
members relinquish important rights (including property rights over the team’s joint output and 
over team inputs such as financial capital and firm-specific human capital) to a legal entity 
created by the act of incorporation.”78 Under this model, the board of directors is not an “agent” 
of the stockholders but rather “[l]ike trustees ... once [directors] elected, become the ultimate 
decision-making authority within the firm, constrained primarily by their fiduciary duties.”79 
In addition, this unique model “eliminates the role of the principal, imposing in its place 
an internal governance structure – the mediating hierarchy – designed to respond to the problem 
of horizontal coordination inherent in certain forms of team production.”80 Thus, the idea of 
principal – agent is not part of this model because no stakeholders – including shareholders and 
74 Id. at 247, 279. But see BAINBRIDGE, supra note 53, at 61 (arguing “firm-specific investments are not the 
defining characteristic of team production. Rather, the critical feature of team production is task nonseparability”). 
75 Blair & Stout, supra note 16, at 279. 
76 Id. at 250–51. 
77 Id. at 287. 
78 Id. at 250. 
79 Id. at 291. 
80 Blair & Stout, supra note 16, at 265. 
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the board of directors – have the power to exert “control” over the other “team” members 
(stakeholders).81 Therefore, the model conceives of shareholders voting and the right to initiate 
derivative litigation merely means that the corporation grants this right to shareholders “because 
they often are in the best position to represent the interests of the coalition that comprises the 
firm.”82 
However, Professor David Millon disagrees with justification of granting shareholders 
voting rights under the Team Production Theory when he says 
In any of these cases, the shareholders’ monopoly over the franchise cannot be 
justified in terms of nonshareholder interests; if corporate law were committed 
equally to all the members of the team, either all affected parties would have a 
right of approval or no one would. At the very least, under a TPM-based 
conception of the board’s role, one might expect the board to have the power and 
the duty to veto shareholders’ decisions that harm nonshareholder 
constituencies.83  
Another criticism of the theory is that the idea of the board of directors as an 
“independent hierarchy” is not compatible with the legal entitlement of shareholders to have 
voting rights, a mechanism which affects the alleged independence of the board (the hierarchy).84 
In addition, opponents of the Team Production Theory criticized the theory’s description 
of the publicly traded corporations as one “team” where in fact it is “a hierarchy of teams.”85 For 
example, worker, executive, and directors are different teams working inside and for the 
corporation. 
81 Id. at 277. 
82 Id. at 289. 
83 David Millon, New Game Plan or Business as Usual? A Critique of the Team Production Model of 
Corporate Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1001, 1019 (2000). 
84 See id. at 1001, 1020. 
85 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 53, at 61. 
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In sum, four main theories shape the debate over the nature of interests in the publicly 
traded corporation. The first one is the traditional theory which regards the company as a 
property of the shareholders and the directors as agents of the principals (shareholders).The 
second theory, the contract theory, views the company as a web of contracts between different 
stakeholders. The third theory is the entity or the concession theory where the corporation is 
regarded as a fiction created by a government act. The last theory is the Team Production Theory 
which visualizes the corporation as aggregate inputs from all stakeholders. Not one of the 
aforementioned theories provides a full account of the true nature of the publicly traded 
corporation but each of them articulates a valid stance that might be taken into consideration 
when trying to answer the question “What is a public corporation?” 
4.3 THE OBJECTIVE OF THE PUBLICLY TRADED CORPORATION  
4.3.1 Shareholders Wealth Maximization 
From a normative perspective, the American Law Institute’s Principles of Corporate Governance 
provides that “a corporation ... should have as its objective the conduct of business activities with 
a view to enhancing corporate profit and shareholder gain.”86 “Most” corporate law scholars 
support the shareholders wealth maximization thesis.87 
In contrast, Principles of Corporate Governance states: 
86 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 2.01(a) (1994). 
87 See Millon, supra note 83, at 1003. 
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[T]hat the objective of the corporation is to conduct business activities with a 
view to enhancing corporate profit and shareholder gain – does not mean that the 
objective of the corporation must be realize corporate profit and shareholder gain 
in short run. Indeed, the contrary is true: long-run profitability and shareholder 
gain are at the core of the economic objective. An orientation toward lawful, 
ethical and public-spirited activity will normally fall within this description. The 
modern corporation by its nature creates interdependencies with a variety of 
groups with whom the corporation has a legitimate concern, such as employees, 
customers, suppliers, and members of the communities in which the corporation 
operates. The long-term profitability of the corporation generally depends on 
meeting the fair expectations of such groups. Short-term profits may properly be 
subordinated to recognition that responsible maintenance of these 
interdependencies is likely to contribute to long-term corporate profit and 
shareholder gain.88 
Shareholder wealth maximization proponents base their argument on the fact that 
“shareholders are the residual claimants to the firm’s income.”89 That means the shareholders 
“invest for the life of the firm and their claims are located at the end of queue should liquidation 
occur.”90 They indeed lack bargaining power to defend their interests in the corporation. In 
defending shareholders wealth maximization, Professor Roberta Romano notes that “the board of 
directors ... principal purpose is to safeguard those who face a diffuse but significant risk of 
expropriation because the assets in question are numerous and ill defined, and cannot be 
protected in a well-focused, transaction-specific way. Thus regarded, the board of directors 
should be seen as a governance instrument of the stockholders.”91 Thus, the stockholders’ 
position is the weaker position in the corporation, which entitles them to special protection.92 
The form of protection that is offered to them (shareholders) is the fiduciary duty which 
88 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 55 (1994). 
89 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 26, at 67. 
90 Oliver E. Williamson, Corporate Governance, FOUNDATION OF CORPORATE LAW 148, 159 (Roberta 
Romano ed., 1993). 
91 Id. 
92 Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making Shareholders the 
Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 23, 44 (1991). 
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Professor Romano described as a “device uniquely crafted to fill in the massive gap in this open-
ended bargain between shareholders and corporate officers and directors.”93 
Besides the aforementioned basis for control purposes, efficiency militates toward having 
one ultimate beneficiary. In support of this claim, Professor Clark remarked that 
A single objective goal like profit maximization is more easily monitored than a 
multiple, vaguely defined goal like the fair and reasonable accommodation of all 
affected interests. It is easier, for example, to tell if a corporate manger is doing 
what she is supposed to do than to tell if a university president is doing what she 
supposed to do. Assuming shareholders have some control mechanisms, better 
monitoring means that corporate managers will be kept more accountable. They 
are more likely to do what they are supposed to do and do it efficiently. Better 
accountability thus encourages people to participate in large corporations....94 
On the other hand, workers, creditors and other stakeholders have fixed claims95 on the 
corporation by which they have the ability to “draft contracts that protect them against the 
consequences of future, unforeseen contingencies.”96 In addition, they could “renegotiate terms 
when contracts are renewed”97 whenever they think more protection is needed or better treatment 
is justified. 
Therefore, nonshareholder constituencies should remain fixed claimants instead of being 
residual claimants (shareholders).98 Protection should be provided to only shareholders who are 
willing to pay for those non-shareholder constituencies who are “unwilling to pay for such 
93 Id. at 41. 
94 ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 20 (1986). 
95 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 26, at 67. 
96 Macey, supra note 92, at 40. 
97 Williamson, supra note 90. 
98 Macey, supra note 92, at 36. 
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protection in the form of lower wages or lower interest rates on debt” as Professor Macey 
argued. 99 
Moreover, the extension of the fiduciary duty to non-shareholder constituencies beyond 
the existing legal scope is contradictory to the intended function of “fiduciary duties,”100 which 
mainly aim “to fill in the massive gap in this open-ended bargain between shareholders and 
corporate officers and directors.”101 
In the end, fiduciary duty is a gap-filling device that should only be available to the 
parties of an incomplete contract, which usually are the shareholders. If in the future other non-
shareholder constituencies are willing to become non-fixed claimants like shareholders, they will 
have at that time valid grounds to be included within the scope of protection of the fiduciary duty 
of shareholder wealth maximization. Other than that, this fiduciary duty as it is should be upheld 
and be kept as an integral part of the corporate structure. If not, the board of directors could 
“easily pursue their own agenda, one that might maximize neither shareholder, employee, 
consumer, nor national wealth, but only their own,”102 as Professor Mark Roe asserts. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 41. 
101 Id. 
102 Mark J. Roe, The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial Organization, 149 U. PA. L. 
REV. 2063, 2065 (2001). 
143 
                                                 
4.3.2 Stakeholders welfare maximization 
Although the shareholder wealth maximization principle dominates American legal practice,103 
there are serious efforts to challenge this principle by making corporate management more 
concerned about non-shareholder constituencies of the publicly traded corporation . In its 
modern form, this effort has developed into a debate between two law professors (Adolf Berle 
and Merrick Dodd) who mainly focused on defining the real function of the publicly traded 
corporation . From one side Professor Adolf Berle argued that the corporation is a wealth 
generating machine for its shareholders.104 On the other side of the debate, Professor Merrick 
Dodd, asserted other functions of the publicly traded corporation  besides making profits for its 
shareholder: serving the non-shareholder constituencies.105 
This 1930’s debate became heated again in the wake of the massive takeover trend of the 
“1980’s”106 by jurists called “communitarians.”107 The communitarians’108 main goal was to 
103 See Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of Economic Globalization, in 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE LAW, THEORY AND POLICY 30, 30 (Thomas W. Joo ed., 2004), where she noted that 
“consensus suggests that corporations have no specific social responsibilities beyond profit maximizing for the 
benefit of shareholders, but that such profit maximizing must occur within the confines of the law, without deception 
or collusion.” 
104 See Adolf Berle, For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365 (1932). 
105 See E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Mangers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932). 
106 David Millon, Communitarianism in Corporate Law: Foundations and Law Reform Strategies, in 
PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 1, 2 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995). 
107 Id. at 1 (Professor Millon says that “[t]hose scholars who challenged the shareholder primacy principle 
may be referred to as communitarians, because ... their work focuses on the sociological and moral phenomenon of 
the corporation as community, in contrast academic discourse in corporate law”). Id. 
108 This theory also called progressive theory. 
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challenge the shareholder wealth maximization principle109 because they believed adhering to 
this principle leads to a negative impact on stakeholders.110 
Professor David Millon argues that stakeholders have made “nontransferable investments 
of human and financial capital in the reasonable expectation of a continued, long term corporate 
relationship.”111 Not only do the shareholders contribute to the corporation and are the 
beneficiaries from corporate “success,” but also other stakeholders share the same goal112 and 
provide similar contributions. In many cases, the success of a corporation matters more to non-
constituency shareholders than it does to the shareholders.113 For example, creditors furnish 
money to needed firms.114 This money in many cases is the real financial cornerstone that makes 
a business succeed. Workers also provide “human capital.”115 Workers, contribution is valuable 
due to the unique talents and skills of the workers which enable the corporation to operate and to 
compete in the open markets. The society as a whole, in some ways, has also contributed to the 
corporation.116 Many societies bear the harmful consequences of accepting certain types of 
109 Millon, supra note 106, at 1. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 2. 
112 Blair & Stout, supra note 16, at 250. Also, Professor Karmel says that “[t]he stakeholder model is 
premised on the theory that groups in addition to shareholders have claims on a corporation’s assets and earnings 
because those groups contribute to a corporation’s capital.” Roberta Karmel, Implications of the Stakeholder Model, 
61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1156, 1172 (1993). 
113 Shareholders in publicly held corporations usually diversify their investments in order to reduce their 
risk. Therefore, the failing of the corporation is just going to cause a relatively smaller effect on shareholders; 
however, this not so for other non-shareholder constituencies such as employees who could not diversify due to the 
nature of their input in the firm. 
114 Karmel, supra note 112, at 1171. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 1172. 
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corporations operating within their borders. For instance, the harmful emissions that a steel plant 
produces, negatively affect the health of the people living in the surrounding community.117 
Based on the above, the fiduciary duty of a board of directors should accommodate all 
stakeholders, not just the shareholders.118 Clearly, such expansion will lead to a “rich foundation 
of mutual trust and interdependence” between all stakeholders including shareholders.119 In 
addition, a board of directors should reconcile all stakeholders “interests,” including the 
stockholders if a contradiction arises between stakeholder groups.120 Directors should choose a 
“solution” that completely “compensates non-shareholders for their losses.”121 The only proper 
way to achieve this goal is to modify the existing laws to grant the stakeholders a protection.122 
However, many scholars take issue with the communitarian point of view. They advocate 
the shareholder wealth maximization principle, either under the traditional view or, the law and 
economics view (contractrian). They do not countenance communitarian ideas because 
traditionalists as well as contractarians are afraid that the adopting stakeholder’s welfare 
maximization principle, as communitarians propose it, may lead to the reduction of the 
“profitability” of the corporation.123 
117 Economists called this negative effect “external cost” or “externality.” For detailed discussion of the 
external cost, see Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1–44 (1960). 
118 Millon, supra note 106, at 12. 
119 Id. at 4. 
120 Id. at 12. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 11. 
123 PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 14, at 19. 
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Professor Milton Friedman is opponent of the stakeholder welfare maximization principle 
in that he asserts that stakeholder wealth maximization is a form of “socialism.”124 He argues: 
In a free-enterprise, private-property system, a corporate executive is an employee 
of the owners of the business. He has direct responsibility to his employers. That 
responsibility is to conduct the business in accordance with their desire, which 
generally will be to make as much money as possible while conforming to the 
basic rules of the society, both those embodied in law and those embodied in 
ethical custom.125 
Therefore, allowing a board of directors to maximize the welfare of a stakeholder is 
regarded in his point of view as a “spending [of] someone else’s money for a general social 
interest.”126 
In addition, contractrians philosophically disagree with the expansion of the fiduciary 
duty to non-shareholder constituencies because this expansion contradicts their view of the 
nature of a publicly traded corporation, which consists of a web of explicit and implicit contracts 
by which the only right of non-shareholder constituencies is that for which they contracted.127 
In fact, the real problem with the expansion of fiduciary duty, as the communitarians 
approach it, that is expanded duties will place non-shareholder constituencies in a much better 
position over shareholders because they will have both what they contracted for and the 
protection of fiduciary duty. This communitarian thesis might have appeal but only in situations 
in which most of non-shareholder constituencies’ compensation is not based on a fixed 
contractual return but rather depends on the corporation’s performance and profitability. 
124 Friedman, supra note 9. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 26, at 36. 
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4.4 THE CONTROL OF THE PUBLICLY TRADED CORPORATION 128 
4.4.1 Separation of Ownership and Control 
4.4.1.1 Introduction 
Two centuries ago, only a few partners or shareholders held control of enterprises and those 
people directly or indirectly directed the enterprise’s business affairs.129 However, development 
led to an accumulation of great wealth and labor which “combined through the corporate 
mechanism into a single producing organization under unified control and management.”130 
In their famous work,131 “The Modern Corporation and Private Property,” Adolf Belre 
and Gardner Means noted that “in the corporate system, the “owner” of industrial wealth is left 
128 Part IV discusses control in the traditional vertical structure of publicly held corporations that follow 
traditional firm theory; whereas Professor Ronald Coase said in his seminal work that the firm exists to reduce costs 
by accumulating all production required inputs in one device which is the firm. R.H. COASE, THE NATURE OF THE 
FIRM, ECONOMICA, New Series, vol. 4, No. 16, 387–405 (Nov. 1937). But, the advancement of communication led 
recently to the possibility that more reductions of cost may happen by the desegregation of a firm’s inputs into 
several firms in order to retain the core function of control to the main corporation. This new model of a horizontal 
structure of a corporation which is not based on Coase’s master-servant model is called a virtual corporation. See 
Clair Moore Dickerson, Spinning Out of Control: The Virtual Organization and Conflicting Governance Vectors, 59 
U. PITT. L. REV. 759, 762 (1998) (author claims a virtual corporation which reduces “costs simultaneously” and 
“makes the virtual organization difficult and cumbersome to govern”). 
129 ADOLF A. BERLE JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 2 
(1933). 
130 Id. 
131 Although Berle and Means were not the first to recognize the separation of ownership and control in 
publicly held corporations; however, they did shed light on this matter. Historically, Adam Smith noted this problem 
in his seminal work: 
The directors of such companies, however, being the manager rather of other people’s money than 
of their own, it cannot well be expected, that they should watch over it with the same anxious 
vigilance with which the partners in private copartnery frequently watch over their own. Like the 
stewards of a rich man, they are apt to consider attention to small matters as not for their master’s 
honour, and very easily give themselves a dispensation from having it. Negligence and profusion, 
therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the management of the affairs of such a company. 
It is upon this account that joint stock companies ... have seldom been able to maintain the 
competition against private adventurers. 
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with a mere symbol of ownership while the power, the responsibility and the substance which 
have been an integral part of ownership in the past are being transferred to a separate group in 
whose hands lies control.”132 This pattern is known as the “separation of ownership and control” 
in publicly traded corporations that has caused the “diffusion” of ownership among so many 
stockholders.133 In other words, the persons who own property, stockholders, no longer control 
that property but the board of directors and managers they (shareholders) appoint, do. In fact, 
separation of ownership and control is an important factor for the ability of a corporation to 
gather a huge amount of wealth.134 
Also, it has been asserted that “as the ownership of corporate wealth has become more 
widely dispersed, ownership of that wealth and control over it have come to lie less and less in 
the same hands.”135 Berle and Means noted that “[t]he separation of ownership from control 
produces a condition where the interests of owner and of ultimate manager may, and often do, 
diverge.”136 
ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 941 (Bantam Classic ed. 2003). 
132 BERLE & MEANS, supra note 129, at 68. 
133 Id. at 52. 
134 Id. at 5. An independent board of directors is an important feature of every publicly held corporation. 
For as Professors Blair and Stout said: 
[a]n independent board is one of the most important characteristics distinguishing public 
corporations from other forms enterprise. Limited partnerships, limited liability companies 
(“LLCs”), and closely held corporations all limit investors’ liability without requiring them to do 
business through a board; partnerships, LLCs and private firm provide vehicles for collective 
investment, sometimes with free transferability of shares; private corporate and some limited 
partnerships enjoy perpetual ability existence; and virtually all forms of enterprise permit their 
owners to delegate the day-to-day management of the firm to hired professional. 
Blair & Stout, supra note 16, at 253 n.9. 
135 BERLE & MEANS, supra note 129, at 69. 
136 Id. at 5. 
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4.4.1.2 Patterns of Control 
Berle and Means categorize corporations based on their pattern of separation of ownership and 
control as follows: 
- Control through almost complete ownership whereby one person or a few persons own 
the shares of the corporation, meaning that this person or those few people are the owners 
and the controllers of the business.137 In this case, there is no separation of ownership and 
control.138 
- Majority control is when a majority of the shares are held by one person or a few 
persons, and these shares entitle this person or persons to control the affairs of the 
corporation, for instance, electing a board of directors, changing bylaws, and approving 
of any other task corporate law has mandated for shareholders. In this case, the majority 
has at least 50% of the corporation’s shares. In fact, although the decision still rests in the 
hands of the majority controlling shareholders, there is a separation of ownership and 
control due to lack of complete control of the business affairs.”139 
- Control through a legal device without majority ownership is an old pattern of 
ownership in which a control exists though a voting trust or a pooling agreement. Thus, 
the control is a result of a legal mechanism not due to economic ownership pattern. 
- Minority control is a situation in which one or a few persons own shares that do not 
entitle them to the majority control of the corporation. In fact, this group has control due 
to a coalition that has been created among themselves, on the one hand, and diffusion of 
137 Id. at 70. 
138 State owned corporations are prominent examples of this pattern where no separation and control exists. 
139 BERLE & MEANS, supra note 129, at 17. 
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the majority of other shares, on the other hand.140 In large corporations, such minority 
coalitions controlling the corporation are fragile due to the communication difficulties 
between large numbers of shareholders.”141 
- Management control is the situation in which shares are widely dispersed among so 
many shareholders that neither a majority nor a minority control exists. In this case, the 
board of directors is in the position of directing the corporation while the shareholders 
hands are tied completely from practicing their limited role in corporate governance.142 
4.4.1.3 Agency Problem 
The divergence problem that stems from the separation of ownership from control is called the 
agency cost problem.143 Agency cost is “the sum of ... monitoring expenditures by the principal 
... [,] the bonding expenditures by the agent,[and] ... residual loss.”144 For example, a hotdog 
seller in the corner of a street does not have agency costs because he prepares and sells the 
hotdogs alone. If this person decides to open his own hotdog shop and hires three people, for 
instance, to help him, he will have a slight agency cost. The agency costs will increase if he (the 
hotdog seller) decides to form a corporation to open three other hotdog shops. Moreover, he will 
140 Id. at 80. 
141 Id. Often referred to this patter as “working control.” 
142 Id. at 84. 
143 Some economists see the relation between shareholders and board of directors as an agency relationship. 
See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Cost and 
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 5 (1976). However, corporate law does not regard the relationship 
between shareholders and directors as an agency relation but a fiduciary one. Also, it is worth noting that many 
scholars argued to the contrary of Berle and Means’ thesis that separation of ownership and control is not an issue 
but a virtue: “diffusion and separation of decision management and control have survival value in complex 
organizations both because they allow valuable specific knowledge to used at the points in the decision process 
where it is most relevant and because they help control the agency problems of diffuse residual claims.” Eugene F. 
Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 323 (1983). 
144 Jensen & Meckling, supra note 143, at 5–6. 
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bear more agency costs if he goes public with his hotdogs corporation where the diverse owners 
elect a board of directors to manage the corporate affairs. In other words, the more the owner 
delegates or loses control of his corporation, the more the agency costs become. 
Thus, stockholders, as risk bearer, should play the final monitoring role of the corporation 
because the reduction of agency costs is combined with their benefits. However, the problem 
with this solution is that stockholders are usually not willing to assume such roles and – even if 
they wanted to – corporate law and their lack of knowledge will prevent them.145 In other words, 
they are “rationally apathetic.”146 
However, modern corporate governance literature has revealed that the dispersed 
ownership model of ownership is an exception to the norm (the concentrated ownership 
model).147 The concentrated ownership model exists in all developing countries and many 
developed countries as well, such as France, Germany, and Italy.148 In the concentrated model, 
agency costs are not caused by the independence of the corporate directors and key executives 
for shareholders supervision but rather by the controlling shareholders and their appointed board 
of directors.149 Truly, constitutional design of the corporation decision making system normally 
confined shareholders’ decision making power to just extraordinary matters. However, 
shareholders’ de facto economic power in the concentrated model shifted this paradigm for 
145 Bainbridge, supra note 4, at 37. 
146 See CLARK, supra note 94, at 390–92. 
147 See Florencio Lopez de Silanes, Rafael La Porta & Andrei Shleifer, Corporate Ownership Around the 
World, 54:2 J. FINANCE 471–517 (1999). 
148 For empirical evidence that indicates concentrated ownership pattern is the dominant ownership pattern 
around the world, see de Silanes et al., supra note 147. 
149 See generally Julian Franks & Colin Mayer, Corporate Ownership and Control in the U.K., Germany, 
and France, vol. 9.4 J. OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE (1997). 
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directors to their benefits.150 Accordingly, (majority) shareholders direct the company’s affairs 
from behind the scenes through dummy directors whom they appoint and remove at any time. 
This scenario opens a wide door for controlling shareholders to seize most of the company 
benefits for themselves, at the expense of minority shareholders who are entitled to share some 
financial benefits of the company based on their investment.151 Thus, and in contrast to the 
dispersed ownership model, the concentrated model of ownership agency problem is between the 
shareholders themselves: the controlling majority shareholders v. minority shareholders.152 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
The first part of this chapter summarized and commented upon various theories of the publicly 
traded corporation : the traditional theory, the nexus of contract theory, the entity theory and the 
team production theory. Clearly, each theory has advantages and disadvantages; however, the 
claim of the traditional theory that shareholders are the owners of the corporation is no longer 
plausible under the law and practice. The nexus of contract theory, which describes shareholders 
as residual claimants, is closer to reality. The last part was devotes for the discussion of 
150 In other words, I believe that a joint stock company drafter historically drafted the provision of such a 
company with one idea in mind: that is no shareholder(s) may have a controlling share of any public company due to 
the huge amount of capital required to be established when such company operations were limited public interest 
mega projects. Also, the drafter may have thought that the small investors of public companies would work together 
diligently to achieve their mutual interests. 
151 See generally Debourah A. DeMott, Agency Principles and Large Block Shareholders, 19 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 321 (1997–1998). 
152 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A FRAMEWORK FOR IMPLEMENTATION VI, at 33 (Magdi R. Iskander & 
Nadereh Chamlou eds., World Bank Group 2000). 
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ownership and control and agency problem in dispersed ownership system and concentrated 
system.  
154 
5.0  ISLAM AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Modern corporate governance is about managing the corporation efficiently by increasing its 
beneficiaries’ value and reducing agency costs. The corporate governance culture of any society 
reflects the ideological foundation of that society. In modern states, corporate governance 
principles would be found in legislation (binding rules) or in ethical codes observed by that 
society (non-binding norms). This categorization of sources fits perfectly with corporate 
governance principles in secular states.1 In such systems, ethics are generally considered to be 
non-binding standards, merely containing a moral obligation recognized by the society. In other 
words, ethics have no legal obligation that could be enforced directly in the court of law.2 
Conversely, Islam is a holistic system that does not differentiate between law and ethical 
non-binding morals.3 Mervyn Lewis noted: 
The New Testament injunction to render unto Caesar the things which are 
Caesar’s, and unto God the things that are God’s, has led to a divergence in the 
1 A secular state refers to the state that separates religious affairs from the public sphere. The degree of 
separation varies from one country to the other. For different patterns of secularisms, see generally CHARLES 
TAYLOR, MODELS OF SECULARISMS, IN SECULARISM AND ITS CRITICS 32, 32–53 (Rajeev Bhargava eds., 1998). 
2 The word “ethics” comes from the Greek word “ethos,” which means in western literature “what is 
appropriate and rational.” Ataullah Siddiqui, Ethics in Islam: Key Concept and Contemporary Challenges, 26 J. 
MORAL EDUC. 423, 423 (1997) (quotation omitted). 
3 See Mervyn K. Lewis, Islamic Corporate Governance, 9 REV. ISLAMIC ECON. 5, 14 (2005). 
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West between sacred and secular that is anathema to Islam. In Islam, the realms of 
God and Caesar are not separate jurisdictions.4 
Moreover, ethics in secular systems are extracted from “human reason” and practice, and 
disregarding “the role of faith,” while “religious ethics draw its resources from revelation.”5 
Therefore, Muslims are obligated to integrate Islam into their all their life’s endeavors.6 Hence, 
Islam, as a holistic nature, “contain[s] a number of basic principles that may be applicable to the 
conduct of corporate affairs,”7 and interacts with modern corporate governance. 
5.2 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN ISLAM 
5.2.1 Social Responsibility 
5.2.1.1 Islamic Perspective on Social Responsibility 
Muslims believe in the unity of God under which “there is no God but Allah.”8 Allah created the 
universe including our planet and all living creatures.9 Allah is the true owner of everything in 
4 Id. 
5 Siddiqui, supra note 2. 
6 See Lewis, supra note 3. 
7 Abdul Rahim Abdul Rahman, An Islamic Perspective of Corporate Accountability and Morality, 4 
GADJAH MADA INT’L J. BUS. vol. 1, 121 (2002). 
8 See the Koran which provides that: “Say: He is Allah, the One! (1) Allah, the eternally Besought of all! 
(2) He begetteth not nor was begotten. (3) And there is none comparable unto Him. (4)” (Koran: Surat Al-Ikhlas, 
verses 1–4). 
9 The Koran provides that: 
Lo! your Lord is Allah Who created the heavens and the earth in six Days, then 
He established Himself upon the Throne, directing all things. There is no 
intercessor (with Him) save after His permission. That is Allah, your Lord, so 
worship Him. Oh, will ye not remind? 
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this world as the Koran notes: “Say: Unto whom belongeth whatsoever is in the heavens and the 
earth? Say: Unto Allah.”10 Allah has full control over this universe: 
Say (unto them, O Muhammad): Who provideth for you from the sky and the 
earth, or Who owneth hearing and sight; and Who bringeth forth the living from 
the dead and bringeth forth the dead from the living; and Who directeth the 
course? They will say: Allah. Then say: Will ye not then keep your duty (unto 
Him)?11 
At the end of the world, Allah will be the final inheritor of everything on this planet as 
noted in the Koran: “Lo! We Only, We inherit the earth and all who are thereon, and unto Us 
they are returned.”12 Human beings are created by Allah and put on the earth as His 
“viceregents,” as the Koran reveals: 
And when thy Lord said unto the angels: Lo! I am about to place a viceroy in the 
earth, they said: Wilt thou place therein one who will do harm therein and will 
shed blood, while we, we hymn Thy praise and sanctify Thee? He said: Surely I 
know that which ye know not.13 
As viceroys, people are entrusted with the stewardship of the earth.14 People as stewards 
are not only entitled to the natural resources of the earth but also obliged to develop them.15 
Also, people are expected to utilize earth’s resources efficiently: 
“O Children of Adam! Look to your adornment at every place of worship, and eat 
and drink, but be not prodigal. Lo! He loveth not the prodigals.”16 
(Koran: Surat Yunus, Verse number 3). 
10 (Koran: Surat Al-Anaam, Verse number 12). 
11 (Koran: Surat Yunus, Verse number 31). 
12 (Koran: Surat Maryam, Verse number 40). 
13 (Koran: Surat Al-Baqara, Verse number 30). 
14 See Rahman, supra note 7, at 122. 
15 The main mandate is to worship Allah as the Koran states: “I created the jinn and humankind only that 
they might worship Me.” (Koran: Surat Ada-Dhariyat, Verse number 56). 
16 (Koran: Surat Al-Araf, Verse number 31). 
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Availability of a natural resource in great quantity does not justify wasteful consumption 
of that resource. In this regard, Prophet Mohammad ordered his companions to economize when 
using water for ablution by saying preserve the water “even if [they] are on the bank of a flowing 
river.”17 
Islam adores a working and wealthy generation and recognizes its impact on people and 
the society. The Prophet Mohammad said, “Work for your worldly life as if you were going to 
live forever, but work for the life to come as if you were going to die tomorrow.”18 Businesses 
thus should not be driven simply by profit or gains, but act also for societal benefit,19 such as the 
conservation of natural resources and sustainability. 
Islam also recognizes two mechanisms for redistribution of wealth.20 The first one, zakat 
(alms), is a mandatory imposed taxation on every Muslim.21 Zakat spending channels are strictly 
prescribed in the Koran, which reflects a strong advocacy of social welfare promotion in Islam: 
The alms are only for the poor and the needy, and those who collect them, and 
those whose hearts are to be reconciled, and to free the captives and the debtors, 
and for the cause of Allah, and (for) the wayfarer; a duty imposed by Allah. Allah 
is Knower, Wise.22 
The second mechanism is sadagah which refers to voluntarily charitable contributions. 
Islamic texts are full of encouragement for Muslims to contribute to others. The Koran reminds 
17 Narrated by Ibn Majah (“The Prophet Mohammad went along one of his companions (Saad) “when he 
was performing ablution, and he [Prophet] said: ‘What is this extravagance?’ He [Saad] said: ‘Can there be any 
extravagance in ablution?’ He [Prophet] said: ‘Yes, even if you are on the bank of a flowing river.”). Id. 
18 Gillian Rice, Islamic Ethics and Implications for Business, 18 No. 4 J. BUS. ETHICS 345–58 (Feb. 1999). 
19 See Rahman, supra note 7, at 122–24. 
20 See RODNEY J. WILSON, ECONOMY, IN A COMPANION TO MUSLIM ETHICS 131, 132 (Amyn B. Sajoo eds., 
2010). 
21 See Rice, supra note 18, at 348. 
22 (Koran: Surat Al-Tawba, Verse number 60). 
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people of their stewardship function over the wealth of God which He has deposited under their 
custody. Hence, people shall not hesitate to give part of Allah’s money to the less advantaged 
persons in society: 
- Believe in Allah and His messenger, and spend of that whereof He hath made 
you trustees; and such of you as believe and spend (aright), theirs will be a 
great reward.”23 
- Those who spend their wealth by night and day, by stealth and openly, verily 
their reward is with their Lord, and there shall no fear come upon them neither 
shall they grieve.24 
Allah condemns greedy people who are excessively attached to wealth accumulation and 
spare nothing for needy persons in the society: 
They who hoard up gold and silver and spend it not in the way of Allah, unto 
them give tidings (O Muhammad) of a painful doom, On the day when it will (all) 
be heated in the fire of hell, and their foreheads and their flanks and their backs 
will be branded therewith (and it will be said unto them): Here is that which ye 
hoarded for yourselves. Now taste of what ye used to hoard.25 
Islamic scope of charitable contribution is very progressive as it includes all living 
creatures. Regarding this, the Prophet noted: “[a] reward is giving in connection with every 
living creature.”26 
23 (Koran: Surat Al-Hadid, Verse number 7). 
24 (Koran: Surat Al-Baqara, Verse number 274). 
25 (Koran: Surat Al-Tawba, Verses number 34-35). 
26 The Prophet Mohammad’s statement came in the context of an interesting story narrated by the Prophet: 
While a man was walking on his way he became extremely thirsty. He found a well, he went down 
into it to drink water. Upon leaving it, he saw a dog which was panting out of thirst. His tongue 
was lolling out and he was eating moist earth from extreme thirst. The man thought to himself: 
‘This dog is extremely thirsty as I was.’ So he descended into the well, filled up his leather sock 
with water, and holding it in his teeth, climbed up and quenched the thirst of the dog. Allah 
appreciated his action and forgave his sins.” The Companions asked: “Shall we be rewarded for 
showing kindness to the animals also?” He (PBUH) said, “A reward is given in connection with 
every living creature.” Narrated by Muslim. 
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However, one should bear in mind that Islam encourages moderate behavior in every 
aspect of life.27 A Muslim has to pursue balanced behavior that neither greedily runs after wealth 
accumulation nor is excessively extravagant, even if such profligacy is for charitable reasons. 
This idea model is depicted in the Koran: “[a]nd let not thy hand be chained to thy neck nor open 
it with a complete opening, lest thou sit down rebuked, denuded.”28 
5.2.1.2 The Socially Responsible Company 
As illustrated, Islam strongly supports a modern corporate notion of social responsibility which 
advocates the implementation of sustainable and charitable practices by corporations. Linking 
modern social responsibility principles to their Islamic counterparts will promote incorporation 
of social responsibility principles into corporate governance systems in Islamic states on one 
hand, and persuade Islamically-aware corporations to implement socially responsible governance 
policies on the other. A well-governed Islamic corporation should have balanced policies that 
may ensure financial gains to the corporation and socially benefit the society.29 A socially 
responsible corporation has to implement environmentally-friendly policies and assign segments 
of its financial and non-financial resources to increase social welfare of the community. 
27 See the Koran which provides: “Thus We have appointed you a middle nation, that ye may be witnesses 
against mankind, and that the messenger may be a witness against you.” (Koran: Surat Al-Baqara, Verse number 
243). 
28 (Koran: Surat Al-Isra, Verse number 29). 
29 See Rice, supra note 18, at 349. Also see Abdul Rahim Abdul Rahman, Issues in Corporate 
Accountability and Governance: An Islamic Perspective, AM. J. ISLAMIC SCI. 55, 62 (1998) (“[T]he right to use and 
benefit from one’s wealth and property must not be exercised as the expense of the interest of the community.”). Id. 
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5.2.2 Adel 
The Arabic word “Adel” conveys two interlinked meanings: fairness and justice. Adel is one of 
the pillars of the Islamic legal and ethical system. All Muslims are under obligation to adhere to 
this principle when dealing with other people, as noted by Allah: 
O ye who believe! Be steadfast witnesses for Allah in equity, and let not hatred of any people 
seduce you that ye deal not justly. Deal justly, that is nearer to your duty. Observe your duty to 
Allah. Lo! Allah is informed of what ye do.30 
The Islamic economic system is one of the key sectors of society that has been heavily 
influenced by the adel principle. Adel defines Islamic economic theory, which has coincided 
greatly with modern market economy (e.g., prohibition of government pricing of goods)31 and 
free movement of goods crossing borders (e.g., custom duties prohibition).32 Islam’s pro- “free 
economy” principles might be justified under the principle of adel because, for instance, 
mandatory pricing of commodities by the state or custom duties levying would constitute 
prejudicial action against merchants. At the same time, adel has played a crucial role in 
justifying some limitations imposed on the Islamic economic model. For instance, Islam rejects 
30 (Koran: Surat Al-Maeda, Verse number 8). 
31 One of the companions (Anas) of the Prophet Mohammad reported the following discussion between the 
Prophet and his companions: 
Prices became excessive during the time of the Messenger of Allah (saws), so they said: ‘O 
Messenger of Allah! Set prices for us!’ So he said: ‘Indeed Allah is Al-Musa’ir, Al-Qabid, Al-
Basir, Ar-Razzaq. And I am hopeful that I meet my Lord and none of you are seeking 
(recompense from) me for an injustice involving blood or wealth.’ (Narrated by al-Tirmidhi.) 
32 The Prophet Mohammad said about a repented adulterous woman that: “Khalid, be gentle. By Him in 
Whose Hand is my life, she has made such a repentance that even if a wrongful tax-collector [muks] were to repent, 
he would have been forgiven.” Narrated by Muslim. The majority of Islamic jurists interpret the aforementioned 
word [muks] as one of its meaning refer to custom duties imposed by states on traders. Islam’s prohibition of custom 
duties fourteen centuries ago reflect a crucial aspect of Islamic economic foundations which were recently 
intertwined with modern free trade principles encompassed in the World Trade organization (WTO) framework, 
namely the GATTS agreement. 
161 
                                                 
unfair trade practices such as monopolies,33 selling below market prices,34 uncertain contracts,35 
and usury (interest).36 Hence, the adel principle has played an influential role in framing the 
Islamic economic system. 
The concept of Adel in Islam interacts with modern corporate governance principles and 
promotes the corporate governance thesis on several fronts. Firstly, a corporate governance 
system has to guarantee fair and just treatment of the company’s stakeholders. For instance, the 
company’s employees have to receive “fair” compensation for their contribution to the 
company.37 Also, shareholders have to receive a fair return for their investment in the firm (i.e., 
dividends or capital gains). Secondly, the board of directors and executive officers have to 
implement a fair decision-making framework in running the company’s affairs. For example, 
monetary compensation for the company management has to be reasonable and determined by a 
fair process, like a well-structured and governed compensation committee. Thirdly, majority 
33 The Prophet Mohammad said: “[n]o one withholds goods till their price rises but a sinner.” Narrated by 
Abi Dawud. 
34 The second successor caliph (ruler) of the Islamic state (634–44), Umar ibn alkattab, forbid merchants to 
sell below market price as depicted in the following incident: 
Umar ibn al-Khattab passed by Hatab ibn Abi Baltaa who was underselling some of his raisins in 
the market. Umar ibn al-Khattab said to him, “Either increase the price or leave our market.” 
Narrated in the Imam Malik (al-Muwtta: sales chapter). 
35 See WILSON, supra note 20. A prominent example in Islamic figh (jurisprudence) is the illegality of the 
contemporary insurance contracts (commercial insurance but not cooperative form) due to the uncertainty which 
makes one party pay for something he might not receive anything in return for it. However, there are some jurists 
like Mustafa Ahmad Al-Zarqa who have opined that an insurance contract is permissible in Islam. See MUSTAFA 
AHMAD AL-ZARQA, AL-MADKHAL AL-FIQHI AL-AAM, vol. 1, 624 (1998). Other eminent scholars such as Sheik 
Yusuf al-Garadawi proposed some modifications to the existing insurance contractual structure to fit within Islamic 
standards. See YUSUF AL-GARADAWI, AL-HALAL WA AL-HARAM FI AL-ISLAM 252 (14th ed. 1985). 
36 See WILSON, supra note 20. In debt financing contracts, one party does all the effort and assumes the 
risk, while the other party is indifferent about the business financed by his money because he will receive his money 
back with interest regardless of what had happened to the project. See generally id. at 131, 145. For theory of 
Islamic finance, see FRANK E. VOGEL & SAMUEL L. HAYES III, ISLAMIC LAW AND FINANCE: RELIGION, RISK, AND 
RETURN (1998). 
37 Mervyn K. Lewis, Islam and Accounting, 25 ACCOUNTING FORUM 103, 110 (2001). 
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shareholders have an obligation towards the minority shareholders, especially during the time of 
fundamental changes in the company’s structure, such as buy-out acquisitions. In this event, the 
majority shareholders are obliged to refrain from approving any unjust transactions against 
minority shareholders or other stakeholders. 
5.2.3 Trustworthiness and Honesty 
5.2.3.1 Introduction 
In the pre-Islamic era, Arabic culture prized the values of honesty and trustworthiness.38 In 
addition, the people of Mecca used to call the Prophet Mohammad before his prophecy “al-
ameen” (the trustworthy).39 Later, the Prophet Mohammad indicated that Islam recognized the 
good pre-Islamic values being observed in the Arab peninsula, noting: “I was sent to perfect 
good character.”40 In fact, these two values “are universal among the three religions [Judaism, 
Christianity and Islam], and indeed, among most moral codes.”41 Such long-standing Arabian 
and Islamic heritages of recognition and admiration of these values would greatly promote 
modern corporate governance ideology and practice. 
38 See, e.g., Akthum bin Saifi Speech in front of the Sassanid Emperor, quoted in Jamhart kutab alarab fi al 
usur alwosta, at 21–22 (1923). 
39 SAFI AL-RAHAMAN AL-MUBARAKFURI, AL-RAHEEQ AL-MAKTUM 62 (2007). 
40 Narrated by Imam Malik (Muwatta: chapter of Good Character). 
41 Rice, supra note 18, at 349. 
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5.2.3.2 Trustworthiness 
Muslims have to maintain their integrity by not violating trust placed on them by others, as the 
Koran provides: 
- O ye who believe! Betray not Allah and His messenger, nor knowingly betray 
your trusts.42 
- Lo! Allah commandeth you that ye restore deposits to their owners.43 
The Prophet Mohammad also ordered Muslims to be trustworthy.44 A trustworthy person 
should respect his contractual relations, as the Koran provides: “O ye who believe! Fulfill your 
undertakings.”45 Moreover, an entrusted person has to conserve and develop the assets 
positioned in his control for the benefit of the asset’s beneficiary. For instance, the custodian of 
orphans’ affluence has to perform his duties with extraordinary integrity and care in accordance 
with Allah’s command: “Come not near the wealth of the orphan save with that which is better 
till he come to strength; and keep the covenant. Lo! of the covenant it will be asked.”46 Also, 
Islam has obligated every Muslim to uphold a trust placed upon him even if the other parties fail 
to keep their obligation towards him, as the Prophet instructed: “[p]ay the deposit to him who 
deposited it with you, and do not betray him who betrays you.”47 
42 (Koran: Surat Al-Anfal, Verse number 27). 
43 (Koran: Surat An-Nisa, Verse number 58). 
44 The ProphetMohammad said: “There are three signs of hypocrites: When he speaks, he lies; when he 
makes a promise, he breaks it; and when he is trusted, he betrays his trust.” Narrated by al-Bukari and Muslim. 
45 (Koran: Surat Al-Maeda, Verse number 1). In other part of the Koran, Allah commands Muslims to keep 
their promise by saying: “and keep the covenant. Lo! of the covenant it will be asked. (34).” (Koran: Surat Al-Isra, 
Verse number 34). 
46 (Korran: Surat Al-Isra, Verse number 34). 
47 As the Prophet Mohammad said: “[p]ay the deposit to him who deposited it with you, and do not betray 
him who betrays you.” Narrated by Abi Dawud. 
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Trustworthiness is regarded a prerequisite of recruiting employees. Two practical 
incidents reported in the Koran show a link between trustworthiness and suitability for 
employment. In the first one, the Prophet Joseph emphasizes his notorious trustworthiness to the 
King of Egypt when Joseph petitioned to be appointed by the king: “[h]e said: Set me over the 
storehouses of the land. Lo! I am a skilled custodian.”48 In another incident, some young women 
urge their father to hire the Prophet Moses due to his famed trustworthiness by saying: “O my 
father! Hire him! For the best (man) that thou canst hire is the strong, the trustworthy.”49 
Clearly, the value of being trustworthy in Islam overlaps with modern corporate 
governance principles, contributing to achieving governance’s goals in different ways. First, the 
corporation’s board of directors and other officers have to preserve the corporation’s assets and 
spend such assets efficiently for the benefit of the corporation and its shareholders. Also, they 
have to maintain their loyalty to the corporation by avoiding any conflict of interest transactions. 
Accordingly, the members of the board of directors and executive officers should not use the 
corporation’s assets for their own interests or to the contrary of the best interests of the 
corporation. Secondly, every member of the corporation has to look after the corporation’s assets 
placed under his trust. This duty of care is so wide that it includes every person working for the 
company. Preserving the company’s assets requires that the board of directors’ members and top 
executive officers receive reasonable compensation. Wasting the company’s resources on 
unnecessary matters violates the duty of trust imposed on these entrusted persons. Thirdly, the 
board of directors and other high-ranking management officers are obligated to hire the most 
qualified persons in the company. Fourthly, the company has to respect all contractual 
48 (Korran: Surat Yusuf, Verse number 55). 
49 (Korran: Surat Al-Qasas, Verse number 26). 
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agreements with its stakeholders. Finally, the company has to observe trust placed in it by 
workers: they must pay workers’ salaries on time, protect their retirement plan, take into account 
their position whenever fundamental change in the company’s legal structure arises (e.g., 
restructuring or dissolution). However, the corporation’s employees have no right to violate their 
duty of trust to the company even if the company has not fulfilled its promises to them. The same 
applies to the corporation if there is betrayal by an employee. For these events, pursuing a legal 
remedy is the only available option to the injured party. 
5.2.3.3 Honesty 
Honesty is another pivotal principle in Islamic ethical system. Honesty commonly goes hand in 
hand with trustworthiness.50 In the Koran, Allah commanded Muslims to be endowed with 
honesty, saying: “O ye who believe! Be careful of your duty to Allah, and be with the truthful.”51 
Prophet Mohammad encourages this good behavior by advising his companions to be honest to 
attain Allah’s satisfaction.891F52 
Transparency represents an integral component of honesty’s value in Islam. A merchant 
has to allow a buyer to accurately determine the condition of goods he presents for sale: 
- Happened to pass [the Prophet Mohammad] by a heap of eatable (corn). He 
thrust his hand in that (heap) and his finger were moistened. He said to the 
owner of that heap of eatable (corn): What is this? He replied ... these have 
been drenched by rainfall. He ... prophet remarked: Why you did not place 
50 Honesty refers to telling the truth and trustworthiness refers to keeping the promise. 
51 (Koran: Surat Al-Tawba, Verse number 119). 
52 The Prophet Mohammad said: “it is obligatory for you to tell the truth, for truth leads to virtue and virtue 
leads to paradise....” Narrated by Muslim. 
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this (the drenched part of the heap) over other eatables so that the people 
could see it? He who deceives is not of me (is not my follower).53 
- Allah’s Messenger (PBUH) forbade the selling by Munabadha, i.e. to sell 
one’s garment by casting it to the buyer not allowing him to examine or see it. 
Similarly he forbade the selling by Mulamasa. Mulamasa is to buy a garment, 
for example, by merely touching it, not looking at it.54 
In addition, a disclosure system in Islam imposes an obligation on the seller to reveal all 
information related to the goods, especially if there is any defect in them: 
Both parties of a business transaction have the right to annul it so long as they 
have not separated; and if they speak the truth and make everything clear they will 
be blessed in their transaction; but if they tell a lie and conceal anything the 
blessing on their transaction will be blotted out.55 
The sellers are prohibited from employing deceptive marketing and advertising strategies: 
The Prophet (PBUH) said: Don’t keep camels and sheep unmilked for a long 
time, for whoever buys such an animal has the option to milk it and then either to 
keep it or return it to the owner along with one Sa of dates.56 
Trade has to be conducted based on market prices that are known by both parties. Neither 
seller nor buyer is entitled to take advantage of the other one; thus they must disclose the fair 
market value of the goods. In this vein, the Prophet Mohammad “forbade the meeting (of 
caravans) on the way and the selling of goods by an inhabitant of the town on behalf of a desert 
dweller.”57 
Islam’s strong support of honesty and transparency promotes sound corporate governance 
objectives, especially with regard to a disclosure framework. Publicly traded corporations are 
53 Narrated by Muslim. 
54 Narrated by al-Bukhari. 
55 Narrated by Muslim. 
56 Narrated by al-Bukhari. The Arabic word “Sa” refers to measure of weight in Arab countries which is a 
proximately equal to two and half kilograms. 
57 Narrated by al-Bukhari. 
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obliged to disclose all material information to investors. Disclosures compatible with Islamic 
values should “include[] the attribute of ‘truth’-fair and accurate disclosure of the matters at 
hand.”58 Merely disclosing all information does not satisfy the Islamic disclosure requirements 
under which the corporation is obliged to signal important information and risk factors to 
investors. As illustrated in the wet heap of corn incident, all material information has to be 
communicated effectively to the investor rather than merely enabling him to search for such 
information “like looking for a needle in haystack.” Dumping a great deal of unnecessary 
information on investors in hopes of burying material information does not fulfill Islamic 
disclosure requirements. 
Disclosed information ought to include all information investors would deem necessary 
to determine compatibility of the corporation operations and finance structure with Islamic 
teachings.59 For instance, any interest-based finance has to be disclosed to investors.60 The 
corporation’s line of business should also be disclosed to investors to enable them to make 
accountable investment decisions, especially with regard to investment in corporations that 
58 Lewis, supra note 37, at 103, 114. 
59 See Lewis, supra note 3, at 23. 
60 See, e.g., Fatwa No. 3134, the Permanent Committee in the General Presidency of Scholarly Research 
and Ifta, vol. 13, P. 505, n.d., available in English at 
http://www.alifta.net/fatawa/fatawaDetails.aspx?BookID=3&View=Page&PageNo=10&PageID=5032 (accessed on 
Dec. 20, 2012) (The fatwa (ruling) of the committee indicated that shareholding in interest based banks is not 
permitted in Islam.). Id. Cf. see, e.g., Fatwa No. 4512, the Permanent Committee in the General Presidency of 
Scholarly Research and Ifta, vol. 13, 508, n.d., available in English at 
http://www.alifta.net/Fatawa/FatawaDetails.aspx?View=Page&PageID=5026&PageNo=1&BookID=7#P508 
(accessed on Dec. 20, 2012) (the committee with regard of shareholding in non-interest based banks ruled: 
[i]t is permissible to buy shares in the banks which do not deal in Riba. Profits earned from 
shareholdings in the bank and which are the result of dealings that do not involve anything Haram 
[prohibited]; are Halal [lawful]. 
Id. (italics added). 
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engage in a prohibited business such as intoxicant production or selling,61 selling predatory 
animals62 and tobacco.63 Moreover, the disclosure framework ought to communicate to investors 
the corporation’s social responsibilities such as its policies towards the environment, charitable 
contributions, and zakat (alms) payment and calculations.64 The external auditor of the 
corporation is under an obligation to signal any violation of Islamic corporate governance 
principles.65 The corporation’s accountant and internal auditor have to ensure a sound recording 
of the corporation’s financial statements, especially with regard to the corporation’s liabilities, as 
instructed by the Koran.66 A sound transparency model should indicate the way a corporation 
61 The Prophet Mohammad said, “The trade of alcohol has become illegal.” Narrated by al-Bukhari. 
62 See Fatwa No. 18807, The Permanent Committee in the General Presidency of Scholarly Research and 
Ifta, vol. 13, 41, n.d., available in English at 
http://www.alifta.net/Fatawa/FatawaDetails.aspx?View=Page&PageID=4581&PageNo=1&BookID=7#P41 
(accessed on Dec. 20, 2012). 
63 See Fatwa No. 4947, the Permanent Committee in the General Presidency of Scholarly Research and Ifta, 
vol. 13, 32, n.d., available in English at 
http://www.alifta.net/Fatawa/FatawaDetails.aspx?View=Page&PageID=4572&PageNo=1&BookID=7#P32 
(accessed on Dec. 20, 2012). 
64 See Lewis, supra note 37, at 103, 114. 
65 For religious auditing, see generally Rahman, supra note 29, at 55, 64–65. 
66 The Koran provides: 
O ye who believe! When ye contract a debt for a fixed term, record it in writing. Let a scribe 
record it in writing between you in (terms of) equity. No scribe should refuse to write as Allah 
hath taught him, so let him write, and let him who incurreth the debt dictate, and let him observe 
his duty to Allah his Lord, and diminish naught thereof. But if he who oweth the debt is of low 
understanding, or weak, or unable himself to dictate, then let the guardian of his interests dictate in 
(terms of) equity. And call to witness, from among your men, two witnesses. And if two men be 
not (at hand) then a man and two women, of such as ye approve as witnesses, so that if one of the 
two erreth (through forgetfulness) the one of them will remind. And the witnesses must not refuse 
when they are summoned. Be not averse to writing down (the contract) whether it be small or 
great, with (record of) the term thereof. That is more equitable in the sight of Allah and more sure 
for testimony, and the best way of avoiding doubt between you; save only in the case when it is 
actual merchandise which ye transfer among yourselves from hand to hand. In that case it is no sin 
for you if ye write it not. And have witnesses when ye sell one to another, and let no harm be done 
to scribe or witness. If ye do (harm to them) lo! it is a sin in you. Observe your duty to Allah. 
Allah is teaching you. And Allah is knower of all things. 
(Koran: Surat Al-Baqara, Verse number 282). 
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acquires its assets and the lawfulness of the means of acquisition.67 Accordingly, Muslim 
investors are required to avoid investing in a corporation which acquires its assets unlawfully 
(e.g. intellectual property infringements). In this vein, the Prophet Mohammad noted: “[h]e who 
buys something stolen, while being aware that it is stolen, shares in the sin and shame of 
stealing.”68 The Islamic perception of disclosure and scope of transparency seem wider than the 
modern disclosure framework. 
5.2.4 Shura (Consultation) 
5.2.4.1 Shuratic Decision-making Process in Islam 
Arabian Peninsula tribes observed the process of consultation in their decision-making even 
before the advent of Islam.69 Generally speaking, in such a decision-making model, the “tribe’s” 
seniors form an “informal” congress for discussing and advising the tribe leader.70 Quraysh, the 
Prophet Mohammad’s tribe, for instance, had a designated council house, Dar al-Nadwa, for 
deliberating and deciding on the tribe’s affairs.71 Later, Islam appraised the value of consultation 
and formally incorporated it in the new religion. The Koran provides: 
67 The Koran provides that: “And eat not up your property among yourselves in vanity, nor seek by it to 
gain the hearing of the judges that ye may knowingly devour a portion of the property of others wrongfully.” 
(Koran: Surat Al-Baqara, Verse number 188). 
68 Reported by al-Bayhaqi, citied in YUSUF AL-QARADAWI, THE LAWFUL AND THE PROHIBITED IN ISLAM 
261 (2d ed. al-Falah Foundation for Translation, Publication, and Distribution 2001) 
69 See PHILIP K. HITTI, HISTORY OF THE ARABS 28 (revised 10th ed. 2002). 
70 See Lewis, supra note 3, at 15. 
71 See Ibrahim A. Al-Marzouqi, Political Rights and Democracy in Islamic Law, in DEMOCRACY, THE RULE 
OF LAW AND ISLAM 455, 456 (Eugene Cortan & Adel Omar Sherif eds., 1999). 
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- And those who answer the call of their Lord and establish worship, and whose 
affairs are a matter of counsel.72 
- So pardon them and ask forgiveness for them and consult with them upon the 
conduct of affairs.73 
Unequivocally, Islam encourages people to consult before commencing any project or 
making important decisions in every mater. In this regard, Shaik al-Mawdudi said: 
Islamic way of life requires that the principle of consultation should be used in 
every collective affair, big or small. If it is a domestic affair, the husband and the 
wife should at by mutual consultation, and when the children have grown up, they 
should also be consulted. If it is a matter concerning the whole family, the opinion 
of every adult member should be solicited. If it concerns a tribe or a fraternity or 
the population of a city, [they have to be consulted, as well].74 
Nonetheless, the need of consultation seems more crucial when the subject matter is 
related to a group of people’s affairs.75 For centuries Islamic scholars have not yet concurred on 
whether performing consultation by the leader is a mandatory or optional matter.76 Although the 
merit of the debate emerged in a constitutional context with regard to ruler-subject relation, 
nothing in the literature suggests excluding other organizational models from that debate 
perspective or insights.77 
Whether shura is obligatory or optional does not matter: what really matters is that a 
form of shuratic decision-making process framework is implemented in both cases. Disregarding 
shura value at any decision-making level represents “a grave immorality which Islam does not 
72 (Koran: Surat Ash-Shura: verse number 38). 
73 (Koran: Surat Al-Imran, Verse number 159). 
74 Shaik al-Mawdudi, Towards Understanding the Quran, surah ash-Sura, n.61, available at 
http://www.islamicstudies.info/tafheem.php?sura=42&verse=30&to=53] (accessed on Feb. 15, 2013). 
75 See id. 
76 See generally TAWFIK AL-SHAWI, FIGH AL-SHURA WA AL-ISTISHARAH 101–57 (2d ed. 1992). 
77 See id. at 8, 21. 
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permit.”78 The leader has to furnish a suitable ambient for consultees to provide their insight.79 
The leader needs not to be opinionated and he has to concede to the best advice offered, as the 
Prophet Mohammad’s tradition teaches us that even the prophet admitted to his followers some 
recommendations “that contradicted his opinion.”80 
The minority’s voice has to be heard and taken into account because “[j]ustice demands 
that all those whose interests are involved in a matter be consulted.”81 The interests of the whole 
group are the ultimate goal of the Islamic shuristic decision-making model; therefore, the leader 
initially has to devote immense exertion to form a consensus over the decision and not resort to a 
majority opinion unless forming a consensus is impossible. For instance, Indonesian people – 
who are a Muslim majority – disregarded the country’s formal constitutional setting which 
adopted the western model of majority ruling82 and upheld their long-standing consultation and 
consensus seeking decision-making model.83 An anthropologist describes the decision-making 
process in Indonesian villages by saying: 
[U]nanimous decision can be reached by a process in which the majority and 
minorities approach each other by making the necessary readjustments in their 
respective viewpoints, or by an integration of the contrasting standpoint into a 
78 al-Mawdudi, supra note 74. 
79 See MAHMOUD SHALTUT, AL-ISLAM AKIDA WA SHARIA 440 (18th ed. Dar Elshorouk 2001). 
80 Rahman, supra note 29, at 55, 62. 
81 al-Mawdudi, supra note 74. 
82 See Kiochi Kawamura, Consensus and Democracy in Indonesia: Musyawarah-Mufakat Revisited, 
Institute of Developing Economies Discussion Paper No. 308, 5–7 (cited pages) (Sept. 2011), available at 
http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Publish/Download/Dp/pdf/308.pdf (accessed on Feb. 20, 2013). Also, Soetardjo 
commented on the limitations of western majority decision-making structure in Indonesia by saying: “a majority 
vote system like that employed in western democracies ... is not familiar to the Indonesian people.” Id. at 4 (quoting 
Soetardo Kartohadikoesoemo, Desa, 102 (1953)). 
83 See Martha G. Lonsdon, Traditional Decision Making in Urban Neighborhoods, 26 INDONESIA 95, 96 
(Oct. 1978) (she said that “[f]or many of the peoples of Indonesia unanimous consent is the indigenous decision-
making rule”). Id. 
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new conceptual synthesis ... [Consultation and unanimity] thus exclude the 
possibility that the majority will impose its view on the minority.84 
One the other hand, consultation about special or technical matters (an expert opinion) 
should be directed to the most qualified person for advice. For instance, the eminent Islamic ruler 
and close companion of the Prophet Mohammad, Umar ibn al-Khattab,85 consulted a woman86 
about the amount of time soldiers’ wives could wait for their husbands to come back from the 
front lines of a war. In another event, Umar referred an alleged satirical poem to a famous poet to 
determine the true nature of that artistic work.87 Needless to say, a consultant in Islam is obliged 
to deliver advice based on his best knowledge and judgment,88 as noted by Prophet Mohammad: 
“One who is consulted is entrusted.”89 
5.2.4.2 Shura and Corporate Governance 
The Islamic compatible corporate governance model has to observe a shuratic decision-making 
process in corporations. The Islamic framework suggests that all members of the organization 
84 KOENTJARANINGRAT, THE VILLAGE IN INDONESIA TODAY, IN VILLAGES IN INDONESIA 386, 397 
(Koentjaraningrat eds., 1967). 
85 For short biography of Umar ibn al-Khattab, see ‘‘Umar ibn, al-Khattab” 2009, in Britannica Concise 
Encyclopedia, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Chicago, IL, USA) (viewed 15 Feb. 2013), from 
http://www.credoreference.com/entry/ebconcise/umar_ibn_al_kha%E1%B9%AD%E1%B9%AD%C4%81b. 
86 ABDUL RAZIQ AL-SANANI, AL-MUSANAF, vol. 7, 157 (1st ed., Dar al-Kotob al-Ilmiyah 2000). The 
woman that Omar consulted was his daughter, Hafsa, and the Prophet Mohammad’s wife. Consultation of women 
about their affairs or matters they have more expertise and insight on was a common practice by Omar. See ABI 
BAKER A. AL-BAYHAGI, AL-SUNAN AL-KUBRA, vol. 10, 193 (3d ed., Dar al-Kotob al-Ilamiyagh: 2003); ABBAS AL-
AKKAD, ABKARIAT OMAR 193 (Dar Nahdat Mesir: 1998). However, that does not mean women’s opinion is not 
sought for in other matters. Since the early days of Islam, women have represented a respected constituent of 
Muslim society in which their voice was taking into account with regard to the Islamic society affairs, on the same 
footing as the men’s voice. For instance, women were consulted on electing the third ruler of the first Islamic state, 
Othman bin Affan. See ISMAIL IBN KATHEIR, AL-BIYDAYAH WA AL-NIHAYAH, vol. 10, 211 (1st ed., Hajir publishing 
1998). 
87 See AL-AKKAD, supra note 86, at 165–66. 
88 al-Mawdudi, supra note 74. 
89 Narrated by Ibn Majah. 
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should be allowed to “participate in the decision-making” process.90 Therefore, the corporation 
has to set policies and procedures to guarantee that no decision would be taken in absence of 
preliminary consultations and consensus-seeking over that decision. For example, the board of 
director’s members and shareholders should not make any decisions within their realm of 
authority without conducting extensive deliberation and devoting a great deal of effort to build 
consensus over the pending matter. Besides conducting the mentioned horizontal consultations, a 
vertical consultation has to be observed between the board of director’s members and the 
company’s top executive officers, and those top officers with the rest of the employees. Allowing 
all employees to participate in the decision-making process will increase their loyalty to the 
company and improve their productivity.91 Any minority group – whether on the board of 
directors or at shareholders meetings – has to be consulted and allowed to participate in the 
decision-making process of the corporation. The opinion of the majority shall not be imposed 
before a candid, consensus- seeking effort is conducted. The company has to support its 
decisions with the best available expert’s opinion. For instance, the financial administrative 
structure and marketing strategies of the company have to be formed and evaluated by experts. 
The division among Islamic scholars over the obligatory nature of shura would allow for 
the emergence of several varieties of shuratic decision-making models. For instance, informal 
incorporations of shura in a company’s decision-making process as in the Indonesian example 
would satisfy the Islamic requirement of a shuratic model. Or, a formal form of a shuratic 
decision-making process might be imposed mandatorily on companies in a way similar to the 
German corporate governance model which requires labor participation in a company’s decision-
90 See SHALTUT, supra note 79, at 158, 440. 
91 See KHALID KHALIL AL-DAHIR, AL-NIDAM AL-IDARI 184 (2009). 
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making process.92 Implementing any form of a shuratic decision-making process reflects an 
inclination to the stakeholder model of corporate governance which strongly advocates the 
stakeholder’s, especially the employees, involvement in the company’s decision-making 
process.93 
5.2.5 Accountability 
5.2.5.1 Fear of Allah 
As in Judaism and Christianity,94 Islam holds that every person will be held accountable on the 
Day of Judgment for his actions in this life.95 People’s actions, whether veiled or concealed, are 
known to Allah, as the Koran provides: “[s]ay, (O Muhammad): Whether ye hide that which is in 
your breasts or reveal it, Allah knoweth it.”96 A wrongdoer may escape accountability in this life 
but, ultimately, they will be held accountable by Allah.97 Therefore, abidance to Islamic rules 
92 For the German labor participatory model of corporate governance see, e.g., MARK J. ROE, POLITICAL 
DETERMENTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: POLITICAL CONTEXT, CORPORATE IMPACT 71–82 (2003). 
93 Several scholars have categorized Islamic corporate governance a stakeholder model. See, e.g., ZAMIR 
IQBAL & ABBAS MIRAKHOR, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC FINANCE: THEORY AND PRACTICE 283–85 (2007). 
94 This connection is illustrated by a western scholar: 
[T]he God of Muslims is the same God of the Jews and the Christians, although without what 
perhaps might be seen as the racial exclusiveness attributed to Him by Judaism, or the intricate 
theology woven around Him by Christianity in the form of the Trinity ... Many of the familiar 
stories and names of the Bible are to be found in the Holy Qur’an .... In fact, Islam is the only non-
Christian religion that makes it an article of faith to believe in Jesus as a prophet.” 
Lewis, supra note 37, at 103, 105. 
95 Allah said: “And whoso doeth good an atom’s weight will see it then, And whoso doeth ill an atom’s 
weight will see it then.” (Koran: Surat al-Zalzala, Verses number 7-8). 
96 (Koran: Surat Al-Imran, Verse number 29). 
97 See Rahman, supra note 7, at 122. 
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and guidance exceeds complying with the rules enacted by legislature.98 In a secular system, for 
instance, taking advantage of a loophole in the legal system would not matter, but it would 
matter greatly in a religion-based system which considers such an action a violation of God’s 
will (i.e., a sin). In addition, permissibility of a specific activity or action by positive laws does 
not confer automatic legitimacy to that activity or action in Islam. For instance, national bank 
operations in Saudi Arabia encompass interest (usury), which is strongly forbidden by Islam.99 
Hence, many well-qualified Saudis tend to refuse to work in the banking sector.100 Not only that, 
but many of them have quit their respectable jobs in that sector for inferior-status jobs or those 
which pay less.101 Until recently, the insurance sector had faced the same negative attitude from 
Saudis.102 Thus, the belief of the inescapable destiny of accountability may enhance Muslims’ 
internal surveillance system and encourage every Muslim to self-enforce Islamic principles 
beyond the limits of a secular system. 
98 See Lewis, supra note 3, at 5–29 (cited page 16). 
99 The Koran provides that: O ye who believe! Devour not usury, doubling and quadrupling (the sum lent). 
Observe your duty to Allah, that ye may be successful.” (Koran: Surat Al-Imran, Verse number 130). 
100 See, e.g., Fatwa No. 5714, the Permanent Committee in the General Presidency of Scholarly Research 
and Ifta, vol. 15, 55, n.d., available in English at, 
http://www.alifta.net/Fatawa/FatawaDetails.aspx?View=Page&PageID=5486&PageNo=1&BookID=7#P55 
(accessed on Dec. 20, 2012). 
101 See, e.g., Fatwa No. 20068, the Permanent Committee in the General Presidency of Scholarly Research 
and Ifta, vol. 8, 371, n.d., available in English at 
http://www.alifta.net/Fatawa/FatawaDetails.aspx?View=Page&PageID=13448&PageNo=1&BookID=7#P371 
(accessed on Feb. 6, 2013) (a person ask the Permanent Committee if he could give zakat (alms) to a person (his 
brother) who voluntarily quit working for a bank because the bank deal in impermissible usury and had not find a 
job since then nor had any source of income). 
102 The dominant opinion of most Islamic jurists in Saudi Arabia is that an insurance contract is forbidden 
under Islamic law because of that contract’s uncertainty and unfairness. See, e.g., Fatwa No. 14839, the Permanent 
Committee in the General Presidency of Scholarly Research and Ifta, vol. 15, P. 9, n.d., available in English at 
http://www.alifta.net/Fatawa/FatawaDetails.aspx?View=Page&PageID=5454&PageNo=1&BookID=7#P9 (accessed 
on Dec. 20, 2012) (the Committee ruled on working in non-Islamic compatible insurance (commercial insurance 
companies) by saying: “[w]orking for this company is impermissible for this is assisting in sin and transgression.”). 
Id. 
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5.2.5.2 “Encouraging Good and Discouraging Evil” 
The Islamic accountability framework is not limited to the hereafter under which every member 
of a Muslim society must stand against any non-Islamic actions that occur in the society. Not 
only that, but a true believer must also try to persuade other fellow Muslims to observe Islamic 
values. This obligation is called “encouraging good and discouraging evil,” which is noted in the 
Koran: 
- And the believers, men and women, are protecting friends one of another; they 
enjoin the right and forbid the wrong, and they establish worship and they pay 
the poor-due, and they obey Allah and His messenger.103 
- Ye are the best community that hath been raised up for mankind. Ye enjoin 
right conduct and forbid indecency; and ye believe in Allah.104 
In addition, the Prophet Mohammad said that: 
Whoever amongst you sees an evil, he must rectify it by his hand; if he is unable 
to do so, then by his tongue (speaking against it); if he unable to do so, then by his 
heart (rejecting it), and the latter is the weakest form of iman (faith).105 
“Encouraging good and discouraging evil” obligation is, also, known as hisbba.106 The 
hisbba obligation in Islam is a “communal obligation.”107 The fulfillment of such an obligation 
by enough members of the society would release the rest of their obligation to perform hisbba.108 
However, the whole of society will be held accountable if all of them ignore performing 
103 (Koran: Surat Al-Tawba, Verse number 71). 
104 (Koran: Surat Al-Imran, Verse number 110). 
105 Narrated by Muslim. 
106 See ABDULAZIZ BIN MOHAMMAD BIN MARSHID, NIDAM AL-HISBA FI AL ISLAM 10 (1972–1973). 
107 See IBN TAYMIYA, PUBLIC DUTIES IN ISLAM: INSTITUTION OF HISBA 23 (Muthar Holland translated from 
Arabic to English) (the Islamic foundation: 1985). 
108 For the nature of the communal obligation in Islam, see generally IMRAN AHSAN KHAN NYAZEE, 
ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE 64 (2000). 
177 
                                                 
hisbba.109 In the eighth century, the Islamic state institutionalized hisbba.110 Since that time, 
most of hisbba functions were assigned to public officers (singular-muhtasab, plural 
muhtasabun), especially with regard to matters requiring a forceful adherence to Islamic 
guidance.111 Historically, the Islamic state had entrusted the hisbba institution with a wide range 
of functions related to judiciary, policing,112 and religion. For instance, the muhtasab prosecutes 
and disciplines merchants and shoppers.113 Moreover, hisbba played a crucial role in preserving 
the integrity of markets by combating fraudulent acts,114 eliminating prohibited commodities 
(e.g., spirit beverages), and commanding shoppers and traders to conduct prayers.115 
Currently, except for the Saudi Arabian “General Presidency of the Promotion of Virtue 
and Prevention of Vices,”116 all post-colonial Islamic states have abolished hisbba from their 
government structure and replaced it with a modern pubic administration structure of control and 
enforcement.117 Even in Saudi Arabia, the original functions of the hisbba have been reduced to 
109 See TAYMIYA, supra note 107. 
110 Lewis, supra note 3, at 17. 
111 For the differences between voluntarily hisbba by non-authorized persons and government authorized 
persons (Muhtasbs), see ABUL-HASSAN ALI MOHAMMAD IBN HABIB AL-BASRI AL-BAGHDADI AL-MAWARDI, AL-
AHKAM AS-SULTANIYYAHI: THE LAWS OF ISLAMIC GOVERNANCE 338–37 (Asadullah Yate, PhD. Ta-Ha Publishers: 
n.d). 
112 The function of hisbba resides between that of judicial and police functions. See AL-MAWARDI, supra 
note 111, at 338–41. 
113 See generally BIN MARSHID, supra note 106, at 151, 175. 
114 See TAYMIYA, supra note 107, at 29–31. 
115 For ordering people to perform prayers, see TAYMIYA, supra note 107, at 26. 
116 For general information on “the General Presidency of the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of 
Vices” see its homepage at https://www.pv.gov.sa/Pages/default.aspx (accessed on Dec. 18, 2012). For critical study 
of the hisba institution in modern Saudi Arabia, see MANSOUR AL-NUGAIDAN, AL-MULOUK AL-MIHTASBOUN: 
ALAMIR BI ALMAROUF WA ALNAHI AN ALMUNKAR FI ALSAUDIAH (1927–2007) (4th ed. 2012). 
117 Muhammad Akram Khan, Al-Hisba and the Islamic Economy, at 137, in appendix of Abul-Hassan Ali 
Mohammad ibn Habib al-Basri al-Baghdadi al-Mawardi, Al-Ahkam As-Sultaniyyahi: the Laws of Islamic 
Governance, at 338, Translated by Asadullah Yate PhD (Ta-Ha Publishers: n.d). For historical aspect of hisba in 
Saudi Arabia, see Abdulaziz bin Mohammad bin Marshid, Nidam al-Hisba fi al Islam, at 189–215 (1972–1973). 
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moral policing, and most of original hisbba functions have been distributed to various 
government institutions.118 Nonetheless, distributing old hisbba functions to modern 
administrative institutions still does not release these institutions from performing any hisbba 
obligations. What really matters here is the substance of the responsibility and not the 
administrative structure of the government. Accordingly, institutions severing one of the hisbba 
functions has to observe the religious aspect of their mandate and remember the ultimate goal 
they are serving, which was eloquently articulated by Shaykh al-Islam Ibn Taymiya: “the aim of 
all authority in Islam is to ensure that all religion shall be God’s, and that the Word of God shall 
be all-high.”119 Failure of administrative institutions on fulfilling their assigned hisbba 
responsibilities will hold the entire society’s members accountable for not fulfilling their 
communal obligation of promoting good and discouraging evil. 
5.2.5.3 Accountability and Corporate Governance 
Accountability theory in Islam furnishes a solid foundation for a modern corporate governance 
premise. A belief of inevitable accountability on the Day of Judgment should encourage the 
companies’ stakeholders to observe Islamic principles that are intertwined with corporate 
governance principles, such as social responsibility, honesty, trustworthiness and fairness.120 The 
ethical framework of these principles may fill any gap existing in the mandatory corporate 
governance structure, as God’s happiness and satisfaction is what matter in Islam. As the Koran 
118 See Abdulaziz bin Mohammad bin Marshid, Nidam al-Hisba fi al Islam, at 208–14 (1972–1973). 
119 Ibn Taymiya, Public Duties in Islam: Institution of Hisba, translated from Arabic to English by Muthar 
Holland, P. 19 (the Islamic foundation 1985). 
120 See Abdussalam Mahmoud Abu-Tapanjeh, Corporate Governance from the Islamic Perspective: A 
Comparative Analysis with OECD Principles, Critical Perspective on Accounting 20, at 556–67 (2009) (the cited 
page is 564). 
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articulates regarding the ultimate objective for every Muslim’s action: “Say: Lo! my worship and 
my sacrifice and my living and my dying are for Allah, Lord of the Worlds.”121 The fear of 
accountability and the desire of attaining Allah’s satisfaction would impose a self-motivated 
behavior to implement Islamic guidance related to corporate governance. 
The obligation of “commanding good and forbidding evil,” may promote the enforcement 
of corporate governance.122 For instance, every stakeholder ought to stand against actions which 
are inconsistent with Islamic norms, including corporate governance violations.123 Stakeholders 
are under an obligation to encourage the company to adopt sustainable and fair governance 
standards. In Islam there is no place for apathetic shareholders, because any shareholder – no 
matter how small his holding – will be held accountable for non-Islamic practices taking place in 
the corporation.124 The idea of “an entity spate from its owners in no way removes th[e] 
obligation” of the shareholders in Islam.125 Therefore, shareholders shall not stand passive about 
the activities taking place in the company. They could sell and leave for another investment 
opportunity, but putting sincere effort to correct the violating company’s behaviors would be a 
better cause of attaining Allah’s satisfaction. For instance, shareholders’ proposals could 
represent an ideal mechanism to signal rejection of any non-Islamic practices taking place in the 
company. In addition, shareholder suits (direct and derivative) would actualize the hisbba 
objectives. 
121 (Koran: Surat al-Anaam, Verse number 162). 
122 See Lewis, supra note 3, at 17. 
123 See Abu-Tapanjeh, supra note 120. 
124 See Lewis, supra note 3, at 22. 
125 See id. 
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Members of the business society may also play a significant role in promoting and 
enforcing corporate governance principles. In the last few years, for example, periodical reviews 
on listed companies’ compliance with Islamic guidance were issued by several Islamic scholars, 
especially with regard to the company’s line of business and finance.126 This practice forced 
several companies’ managements to observe such concerns and impose pressure on their 
managements to lean towards more Islamically-accepted governance practice. For example, the 
Saudi giant oil company ARAMCO issued Islamically-compliant finance securities, sukuk, to 
finance one of its major projects to increase the marketability of sukuk.127 Also, several public 
companies have established special committees to supervise the compatibility of those 
companies’ operations with Islamic rules. For instance, the Islamic Supervisory Committee 
(Unit) in Al Rajhi Bank (a Saudi listed company) intends to: “ensure that the bank conducts its 
business in harmony with the precepts of Islamic Sharia.”128 
Capital market authorities and other public companies regulators (i.e., the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry and the Saudi Organization Certified Public Accountants, “SOCPA”) 
represent a modern implementation of the Islamic concept of hisbba. Responsible members in 
such institutions have to realize the religious dimension of the job which requires a diligent effort 
on their institution’s behalf to maintain capital market integrity and prevent harm to shareholders 
126 See, e.g., Islamic way website, http://main.islammessage.com/newspage.aspx?id=9663 (accessed on 
Mar. 3, 2013). 
127 See Saudi Stock Exchange Tadawul website, 
http://www.tadawul.com.sa/wps/portal/!ut/p/c1/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP0os3gX35DgIB9TQwMLY1dz
A09nI79QCwsDIDACykeaxfsZOIcFeZoYGRgEmxoYeJr4hIU4-7gbG3iYUqIbKE-
KbveAMFOQ7mCj4AAvYwNPQrqDE4v0_Tzyc1P1C3JDQyPKHRUB0itEDw!!/dl2/d1/L3dDb1ZBQSEhL3dHa0
FKREFOZ0EhIS9ZQkpKdzQ1dy83X0RNVFNSTDUxMDgzRTcwSUMyTlU4ODAwMDg0/?symbol=5014&tabO
rder=9&bondsDetail=true (accessed on Feb. 10, 2013). 
128 See Al Rajhi Bank homepage, available at http://www.alrajhibank.com.sa/en/about-us/pages/sharia-
group.aspx (accessed on Feb. 28, 2013). 
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and other stakeholders. For instance, those institutions are obliged to inspect and rectify actions 
that violate Islamic principles of equity (e.g., minority exploitation by controlling shareholders) 
and honesty (e.g., fraud or deception). The enforcement of the corporate governance principles 
has to be applied in a non-discriminatory basis. The Prophet Mohammad emphasized the 
importance of this norm by saying that: 
The people before you were ruined because when a noble person amongst them 
committed theft, they would leave him, but if a weak person amongst them 
committed theft, they would execute the legal punishment on him. By Allah, were 
Fatimah, the daughter of Muhammad, to commit the theft, I would have cut off 
her hand.129 
All in all, application of the hisbba notion is very wide and not limited to the 
aforementioned examples and may accommodate countless existing and future commendable 
corporate governance inspection and enforcement mechanisms. 
5.3 A BIRD’S EYE VIEW OF ISLAMIC CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SYSTEM 
Modern corporate governance principles are mainly concerned with decision-making processes 
and control of publicly traded corporation s.130 Normally, any corporate governance model 
contains principles intended to reduce agency costs and promote fairness and transparency and 
furthermore to make the company and its management accountable to its stakeholders, including 
the society at large (social responsibility). In a holistic system like Islam, religious teachings 
regulate both the private and public lives of every person, which includes the social and 
129 Reported by al-Bukhari and Muslim. 
130 For corporate governance goals, see chapter III. 
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economic interactions in the community, such as corporate governance matters. This chapter 
shed light on the Islamic view of corporate governance by investigating the Islamic roots of 
modern corporate governance, and assessing its application and contribution to modern corporate 
governance framework. The Islamic principles of adel (fairness), honesty, trustworthiness, 
accountability, social responsibility, shura (consultation) are the cornerstone foundation of the 
Islamic corporate governance model. The substance Islamic principles are clearly reflected in the 
following subjects of modern corporate governance. 
5.3.1 The Protection of Minority Shareholders 
The Islamic model of corporate governance provides a solid foundation for the protection of 
shareholders. Islamic principles reject any form of oppression towards minority shareholders. 
Discriminatory treatment or exploitation by the controlling shareholders in relation to minority 
shareholders is prohibited. The minority shareholders have to be treated the same as majority 
shareholders, especially in the event of a buy-out or any other fundamental change of the 
company structure. Islamic principles also guarantee shareholders – especially the minority 
group – the right to express their voice effectively to the board of directors or at the shareholders 
meeting. 
5.3.2 The Duty of Company’s Management 
The company’s board of director members, top executives, and other management officers are 
obliged to observe Islamic governance principles. Islam imposes a trust duty on every custodian 
of the company’s assets. That implies a wide scope of fiduciary duty of care in an Islamic 
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governance system, including every employee of the company. On the other hand, the decision-
making structure of the company has to observe the Islamic shuratic decision-making process. 
Hence, a constructive environment of deliberation and consultation before undertaking decisions, 
or at least the important ones, within the organization has to be observed. The voices of all 
participants in the company should receive prompt attention from the decision makers, especially 
those weak parties such as minority shareholders and employees. Decision-making goals must 
focus on the company’s interest, as reflected in the stakeholder primacy theory of governance. 
5.3.3 Transparency and the Disclosure Framework 
An Islamic model of governance encourages a transparent corporate governance framework. 
Generally, the disclosure system endorsed by modern corporate governance coincides greatly 
with Islamic principles. Nonetheless, the Islamic disclosure system has a wider scope than the 
modern disclosure system. The disclosure system in Islam has its own characteristics which 
require disclosing information that concerns Muslim investors and stakeholders, especially 
employees and consumers. Investors and the other stakeholders have the right to acquire detailed 
information about the company’s financial structure and business activities. That is not to assess 
the company’s financial position or future prospect but to instead ensure the company is not 
engaged in activities contradicting Islam, such as interest finance (usury), or the selling or 
provision of prohibited products or services (i.e. wine production or selling). Islamic discourse 
system obliges companies to be transparent with regard to their social responsibility obligations 
(zakat payment) and policies (sustainability). 
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5.3.4 Accountability 
An Islamic perspective of accountability provides the foundation of two important corporate 
subjects. First, accountability is intertwined with Muslims’ belief of the unity of the God (Allah), 
the day of judgment, and human stewardship (kilafah or vice-regency) over the earth. Such belief 
has two crucial implications to the corporate governance. First, corporations are required to 
peruse socially-responsible policies. A publicly traded corporation  is not merely a wealth-
generating engine for its shareholders as, for instance, Milton Freidman advocates,131 but rather a 
juridical person with social functions and responsibilities. Therefore, the Islamic view of socially 
responsibility coincides with modern corporate “socially- responsible” literature and standards, 
such as the conservation of natural resources and the charitable contribution to the community. 
Secondly, the Islamic perspective of accountability furnishes the foundation of the 
enforcement framework of corporate governance principles. Generally, an Islamic enforcement 
framework consists of two main components. The first part is connected to afterlife 
accountability by Allah to all individuals. Every person will be held accountable on the Day of 
Judgment for his or her actions in life. A strong belief of such inescapable accountability may 
encourage Islamic corporate governance principles, namely the ones intertwined with Islamic 
teachings such as fairness, social responsibility, transparency, and trustworthiness. The second 
part is related to the enforcement of corporate governance principles in this life. The duty of 
hisbba, or “encouraging good and discouraging wrongs,” offers the basis of today’s enforcement 
model of corporate governance principles. This model consists of a tri-layer structure: self-
131 For Milton Friedman view, see supra note (9) chapter IV. 
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enforcement by individual believers; civil society’s enforcement by a group of believers; and 
sanctioned enforcement by the government. The first two layers represent a self-enforcing 
mechanism of corporate governance principles. For instance, an individual stakeholder or a 
group of stakeholders are required to carry out the hisbba duty by encouraging the company to 
pursue good corporate governance and discouraging any violation of corporate governance 
principles. The last layer is related to enforcement of corporate governance by the government. 
Besides performing their legal responsibilities, government institutions are required to fulfill 
their hisbba role as a representative of society. Defaulting on the enforcement of laws and 
regulations assigned to government institutions will make the whole society sinful for not 
performing their duty of hisbba. Because the ultimate obligation of enforcement rests on society, 
self-enforcing hisbba may complement any weakness in the government’s enforcement 
framework, especially in developing countries where an enforcement framework is normally not 
efficient. In this regard, Majid Khadduri said: “if the state failed to enforce the law ... , the 
believer still remained under the obligation to observe the law even in the absence of anyone to 
enforce it.”132 The society and the government (as the people’s representatives) have to ensure 
the application of corporate governance principles on an equal basis. Islam stands strongly 
against any selective application of its rules or standards. 
On the other hand, the enforcement standard of corporate governance might be increased 
if a clear connection between modern corporate governance principles and their Islamic 
counterparts were emphasized. Such a move is expected to raise the degree of approval of 
corporate governance principles by Islamic societies, especially in countries consisting of 
132 Majid Khadduri, Nature and Source of Islamic Law, 22 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 3, 7 (1953). 
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religiously conservative citizens such as Saudi Arabia. Unfortunately, Saudi Corporate 
Governance Rules “SCGRs” have ignored the significance of such a connection by not linking 
its rules with Islamic teachings. For instance, SCGRs do not incorporate the shura principle and 
do not emphasize the importance of disclosing material information to Muslim investors and 
stakeholders. Accordingly, the Saudi Capital Market Authority “SCMA” may need to rethink its 
current approach of implementing corporate governance in the country which merely focuses on 
complying with the international best standards toward a balanced approach that takes national 
factors into account. A step like that, if taken, would promote good corporate governance aims in 
Saudi Arabia and encourage people to uphold the corporate governance principles as part of their 
religious duties. 
5.4 CONCLUSION 
This Chapter highlights several Islamic principles that have a connection to corporate 
governance principles. The Islamic corporate governance model is founded mainly upon six 
principles: social responsibility, adel, trustworthiness, honesty, shura, and accountability. The 
analysis of the substance of these principles reveals a great overlap between the Islamic view of 
corporate governance and the modern corporate governance thesis. Both systems support 
efficiency, sustainability, fairness, transparency and accountability. Nonetheless, the Islamic 
corporate governance model contains a few exceptional principles that require the adoption of a 
shuratic decision-making process within the company and the expansion of the scope of a 
disclosure system to include matters concerning Muslim investors, especially regarding the 
company’s line of business, financial structure, and Zakat payment. There is an obvious disparity 
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between the Islamic corporate governance framework in theory as articulated in this chapter and 
the Muslims communities’ actual respect of corporate governance value.133 Islamic countries, 
regrettably, suffer from common third world governance problems, mainly corruption134 and 
weak contact enforcement.135 When the gap between business ethics standards and practice was 
slim several centuries ago, Muslim merchants astonished other, non-muslim business 
communities by their high moral standards and caused a huge number of those societies to 
convert to Islam.136 A notable example is Indonesia, today’s largest Islamic state, which became 
an Islamic country through the interaction of ethically-abiding Muslim merchants.137 At the end, 
Islamic corporate governance leans toward the stakeholders’ theory, which promotes the 
consideration of the interests of non-shareholder constituents when governing the company. 
 
133 See Rice, supra note 18, at 352. 
134 Most Islamic countries ranked at the rear of the corruption rankings. See Transparency International: 
Corruption Perception Index of 2012, available at 
http://issuu.com/transparencyinternational/docs/cpi_2012_report/1 (accessed on May 14, 2013). 
135 Many Islamic countries scored very low in the contract enforcement ranking conducted by the World 
Bank. See the World Bank: International Finance Corporation, Doing Business Index 2012, Economy Ranking, 
available at http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings (accessed on May 14, 2013). 
136 See Rice, supra note 18, at 347. 
137 See WILSON, supra note 20, at 31, 137. Indonesia population is over 250 millions, more than% 86 is 
Muslims. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA): the World Factbook, Indonesia, available at 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/id.html (accessed on May 14, 2013). 
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6.0  CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN SAUDI ARABIA: GENERAL FRAMEWORK 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is devoted to discussing the general framework of existing Saudi corporate 
governance. The external structure of corporate governance is crucial to corporate governance 
reform. The development of institutions complementing corporate governance and the ownership 
pattern of publically traded companies are decisive factors in determining the trajectory of 
corporate governance reform in all countries. Accordingly, this chapter provides an introduction 
to the Saudi capital market, including capital market authority functions. With this introduction 
as a foundation, the ownership structure of Saudi publicly traded companies is examined. From 
this point, the chapter moves into a discussion of the sources of corporate governance in Saudi 
Arabia. Furthermore, the disclosure system in publicly traded companies is investigated. Finally, 
this chapter assesses the capability of the Saudi judicial system in promoting good corporate 
governance in the country. 
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6.2 SAUDI CAPITAL MARKET 
6.2.1 Historical Remarks 
The Saudi capital market, arguably, emerged hand in hand with the formation of the first Saudi 
joint stock company, “Arab Automobile,” in 1935.1 The trading volume developed and expanded 
with the increase of the number of joint stock companies.2 In 1982, the Kuwaiti Capital Market 
collapsed in the Souk Al-Manak catastrophe, caused mainly by trading forward checks.3 In 
response, the Saudi authority decided to regulate its capital market to prevent the same disaster 
from happening in the Saudi capital market. 1984 witnessed the first set of financial regulations 
in the Saudi capital market, including the forbidding of trading stocks by forward checks.4 The 
reactive and precautionary regulations enacted by the Saudi authority to avoid such a problem 
from happening in Saudi Arabia had encompassed the premature statutory and institutional 
frameworks of the capital market.5 That implemented framework had assigned the stock market 
regulation and supervision to a ministerial committee consisting of three relevant ministries: the 
1 See the Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul) website, available at http://www.tadawul.com.sa (accessed on 
Oct. 17, 2011). Arabian Automobile winded up shortly after its creation in 1935. 
2 In the middle of 1975, there were 14 (JSCs). Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul) website, available at 
http://www.tadawul.com.sa/wps/portal/!ut/p/c1/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP0os3g_AewIE8TIwMLj2AXA
0_vQGNzY18Q1wAoH4kk7x4QZmrgaeITbBQc4GVs4GlEQHdwYpG-n0d-bqp 
QW5EOQAsB49z/dl2/d1/L0lHSkovd0RNQUprQUVnQSEhL1lCWncvZW4!/ (accessed on Oct. 17, 2011). 
3 In 1982, Kuwaiti capital market experienced a precipitous drop. “Souk Al-Manak” was the first capital 
market disaster in the GCC countries. The official market lost about one quarter of its value and the unofficial 
market lost about 60% of its value. The main cause of the market collapse was the trading in forward checks in lieu 
of cash which created a bubble that imploded in 1982. As a result, the Kuwaiti government restructured the Kuwaiti 
capital market and enacted a new regulatory framework of the market to halt such a calamity from happing again. 
Kirt C. Butler & S.J. Malaikah, Efficiency and Inefficiency in Thinly Traded Stock Markets: Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia, 16 J. BANKING & FIN. 197, 198–99 (1992). 
4 ABDULAZIZ M. AL-DUKHEIL, THE BANKING SYSTEM AND ITS PERFORMANCE IN SAUDI ARABIA 57 (1995). 
5 See Butler & Malaikah, supra note 3, 197, 199. 
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Ministry of Commerce and Industry, the Ministry of Finance and the Saudi Arabian Monetary 
Agency (SAMA).6 The Ministry of Commerce, according to Saudi Companies’ Law (SCL), had 
– and still has – the authority to regulate and supervise Saudi joint stock companies (JSC) from a 
company’s formation to its winding up, which includes the stock issuance, negotiation (transfer) 
of shares, and public offering.7 Also, the Ministry has the discretionary authority over the 
conversion companies to the joint stock company form.8 The Ministry of Finance has general 
authority to articulate the financial policy of the country, which includes capital market policies 
and goals.9 Most importantly, SAMA is entrusted with the “operational ... management of the 
Saudi stock market.”10 Similar enough to the German stock market structure, SAMA authorized 
national banks exclusively to serve as intermediaries (brokers) of the selling and purchasing 
stocks.11 A Saudi official commented on that approach: 
Because there are more than 1,000 bank branches across the Kingdom, it was 
thought the banks were in the best position to provide this service to all citizens, 
6 Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul) website, available at 
http://www.tadawul.com.sa/wps/portal/!ut/p/c1/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP0os3g_AewIE8TIwMLj2AXA
0_vQGNzY18Q1wAoH4kk7x4QZmrgaeITbBQc4GVs4GlEQHdwYpG-n0d-bqp 
QW5EOQAsB49z/dl2/d1/L0lHSkovd0RNQUprQUVnQSEhL1lCWncvZW4!/ (accessed on Oct. 17, 2011). 
7 Saudi Companies Law (CL) enacted by Royal Decree No. (M/6) in (Rabi-Al-Awwal 22, 1385 H) 
correspondent to (July 22, 1965). 
8 For the rules required by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry for conversion to join stock company, 
see The Guidelines for Conversion to Joint Stock Companies issue by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry 
resolution number (495) dated in Rabia Al-Awal 25, 1418 H correspondent to July 29, 1997. 
9 See RAMADY, supra note 88, at 148. 
10 Id. 
11 Article 1 in “the Executive Rules to Regulate Dealings in Company’s Shares Through Local Banks” 
which states that: 
The duty of buying and selling shares of Saudi joint stock companies are restricted to Saudi banks 
which are licensed to do so. The banks perform the role of mediator on behalf of clients (directly) 
and no share dealings can take place without their mediation. 
Cited in Awwad Saleh Awwad, Legal Regulation of the Saudi Stock Market: Evaluation and Prospects for 
Reforms, 393, Appendix A (PhD) (2000) (unpublished dissertation University of Warwick School of Law) (one file 
with author). 
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even if they are in remote locations. Most importantly, building the stock 
exchange within the banking system would provide the market with better 
settlement and clearing systems. It was rightly assumed that situating the stock 
market within the banking system would provide the market with the best and less 
risky settlement.12 
Every licensed brokerage bank has to designate a special unit in Riyadh (the capital) to 
perform the newly assigned brokerage function. The banks are allowed to charge commissions 
for its services.13 However, the banks are prohibited from trading in the stock market for their 
own accounts.14 At that time, stock trading was settled and cleared manually (off-exchange).15 
During the period from 1985 to 2001, several important steps were taken by SAMA to 
improve the performance and efficiency of capital markets. First, it formed a company to handle 
the registration of joint stock companies’ shares.16 Second, trading was facilitated in the market 
by introducing a system that allows investors to buy and sell stocks through the Internet.17 The 
system was named Tadawul (2001).18 In 2003, Saudi government took steps to regulate capital 
markets by unifying the regulatory and supervision mandates into a single government agency 
(Capital Market Authority “CMA”)19 and initiating a formal securities exchange, Tadawul. 
12 Interview with Mr. Mansoor Al-Mayman, Deputy Minister of Finance and Member of the supervisory 
committee, Riyadh, November 21, 1997, quoted in Awwad, supra note 11, at 182. 
13 Banks are allowed to charge no more the 1% of the transaction as a settlement fee. See Butler & 
Malaikah, supra note 3, at 197, 199. 
14 Article 1 in “the Executive Rules to Regulate Dealings in Company’s Shares Through Local Banks, 
quoted in Awwad Saleh Awwad, Legal Regulation of the Saudi Stock Market: Evaluation and Prospects for 
Reforms, Appendix A (PhD) (unpublished dissertation University of Warwick School of Law 2000). 
15 See Butler & Malaikah, supra note 3, at 197, 199. 
16 The company name “the Saudi Shares Registration Company.” See id. 
17 See RAMADY, supra note 88, at 149. In fact, Tadawul has followed other technologically advanced 
system (of that time) called “the Electronic Securities Information System (ESIS)” which was launched in 1990. See 
generally Awwad, supra note 11, App. A, at 197–213. 
18 See id. This internet based system, initiated in 2001, follows an electronic-based trading system that was 
launched six years before the TADAWUL initiation. Id. at 148–49. 
19 SCML art. § (4)(a). 
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6.2.2 Modern Capital Market Structure 
6.2.2.1 Regulatory Framework 
i. Capital Market Authority (CMA) 
The Capital Market Law (CML)20 established an independent government entity entrusted with 
the supervision and regulation of the Saudi capital market, “The Capital Market Authority” 
(CMA).21 The CMA has the power to implement the CML provisions and passes all related rules 
and regulations.22 The CML sets the objectives of the CMA which encompasses, inter alia, the 
regulation of securities offering and trading,23 disclosure,24 public offering,25 and proxy.26 More 
importantly, the CML entrusts the CMA with the protection of capital market investors from any 
unfair or deceptive actions which may occur in the Saudi capital market.27 The CML has granted 
20 The Capital Market Law (SCML) that the enacted by the royal decree number (M/30) in Jumada al-
Ahkirah 2, 1424 correspondent to (July 31, 2003). 
21 CML Article § (4)(a) which states that: 
An Authority to be named “The Capital Market Authority” is hereby established in the Kingdom 
and shall directly report to the President of the Council of Ministers. It shall have a legal 
personality and financial and administrative autonomy. It shall be vested with all authorities as 
may be necessary to discharge its responsibilities and functions under this Law. The Authority 
shall enjoy exemptions and facilities enjoyed by public organizations. Its personnel shall be 
subject to the Labor Law. 
However, this is a relative independence by which the (SCMA) has to coordinate its work with the Saudi 
Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) with regard any matter that might affect any the monetary conditions in Saudi 
Arabia. CML Article § (6)(b). 
22 CML art. § (5) para. (a) and art. § (6) para. (a) subparagraph (1). 
23 CML art. § (5)(a)(2). 
24 Id. § (5)(a)(6). 
25 Id. § (5)(a)(7). 
26 Id. 
27 Id. art. § (5)(a)(4). 
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the CMA wide power, inter alia, to suspend the exchange for no more than one day,28 specify 
the brokers’ commissions,29 prohibit and suspend trading of any share or issuance,30set standards 
and requirements of auditing listed companies and investment funds,31 license rating agencies,32 
and prescribe conditions and standards of the company’s financial statements and the board of 
director’s report contents.33 
The CMA is managed by a board called “the Board of Capital Market Authority” 
(BCMA).34 The BCMA has the power to: 
[E]xercise all authorities entrusted to the [Capital Market] Authority in 
accordance with the provisions of ... [Capital Market] Law. The Board will 
specify how the Authority’s functions, responsibilities and operations will be 
organized among its divisions and departments.35 
The BCMA consists of five full time members (commissioners) including the board 
chairmen.36 All commissioners are appointed by Royal Order for a five year session that can be 
renewed one time.37 
28 Id. § (6)(a)(5). 
29 Id. § (6)(a)(8). 
30 Id. § (6)(a)(7). 
31 Id. § (6)(a)(9). 
32 Id. § (6)(a)(18). 
33 Id. § (6)(a)(10). 
34 Id. § (7)(a). 
35 Id. § (7)(d). 
36 Id. § (7)(a). To secure the independent and impartiality of the SBCMA members, the SCML Article 
§ (11) provides that: 
The members of the Board and the employees of the Authority shall not engage in any other 
profession or job, including occupying a position or a post in any company, in the government, or 
public or private institutions. Furthermore, they shall not provide advice to companies and private 
institutions. 
37 Id. art. § (7)(b). 
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The chairman of the BCMA is the CMA chief executive officer, who is in charge of 
“implement[ing] the Authority’s policy and shall be responsible for the management of its 
affairs.”38 CMA is entrusted with the supervision of four market players that are Saudi Stock 
Exchange (Tadawul), authorized persons, listed companies, and traders.39 
ii. Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul) 
The CML provides that a formal capital market has to be established, under the name of “[s]audi 
stock exchange” (Tadawul).40 In 2007, the Saudi Council of the Ministers established the new 
exchange company41 with a 1,200,000,000 SR cash capital,42 totally provided by the 
government.43 The SCML prescribes that Tadawul opt to select a joint stock company form44 
and allows Tadawul to sell part of its shares to the public.45 Tadawul is the exclusive securities’ 
exchange in Saudi Arabia.46 Tadawul’s bylaws provides: 
The purposes of ... [Tadawul] include the provision and management of securities 
trading services, providing settlement and clearing services of securities, 
depository and registration of securities ownership, and dissemination of 
securities information ... [Tadawul] may engage in other related activities in order 
to meet its objectives as specified in the Capital Market Law.47 
38 Id. § (11). 
39 Id. § (6) 
40 A good step intends to separate regulatory functions from the operational one as illustrated by best 
practices. 
41 Council of Ministers resolution No. (71) in Safar 29, 1428H correspondent to (Mar. 19, 2007). 
42 Tadawul By-law Article § (6). The Capital in dollars is around $320 billion. 
43 That capital was provided by the Saudi government investment medium called “the Public Investment 
Fund.” Tadawul By-law Article § (6). 
44 Tadawul By-Law Article (1). 
45 Id. art. (7). 
46 CML Article § (21)(b). 
47 Article § (3). 
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The CML delineates the chief objectives for Tadawul as follows:48 
• Insure fairness, efficiency, and transparency of the listing requirements 
and trading rules. 
• Implement reliable and swift settlement and clearance system. 
• Frame professional standards for brokers and enforce those standards. 
• Insure the financial strength and soundness of brokers. 
• Implement a proper framework for the protection of money and 
securities under the control of the brokerage companies. 
The company is managed by a board of directors comprised of nine members49 
representing the relevant government authorities (Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Commerce 
and Industry, and Monetary Agency)50 and various capital market players (four members 
representing brokerage companies, and two members representing listed joint stock 
companies).51 Both public and private sectors’ board members are appointed by the Council of 
Ministers.52 The board has the authority to propose to the Board of CMA any regulations, rules, 
and directives that are related to the operation of the capital market exchange (Tadawul).53 
Tadawul are managed by an executive manager appointed by the Tadawul Board of Directors 
with approval of the Board of CMA.54 
iii. Securities Dispute Committees 
The SCML has established a specialized (apart from the judicial branch) dispute settlement 
mechanism, “the Committee for Resolution of Securities Disputes” (CRSD) to adjudicate any 
48 CML Article § (20)(c)(1–4). 
49 CML Article § (20)(a). 
50 SCML Article § (22)(b)(1–3). 
51 Id. § (22)(b)(4 & 5). 
52 Id. § (22)(b). 
53 SCML Article § (23)(a) and SCML Article § (22)(e). According to this article, the Tadawul Board of 
Directors has the authority to propose requirements for listing and trading of securities. 
54 SCML art. § (22)(e). 
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dispute arising in connection to CML provisions, applications or regulations enacted within the 
realm and power of CML.55 Moreover, the CRSD jurisdiction includes the review of any 
complaint over resolution or any other action taken by the CMA or Tadawul.56 The CML 
dictates that committee members have to be legal experts specializing in “commercial ... , 
financial affairs and securities.”57 The CRSD has wide authority “to investigate and settle 
complaints and suits, including the power to issue subpoenas, issue decisions, impose sanctions 
and order the production of evidence and document.”58 In other words, the committee has 
jurisdiction over three legally recognized areas: civil law, administrative law, and criminal law. 
This wide authority has a positive impact on accelerating the process of justice by unifying 
jurisdictions of adjudicating matters related to capital markets in one dispute settlement 
mechanism. Otherwise, for instance, a judicial review of CMA actions including decisions, 
rulings, and resolutions as an administrative agency would be in front of the Board of Grievances 
(administrative court).59 
The decisions of the Committee for Resolution of Securities Disputes can be appealed in 
front of an appellate panel, “the Appeal Committee for the Resolution of Securities Conflicts” 
(ACRS).60 According to the SCML, the ACRC has: 
The discretion to refuse to review the decisions of the Committee for the 
resolution of Securities Disputes, to affirm such decisions, to undertake a de novo 
review of the complaint or suit based on the record developed at hearing before 
55 SCML art. § (25)(a) [hereinafter CRSD]. 
56 Id. § (25)(c). 
57 Id. § (25)(b). 
58 Id. § (25)(a). 
59 The Board of the Grievances Law (Diwan Al-mazalm) (BGL) art. § (13)(b). 
60 SCML art. § (25)(f). According to this article, “the appeal has to be filed within from their notification 
date.” 
197 
                                                 
the Committee and issue such decision as it deems appropriate in relation to the 
complaint or the suit.61 
Clearly, allowing the ACRS the discretion of admitting cases for review reflects the 
influence of the American legal ideology on the CML.62 The appellant panel is comprised of 
three members representing three government bodies: the Bureau of Experts at the Council of 
Ministers, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, for a renewable 
three year session.63 Final decisions issued by CRSD64 or the decisions of ACRC have equal 
legal standings as the decisions issued by the ordinary courts.65 Moreover, the decisions of both 
committees are enforced in the same manner of enforcing court decisions.66 Obviously, the 
specialized dispute mechanism of solving securities disputes has the weight and respect as any 
other counterpart in the judiciary. 
Most of the cases filed and appealed are in civil matters. In 2010, for instance, 93 
(81.6%) cases were filed in civil matters out of a total of 114 cases filed in front of CRSD67 and 
57 appeals were filed in the same matter in front of ACRC out of 75 appeals.68 In contrast, only 
61 SCML art. § (25)(g). 
62 In general, in the American legal system, the petition for review filed in the Supreme Court is not a right 
of the grievant but rather a discretionary power vested in the hands of the Supreme Court, which is called the writ of 
certiorari. See (Rule 10) in the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States which states that: “[r]eview on a 
writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion. A petition for a writ of certiorari will be granted 
only for compelling reasons.” 
63 SCML art. § (25)(g). 
64 See id. The CRSD only become final if they are not appealed within a legally required period. See id. art. 
§ (25)(f). 
65 SCML art. § (25)(g). The ACRC decisions are always final. But CRSD decisions only become final if 
they are not appealed within a legally required period. See id. art. § (25)(f & g). 
66 See SCML art. § (25)(h). 
67 Saudi Capital Market Authority, Annual report, tbl.58, p. 137 (2010). 
68 Id. at tbl.62, at 142. 
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11 criminal cases were filed before the CRSD (representing 9.6% out the total filed cases)69 and 
14 cases were appealed before the ACRC (representing 18.7% out of the total filed cases).70 The 
administrative cases were the least number filed in front of both committees (CRSD and 
ACRC).71 
Unfortunately, the CRSD has not risen yet to the level of expectation of its founder by 
delivering a fast track exceptional dispute settlement mechanism for the Saudi Capital Market. 
The CRSD is not delivering enough verdicts compatible with the amount of cases filed in front 
of it. In 2010, a mere 15 cases were decided upon by CRSD against 114 cases filed.72 To the 
contrary, ACRC seemed more productive as it issued verdicts on 108 appeals73 against 75 cases 
appealed before it in the same year.74 The inconsistency of production among these committees 
needs to be addressed and solved by the SCMA before cases accumulate in the CRSD; 
otherwise, the idea of the CML designer of securing an efficient dispute settlement mechanism 
for the Saudi nascent capital market apart from the ill-functioning judicial branch sooner or later 
will be compromised.75 
69 Id. at tbl.58, at 137. 
70 Id. at tbl.62, at 142. 
71 See id. at tbl.58, at 137. See also id. at tbl.58, at 137. 
72 See id. at 136. 
73 Id. at tbl.63, at 144. 
74 Id. at tbl.62, at 142. 
75 See Joseph W. Beach, The Saudi Arabian Capital Market Law: A Practical Study of the Creation of Law 
in Developing Markets, 41 STAN. J. INT’L L. 307, 318–19 (2005). 
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6.2.2.2 The Economics of the Saudi Stock Market 
In 2010, the capitalization of the capital market reached $354 Billion.76 Accordingly, the Saudi 
capital market is regarded the biggest market in Arab World77 including the GCC countries’ 
capital markets,78 and the largest capital market in the Middle East capital markets.79 Moreover, 
in 2009, the Saudi capital market was ranked 23rd worldwide.80 
76 World Bank, World Development Indicators (2010), available at 
http://data.worldbank.org/country/saudi-arabia (accessed on Nov. 10, 2011). 
77 The Arab World, in this study, refers to the 22 member countries in the League of Arab States, including 
the Palestinian territory: Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, 
Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, 
and Yemen. For more information, see the League of Arab States’ website, available at 
http://www.arableagueonline.org/wps/portal/las_en/home_page/!ut/p/c5/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP0os3g
Xy8CgMJMgYwOLYFdLA08jF09_X28jIwN_E6B8JG55C3MCuoNT8_TDQXbiNwMkb4ADOBro-3nk56bqF-
RGVHjqOioCAKQoUKM!/dl3/d3/L2dBISEvZ0FBIS9nQSEh/ (accessed on Nov. 10, 2011). The second largest 
Arab capital market is the Kuwaiti capital market with a capitalization of $119,620,955,366. World Bank, World 
Development Indicators (2010), available at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LCAP.CD (accessed on 
Nov. 10, 2011). 
78 Arabian Gulf countries are the member countries of “the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the 
Gulf”: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates. See the Cooperation Council for the 
Arab States of the Gulf website, http://www.gcc-sg.org/eng/indexc64c.html?action=GCC (accessed on Nov. 10, 
2011). In fact, the Saudi Capital Market capitalization is almost equivalent to the other five states’ total capital 
markets’ capitalization. The second largest capital market in the Middle East is the Turkish capital market with a 
capitalization of $306,662, 330,597. World Bank, World Development Indicators (2010), available at 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LCAP.CD (accessed on Nov. 10, 2011). 
79 The second largest capital market in the Middle East is the Turkish capital market with a capitalization of 
$306,662,330,597. See the World Bank, World Development Indicators (2010), available at 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LCAP.CD (accessed on Nov. 10, 2011). 
80 The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the World Factbook, available at 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2200rank.html (accessed on Nov. 10, 2011). 
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 Table 3. Arab Countries’ Capital Markets Indicators 
Capital Market Number of Listed 
Companies 
Market Capitalization Traded Shares Turn Over 
ratio (%) 
Amman (Jordan) 247 27,209.900.000 618,800.000 2.6 
Bahrain 29 16,590.000.000 95,900.000 0.6 
Tunisia 57 9,647.800.000 72,000.000 3.73 
Saudi Arabia 150 338,873.000.000 13,448.200.000 25,4 
Muscat  130 26,209.700.000 506,900.000 1.8 
Kuwait 216 86,295.000.000 11,975.000.000 8.1 
Beirut (Lebanon) 25 10,285.000.000 13,700.000 0.7 
Egypt 214 48,679.000.000 3,648.000.000 9.5 
Casablanca 76 60,092.200.000 66,600.000 3.9 
Abu Dhabi 67 71,329.000.000 2,883.740.000 1.60 
Dubai 62 49,033.000.000 3,779.300.000 2.5 
Qatar 42 125,598.000.000 668,600.000 4.7 
Khartoum 56 2,695.000.000 16,200.000 8.6 
Algiers 2 135,600.000 80,900 0,45 
Damascus (Syria) 21 1,527.520.000 4,830.000 1.50 
Source: Arab Countries Capital Markets, Arab Monetary Fund: (Fourth Quarter of 2011) 
Saudi Market capitalization has risen immensely in a very short period of time, reaching 
its peak in 2007 at $515 billion.81 However, the massive increase was no more than a bubble that 
imploded after a short period of time to return to almost the same level that was before the vast 
increase had taken place.82 The Saudi capital market drop is one of the most severe market 
81 World Bank, World Development Indicators, available at 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LCAP.CD (accessed on Nov. 10, 2011). Accordingly, Saudi Capital 
market value exceeded the value of some developed economies such as Italy. Id. 
82 Saudi Capital Market capitalization returned in 2010 to an approximate level preceding the 2006 massive 
increase. See The World Bank, World Development Indicators (2010), available at 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LCAP.CD (accessed on Nov. 10, 2011). 
82 World Bank, World Development Indicators (2010), available at 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LCAP.CD (accessed on Nov. 10, 2011). 
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declines in the modern history of stock markets.83 The collapse was a Saudi-caused and suffered 
crisis.84 In other words, in the wake of 9/11 Saudi expatriate investments flooded back to Saudi 
Arabia due to the fear of unwanted legal actions that might be taken against Saudi citizen’s 
investment, especially by the U.S. government.85 Moreover, oil price boosts since the 2000’s had 
injected enormous amounts of cash into the Saudi economy, which then leaked into the capital 
market through government spending.86 During both periods of increase and decline, the capital 
market suffered from a great deal of speculation fueled by rumors, or recommendations – as 
called by Saudis – to soften its illegal implications.87 In fact, most investors at that time (and to 
some degree still) are not aware of violating the law when buying and selling on inside 
information. Becoming worse off, many people spread rumors with good intentions and directed 
other people to the “El Dorado.”88 However, most rumors were fabricated by a large number of 
speculators who intended to inflate the price of the targeted stocks and then sell those stocks at a 
higher price to the rumors’ followers. Additionally, there was a lack of competent financial 
analysts who could offer impartial financial advice on the stock market and share trading on 
83 See FERNANDO DELGADO & MAHER HASAN, STOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENTS IN THE COUNTRIES OF THE 
GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL (Ahsan Mansur & Fernando Delgado eds., 2008). In fact, The Saudi Capital Market 
lost around 60% of its market value. 
84 The Saudi capital market was almost confined to Saudi citizens at the time of the crash. 
85 See Abdul Momen, Impact of 9/11 on the Saudi Economy, Arab News (posted July 29, 2002), available 
at http://www.arabnews.com/node/222928 (accessed on June 10); Mohamed A. Ramady, 9/11 Changes the Face of 
Gulf Economies, Arab News (posted Sept. 25, 2006), available at http://www.arabnews.com/node/289492 (accessed 
on June 11, 2012); Fahad Mohammad Almajid, A Conceptual Framework for Reforming the Corporate Governance 
of Saudi Publicly Held Companies: A Comparative and Analytical Study from a Legal Perspective 221 (Ph.D.) 
(2008) (unpublished dissertation University of Manchester). 
86 See Jadwa Investment, Oil and the Saudi Stock Market, 2 (May 2011), available at 
http://www.jadwa.com/en/researchsection/research/market-research?page=2 (accessed on Dec. 26, 2012). 
87 See RAMADY, supra note 148, at 166. 
88 “El Dorado” is a mythical story about a missing city full of gold. The current meaning refers to “any 
place where wealth can be quickly and easily gained.” Eldorado 2011, Encyclopedia Britannica Online, available at 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/182231/Eldorado (accessed on Nov. 10, 2011). 
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various media channels.89 For example, in a very short period of time, before the market 
collapsed, analysts projected the market index would continue to boost swiftly,90 but that was 
merely conjecture. The market started to decline on February 26, 2006 and eventually lost 
around 70% of its value in a short period of time. 
 
Table 4. Saudi Stock Market Capitalization 2002–2011 
Year Market Capitalization (Billion SR) Change % 
2002 280.73 2.26% 
2003 589.93 110.14% 
2004 1,148.60 94.70% 
2005 2,43820 112.28% 
2006 1,225.86 -49.72% 
2007 1,946.35 58.77% 
2008 924.53 -52.50% 
2009 1,195.51 29.31% 
2010 1,325.39 10.86% 
2011 1,270.84 -4.12% 
 Source: Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul), Annual Statistical Report (2011). PP.42. 
National banks played a major role in inflating that market bubble by providing small 
investors with outsized loans to be invested mainly in the stock market.91 The banks’ advances 
were usually secured by the investor’s portfolio, salary, or any other asset.92 As soon as the stock 
89 In the well-regarded (CNBC Arabia) T.V. channel, a Saudi financial analyst appeared a short time after 
the market collapse and forecasted an increase of the capital market. 
90 Abraheem Algirnas, tawguat bi wosul al-muaasher ila ithnain wa ashreen alf nogta (alriyadh), 
Newspaper: Issue No. 13803 in April 11, 2006, available at 
http://www.alriyadh.com/2006/04/11/article145404.html (accessed on Dec. 23, 2012). 
91 The banks’ own finances increased massively from approximately 40 billion SR in early 2003 to around 
188 billion SR on the day of crash. Abualhameed al-umari, al-Thikra al-Kamisah Linhiyar al-souk al-Saudiah 
(2006–2011) [the Fifth Anniversary of Saudi Market Crash 2006–2011]. Al-Riyadh Daily Newspaper, February 21, 
2011 issue number 15587, available at http://www.alriyadh.com/2011/02/26/article608219.html (accessed on 
Nov. 12, 2011). 
92 Many people sold their homes, cars, and whatever they could capitalize on to invest in the capital market. 
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market started to decline, banks rushed to liquidate investors’ portfolios fearing (or more likely 
knowing) that most creditors would not pay back their debts.93 
The government took several steps to stop the crash or at least to revive the market and 
mitigate the crisis. For instance, it split the nominal value of all trading shares by five to increase 
market liquidity.94 Saudi high-ranking officials spoke publicly to calm panicked investors and 
discourage them from liquidating their portfolios by attributing the market decline to 
psychological factors rather than to economic ones.95 Moreover, the King himself was very 
displeased with the collective loss of middle class citizens due to the capital market crash. 
Hence, he expelled the commissioner of the CMA.96 The King also promised the creation of a 
fund for middle class citizens.97 The government would manage the fund for the benefit of the 
middle class citizens. In this intended fund the government would bear the risk of any loss while 
the investors would enjoy the full amount of the profit. Clearly, the fund’s main idea was to 
93 In many cases, the liquidation process had no valid legal ground, a situation which led to the filing of a 
great deal of cases against the banks. In most cases the ruling was against the banks in favor of the harmed investors. 
See the statement of the Chairmen of the CRSD (Dr. Mohammad Al-Marsogi.), cited in the Asharq Al-Awsat News 
Paper issue 10224 on November 25, 2006, available at 
http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=6&article=393675&issueno=10224 (accessed on Nov. 12, 2011). 
94 See Capital Market Authority Board resolution No. (4-154-2006) in 27 Safar, 1427 H correspondent to 
27 March 2006. 
95 Even before the crash, a public official was encouraging the stock market rise. See Abualhameed al-
Umari, al-Thikra al-Kamisah Linhiyar al-souk al-Saudiah (2006–2011) [the Fifth Anniversary of Saudi Market 
Crash 2006–2011]. Riyadh newspaper, February 21, 2011 issue number 15587, available at 
http://www.alriyadh.com/2011/02/26/article608219.html (accessed on Nov. 12, 2011). 
96 See Royal Order (A/44) in Rabi Al-Awal 14, 1427 H correspondent to (May 12, 2006), available at 
http://www.spa.gov.sa/awamer.php?pg=24&lite= (accessed on Nov. 11, 2011). 
97 For King Abdullah’s televised speech on the promise of the creation of a fund for the low income Saudi 
citizens. See al-Riyadh Newspaper issue 13840 on May 16, 2006 (the original source is the Saudi Press Agency 
‘SPA’), available at http://www.alriyadh.com/2006/05/16/article154990.html (accessed on Nov. 12, 2011). 
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shield amateur investors from loss by appointing a professorial manager to do the job for them. 
However, the promised “government managed and guaranteed fund” has not materialized .98 
Since the 2006 crisis, the Tadawul All-Share Index (TASI) is still hovering around 6,000 
points.99 Moreover, the Saudi capital market is still suffering from high volatility,100 and 
speculation practices are still evident.101 This may be attributed to the small number of listed 
companies in the Saudi capital market and to the slim number of tradable stocks in the exchange 
(Tadawul).102 
Actually, a fear from losing their assets may be preventing Saudis from reinvesting in the 
capital market. However, current stagnancy on the Tadawul All-Share Index could provide CMA 
time to develop its capabilities and perfect the regulatory structure of the Saudi emerging capital 
market. Needless to say, elevating the restriction on foreign investors to invest103 directly in the 
Saudi capital market, instead of the current “Swap Agreement”104 mechanism, is an important 
step in developing the Saudi capital market.105 The necessity does not stem from the cash inflow 
98 It seems the Saudi government has changed its mind about creating such a fund because no information 
about it has mentioned by any Saudi after the King’s televised speech in 2006, which encompassed his idea of 
creating such fund. See generally Rashid M. Alfozan, Sundooq Thawi Al-Dakl Al-Mahdood Ain?, Where is the low 
income mutual fund?, Riyadh newspaper issue number 14637 in 21 July, 2008 (in Arabic). 
99 Based on the closing of Tadawul All-share Index of 2009, 2010, and 2011. See Saudi Stock Exchange 
Tadawul, Tadawul Annual statistics of 2011, available at http://www.tadawul.com.sa (accessed on June 11, 2012). 
100 See RAMADY, supra note 88, at 162. 
101 See id. at 163-64. 
102 For floating shares issued in the Saudi stock market, see RAMADY, supra note 88, at 161–62. 
103 On the wake of 2006 market crash, non-Saudi residents were allowed to invest directly in the Saudi 
Stock Market with some restrictions. 
104 Under the SWAP agreement, foreign investors enjoy the economic rights of the share, but not the 
political one (voting right). 
105 SCMA founded its decision of allowing non-resident foreigners in Saudi Arabia to have access to stock 
markets on two grounds: to “deepen the capital market and promote its efficiency ... [and] strengthen the Saudi 
capital market’s openness indicator for foreign direct investments.” Saudi Capital Market Authority, 2010 Annual 
Report, 46 (2010). 
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that might be injected into the Saudi capital market by foreign investors but more importantly 
from the financial expertise international institutional investors would add to the system. 
Accordingly, the economic value added, which more likely would come with the international 
institutional investors to the Saudi Stock Market, would outweigh the fear from the “hot money” 
effect on the Saudi capital market. 
6.3 SOURCES OF SAUDI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
6.3.1 Hard sources 
6.3.1.1 The Companies Law of 1965 
The Companies Law of 1965 (CL)106 abrogated the companies’ old legal framework laid in the 
Commercial Court Law of 1932 (CCL).107 The CL furnished rules for joint stock companies 
from incorporation to liquidation. Before the enactment of Capital Market Law 2003,108 CL had 
been considered the most influential source of the corporate governance of joint stock 
companies.109 Currently, CL contains key corporate governance rules which include the board of 
106 Issued by the Royal Decree (M/ 6) in (Rabi al-Awwal 22, 1385 H) correspondent to July 22, 1965. 
107 Issued by the Royal Decree (32) in (Muharram 15, 1350) correspondent to June 2, 1931. This Law has 
two names: the Commercial Court Law and the Commercial Law. But, the most frequently used one is the 
Commercial Court Law. 
108 Issued by the Royal Decree (M/30) in (Jumada al-Akirah 2, 1924 H) correspondent to July 31, 2003. 
109 The Companies Law had been the solo primary source of corporate governance in publicly held 
companies but enactment of the new capital market law divides this mandate among both laws and their 
implementing authorities. At the early stage of the implementation of CML, a confusion of mandates created a 
problem whereby the issue had been solved by a memorandum of understanding that clarifies the scope of each 
authority with regard to some important matters related to public companies. 
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director’s functions and formation,110 shareholders’ power and rights,111 disclosure,112 capital 
structure and capital change,113 and criminal sanctions.114 CL applies to publicly traded and close 
joint stock corporations by which any joint stock company has to comply with CL provisions. 
Most of the CL provisions applicable to the joint stock company are mandatory rules in nature. 
Moreover, CL authorizes the Minister of Commerce and Industry to issue implementing 
regulations and resolutions to supplement CL provisions.1091F115 For instance, the Minister issued a 
resolution requiring all JSCs to establish audit committees. 1092F116 Moreover, joint stock companies 
by a Ministerial decision are required to adopt the standardized form of joint stock company by-
laws 1093F117 unless there is a compelling reason to deviate from the terms stated in the Ministry’s 
form.1094F118 A Ministerial resolution has set a mandatory framework for JSCs board of directors’ 
compensations and benefits.1095F119 
110 See C.L. arts. §§ (66–82). 
111 See id. §§ (83–97). For auditing of the company accounts, see C.L. arts. §§ (129–33). 
112 See id. §§ (89 & 122). 
113 See id. §§ (134–46). 
114 See id. §§ (229–31). 
115 For more details about implementing regulations, see chapter II 
116 Ministerial Resolution by Ministry of Commerce and Industry No. (903) dated in (1414 H) 
corresponding to (1993). 
117 C.L. art. § (51). 
118 Id. 
119 See chapter VII. 
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6.3.1.2 Capital Market Law and Regulations 
i. Capital Market Law 
Capital Market Law (CML) contains several corporate governance rules for listed joint stock 
companies. The CML is a concise piece of legislation which consists of 67 articles.120 The CML 
is divided into several sections that govern, inter alia, disclosure,121 proxy solicitation,122 market 
manipulation and insider trading.123 Moreover, the CML granted CMA a broad discretion to 
render implementing regulations for CML. Accordingly, CMA enacted several implementing 
regulations that encompass provisions related to corporate governance directly such as Corporate 
Governance principles,124 or indirectly such as the Listing,125 market conduct,126 merger and 
acquisition,127 and securities offering (public and private).128  
120 Issued by the Royal Decree (M/30) in (Jumada al-Akirah 2, 1924 H) correspondent to July 31, 2003. 
121 CML arts. §§ (40–48). 
122 Id. § (41). 
123 Id. §§ (48 & 50). 
124 Corporate Governance Regulations Issued by the Board of Capital Market Authority pursuant to 
Resolution No. 1/212/2006 in Shawwal 21, 1427 H (corresponding to Nov. 12, 2006). 
125 Issued by the Board of Capital Market Authority pursuant to Resolution No. 1/11/2004 in Rajab 20, 
1425 H (corresponding to Oct. 4, 2004). 
126 Market Conduct Regulations Issued by the Board of Capital Market Authority pursuant to Resolution 
No. 3/11/2004 in Rajab 20, 1425 H (corresponding to Oct. 4, 2004). This regulations comprise of 21 Articles that 
are intended to supplement the generally stated provisions in the capital market law: to maintain the market 
integrity, to set standard for proper action by market participants. Accordingly, the regulation has described in 
details the nature of the prohibited market manipulation, insider trading, and false statements. 
127 Merger and Acquisition Regulations Market Conduct Regulations Issued by the Board of Capital Market 
Authority pursuant to Resolution No. 1/50/2007 in Rajab 21, 1428 H (corresponding to Oct. 3, 2007). 
128 Offers of Securities Regulations Issued by the Board of Capital Market Authority pursuant to Resolution 
No. 2/11/2004 in Rajab 20, 1425 H (corresponding to Oct. 4, 2004). 
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6.3.1.3 Corporate Governance Regulations 
CMA issued the Corporate Governance Regulations (SCGRs) in 2006.129 The SCGRs is directed 
toward Saudi joint stock companies listed on the Saudi Securities Exchange (Tadawul).130 The 
regulation is not binding but rather directive in nature, as the SCGRs states: 
[The SCGRs] constitute the guiding principles for all companies listed in the 
Exchange unless any other regulations, rules or resolutions of the Board of the 
[CMA] provide for the binding effect of some of the provisions herein 
contained.131 
The SCGRs consists of 19 articles which cover various corporate governance subjects 
including the rights of the shareholders,132 disclosure and transparency,133 and board of 
directors.134 Moreover, the SCGR furnishes definitions of key terms related to corporate 
governance such as the independent members of the board of directors, non-executive director, 
stakeholders, and minority shareholders.135 Publicly traded companies, though, are not obligated 
to implement most of this regulation provisions, and have to provide in annual board of 
directors’ reports a reason for the non-implementation. The board has to specify in its annual 
report the implementation of any article. Article (1) of SCGRs provides that: 
[A] company must disclose in the Board of Directors’ report, the provisions that 
have been implemented and the provisions that have not been implemented as 
well as the reasons for not implementing them. 
129 Corporate Governance Regulations Issued by the Board of Capital Market Authority pursuant to 
Resolution No. 1/212/2006 in Shawwal 21, 1427 H (corresponding to Nov. 12, 2006). 
130 Corporate Governance Regulations (SCGRs) art. § (1)(a). 
131 Id. § (1)(b). 
132 Id. § (5). 
133 Id. §§ (1) & (9). 
134 Id. §§ (10)-(18). 
135 Id. § (2)(b). 
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This approach is similar to the English “comply or explain” technique of the 
implementation of good corporate governance standards.136 Nonetheless, the CMA has the 
power to mandate full implementation of some of the SCGRs provisions. For example, the CMA 
has required all listed companies to adhere to some SCGRs provisions such as the board of 
director’s formation137 and to adhere to disclosure requirements as stated in Article 9 of the 
SCGRs.138 In addition, CMA requires every listed company to have an audit committee139 and to 
have an internal control system compatible with SCGRs.140 
6.3.1.4 Listing Rules 
Public offerings of securities have to be in accordance with CML and its Implementing 
regulations, most notably LRs.141 LRs are comprised of 53 mandatory articles and 9 annexes. 
LRs have various provisions to regulate public offerings and listings on the Saudi Securities 
Exchange (Tadawul).142 Nearly all of the LRs are adopted from the London Stock exchange 
136 See chapter III. 
137 The Board of CMA resolution No. 1/36/2008 in Thul-Qadah 12, 1429 H (corresponding to Nov. 10, 
2008), which provides that paragraph (c) and (e) of article 12 in SCGRs is mandatory. 
138 The Board of CMA resolution No. 1/36/2008 in Thul-Qadah 12, 1429 H (corresponding to Nov. 10, 
2008). 
139 The Board of CMA resolution No. 1/36/2008 in Thul-Qadah 12, 1429 H (corresponding to Nov. 10, 
2008), which provides that article 14 in SCGRs is mandatory. 
140 The Board of CMA resolution No. 1/33/2011 in Thul-Hijja 13, 1432 H (corresponding to Oct. 30, 
20011). 
141 LRs art. § (2)(b). See also Offers of Securities Regulation art. § (8). Offers of Securities Regulation 
(OSR) issued by the Board of the CMA by the resolution No. 2-11-2004 in Rajab 20, 1425 H (corresponding to Oct. 
4, 2004) (OSR Amended by the Resolution of the Board of CMA No. 1-28-2008 in Rajab 17, 1429 H 
(corresponding to Aug. 18, 2008). 
142 LRs art. § (2)(a). 
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Listing Rules.143 LRs contain various rules regarding corporate governance best practices. For 
instance, the LRs oblige boards of directors and high management staff to perform their duties 
and function for the interests of the company.144 LRs furnish rules which govern prelisting 
requirements, listing obligations, and delisting provisions. 
To be listed on the Saudi Securities Exchange (Tadawul), an applicant has to be a Saudi 
joint stock company145with at least 200 shareholders.146 Also, the company had to have been 
conducting business for three years before the submission of application.147 The applicant has to 
have skilled and knowledgeable high managerial staff members148 who have been directing the 
company for at least three financial years.149 The company has to provide CMA with three 
consecutive years of financial results.150The applicant also has to publish a prospectus.151 In 
addition, thirty percent of the company shares have to be offered to public investors on the 
exchange.152 Recently, LRs have allowed foreign companies to list their securities (cross-listing) 
on the Saudi Securities Exchange (Tadawul).153 
143 Abdulrahman Y. Baamir, Issues of Transparency and Disclosure in the Saudi Stock Market, 22 ARAB 
L.Q. 63, 66 (2008). 
144 LRs art. § (44). 
145 LRs art. § (11)(a). However, recently the LRs allow for cross-listing by foreign companies. See LRs art. 
§ (14). 
146 LRs art. § (13)(a)(1). 
147 Id. § (11)(b). 
148 LRs art. § (11)(e) which provides that “[t]he senior executives of the issuer must have appropriate 
expertise and experience for the management of the issuer’s business.” Id. 
149 LRs art. § (11)(b). 
150 LRs art. § (11)(c). However, the CMA has the power to shorten the listing requirement under special 
circumstances. Id. 
151 LRs art. § (21). 
152 Id. § (13)(a)(2). 
153 Id. § (14). 
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Every listing applicant has to appoint financial and legal advisors.154 Both advisors have 
to be licensed to practice in Saudi Arabia.155 The financial advisor performs several functions 
according to LRs. Besides being a focal point of communication with CMA in regard to all 
listing requirements,156 the advisor has to provide CMA with any needed information about the 
company.157 Moreover, the financial advisor has to conduct due diligence on the company and 
ensure that it has complied with all listing prerequisites.158 On the other hand, the legal advisor’s 
main role is to confirm the application’s conformity with LRs.159 
After gaining admission for a listing, the company has to comply with various rules, most 
importantly disclosures.160 LRs require continuous disclosures by the company, the board of 
directors, and major shareholders. LRs provide that “all disclosures made by a [listed company] 
to the public and to the [CMA] must be clear, fair and not misleading.”161 Moreover, the LRs 
reiterate to the board of directors and high management of listed companies duty to discharge 
their tasks for the interest of the company.162 
Not complying with LRs and CML or implementing its regulations allows CMA to 
suspend and cancel listings. Listing suspensions or cancelations may arise when the CMA 
decides that it is necessary for the protection of market investors or for retaining capital market 
154 Id. § (5)(a). 
155 Id. § (6)(a). 
156 Id. § (7)(a)(1). 
157 Id. § (7)(a)(3). 
158 Id. § (7)(a)(2). 
159 Id. § (9) and see LRs Annex (8). 
160 See id. arts. §§ (40–48). 
161 Id. § (40)(a). 
162 Id. § (44). 
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discipline.163 Also, CMA may take either of the aforementioned actions if the financial or 
operational position of the listing is unstable.164 Cross-listed companies will be suspended or 
canceled in the Saudi Securities Exchange (Tadawul) if the crossed stock exchange has taken one 
of those measures.165 
Listed companies have no right of withdrawing their shares voluntarily from listing on 
the Saudi exchange.166 However, listed companies can apply for a temporary halt of a listing 
under specific conditions.167 In the last few years, the CMA has suspended the listings of several 
non-complying companies, such as the first suspensions in 2007 against Bisha Agricultural 
Development Company (Bisha)168 and Anaam International Holding Group Company (Annam) 
for not complying with CML and LRs.169 
6.3.2 Accounting Standards 
Sound accounting and auditing statements not only help management of the company and board 
of directors to make informed decisions and assess the enterprise performance but also help 
investors and public authorities to determine the enterprise’s financial position.170 So, the 
implementation of a sound accounting and auditing systems is very important in a capital market 
163 Id. § (35)(a)(1). 
164 Id. § (35)(a), which states that: “[CMA] considers that the issuer does not have a sufficient level of 
operations or sufficient assets to warrant the continued trading of its securities on the exchange.” Id. 
165 Id. § (35)(a)(6). To date, there is no cross listing has occurred in Saudi Stock Exchange. 
166 LRs art. § (36). 
167 See id. § (37). 
168 Board of CMA resolution No. (1-3-2007) in Thul-Hijjah 23, 1427 (corresponding to Jan. 13, 2007). 
169 Board of CMA resolution No. (5-1-2007) in Thul-Hijjah 28, 1427 (corresponding to Jan. 18, 2007). 
170 See THE OECD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES 49 (2004). 
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and good corporate governance as well. In this context, the OECD Corporate Governance 
Principles (2004) suggests that the company’s “[i]nformation should be prepared and disclosed 
in accordance with high quality standards of accounting.”171 The reliability of financial data 
significantly “depends on the standards under which it is compiled and disclosed.”172 These 
international accounting standards have become the role model for the quality financial 
information preparation.173 In addition, “best practice” suggests that auditing of the company 
records should be carried out by “an independent, competent and qualified auditor”174 to insure 
of the reliability of the audited documents.175 In addition, the auditor has to express his view on 
the “way” wherein the financial results of the company “have been prepared and presented.”176 
Saudi Arabia enacted the Law of Public Accountants (LPA) to enhance the regulatory 
framework of accountancy and auditing professions in the country.177 Such an independent body 
complies with best practice standards which intend to ensure the independence of the accounting 
profession.178 Independence of the regulatory and supervisory body promotes the reliability of 
financial results.179 Therefore, LPA established a specialized professional organization, the Saud 
Organization of Public Accountants (SOCPA), supervised by the Ministry of Commerce and 
171 Id. at Principle (v) paragraph (B). 
172 THE OECD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES 49 (2004). 
173 See id. 
174 Id. at Principle (v) paragraph (c). 
175 THE OECD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES 54 (2004). 
176 Id. 
177 The Law of Public Accountant (LPA) issued by the Royal Decree No. (M/12) in Jumada-al-Awwal 13, 
1412 H (corresponding to Nov. 20, 1991). 
178 See THE OECD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES 54 (2004). 
179 See id. 
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Industry, to regulate and supervise public accountancy and auditing profession in the country.180 
LPA grants SOCPA vast power to implement all measures for promoting and developing the 
accounting profession in Saudi Arabia, such as auditors’ certification, continuous training, and, 
more importantly, setting accounting and auditing standards and supervising their 
implementations.181 Yet, SOCPA has succeeded in enhancing the accountancy profession in 
Saudi Arabia to a high degree in comparison to some countries in the region, as the International 
Federation of Accountants (IFAC) pronounced: “SOCPA is a well established professional 
accountancy body with highly skilled and experienced staff and members. SOCPA is keen to 
provide support, advice and assistance to other professional bodies in Arabic-speaking 
countries.”182 
Accounting standards are mainly divided into two schools of thoughts: “rules-based” and 
“principles-based” accounting standards systems. The former is elaborate and designed to 
provide for “bright line” accounting standards as in the American (GAAP) accounting system, 
while the other one is broader and less detailed as in British and International Accounting 
Standards.183 Both standards treat a wide range of areas similarly and fewer areas differently.184 
The standards’ positions on property valuation are just one of the substantial inconsistent areas 
180 Public Accountants Law (PAL) Article § (19). 
181 Id. 
182 International Federation of Accountants (IFAC), Tools and Resources to Support the development of the 
Accounting Profession, N.Y., New York: IFAC., p. 100 (2007), available at 
http://www.ifac.org/sites/default/files/publications/files/tools-and-resources-to-supp_0.pdf (accessed on May 13, 
2012). 
183 See, e.g., Frederick Gill, Principles Accounting Standards, 28 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 967, 972 
(2002–2003). 
184 For comparison between principles-based accounting standards (IFRS) and rule accounting-based 
standards (GAAP) see generally Ernst & Young, US GAAP versus IFRS: basics (2011), available at 
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/US_GAAP_v_IFRS:_The_Basics/$FILE/US%20GAAP%20v%20IFR
S%20Dec%202011.pdf (accessed on Feb. 18, 2013). 
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between the two accounting schools.185 The American standard prohibits the revaluation of 
assets, with only historical cost reported, while the international standards allow for such 
revaluation of assets.186 A rule-based approach grants a slim space for “discretion” in contrast to 
the principle-based approach which authorizes a wide “discretionary” space.187 Recently, the 
principle-based approach gained international popularity – especially in the wake of the financial 
scandals in the U.S., such as Enron, which are attributed in some part to the U.S. accounting 
rule-based approach ideology.188 The rule-based approach shifts the burden from concentrating 
on the company’s financial “status as a going concern, [to] focusing on compliance with 
complex rules as an end in and of itself.”189 Accordingly, Sarbanes-Oxley Reform Act requests 
the SEC to study the possible adoption of principles based accounting to the U.S. corporate 
governance system various principle-based standards.190 
Saudi accounting standards used to be heavily influenced by the U.S. rule-based 
“Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP).”191 However, in response to the G-20 
recommendation to enhance the quality of financial reporting, SOCPA recently announced its 
185 Ernst & Young, US GAAP versus IFRS: basics, 15 (2011), available at 
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/US_GAAP_v_IFRS:_The_Basics/$FILE/US%20GAAP%20v%20IFR
S%20Dec%202011.pdf (accessed on Feb. 18, 2013). 
186 See id. 
187 See Amra Balic, Transparency, Disclosure, and Audit, in GOVERNANCE AND RISK: AN ANALYTICAL 
HANDBOOK FOR INVESTORS, MANGERS, DIRECTORS, AND STAKEHOLDERS 86, 90 (George Dallas ed., 2004). 
188 See id. 
189 Id. 
190 Andrea Esposito et al., United States, in GOVERNANCE AND RISK: AN ANALYTICAL HANDBOOK FOR 
INVESTORS, MANGERS, DIRECTORS, AND STAKEHOLDERS 300, 314 (George Dallas ed., 2004). 
191 See the Secretary General of the Saudi Organization for Certified Public Accountants (SOCPA) circular 
No. (2/102) in Shaban 21, 1414 H (corresponding to Feb. 1, 1994), which provides that certified public accountants 
have to consult American standards if there is no Saudi standard governing the matter being audited by them. 
However, in 2003, SOCPA amended its circular by changing the gap fillers standards from the American standards 
to the International Accounting Standards. The General Director of the Companies General Directorate in the 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry No. (3944/9/400/222) in Thul Qadah 1, 1423 (corresponding to Jan. 4, 2003). 
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attention to shift towards principle-based, International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).192 
Currently, only banks and insurance companies are required to adhere to International 
Accounting Standards,193 while the rest of listed companies in the Saudi exchange (Tadawul) are 
required to prepare their financial documents in accordance with Saudi standards.194 The only 
challenge SOCPA might face is the lack of adequate resources to conduct all the assigned 
functions assigned to it bylaws.195 
6.3.3 Other Sources of Corporate Governance 
Some corporate governance rules are delineated in special statutes governing the economic 
activities of publicly traded companies conducting business within the realm of those statutes. 
For instance, banks and insurance companies have additional or various governance 
requirements in comparison to other listed joint stock companies.196 Bankruptcy rules generally 
192 See the resolution of SOCPA Board, 10th meeting, 6th session, in February 18, 2012, in regard to the 
endorsement of SOCPA project’s adopting International accounting and auditing standards, available at 
http://www.socpa.org.sa/Pdf/international_standard.pdf (accessed on May 13, 2012). For the reasons behind the 
recent popularity of principle-based accounting, see generally Alnoor Bhimani, The Role of a Crisis in Reshaping 
the Role of Accounting, 27 J. ACCOUNT. PUBLIC POLICY 444–54 (2008). 
193 Although listed on the Saudi capital market and required to elect public joint stock company form, the 
Banking sectors are required to follow international accounting standards. 
194 See Listing Rules (LRs) arts. (26 & 27). Article 27 provides that 
The [listed joint stock company] must provide the [Capital Market] Authority and announce to 
shareholders its annual accounts (which must be prepared and audited in accordance the 
accounting standards issued by SOCPA). 
Otherwise, the company has to provide justification in the board of director’s annual report for its deviation 
from the Saudi Accounting Standards. LRs art. § (27)(b)(6). 
195 See THE WORLD BANK REPORT ON THE OBSERVANCE OF STANDARDS AND CODES (ROSC): CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE COUNTRY ASSESSMENT OF THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA 5 (Feb. 2009). 
196 For example, the Cooperative Insurance Companies Law required endorsement from the Saudi Arabian 
Monetary Agency (SAMA) to insure the board of director’s appointees. See art. § (6) of Cooperative Insurance 
Companies Law. 
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interact with corporate governance, especially with regard to the shift in the board of directors’ 
role as guardian of the interests of creditors rather than those of shareholders. However, Saudi 
Arabia does not yet have complete bankruptcy statutes: only rules regarding the company’s 
liquidation and the procedures for consolidation with the company creditor which may interact 
with corporate governance.197 Criminal law provisions may also contain rules related to 
corporate governance. For example, “the Anti-Bribery Law” criminalized making bribes or 
receiving them by public company employees, including executives or board of director’s 
members of joint stock companies.198 Moreover, the Bureau of Public Auditing (BPA) has the 
authority to review all of the financial matters of any public company that is owned in part by the 
government or a company for which the government guarantees an annual minimum profit as 
with the Saudi Electricity Joint Stock Company.199 Case law carries nearly no weight as a source 
of corporate governance rules in Saudi Arabia due to the underdevelopment of the Saudi judicial 
system and the non-publication of decided cases. Accordingly, the court’s decisions provide 
neither binding authority as common law tradition nor are seen as authoritative in civil law 
systems. 
197 See art. § (14) in Bankruptcy Preventing Settlement Law which Issued by the Royal Decree No. (M/16) 
in Ramadan 4, 1416 H (corresponding to Jan. 25, 1996). 
198 See art. § (8)(4–5) in Anti-Bribery Law which Issued by the Royal Decree No. (M/36) in Thu-Hijja 29, 
1412 H (corresponding to July 1, 1992). 
199 See arts. (9) & (10) in The Bureau of Public Auditing which was issued by the Royal Decree No. (M/9) 
in Safar 1, 1391 H (corresponding to Apr. 7, 1971). 
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6.4 DISCLOSURE IN THE SAUDI LEGAL SYSTEM 
6.4.1 Introduction 
Disclosure is one of the mechanisms to promote integrity in the capital market.200 A transparent 
capital market reduces agency costs201 and creates a leveled playing field for all participants. It is 
well established that “[a] world ... without adequate truthful information is a world with too little 
investment, and in the wrong things to boot.”202 Disclosure offers investors equal access to the 
company’s information. Such information allows investors to compare companies’ performances 
and make an informed decision about their investment allocation.203 Otherwise, investors would 
be forced to conduct their own research about every company in the market to find one in which 
they could invest.204 Investors will be responsible to verify the accuracy of provided information 
whereby fraudulent information may affect the allocation of investment in the market under 
which better performing firms may not be rewarded financially.205 Therefore, “[i]nvestors do not 
... want to inspect; they seek to be passive recipient of an income stream, not to be private 
investigators.”206 
200 THE OECD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES 49 (2004). 
201 For the agency cost problem, see chapter IV. 
202 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 
VA. L. REV. 669, 673 (1984). 
203 See THE OECD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES 49 (2004). 
204 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 202, at 674–75. 
205 Id. at 669, 673–74. 
206 Id. at 669, 675. 
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On the other hand, disclosure is considered to be one of the techniques used by policy 
makers to promote corporate governance ambience.207 For instance, shareholders’ acquisition of 
the company’s information through disclosure allows them to decide whether to reelect the 
existing board of directors’ members or not.208 Also, disclosure of an underperforming board of 
directors may encourage a takeover by another company,209 which more likely would push the 
incumbent board to increase its performance to avoid such a possibility. In addition, knowing 
what is going on inside the company, especially with regard to interested parties’ contracts, may 
help shareholders to enforce board of directors’ members “fiduciary duties.”210 In this regard, 
Merritt Fox said, “without required disclosure, most suits, even the ones against managers who 
in fact did breach their duties, would inevitably, start out as ‘fishing expeditions.’”211 
Since companies may not disclose their crucial information, not necessarily to hide 
misconduct, although that is possible, but in many times for other reasons such as management’s 
shame in underperformance,212 or hiding important business information from competitors,213 a 
national legal system tends to implement a mandatory disclosure framework. Mandatory 
disclosure refers to “any kind of legal obligation that requires ... [a company’s] management [or 
shareholders] to provide on regular basis information that otherwise might not be inclined to 
207 See Merritti B. Fox, Required Disclosure and Corporate Governance, in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE: THE STATE OF THE ART AND EMERGING RESEARCH 701, 704 (Klaus J. Hopt et al. eds., 1998). 
208 Id. at 705. 
209 Id. at 710. 
210 Id. at 708. 
211 Id. 
212 Id. at 703 n.4. 
213 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 202, at 673. 
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provide.”214 There is no single best disclosure model to be imported and implemented at the 
national level. National ownership structure has a key effect in shaping any national disclosure 
framework.215 For instance, high disclosure standards are in the dispersed ownership model, as in 
the U.S.A and U.K, while the need for the same standards is less urgent in concentrated 
ownership models.216 The OECD Corporate Governance Principles of 2004 suggest adopting a 
disclosure structure that at least guarantees the disclosing of the company’s “financial situation, 
performance, ownership, and governance of the company.”217 In addition, an effective corporate 
governance model has to guarantee the accuracy of the disclosed information and its publication 
in a specified timeline.218 However, underdevelopment of disclosure systems is not necessarily 
attributed to deficiency in the governing rules but rather may be a cause of ineffective 
enforcement measures by authorities, if not both.219 
6.4.2 Saudi Disclosure System 
The Saudi disclosure system has evolved rapidly in the last thirty years from minimal disclosure 
requirements under the Companies Law (CL) to the sophisticated disclosure requirements 
encompassed in the CML and its implementing regulations.220 Currently, disclosure 
214 Fox, supra note 207, at 703. 
215 Id. at 716. 
216 Id. 
217 THE OECD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES OF 2004, Principle V. 
218 Id. 
219 See supra note 254, at 63, 72. 
220 For historical background on disclosure in Saudi Arabia before the CMA assumed its role in this regard, 
see generally Awwad Saleh Awwad, Legal Regulation of the Saudi Stock Market: Evaluation, and Prospects for 
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requirements and conditions are scattered in various legal documents, most frequently 
Companies Law (CL), Capital Market Law (CML), Listing Rules (LRs), and Corporate 
Governance Regulation (CGR). Those sources represent the backbone of Saudi disclosure’s 
system. LRs require that every listed company ought to present to the [CMA] “without delay all 
information, explanations, books, and records ... which must be clear, accurate and not 
misleading.”221 CGR encourages every listed company to “lay down in writing the policies, 
procedures and supervisory rules related to disclosure.”222 
Disclosure requirements take various forms, whereby some are directed to the company 
and other disclosure requirements are directed to shareholders, board of directors’ members, and 
senior executive officers. A study on the Saudi disclosure framework pointed out that disclosure 
in Saudi Arabia is significantly influenced by developed countries’ disclosure experiences and 
the recommendations of international financial institutions.223 In this context, Baamir remarked: 
When looking at the disclosure provisions in CML and other disclosure provisions from any 
developed market, the first impression will be that the CMA rules are a direct translation of LSE 
[London Stock Exchange] or NYSE [New York Stock Exchange].224 
Nonetheless, a study by the World Bank in 2009 indicated that the Saudi framework of 
disclosure is still not in full compliance with transparency and disclosure recommendations of 
the OECD Corporate governance Principles of 2004.225 At the enforcement level, the nascent 
CMA has devoted great effort to promote the disclosure system in Saudi Arabia. In the last few 
Reforms, Appendix C, 218-50 (PhD) (2000) (unpublished dissertation at University of Warwick School of Law [on 
file with the author]. 
221 LRs art. § (34)(a). 
222 CGR art. § (8). 
223 See Baamir, supra note 143, at 63, 78. 
224 Id. 
225 The World Bank Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC), Corporate Governance 
Assessment: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Feb. 2009). 
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years, the CMA has implemented disclosure requirements more strictly. For instance, the CMA 
recently suspended the trading of several listed companies for not complying with disclosure 
requirements.226 
6.4.2.1 Disclosure by the Company 
i. The Prospectus 
Whenever a company aims to list its securities on the securities exchange listing or a listed 
company intends to offer new securities to the market, the company is normally required to 
disclose its financial and non-financial information to capital market investors by issuing a 
“prospectus.”227 Issuance of a prospectus is considered to be a global best practice model.228 For 
instance, a European resolution was issued in this regard stating that “[m]ember states shall not 
allow any offer of securities to be made to the public within their territories without prior 
publication of a prospectus.”229 Saudi LRs mandates every company by for offering shares to the 
public to issue a prospectus written in the Arabic language230 and: 
226 In 2012, For example, CMA suspended the Allied Cooperative Insurance Group (ACIG) and Buruj 
Cooperative Insurance Company (Buruj). Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul) webpage, http://www.tadawul.com.sa 
(accessed on June 9, 2012). 
227 CML art. § (40)(b). 
228 See EILIS FERRAN, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE LAW 429 (2008). 
229 Art. § (3)(1) in the Directive 2003/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the council of 4 November 
2003: on the prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading and 
amending Directive 2001/34/EC. Published in the Official Journal of the European Union in 31/2//2003. In 
compliance with this Directive the United Kingdom has required that: “[i]t is unlawful for transferable securities to 
which this subscription applies to be offered to the public in the United Kingdom unless an approved prospectus has 
been made available to the public before the offer is made.” Art. § (84)(1) in Financial Services and Market Act of 
2000 (FSMA). 
230 LRs art. § (21)(d). 
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[C]ontain all information which is necessary to enable an investor to make an 
assessment of the activities, assets and liabilities, financial position, management 
and prospects of the issuer and its profits and losses and must include information 
in relation to the number and price of the securities and any obligations, rights, 
powers, and privileges attaching to them.231 
However, the company has to gain CMA approval before the promulgation of the 
prospectus.232 The CMA has power to reject the prospectus if disclosure requirements not have 
been met or are not accurate.233 The approved prospectus has to be sent to buyers at the time 
specified by the CMA.234 
ii. Financial Results and Board of Directors’ Report 
The OECD principles suggest that all listed companies have to disclose their “financial 
results.”235 Financial results generally refer to the “balance sheet, the profit and loss statements, 
the cash flow statement and notes to the financial statements.”236 Financial results disclosure has 
double objectives, which are “to enable appropriate monitoring to take place and to provide the 
basis to value securities.”237 To achieve the goals of disclosure standards, financial data has to be 
“prepared” properly.238 According to CML, every listed company is under periodic obligation to 
disclose its financial results and to issue a board of director’s report.239 First, the financial results 
231 Id. art. § (21)(a). For the content of Prospectus, see also CML art. § (42). 
232 CML art. § (43)(a). 
233 CML art. § (44)(d). 
234 CML art. § (41). 
235 THE OECD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES OF 2004, Principle V. 
236 ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
PRINCIPLES 50 (2004). 
237 THE OECD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES 50 (2004). 
238 Id. 
239 CML art. § (45). 
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have to be disclosed quarterly and annually.240 Financial results consist mainly of the balance 
sheet, profit and loss statement, and cash flow statement.241 
The company’s board of directors has to approve the results which then need to be signed 
by the chief executive officer (CEO) and chief financial officer (CFO) of the company.242 
However, the information in those financial documents should be public before the approval for 
disclosure is granted from the CMA.243 The CML prohibits trading of shares based on 
information that has not yet become public.244 
Second, best practice suggests that various nonfinancial information should be attached 
with the financial results, such as the operational results of the company, its future objectives and 
projected risk factors, board members and top management compensation, curriculum vitas of 
the board members, and related parties transactions.245 In addition, the attached report has to 
encompass the company’s corporate governance framework and procedures.246 In fact, one of the 
disclosure’s main goals is to allow the investor to comprehend the “whole picture” of the 
company.247 
240 Id. § (45)(a). Originally, art. § (89) of the CL was the only legal source of disclosure of its financial 
information to its shareholders. This obligation was just for the annual financial results. 
241 Id. The company financial disclosure has to be prepared in accordance with Saudi Accounting Standers 
issued by SOCPA. LRs art. § (26)(d) 
242 LRs art. § (42)(a). 
243 CML art. § (45)(c). 
244 Id. art. § (50). 
245 THE OECD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES OF 2004, Principle V paragraph (A) subparagraphs 
(1, 2, 4, and 5). 
246 Id. at Principle V paragraph (A) subparagraphs (8). 
247 THE OECD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES 50 (2004). 
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In the Saudi system, board of directors of the listed company has to attach to the 
company’s annual financial results their annual report (the board of director’s report “BDR”). 248  
The BDR must contain disclosures of various financial and governance matters. For instance, the 
BDR should contain information about the listed company, such as its core business and 
activities.249 Moreover, the report has to divulge all relevant information regarding the 
company’s board of directors, executive officers, and top managerial individuals.250 The report 
also has to provide information about major shareholders of the company.251 The company 
management has to script their views on the report with regard to the company’s existing 
business and their forecast on the business’ expected future.252 
The report has to disclose information about the company’s board of directors such as the 
board’s formation and classification of its members (executive, non-executive, or 
independent).253 The report has to illustrate the functions of the board of director’s committees, 
information about the members of those committees and the number of the each committee 
meetings.254 In addition, compensation and remuneration of the board of director’s members, 
including the board chairman,255 and the compensation and remuneration of highest paid 
managerial staff, including the chief executive officer (CEO) and chief financial officer (CFO) 
248 See LRs art. § (43). Also see CGR art. § (9). 
249 CML art. § (45)(b)(1) and LRs art. § (43)(1). 
250 CML art. § (45)(b)(2). 
251 Id. 
252 Id. § (45)(b)(3). 
253 CGR art. § (9)(c). 
254 Id. art. § (9)(d). 
255 Id. art. § (9)(e)(1). 
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must be reported.256 The internal control audit committee report has to be included in the board’s 
report.257 The report should include the number of board of director’s meetings and attendance 
sheet of the board members for the last financial year.258 
The company obliges to disclose any contract entered into with interested parties.259 
Thus, if any board of director’s member, or chief executive officer (CEO) or chief financial 
officer (CFO) has an interest in any contract that the company may sign, the report must disclose 
that matter explicitly.260 Significant decisions of the company need to be included in the report, 
including the company’s strategic plans.261 Also, the company has to indicate in the board’s 
report any sentence, penalty or measure implemented by the CMA against the company and the 
verdict rendered against the company by the judiciary.262 
iii. Additional Forms of Disclosure by the Company 
The company has to notify the CMA of any change in ownership of major shareholder who owns 
five percent or more of the company shares.263 Moreover, the company is obliged to notify the 
CMA and disclose to the public any decisions related to the company’s capital change (increase 
or decrease),264 divided payment or nonpayment,265 repurchase or redemption of the company 
256 CGR art. § (9)(e)(2). 
257 Id. art. § (9)(g). 
258 LRs art. § (43)(16). 
259 Id. art. § (43)(17). 
260 Id. art. § (43)(18). 
261 Id. art. § (43)(2). 
262 CGR art. § (9)(f). 
263 LRs art. § (46)(a). 
264 Id. § (46)(b)(1). 
265 Id. § (46)(6)(2–3). 
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shares,266 amendment of the bylaws, changing headquarter locations,267 calling for general 
meeting including the meeting agenda,268 changing the external auditor,269 matters related to 
winding up and liquidation,270 or court or quasi-judicial decisions impeding the company from 
“utilizing” more than five percent of its assets.271 In addition, the company has to use the Arabic 
language in all its communications and notifications272 and send “copies to the authority of the 
circulars sent to shareholders and all documents relating to acquisitions, mergers and offers, 
notices of meetings, reports, announcements or other similar documents” swiftly upon their 
issuance.273 
6.4.2.2 Disclosure Concerning Members of the Board of Director, Senior Executives, and 
Shareholders 
Ownership of major shareholders has some implication on the corporate governance system, 
especially with regard to minority shareholders and small investors in the capital market. OECD 
Corporate Governance Principles (2004) suggests disclosure of “[m]ajor share ownership and 
voting rights.”274 Disclosure has to include direct ownership and indirect patterns to satisfy the 
266 Id. § (46)(b)(4). 
267 Id. § (47)(1). 
268 Id. § (47)(6). 
269 Id. § (47)(2). 
270 Id. § (47)(3). 
271 Id. § (47)(5). 
272 Id. § (48)(1). 
273 Id. § (50). 
274 THE OECD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES OF 2004, Principle (V) paragraphs (A) subparagraph 
(3). 
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OECD disclosure standards.275 Saudi LRs regard ownership of 5% or more of listed company 
shares as a substantial shareholding.276 Accordingly, shareholders are obliged to promptly notify 
the company and CMA about such a holding whenever it reaches that level.277 Change in the 
substantial holding ownership by one percent or more (decrease or increase) also has to be 
reported.278 A board of directors’ member and top management staff should notify the company 
and CMA about their acquisition of shares regardless of the amount.279 The CMA and the 
company have to be notified by a board of directors’ member or top management staff if the 
value of the holding changes by fifty percent or more or if the change is equal to one percent (or 
more) of the company’s outstanding shares.280 The share holding of the substantial shareholder, 
board of directors’ member, top management staff members, including their dependent family 
members,281 a company controlled by any one of those categories, shares,282 and any person 
associated with any of the mentioned categories are “to act in concert to acquire interest in or 
exercise voting rights in the the ... [listed company].”283 In those cases, the shareholder has to 
275 THE OECD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES 51 (2004). 
276 LRs art. § (45)(a)(1). 
277 Shareholder has to conduct the notification “at the end of the trading day of the occurrence of the 
relevant event.” LRs art. § (45)(a). It has been proposed that shareholding notification should not be carried by the 
shareholder himself but rather by CMA to increase the efficacy of market surveillances and protect it from 
manipulative actions. See Baamir, supra note 143, at 79 (2008). 
278 LRs art. § (45)(a)(2). 
279 LRs art. § (45)(a)(3). 
280 LRs art. § (45)(a)(4). 
281 LRs § (45)(b)(1). The scope of implementation of this article is too wide where it includes all of 
relatives of the substantial shareholder. Although this might increase the protection of investors, it seems that it went 
beyond the legal limits of fairness. Hence, the scope of this article needs to be revised to only direct family members 
such as spouse and children under 18 years old. 
282 LRs art. § (45)(b)(2). 
283 Id. art. § (45)(d)(3). 
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complete a form and send it to the CMA284 with a clarification of his objective of the 
ownership.285 
However, assertion of indirect ownership is very difficult in Saudi listed companies, due 
to the poor disclosure framework of unlisted companies in Saudi Arabia. Many major share 
holdings in listed companies are registered under the names of other business associations which 
are undoubtedly controlled by a concealed major shareholder. Therefore, cross ownership and 
pyramidal ownership structure are more likely to exist in Saudi companies whereby major 
holdings of unlisted companies in the listed companies might be only the tip of an iceberg of a 
conglomerate business association. All in all, the Saudi disclosure system has satisfied the best 
practice standards with regard to direct ownership. However, this disclosure framework needs to 
be improved with regard to indirect ownership. Otherwise, not providing full disclosure 
accounting to the public regarding who is the ultimate owner of the shares may forfeit the goals 
of ownership disclosure and diminish the accountability of the real owner to the public. 
In the end, the disclosure system in Saudi Arabia disregards two crucial elements related 
to the corporate governance structure in this country. First, state owned and controlled publicly 
traded companies [SOEs] are not required to disclose information related to government 
ownership. Investors should be informed as to whether the government will act as a responsible 
shareholder that respects the independence of the SOE board286 and will not intervene in the 
daily administrative affairs of the SOE.287 Accordingly, the government needs to formulate a 
284 Id. § 45(d). 
285 Id. art. § (45)(d)(4). If the shareholder changed his ownership objective he must notify the CMA rapidly 
and refrain from selling his shares for the following ten days. Id. art. § (45)(e). 
286 OECD Guidelines, Chapter (II) C. 
287 OECD Guidelines, Chapter (II) B. 
230 
                                                 
clear shareholding “policy,” which pinpoints “the overall objectives of state ownership, the 
state’s role in corporate governance of the SOE, and the method of implement[ing] its ownership 
policy.”288 For example, the government should disclose its intention to utilize its holdings for 
either the provision of public utility to its citizens, national development purposes to its citizens 
at a reasonable price, or business reasons.289 Secondly, under the current disclosure system, 
publicly traded companies are not required to disclose matters connected to shariah. Saudi 
investors, for example, should know if the company is engaged in prohibitive economic activity 
like selling musical instruments or finance its operation through interests (both activities are 
permitted under the Saudi law but not shariah).290 
6.5 OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL IN SAUDI PUBLICLY TRADED COMPANIES 
6.5.1 Ownership Structure 
The number of listed companies in Saudi Arabia has grown phenomenally since the inception of 
the Saudi Capital Market Authority (CMA) in 2003. In such a newly organized capital market, 
however, several big companies that are in “the Saudi Top 100 Companies List”291 are still not 
288 OECD Guidelines, Chapter (II) A.  A clear definition of the policy of ownership will tell other 
shareholders the objective of government investment in the company. OECD Guidelines, page 24. 
289 See OECD Guidelines, page 23. 
290 For Islam and disclosure see chapter IV. 
291 For the complete, list see Aleqtisadiah on-line, issue No. 6795 for May 19, 2012.This list was issued by 
Aleqtisadiah newspaper and was desiged to mimic other internationally recognized lists of large companies, such the 
Forbes and the Financial Times lists. The 100 company club, Aleqtisadiah on line, issue No. 5348 for February 6, 
2008. 
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listed on the Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadwaul). For instance, Alahli Bank (NCB),292 Arab Supply 
and Trading Company (ASTRA),293 Zahran holding Company,294 Manafea Holding Company, 
are not listed companies at present.295 Most significantly, the world biggest oil company, Saudi 
Aramco, is not a listed company.296 
Table 5. Number of Saudi Publicly Traded Joint Stock Companies from 1990 to 2012 
Year Number of public joint stock companies 
1992 60 
1997 70 
2002 68 
2007 111 
2012 155 
Source: Capital Market Authority: annual reports of 2007 and Saudi 
Stock Exchange (Tadawul) homepage, http://www.tadawul.com.sa (accessed 
on Dec. 7, 2012). 
Although the seminal study, “Corporate Ownership around the World,” excluded Saudi 
Arabia due to its lack of a “significant capital market” at the time of the study (1999),297 other 
292 Alhali Bank (NCB) is the first Saudi Bank for which the Saudi government controls most of its shares. 
The Bank is ranked 4th on the “Saudi Top 100 Companies List” of 2012 complied by the Saudi newspaper 
Alqitsadiah. 
293 ASTRA is ranked 30 on the “Saudi Top 100 Companies List” of 2012, as complied by the Saudi 
newspaper Alqitsadiah. 
294 Zaharan is ranked 36 on the “Saudi Top 100 Companies List” of 2012, as complied by the Saudi 
newspaper Alqitsadiah. 
295 Manafea is ranked 40 on the “Saudi Top 100 Companies List” of 2012, as complied by the Saudi 
newspaper Alqitsadiah. 
296 Christopher Helman, Big Oil: The World’s Biggest Oil Companies, FORBES (7.9.2010, 5:28 PM ET), 
available at http://www.forbes.com/2010/07/09/worlds-biggest-oil-companies-business-energy-big-oil.html 
(accessed on Mar. 27, 2012). Moreover, two other large construction companies, which have been entrusted with 
conducting mega projects in Saudi Arabia, namely SAUDI OGER (LTD) and SAUDI BINLADN GROUP are not 
listed companies. Aramco is a limited liability, state owned company with a market value estimated at seven 
hundred and eighty billion dollars. Financial Times, FT Non-Public 150—the full list (Dec. 14, 2006), available at 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/5de6ef96-8b95-11db-a61f-0000779e2340.html#axzz2EPVkOkoy (accessed on 
Dec. 7, 2012). 
297 R.L. Porta, F. Lopez-De-Silanes & A. Shleifer, Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FINANCE 
471–17, 474 (1999). 
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sources have indicated that the pattern of Saudi ownership is concentrated.298 Major holding are 
in the hands of government, semi government institutions, families, and major individual 
investors. This section will highlight the ownership structure in Saudi listed companies. 
6.5.1.1 Government Ownership 
The Saudi government invests in the Saudi capital market through various mediums, notably the 
Public Investment Bank (PIF). The Government has 22 block holdings in 21 listed companies, 
which represents only 14% of Saudi companies listed on (Tadawul). Although the number of 
government investments in the capital market seems insignificant, the value of these investments 
is enormous – 341 Billion SR.299 The market share of government investment in the capital 
market is around 27%.300 The distribution of government investments is focused on specific 
sectors, such as cement, banking, energy, and petrochemicals (see Table 2).301 
 
298 See, e.g., WALEED ALAJLAN, OWNERSHIP PATTERNS AND THE SAUDI MARKET IN ADVANCES IN 
FINANCIAL ECONOMICS: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, vol. 9, 161–86, 184 (2004). See also Fahad Mohammad 
Almajid, A Conceptual Framework for Reforming the Corporate Governance of Saudi Publicly Held Companies: A 
Comparative and Analytical Study from a Legal Perspective 207-30 (Ph.D.) (2008) (unpublished dissertation 
University of Manchester). 
299 Based on Information concerning listed companies on the Tadawul homepage (Nov. 8, 2012) and Al-
Joman Economic Research Center. 
300 Based on major shareholder information on the Saudi Securities Exchange (Tadawul) website, May 30, 
2012. 
301 Major shareholder information on the Saudi Securities Exchange (Tadawul) website, May 30, 2012. 
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Table 6. Major Shareholding in Listed Companies Owned by Saudi Government Institutions,   
According to the Saudi Securities Exchange (Tadawul) Fifteen Market Sectors 
Sector Number of Companies 
Petrochemical Industries 2 
Banking and Financial 3 
Telecommunication and Information Technology 1 
Agriculture and Food Industries 3 
Industrial investment 1 
Energy and Utilities 2 
Cement 4 
Building and construction 1 
Real estate development 1 
Transport 2 
Hotel and tourism 1 
Total 21 
Sources: Major shareholders information on the Saudi Securities Exchange (Tadawul) 
(May 30, 2012). 
6.5.1.2 Semi Government Ownership 
Pension fund assets are managed by two agencies, the Public Pension Agency (PPA),302 and the 
General Organization for Social Insurance (GOSI).303 The (PPA) is entrusted with managing the 
pensions of public sector employees, such as civil servants, army and national guard members, 
and Internal Security Forces (for example, Police and Fire Fighters),304 while the latter, the 
GOSI, is in charge of private sector employees’ pensions.305 The two agencies have been 
302 See the Regulation of the Public Pension Agency, which issued by the Council of Ministers resolution 
No. 3 in Rabi Al-Awwal 3, 1425 H, corresponding to April 22, 2004. 
303 Article § (9) Paragraph (1) of the Social Insurance Law, which was enacted by Royal Decree No. M/33 
on Ramadan 3, 1421 H, or November 29, 2000 AD. 
304 Article § (10) of the Regulation of the Public Pension Agency, which was issued by Council of 
Ministers resolution No. 3 on Rabi Al-Awwal 3, 1425 H, or April 22, 2004 AD. 
305 Article § (9) Paragraph (1) in the Social Insurance Law, which was enacted by Royal Decree No. M/33 
on Ramadan 3, 1421 H, or November 29, 2000 AD. 
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established by the government, which exerts a wide scope of authority over the agencies’ 
supervision and operation, including the appointment of their governors.306 
6.5.2 Public Pension Agency (PPA) 
The Public Pension Agency (PPA) has major shareholdings in twenty Saudi listed companies out 
of the 155 companies listed on the Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul).307 The total market value 
of PPA ownership is around 27 billion (SR).308 PPA investment is concentrated mainly in three 
economic sectors, including financial services, telecommunication, and industry including 
petrochemicals. 
306 The king appoints the governors of both agencies. See Article § (13) of the Social insurance Law and 
Article (8) of the Regulation of the Public Pension Agency. 
307 Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul), available at http://www.tadawul.com.sa (accessed Oct. 8, 2012). 
308 The Value of Disclosed Institutions Ownership in the Saudi Listed Companies on October 31, 2012 by 
Aljoman Center of Economic Consultation, available at http://www.aljoman.net/ (accessed on Nov. 14, 2012). 
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 Table 7. Major Shareholding of the Public Pension Agency (PPA) in Saudi Listed Companies by 
Sector 
Market Sector Major shareholding 
Petrochemical Industries 4 
Banking and Financial 4 
Telecommunication and Information Technology 2 
Industrial Investment 2 
Cement 6 
Building and Construction 1 
Insurance 1 
Total 20 
Source: Major shareholders information on the Saudi Securities Exchange (Tadawul) 
(Nov. 8, 2012.) 
6.5.3 General Organization of Social Insurance (GOSI) 
The GOSI is the second largest investor in the Saudi stock market. The GOSI possesses thirty 
one major shareholdings, which represents 90 billion (SR) of market value.309 Major 
shareholdings of the GOSI range between 5 and 22%. Around 64% of GOSI shareholdings are 
focused on three market sectors, namely banking, petrochemicals, and cement. 
309 The Value of Disclosed Institutions Ownership in the Saudi Listed Companies on October 31, 2012 by 
Aljoman Center of Economic Consultation, available at http://www.aljoman.net/ (accessed on Nov. 4, 2012). 
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 Table 8. Major Shareholding of the General Organization of Social Insurance (GOSI) in Saudi 
Listed Companies by Sector 
Sector Major shareholding 
Petrochemical Industries 6 
Banking and Financial 8 
Telecommunication and Information Technology 2 
Agriculture and Food Industries 1 
Industrial Investment 1 
Energy and Utilities 1 
Cement 6 
Building and Construction 1 
Real Estate Development 2 
Insurance 1 
Hotel and tourism 1 
Media and Publishing 1 
Total 31 
Source: Major shareholders information on the Saudi Securities Exchange (Tadawul) 
(Nov. 8, 2012). 
In total, semi-government agencies have major holdings in 39 listed companies. The 
market value of semi-government institutions is about 118 billion (SR), distributed between 50 
or 51 companies. Semi-government agency ownership represents about 17% of institutional 
holdings’ in the Saudi Capital Market. 
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 Table 9. Major Shareholdings of Semi Government Institutions in Saudi Listed Companies by Sectors 
Sector Major 
Shareholding 
Number of 
Companies 
Companies with 
both Institutions 
Petrochemical Industries 10 9 1 
Banking and Financial 12 8 4 
Telecommunication and 
Information Technology 
4 3 1 
Agriculture and Food 
Industries 
1 1 0 
Industrial Investment 3 2 1 
Energy and Utilities 1 1 0 
Cement 12 8 4 
Building and Construction 2 2 0 
Real Estate Development 2 2 0 
Insurance 2 1 1 
Hotel and tourism 1 1 0 
Media and Publishing 1 1 0 
Total 51 39 12 
Source: Major shareholders information on the Saudi Securities Exchange (Tadawul) (Nov. 8, 2012). 
6.5.3.1 Family Ownership 
Apart from a few longstanding merchant families in the Arabian Peninsula, such as the 
Alireza310 and al-Gosaibi families,311 nearly all of today’s businesses families emerged after the 
foundation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932,312 mainly during the oil bonanza of the 
310 The Alireza family originally migrated from Iran to Jeddah, the western port city in the Arab Peninsula, 
in early nineteen century. For historical remarks on the Alireza business family, see MICHAEL FIELD, THE 
MERCHANTS: THE BIG BUSINESS FAMILIES OF SAUDI ARABIA AND THE GULF STATES 14–47 (1984). 
311 The Algosaibi family started their business in Bahrain at the end of the nineteen century. For historical 
background on the Algosaibi famly and commerce, see FIELD, supra note 310, at 217–46. The Algosaibi family 
business recently underwent an acute financial problem due to some mismanagement of one of the family affiliates. 
See Erik Larson, Algosaibi Family Ordered by U.K. Court to Show Saudi Assets, BLOOMBERG L.P. (July 7 2011), 
available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-07-07/algosaibi-family-ordered-by-u-k-court-to-reveal-saudi-
assets.html (accessed on Nov. 30, 2012). 
312 See supra chapter II. 
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1970s.313 Currently, around 90 percent of business enterprises in Saudi Arabia are family 
owned.314 Accordingly, family businesses play a significant role in the Saudi economy, 
contributing a quarter of the country’s GDP.315 Business families control 45 percent “of the top 
100 Saudi companies.”316 Nonetheless, the size of family businesses is still not fully reflected in 
Saudi capital markets because the majority of families shy away from going public, as for 
example the Bin-Ladin family does.317 
Several listed companies carry controlling family names, such as Abdullah al-Khodari 
Sons Company, al-Rajhi Bank, and al-Zamil Industrial Investment, while the other companies 
have distinctive business names (for example, Jarrir Company and the Kingdom Holding 
Company).318 For various reasons, numerous families’ investments in listed companies are 
disguised under the name of private equity firms.319 Thus, available data does not necessarily 
provide accurate information on the size of family ownership in the Saudi capital market. Saudi 
313 See supra chapter II. 
314 Council Saudi chamber of commerce and industry, 
http://www.csc.org.sa/Arabic/OurServices/FamilyFacilities/Pages/AboutUS.aspx (accessed on Nov. 30, 2012). 
315 Id. 
316 MOHAMED RAMADY, THE SAUDI ECONOMY 196 (2010). 
317 The Bin Ladin family structures its family business in a limited liability company form. For more 
information about the bin Ladin family company see Saudi Binladin Group, website, http://www.sbg.com.sa/ 
(accessed on Dec. 17, 2012). 
318 See list of listed companies in Saudi Stock Exchange Tadawul, available at 
http://www.tadawul.com.sa/wps/portal/!ut/p/c1/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP0os3g_A-
ewIE8TIwP3gDBTA08Tn2Cj4AAvY_dQA_3gxCL9gmxHRQB0Zc_U/ (accessed on Nov. 4, 2013). See also Fahad 
Mohammad Almajid, A Conceptual Framework for Reforming the Corporate Governance of Saudi Publicly Held 
Companies: A Comparative and Analytical Study from a Legal Perspective 218 (Ph.D.) (2008) (unpublished 
dissertation University of Manchester). 
319 Beside the economic and financial structure of the family business, there other various reasons for 
persons to hide their real identity from the public, mostly to avoid public scrutiny into the source of the business 
owner’s money. Secondly, some business families have political connections, which cause them to prefer keeping 
their businesses unconnected to their real names. Finally, a number of rich business families avoid disclosing their 
wealth to the public due to fear of attracting what is believed to be the ‘evil eye.’ See Yasein Aljafri, 92 billion is the 
profit of the largest 100 Saudi companies, Aleqtisadiah on line, issue No. 6795 in May 19, 20012. 
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Stock Exchange data indicates that family ownership in the Saudi capital market is around 145 
billion (SR).320 The Saudi Royal Family has the largest ownership share in family ownership 
which is followed by the Al-Rajhi family (see Table 7).321 
 
Table 10. Family Ownership in Saudi Arabia in the Saudi Capital Market (at the end of 
September 2012) 
Family Name Market value Billion SR Percentage % 
al-Saud* 62,134 43 
al-Rajhi 49,289 34 
al-Rashid 6,866 5 
al-Eissa 6,728 5 
al-Ageal 4,970 3.4 
al-Hokair 4,483 3 
al-Subaie 2,799 2 
al-Shalash 1,614 1 
al-Abdullatif 1,560 1 
Other Families 4,371 3 
Total 144,808 100% 
Source: Family Ownership in the Saudi Capital Market, October 15, 2012. 
*Al-Saud is the Royal Family of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The investment 
registered under the Family name is owned by individual investors who are 
members of the Family in their personal capacity, and no formal legal privileges 
are provided for their investments. Furthermore, the Royal Family is an 
extended family that comprises several thousand members and its members’ 
investments are not managed in concert with each other. 
6.5.3.2 Individual Investors’ Holdings 
A notorious characteristic of the Saudi stock market is the high percentage of individuals (real 
persons) investing in the capital market in comparison with the available market share for this 
class. There are 79 major individual shareholders in the Saudi capital market, holding 94 major 
320 Family Ownership in Saudi Capital Market on September 30, 2012 by AlJoman Center of Economic 
Consultations. 
321 Id. 
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block holdings in the various listed companies.322 The value of stock held by major individuals is 
around 124 billion (SR). almost 99% of this amount (123 billion SR) is owned by just 54 
people.323 The Saudi billionaire Alwaleed bin Talal al- Saud324 has the largest ownership share 
among this group of individual shareholders, with over 54 billion (SR) in block holdings, 
followed by the Saudi businessman Suleiman al-Rajhi, with stock holdings worth 21 billion 
(SR).325 
 
Table 11. Top Four Major Individual Shareholders’ Ownership in the Saudi Arabian Capital 
Market (at the end of September 2012) 
Investor name Market value of major 
shareholding (billion) 
Percentage to the total major 
individual shareholding 
Alwaleed al-Saud 54,569 46 
Suleiman al-Rajhi 21,501 18.1 
Sultan al-Saud 8,792 7.4 
Abdullah al-Rajhi 7,350 6.2 
Total 92,232 77 
Source: Aljoman Center for Economic Consultations, 31/10/2012. 
6.5.3.3 Foreign Ownership 
Foreigners are not permitted to invest directly in the Saudi Capital Market; however, foreign 
investors may invest in the Saudi capital market indirectly through equity swap agreements.326 
Swap agreement investors are not permitted to participate in the company governance, such as 
322 Classification of Disclosed Ownership in Saudi Capital Market on October 31, 2012, by Aljoman Center 
for Economic Consultation (Nov. 13, 2012). 
323 Value of individuals disclosed ownership in Saudi listed companies as of August 9, 2012, by Aljoman 
center for economic consultations on September 8, 2012. 
324 Forbes Magazine listed Alwaleed bin Talal as the 29th wealthiest person of the world. See The World’s 
Billionaires, Forbes, http://www.forbes.com/billionaires/list/# (accessed on Oct. 28, 2012). 
325 Value of individuals disclosed ownership in Saudi listed companies as of August 9, 2012, by Aljoman 
center for economic consultations on September 8, 2012. 
326 See Capital Market Authority CMA: Swap Agreement, 20/8/2008, available at 
http://www.cma.org.sa/ar/mediacenter/pr/Pages/swapagreement.aspx (accessed Nov. 13, 2013).  
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voting in the shareholders’ meetings.327 Shares owned in accordance with a swap agreement are 
not easily transferred.328 Despite these restrictions, swap agreements do provide foreign investors 
with limited access to the Saudi market, while maintaining a significant limit on foreign 
investment in that market. Thus, Morgan Stanley excludes the Saudi capital market from its 
Emerging Market Index (MSCI) because of the prohibition on foreign portfolio holders investing 
directly in the Saudi market.329 Currently, Saudi capital market is listed in Morgan Stanley 
frontier Markets Index alongside with Argentina and Ukraine.330 
The national media reports that the Saudi Capital Market Authority (CMA) is currently 
considering opening the capital market to foreign investors.331 Even if that happens, strict 
prerequisites will be imposed on nonresident foreign investors, under which only qualified 
institutional investors will have access to the Saudi Capital Market.332 The Saudi government’s 
ambivalent position toward foreign portfolio investment more likely is driven by the fear of the 
ramifications on the economy if “hot money” is allowed to flow into the market. As the Saudi 
327 See id. 
328 See id. 
329 MSCI Press Release (June 20, 2012), MSCI Announces the results of the 2012 Annual Market 
Classification Review, available at http://www.msci.com/eqb/pressreleases/archive/Mkt_Class_2012.pdf (accessed 
on Dec. 5, 2012) (the press release provides that: “non-GCC based investors have indirect access to the Saudi equity 
market through the use of swaps which for institutional investors may cause compliance issues. The introduction of 
a new scheme allowing direct access for non-GCC based investors to the Saudi equity market may result in MSCI 
considering the inclusion of Saudi Arabia in Frontier Markets or Emerging Markets, depending on the level of 
market accessibility.”). Id. at 5–6. 
330 Morgan Stanley (MSCI) homepage, 
http://www.msci.com/products/indices/country_and_regional/tradable/frontier_markets_100/performance.html 
(accessed on Jan. 22, 2014).  
331 See, e.g., Dania Saadi, Saudi Market Opens Up, but Gradually, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/22/world/middleeast/22iht-m22-saudi-bourse.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 
(accessed on Dec. 5, 2012). 
332 See Abdulrahman Al-Tuaijri, The Chairmen of Saudi Capital Market Authority (CMA), Taking Stock in 
Saudi Arabia, Talks to CNBC (Mar. 23, 2010, 9:42 AM ET), available at 
http://video.cnbc.com/gallery/?video=1448768833&play=1 (accessed on Dec. 5, 2012). See also Saadi, supra note 
331. 
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Capital Market Chairmen, Abdulrahman al-Tuaijri, asserts, “It is not that I want to shield the 
Saudi [Capital] Market … (but) we are more concerned about hot money and we want to see it in 
a very well organized way that are coming into our market.”333 
The citizens of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states have recently been 
allowed to invest in the Saudi capital market under the national treatment principle in accordance 
with GCC agreements.334 In addition, foreign residents in Saudi Arabia are allowed to invest in 
the Saudi stock market.335 
Accordingly, the market share of foreign portfolio investment is small, specifically, it 
only accounts for around 6% of the Saudi capital market.336 The banking sector is the exception, 
in which the concentration of foreign ownership is high (see table 9). Having a strategic 
partnership with well known foreign bank was one of the obvious conditions to establish a bank 
in Saudi Arabia. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
333 Abdulrahman Al-Tuaijri, Chairmen of the Saudi Capital Market Authority (CMA), quoted in Saudi 
Bourse Wants Foreigners but Fears “hot” money (Asma Alshharif and Ulf Laessing, Web, Reuter (Oct. 27, 2010), 
available at http://uk.reuters.com/article/2010/10/27/uk-saudi-bourse-idUKLNE69Q01B20101027 (accessed on 
Dec. 5, 2012). 
334 See Council of Ministers Resolution No. (267) in Shaban 14, 1428H corresponding to August 27, 2007. 
335 See Capital Market Authority (CMA) Statement of March 20, 2006, available at 
http://www.cma.org.sa/Ar/News/Pages/CMA_N193.aspx (accessed on Dec. 5, 2012). 
336 Gaweim kobar almullak takshif an miyat milyar riyal llajanb fi al soug alsaudeih, aleqtisadiah 
newspaper online, Issue No. 5445, Sept. 9, 2008, available at http://www.aleqt.com/2008/09/07/article_153806.html 
(accessed on Dec. 6, 2012). 
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Table 12. Foreign Ownerships in Saudi Listed Banks 
The Bank Foreign Ownership % 
SABB (British) 40 
Saudi Faranci (France) 31.1 
Arab National 40 
Aljazira 5.8 
Saudi Investment 7.4 
Saudi Hollandi (Netherlands) 39.9 
Source: Major shareholders information on the Saudi Securities Exchange 
(Tadawul) (May 30, 2012). 
6.5.3.4 Ownership and Control Pattern 
The concentration of ownership in Saudi listed companies is evident. Of these listed companies, 
90% have major shareholders.337 Moreover, the level of concentration in Saudi listed companies 
is quite high: 56 of 155 companies have a concentration level above 50%.338 
337 Al-Joman Center for Economic Consultations, February 29, 2012. Only 15 listed companies have no 
major shareholders. See Listed Companies with no Major shareholders, March 29, 2012, by Al-Joman Center of 
Economic Consultations. 
338 List of Disclosed Shareholdings in the Saudi Bourse (from High to Low) on February 29, 2012 by Al-
Joman Center of Economic Consultations. 
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 Table 13. Concentration Level of Major Stock Holding (5% or more) in the 20 Largest 
Saudi Listed Companies 
Number The company Concentration % Major shareholders 
1 SABIC 75.4 2 
2 Al-Rajahi 35.7 3 
3 STC 83.6 3 
4 Saudi Electricity 81.2 2 
5 SAFCO 59.6 2 
6 SAMBO 49.3 3 
7 Etihad Etisalat 38.8 2 
8 Riyadh 69.5 5 
9 Kingdom 95 1 
10 SABB 74.4 4 
11 Saudi Faranci 53.7 3 
12 Saudi Kayan 35 1 
13 YANSAB 62 2 
14 Arab National 66.3 4 
15 MA’ADEN 66.8 3 
16 Almarai 70.8 3 
17 Industrialization 46.6 7 
18 Petro Rabigh 75 2 
19 SAVOLA Group 40.1 4 
20 Alinma 30.7 3 
Source: Tadawul, major shareholders information on November 19, 2012. 
The combined market value of the top 20 listed companies on the Saudi stock exchange 
is worth 960 billion (SR),339 which represents 75% of total market capitalization.340 Furthermore, 
major block holdings are under the control of a small number of investors (see Table 11). For 
instance, two major shareholders control 75% of the largest listed company, SAPIC (a giant 
petrochemicals conglomerate), while 95% of the Kingdom Company (a multi-investment 
339 Source: Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul), Annual Statistical Report (2011): Market Capitalization as on 
12/31/2011. 
340 Market capitalization at the end of 2011 is 1, 270, 842, 630 billion (SR) which is equal to $ 338, 891, 
368. 
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holding company that, for example, holds 45% of the Four Seasons Hotels together with the 
Cascade Company of Bill Gates) shares are controlled by one investor, Alwaleed bin Talal al-
Saud.341 
 
Table 14. Number of Major Shareholders in Saudi Listed Companies 
Major Shareholders Companies 
One 28 
Two 37 
Three 32 
Four 26 
Five 7 
Six 5 
Seven 4 
Source: Al-Joman Center for Economic Consultations, February 29, 2012. 
Major shareholders’ ownership is worth 800 billion (SR), which denotes over 60% of 
market capitalization of these companies. In fact, 85% (679 billion SR) of total major 
shareholding blocks are controlled by institutions: business organizations, government 
institutions, and semi-government institutions.342 Public investment Funds (PIF) hold the largest 
number of shares among institutions with 43% of institutional investor ownership and is 
followed by the General Organization of Social Insurance (GOSI) with 13% of the institutional 
investors’ share of the capital market. 
341 Major shareholders’ information on the Saudi Securities Exchange (Tadawul) website, May 30, 2012 
and the Kingdom Company homepage, http://www.kingdom.com.sa/investments/hotels/management-
companies/four-seasons-hotels-and-resorts (accessed on Jan. 22, 2014). 
342 There are over 2000 institutions that are investing in the Saudi capital market. However, merely 200 
institutions have major shareholdings. See Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul), Annual Statistical Report (2011): 
Market Capitalization as of 12/31/2011. Page 30 and Classification of Disclosed Ownership in Saudi Capital Market 
on October 31, 2012, by Al-Joman Center for Economic Consultation (Nov. 13, 2012). 
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 Table 15. Institutional Major Holding Distribution in the Saudi Capital Market 
Institution Market Capitalization Percentage % 
Public Investment fund (PIF) 288,942,600 43 
General Organization of Social Insurance 90,785,580 13 
Saudi Government 40,245,130 6 
SABIC 39,451,500 6 
Public Pension Agency 27,283,960 4 
Other Institutions 191,343,066 28 
Total 678,051,836 100 
Source: Al-Joman Center for Economic Consultations, September 30, 2012. 
While there are four million individuals with investments in the capital market, few of them (79 
persons) have major shareholdings.343 Ownership by the major individual investors represents 
15% of the total major shareholdings.344 
This chapter’s examination of the structure of ownership in the Saudi capital market 
confirms that the Saudi pattern of ownership is still enormously concentrated. Such systems 
commonly encounter a principal (majority shareholders) - principal (minority shareholders) 
agency problem.345 In order to encourage increased diversity of ownership, the Saudi corporate 
governance system needs to devote special attention to addressing the protection of minority 
shareholders in Saudi listed companies. Systems with good protection of investors such as the 
U.S. system have more diversified investment and less investment risks accordingly. 
343 Abridged Presentation and Analysis of Individuals’ Disclosed Ownership in Saudi Listed Companies, 
August 16, 2012, by Al-Joman Center of Economic Consultations. 
344 Classification of Disclosed Ownership in the Saudi Capital Market, October 31, 2012, by Al-Joman 
Center for Economic Consultation (Nov. 13, 2012). 
345 See chapter IV. 
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6.6 SAUDI JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
6.6.1 Introduction 
The existence of an effective judicial system represents a key prerequisite for corporate 
governance.346 A judicial system that supports good corporate governance standards needs to be 
dependable and to move rapidly in handling cases.347 Within the system, judges should have 
proper training to confront the complex issues of corporate governance.348 The judges’ ability to 
further the ideology of corporate governance is connected to the “remedies” available under a 
national system.349 Judges in common law countries have insightfully expanded the cause of 
good corporate governance by “filling gaps” in their legal systems.350 For instance, fiduciary 
duties represent a notable example of the judiciary's contribution to corporate governance 
standards.351 
Conversely, such positive contributions are not expected from developing countries, 
where the judiciary is typically made up of less capable judges.352 Judges in developing countries 
346 See Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets, 48 
UCLA L. REV. 781, 789–91 (2000–2001). 
347 See id. at 781, 790 and 807. 
348 See Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 HARV. L. REV. 
1911, 1926 (1995–1996). 
349 See id. 
350 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Privatization and Corporate Governance: The Lessons from Securities 
Market Failure, 25 J. CORP. L. 1, 27 (1999–2000), and Bernard Black, The Principal Fiduciary Duties of Board of 
Directors, Presentation at Third Asian Roundtable on Corporate Governance 1 (Singapore Apr. 4, 2001), available 
at http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/1872746.pdf (accessed Nov. 27, 2013). 
351 See generally Black, supra note 350. 
352 This is more expected from countries with civil law tradition. Civil law system does not provide judges 
with a room to expand the statutory provisions as of their common law counterpart. See Coffee, supra note 350 (“the 
civil law judge may not have the same authority or the same expansive understanding of the judicial role. To the 
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are only equipped to deal with basic corporate governance issues. Accordingly, corporate 
governance principles in developed countries should be well crafted in order to facilitate their 
understanding and implementation. In relation to this issue, Professor Bernard Black said: 
“[E]nforcement will be easier if the court can often resolve disputes by applying bright-line rules 
rather than broad standards.”353 
6.6.2 The Efficiency of the Saudi Judicial System 
The Saudi legal system, as in most developing counties, suffers from a weak judicial system. 
Although analyzing the causes of this state of affairs is beyond of the scope of this study, it is 
crucial to highlight several factors that contribute to the issue, assessing their effects on the Saudi 
corporate governance system. 
6.6.2.1 The Judicial Process and Enforcement 
Judicial proceedings are very slow in Saudi Arabia; it may take years for the court to issue a 
judgment, putting an end to a particular dispute.354 The percentage of judges in Saudi Arabia is 
one of the lowest percentages in the world (see Table 1). 
 
extent that the civil law distrusts judicial activism or views it as a usurpation of the legislature's role, the civil law 
judge is confined to the narrower role of interpreting what comprehensive civil codes have actually specified. Thus, 
at least at the margin, the common law encourages gap-filling, while the civil law tends to impede it.”). Id. 
353 See Black & Kraakman, supra note 349, at 1911, 1926–27. 
354 RIYADH ECONOMIC FORUM, FOURTH SESSION, ALANDIMA ALTIJARIAH WA MUTATLABAT ALTANMIYAH 144 (2009) 
[hereinafter RIYADH ECONOMIC FORUM]. See also See Fahad Mohammad Almajid, A Conceptual Framework for 
Reforming the Corporate Governance of Saudi Publicly Held Companies: A Comparative and Analytical Study 
from a Legal Perspective (Ph.D.) 242 (2008) (unpublished dissertation University of Manchester). 
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Table 16. Number of Judges in Selected Countries 
Country Number of Judges 
(per 100 K inhabitances) 
Saudi Arabia 4.0 
Italy 10.2 
U.S.A. 10.81 
France 12.47 
Switzerland 14.1 
Portugal 18 
Germany 24.5 
Source: CEPEJ 2010 Report, Study on 16 Comparable Countries by Jean-Paul Jean and CEPEJ Expert (28 November 
2010); J. Mark Ramseyer and Eric Rasmusen, Comparative Litigation Rates, Discussion Paper No. 681. Harvard Law 
School; Riyadh Economic Forum, first session, Albuniyah altashriah wa alqdaiyah fi almamlakah alarabia alsaudiah 
268 (2005). 
The insufficient number of judges in the Saudi judicial system represents a key factor 
slowing down the dispute resolution process. At present, the Saudi judicial system would need 
more than five thousand judges in order to conform to best practice standards.355 The shortage of 
judges is not related to financial considerations; Saudi judges are compensated adequately.356 
This shortage is related to the appointment process which has been selective and confined to 
groups or families that have a reputation for integrity.357 More importantly, many top Islamic law 
schools graduates refuse to accept judicial posts to avoid the perceived danger of punishment 
from God,358 as the Prophet Mohammad informed: 
There are three types of judges: Two judges who are in the Fire, and a judge who 
is in Paradise. A man who judges without the truth, and knows that- this one is in 
355 See RIYADH ECONOMIC FORUM, THIRD ANNUAL PERIOD, ALBIYAH ALADLIYAH WA MUTATALABAT 
ALTANMIYH 75 (2007). 
356 For judges salaries see the Saudi Ministry of Civil Service webpage, 
http://www.mcs.gov.sa/EmploymentRights/Pages/SalariesLadders.aspx# (accessed Nov. 29, 2013). 
357 This process unfortunately produced a bias in the selection process that excluded many qualified non 
Najidi (person from Najid region) persons from the judiciary. Recently, the selection process of judges has become 
less biased and includes person from regions and families that were excluded in the past. For more on the Najdi's 
dominance in jobs and positions connected to religion, see Mohmmad Nablil Mouline, Ulma alislam, 277 and after 
(2011). 
358 See the former Saudi Minister of Justice, Abdullah al-Shaik, press release in Al-Jazeerah newspaper 
issue No. 12577 dated 16 Safar 1428. 
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the Fire. One who judges while not knowing ruins the rights of the people. So he 
is in the Fire. A judge who judges with the truth, that is the one in Paradise.359 
 Exacerbating the problem, any enforcement of a regulation or decision requires 
pursuing justice through a lengthy and inefficient process.360 Moreover, the enforcement process 
is not always completed, nor is it always successful in its efforts. 
 
Table 17. Two Enforcement Indicators for Selected Countries (2014) 
Country Contract 
Enforcement 
Ranking (world) 
Time of Enforcement 
(days) 
Korea (Rep) 2 230 
Germany 5 394 
France 7 395 
U.S.A. 11 370 
Singapore 12 150 
Malaysia 30 425 
Japan 36 360 
Mexico 71 400 
Saudi Arabia 127 635 
Nigeria 136 447 
Source: Doing Business 2014, the World Bank (2013). 
6.6.2.2 Judges’ Qualifications 
The secondly problem of the Saudi judicial system is that judges do not receive the proper 
education and training they will need to resolve complex legal issues.361 Generally speaking, 
judges in Saudi Arabia are trained in Islamic law having made no study of modern legal subjects, 
359 Reported by Tirmithi. However, those groups forgot the more reliable tradition of the Prophet which 
states: “When a judge utilizes his skill of judgment and comes to a right decision, he will have a double reward, but 
when he uses his judgment and commits a mistake, he will have a single reward.” Reported by Al-Bukhari and 
Muslim. 
360 See generally RIYADH ECONOMIC FORUM, supra note 354, at 87–91. 
361 They are trained to deal with Islamic law issues but not statutory based issues. See generally Riyadh 
Economic Forum, third annual session, Albiyah aladliyah wa mutatalabat altanmiyh, 114–17 (2007). 
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such civil procedure and statutory law.362 The curriculum in Islamic law schools consists 
exclusively of teaching classic Islamic treatises, authored several centuries ago.363 Such training 
is rigorous, but without a doubt, it is not sufficient to fulfill modern judiciary functions, for 
which judges are expected to follow and interpret a great number of statutes. Accordingly, judges 
must receive sufficient training in both Islamic and statutory based law in order to be effective in 
the modern Saudi judicial system. 
6.6.2.3 Judicial System Segmentation 
The Saudi judiciary is dispersed between its traditional court system and a variety of semi-
judicial tribunals. This problem has its roots in the controversy that arose in the 1930s over the 
government's adoption of modern legislation, and codification.364 Religious scholars, the ulama, 
who have an absolute control over judicial branch, had strongly opposed all proposals for 
codifying Islamic jurisprudence.365 Ayoub Al-Jarbou ascribes the rejection of codification to the 
judges' desire to conserve their wide discretionary power over the judicial process and to the 
ulama's interest in maintaining their power in the society.366 That might be an accurate 
description of a number of ulama especially ones with high government positions. However, for 
362 See RIYADH ECONOMIC FORUM, supra note 354, at 115. 
363 See Ayoub M. Al-Jarbou, The Role of Traditionalists and Modernists in the Development of the Saudi 
Legal System, 21 ARAB LAW Q. 191, 212–13 (2007). 
364 See generally id. at 191, 200–01 (“[C]odifying Shariah simply means that there are different valid 
opinions on certain issues, and the authority chooses one of them to be binding among people and in courts.”). Id. at 
195–96. For a comprehensive study of codification and Islamic rules, see ABDURRAHMAN A. AL-KASEM, ALISLAM 
WA TAQNEIN ALAHKAM (2d ed. 1977). 
365 See Al-Jarbou, supra note 363, at 191, 201. See also See Fahad Mohammad Almajid, A Conceptual 
Framework for Reforming the Corporate Governance of Saudi Publicly Held Companies: A Comparative and 
Analytical Study from a Legal Perspective (Ph.D.) 164 (2008) (unpublished dissertation University of Manchester). 
366 Id. at 191, 197. 
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the majority of ulama, codification has a historical negative connotation because “[f]rom French 
Algeria to British India to Indonesia, codification of Shariah[sic] law was central to the colonial 
project to control the legal sphere and enable economic exploitation of colonies.”367 
In contrast, proponents of codification argue that the Saudi Arabian judicial system grants 
judges the wide authority to select rules from various Islamic sources.368 Such a system is not 
predictable, in many cases producing contradictory verdicts.369 For instance, “[i]n 2006, a judge 
sentenced four men to between six to twelve years’ imprisonment each for sexually harassing 
women ... , while the same year three men convicted of raping a twelve-year-old boy received 
sentences of between one and two years in prison each and 300 lashes.”370 
In the end, the ulama influence has halted the implementation of Islamic codified laws in 
Saudi Arabia. At the same time, however, the Saudi government has launched a western style 
legislative scheme to regulate numerous social and economic activities.371 In this context, 
George Sfeir said: 
Saudi Arabia’s approach to law reform has been cautious and piecemeal, the 
product of conflicting priorities. On the one hand there is the oil revenue fueled 
367 ANDREW HAMMOND, THE ISLAMIC UTOPIA: THE ILLUSION OF REFORM IN SAUDI ARABIA 56 (2012). 
368 Al-Jarbou, supra note 363, at 191, 199. 
369 See id. at 191, 196. 
370 HAMMOND, supra note 367, at 140. 
371 See Maren Hanson, The Influence of French Law on the Legal Development of Saudi Arabia, 2 ARAB 
L.Q. 272, 288–90 (1987), and Al-Jarbou, supra note 363, at 191, 201 (“regardless of the attitude of ... [the Ulma] 
towards these laws, and their interest in applying Shariah, which exists in the jurisprudence books to all aspect of 
life, many laws have been enacted in criminal, administrative, and commercial areas of the legal system. These laws 
correspond to the comprehensive development plans that the country is going to go through.”). Id. See also Fahad 
Mohammad Almajid, A Conceptual Framework for Reforming the Corporate Governance of Saudi Publicly Held 
Companies: A Comparative and Analytical Study from a Legal Perspective (Ph.D.) 232 (2008) (unpublished 
dissertation University of Manchester). 
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drive for modernization and development, and, on the other, the perceived need to 
preserve traditional social values and religious mores.372 
The problem is that many provisions of adopted statutes contradict Islamic law373 which, 
in turn, has inflamed the ulama and strengthened their disinclination toward legal modernization. 
The Saudi government has overcome the issue of judges' reluctance to recognize enacted 
statutes by creating an informal judicial system, alongside the original judiciary.374 The new 
system comprises a number of specialized semi-judicial tribunals (administrative committees) 
that are exclusively entrusted with solving disputes that falls within the scope of a specific 
statute.375 The semi-judicial tribunals’ practice falls quite short of judicial best practices, in areas 
such as independence, transparency, and professionalism.376 
6.6.2.4 Transparency 
The Saudi Judicial System is not transparent. For instance, the courts and semi-judicial tribunals’ 
decisions are not published or available to the public, or even to lawyers.377 Such obscurity 
372 GEORGE N. SFEIR, MODERNIZATION OF THE LAW IN ARAB STATES: AN INVESTIGATION INTO CURRENT 
CIVIL CRIMINAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE ARAB WORLD 45 (1998). 
373 See Al-Jarbou, supra note 363, at 191, 203. 
374 See id. at 191, 202. See also Fahad Mohammad Almajid, A Conceptual Framework for Reforming the 
Corporate Governance of Saudi Publicly Held Companies: A Comparative and Analytical Study from a Legal 
Perspective (Ph.D.) 164 (2008) (unpublished dissertation University of Manchester). 
375 See generally RIYADH ECONOMIC FORUM, supra note 354, at 72–73 & 78, 84–85. 
376 For instance, the committees’ members are mostly public servants working for the same ministry or 
government agency that in charge of enforcing the relevant statute. All commissioners serve in part time basis with 
minimal compensation for that extra work they deliver. No requirement to have training in law to be a member of 
such committees. The committees are not governed by binding civil procedures code and the verdicts are not 
published or available for public. See RIYADH ECONOMIC FORUM, supra note 354, at 72-73 & 78, 84-85. See also 
Fahad Mohammad Almajid, A Conceptual Framework for Reforming the Corporate Governance of Saudi Publicly 
Held Companies: A Comparative and Analytical Study from a Legal Perspective (Ph.D.) 166 (2008) (unpublished 
dissertation University of Manchester). 
377 See the Bureau of Experts Report No. 127 in (10 Rabi al-Awal 1422 H) corresponding to June 2, 2001. 
See also See Fahad Mohammad Almajid, A Conceptual Framework for Reforming the Corporate Governance of 
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hinders public supervision of the judicial process and prevents lawyers from predicting judicial 
policy towards a specific legal issue. The publishing of decisions plays a crucial role in 
understanding and improving the legal system.378 For instance, a decision to reform a specific 
area of the law would not be complete without the judge being informed about judicial 
implementation of relevant statutes. Compounding the problem, the absence of classification of 
court decisions deprive judges the opportunity to benefit from earlier decisions that were issued 
in similar disputes. This lack of access encourages inconsistency in judicial practice. 
6.6.2.5 Law Profession 
Lawyers play a minimal role in enhancing the Saudi justice system. This fact may be related to 
the underdevelopment in terms of organization of the Saudi legal profession country. For 
instance, there is no lawyers' association that organizes, supervises, and works to improve the 
legal profession.379 Currently, in part the Ministry of Justice fills this void by administering 
operations such as the licensing and disciplining of lawyers.380 Qualifications for practicing law 
in Saudi Arabia are very basic and easy to satisfy. For example, no qualifying or licensure exam 
is required; a few years of experience suffice.381 Furthermore, the practice of law is not confined 
Saudi Publicly Held Companies: A Comparative and Analytical Study from a Legal Perspective (Ph.D.) 162 (2008) 
(unpublished dissertation University of Manchester). 
378 See Aleqtisadiah News Paper issue No. 4913 in March 25, 2007, available at 
http://www.aleqt.com/2007/03/25/article_83914.save (accessed Nov. 22, 2013). 
379 See RIYADH ECONOMIC FORUM, supra note 354, at 80. 
380 See Articles §§ (7, 29, 30, 31) and of Law Profession Law enacted by Royal Decree M/ 38, 28 Rajab 
1422H corresponding to October 15, 2001. 
381 See Article § (3) of Law Profession Law enacted by Royal Decree M/ 38, 28 Rajab 1422H 
corresponding to October 15, 2001. 
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to licensed lawyers; any person with power of attorney may serve in the capacity of a lawyer.382 
Such non-trained "lawyers" tarnish the reputation of the legal profession and diminish its respect 
in the courts.383 For instance, judges may hunt for any excuse to expel lawyers from the court 
room. 
6.6.3 Does the Saudi Judicial system support Corporate Governance effectively? 
The forgoing analysis illustrates several issues in the Saudi judicial system, which suggest that 
such a system cannot be expected to play a supportive role in the ideology of corporate 
governance. In the area of corporate governance, effective enforcement requires a judicial system 
that responds swiftly to violations of rules and regulations in corporate governance and 
effectively redresses prejudiced stakeholders. Effective redresses require a creative, capable 
judiciary that is able to fill gaps in the national system of governance. The 'old fashioned' 
training of Saudi judges undermines their ability to adjudicate efficiently the complex corporate 
governance issues they encounter.384 
In the last ten years, the government has issued a number of decisions in an attempt to 
reform the Saudi judicial system.385 Accession of Saudi Arabia to the WTO in 2005 presses the 
382 See Article § (18) of Law Profession Law enacted by Royal Decree M/ 38, 28 Rajab 1422H 
corresponding to October 15, 2001. 
383 See RIYADH ECONOMIC FORUM, supra note 354, at 80. 
384 See Fahad Mohammad Almajid, A Conceptual Framework for Reforming the Corporate Governance of 
Saudi Publicly Held Companies: A Comparative and Analytical Study from a Legal Perspective (Ph.D.) 167-168 
(2008) (unpublished dissertation University of Manchester) (he argues for improving judges qualifications to meet 
the modern challenges.”) Id  
385 See Royal Order A/ 14 (23 Safar in 1426 H), corresponding to April 2, 2005, in re of organization of the 
Saudi judicial system. 
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Saudi government to pursue “legal and judicial reforms.”386 These reforms have the intent of 
abolishing the semi-judicial tribunals currently operating in the country, allocating their 
functions to the traditional judicial system.387 Moreover, an appellate level of adjudication has 
been created whereby Saudi court system for the first time has become a three tier judicial 
system.388 
A series of specialized courts, which include first instance commercial courts and 
commercial appellate circuits, constitute the new court structure.389 The creation of a specialized 
commercial court represents a pivotal step in the right path which confirms with other civil law 
countries reform agenda.390 Professor John Coffee commented on this trend by saying: “[t]he 
inflexibility of civil law courts has already led to the creation of specialized courts in some civil 
law countries, which specialized courts have exclusive jurisdiction over some subject 
matters.”391 
The reform, also, had required courts to publish their decisions on a regular basis.392 
Furthermore, the government has issued a new law regulating the enforcement of judicial 
decisions.393 The new framework of enforcement is expected to lead to development of 
386 HAMMOND, supra note 367, at 57. 
387 See Section 9 of the Implementation Mechanism for Judicial and Board of Grievances Laws Royal 
Decree M/ 78 (19 Ramadan in 1428 H) corresponding to October 1, 2007. 
388 See Article § (16) of the Judicial Law issued by Royal Decree M/ 78 (19 Ramadan in 1428 H) 
corresponding to October 1, 2007. For more information about Saudi judicial system see chapter (II). 
389 See Article §§ (9 and 16) of the Judicial Law issued by Royal Decree M/78 (19 Ramadan in 1428 H). 
390 See Coffee, supra note 305, at 1, 29–30. 
391 Id. at 1, 29 [footnote omitted]. 
392 See Article § (71) Paragraph (3) of the Judicial Law issued by Royal Decree M/78 (19 Ramadan in 1428 
H) corresponding to October 1, 2007 and Article § (21) of The Board of Grievances Law issued by royal decree No. 
(M/78) (19 Ramadan in 1428 H) corresponding to October 1, 2007. 
393 See Enforcement Law issued by Royal Decree M/ 53 (13 Shaban in 1433 H) corresponding to July 3, 
2012 
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enforcement mechanisms in the country. Furthermore, the new reform recognizes the importance 
of the codification of Islamic jurisprudence, for which a high level committee has been created to 
undertake this mission.394 
Implementing the aforementioned reforms is expected to improve the Saudi judicial 
system. However, the attainment of full implementation of the reform agenda is a more complex 
and challenging task than it might seem, given that several religious problems have not been 
solved yet with the Ulama.395 For instance, judges of the new commercial courts will continue to 
refuse to recognize statutes that contradict Islamic teachings.396 In this juncture, Ayoub Al-
Jarbou said: 
The difference between the Shariah Courts’ attitude toward enacted laws and their 
attitude toward unlawful ... [provisions included in these laws] is that their 
attitude towards the former might one day change and agree to judge cases and 
controversies according to them if these laws comply with Shariah, whereas their 
attitude toward the latter will remain the same, i.e. the refusal to entertain them.397 
To avoid this problem, the new reform has maintained a number of semi-judicial 
tribunals that are related to the most problematic statutes, particularly banking, securities, and 
customs.398 However, disputes in the settlement of less problematic statutes, such as company 
law, are assigned to the new commercial courts.399 The problem is that the new commercial 
394 See Royal Order A/ 14 (23 Safar in 1426 H), corresponding to April 2, 2005, in re of organization of the 
Saudi judicial system. 
395 A former Saudi judge, Abdulaziz al-Gasim, views the judicial reform as an opportunity for “cleansing 
the judiciary of the conservatism that has dominated up to now,” quoted HAMMOND, supra note 367, at 142. 
396 The rejection of codification sentiments among Islamic scholars has decreased recently or at least 
moved from the rejection of codification per se to the rejection of provisions that contradict Islamic law. 
397 Al-Jarbou, supra note 363, at 191, 205. 
398 See Section 3.1 of the Implementation Mechanism for Judicial and Board of Grievances laws Royal 
Decree M/ 78 (19 Ramadan in 1428 H) corresponding to October 1, 2007. 
399 See Article § (35) of the Law of Procedures before Sharaih Courts Procedures issued by Royal Decree 
M/ 1 (22 Muharram in 1435 H) corresponding to November 25, 2013. 
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courts will refuse to recognize interest-based contracts, including bonds and other forms of debt 
finance. Insurance contract legality under Islamic law is still a controversial issue, which may 
hinder the enforceability of such contracts depending on which judges adjudicate cases relating 
to them. Likewise, recognition of the limited liability of shareholders is still controversial among 
Islamic scholars because under the view of a number Islamic scholars that each person is fully 
responsible to pay his own debts.400 The enforcement of shareholders’ rights in companies with 
objectives that contradict Islamic law is not guaranteed.401 Furthermore, there is no enforcement 
of the rights associated with preferred stocks that confer priority over profits or assets upon 
liquidation.402 
In short, the Saudi judicial system faces several issues, including those that involve 
ideological and theological controversies over the substance of reform. A large number of ulama 
still “views the reforms with suspicion.”403 Such issues are more than likely to have negative 
effects on the judicial system and to undermine its function for the next few years. The recent 
reforms considered here will improve the judicial system, but probably not to a level that will 
enable the Saudi judicial system to offer an efficient external mechanism of enforcing corporate 
governance. 
400 See supra chapter V. 
401 See supra chapter V. 
402 See supra chapter V. 
403 HAMMOND, supra note 367, at 139. 
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6.7 CONCLUSION 
The creation of a capital market authority and official securities exchange, Tadawul, in 2004 
represents a pivotal step toward improving the regulatory environment for publicly held 
companies in the country. The Capital Market Authority has supplemented the Companies Law 
of 1965 with a set of regulations aimed at improving corporate governance directly and 
indirectly, through such measures as enacting the Listing Rules Regulation and the Corporate 
Governance Rules. 
Ownership in the Saudi capital market is concentrated; families, semi-government and 
government funds control most of the publicly traded companies. Consequently, the agency cost 
problem in most Saudi companies is between controlling shareholder(s) and minority 
shareholders. Such an agency problem raises concerns over the protection of minority 
shareholders in Saudi Arabia. 
The disclosure rules currently operating in Saudi Arabia comply with most 
internationally recognized best practice standards. The CMA is still not able to decrease insider 
trading and other conflict of interest transactions to an expected level. The disclosure system has 
failed to observe the importance of disclosing information related to the government as a unique 
investor in the Saudi capital market. The government, as a shareholder, should disclosure its 
purpose of ownership in each publicly traded company. Investors need to know whether any 
government investment is for political or for purely business reasons. Moreover, the disclosure 
system has not taken into account the importance of disclosing financial information that 
potentially has religious implications for investors. Saudi investors need to know if the company 
is engaging in any activity that contradicts Islamic principles. 
260 
Given its current structure, the Saudi Judiciary cannot be expected to support the cause of 
corporate governance. The judicial system in Saudi Arabia is underdeveloped and defused 
among a system of formal (religiously based) courts and informal semi-judicial tribunals 
(shadow justice system).404 The slow adjudication process is neither transparent nor consistent. 
Recently, major steps toward reform have been taken to improve the Judiciary. However, 
improving the judicial system, if successful, will be a complex process and will require a lot of 
time. 
 
404 See Fahad Mohammad Almajid, A Conceptual Framework for Reforming the Corporate Governance of 
Saudi Publicly Held Companies: A Comparative and Analytical Study from a Legal Perspective (Ph.D.)  (2008) 
(unpublished dissertation University of Manchester) ( he noted: “one of the fundental problems cuaseing confusing 
for invesotrs and businesses, domestic or foreign, as well as instability in the system is related to the duality in the 
judiciary.”) id  
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7.0  INTERNAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN SAUDI PUBLICLY TRADED 
COMPANIES: BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
In theory, shareholders are expected to govern the company’s affairs and oversee the 
performance of the company’s management. However, the enormous size of the group of 
shareholders makes this expectation impractical due to collective decision-making problems. To 
overcome this hurdle, an intermediary (between the shareholders and management) institution 
has been crafted: the board of directors, who govern the company in lieu of the shareholders.1 
Nonetheless, shareholders retain a few fundamental powers beyond the board of director’s 
authority.2 
The legal literature concerning corporations reflects a division among scholars over the 
nature of the board of directors. One group of scholars views the board as a subordinate body, 
comprised of agents of the company (or the shareholders’ General Meeting “GM”), 1383F3 while other 
scholars categorize the board as an independent organ of the company, which represents the 
1 See chapter IV. 
2 See chapter VIII. 
3 THARWAT ABDELRAHEIM, AL-GANOUN AL-TIJARI AL-MASRI 432 (1982); ALI HASSAN YOUNES, AL-
SHAREIKAT AL-TIJARIAH 274–75 (1956); the Legal Memo of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry No. 11/556 in 
18/7/1400 [on file with the author]. 
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company’s will and acts on its behalf.4 The premise of these views is noticeable in scholarly 
discussion of the legal framework of boards of directors in joint stock companies, including the 
board’s nature, powers, duties, as well as the liability of its members. 
The board of directors is the cornerstone mechanism of internal corporate governance. In 
systems with weak external corporate governance mechanisms, such as the Saudi system, the 
board of directors is expected to play a crucial role in protecting the best interests of the 
company and its shareholders. This chapter is devoted to evaluating the structure of boards of 
directors in Saudi publicly held companies. This evaluation is conducted in light of OECD 
recommendations and comparative corporate governance, primarily in relation to the U.S. and 
French systems. The main goal of this chapter is to spur efforts to reform the governance of 
boards by directors in order further to improve the overall mechanisms of internal corporate 
governance in Saudi Arabia. A number of topics related to the board of directors are covered in 
this chapter, including its structure, functions, formation, duties, and remunerations. 
7.2 BOARD STRUCTURE 
Comparative corporate governance indicates that boards of publicly held companies may be 
single- or two-tiered board. No best practice preference is given to one board structure over the 
other. For instance, the OECD Principles recognizes both the single-tiered and two-tiered board 
4 See MUSTAFA KAMAL TAHA, AL-SHAREIKAT AL-TIJARIAH 240 (1997). 
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structures.5 Both board structures are expected to fulfill the same functions, namely the 
management and supervision of company affairs. However, the two-tiered board separates the 
supervisory role of the board from its managerial role,6 while the single-tiered, or unitary, board 
vests both functions in one body.7 
The contemporary incorporation of independent directors into a one-tiered board, in fact, 
has brought the practice of the one-tiered board closer to that of the two-tiered board.8 For 
instance, independent directors are expected to play a supervisory role over their colleagues who 
are executive directors, in the same manner by which a supervisory board exerts formal oversight 
on a management board. 
As in the U.S. system, the board of directors for Saudi listed companies consists of a 
single-tiered body.9 In contrast, the French corporate governance system provides publicly 
traded companies with the option to select either the single- or two-tiered model.10 In practice, 
the single-tiered board model is more popular among French publicly held companies.11 
5 No matter which board structure adopted, the “[t]he [OECD] Principles are intended to be sufficiently 
general to apply to whatever board structure is charged with the functions of governing the enterprise and 
monitoring management.” OECD Principles, at 58. 
6 For the structure of the two-tiered board see the French Commercial Code [hereinafter FCC] articles §§ (L 
225-57 – L225-90-1). The English version of FCC, which is the only version consulted in this study, is lastly 
updated on March 20, 2006. The FCC in English is available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/Traductions/en-
English/Legifrance-translations (accessed on Nov. 8, 2013). 
7 For the structure of the single-tiered board see the French Commercial Code [hereinafter FCC] articles 
§§ (L 225-17 – L225-42-1). 
8 See ADRIAN CADBURY, THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CHAIRMANSHIP: A PERSONAL VIEW 71 
(2002). 
9 See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.03(a); and C.L. Article § (80). 
10 See French Commercial Code (FCC) Articles §§ (L225-17) and (L225-57-59). Also see AFEB-MEDEF, 
Corporate Governance Code of Listed Corporations, Principle 3.1. (2013). 
11 CHRISTINE A. MALLIN, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 225 (2010). 
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Conversely, a number of countries such Germany, Indonesia and China require a two-tiered 
board structure.12 
Adopting a two-tiered board system is not a part of the current corporate governance 
reform agenda in Saudi Arabia.13 This could be due to the absence of labor unions in the country, 
organizations that might advocate shifting the existing one-tiered structure of the board to a two-
tiered structure, a system which is better equipped to facilitate labor integration in governance.14 
For instance, trade unions in post World War II Germany played a significant role in readopting 
the codetermination model of the board of directors in that country.15 
The proliferation of co-determination in systems with mandatory two-tiered boards does 
not exclude this functionality of board structure in systems with no co-determination agenda.16 
The two-tiered board originally was devised in the seventeenth century as a means of enhancing 
the control system in the company.17 Moreover, a two-tiered board is not a perquisite for having 
a co-determinate board; co-determination can be implemented in both single-tiered and two-
12 See MARTIN SCHULZ & OLIVER WASMEIER, THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: A CONCISE 
OVERVIEW OF GERMAN CORPORATE LAW 41 (2012); THE INSTITUTE OF DIRECTORS, THE HAND BOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A DEFINITIVE GUIDE 468–70 (2005); and GU MINKANG, 
UNDERSTANDING CHINESE COMPANY LAW 181–83 (2006). 
13 See Fahad Mohammad Almajid, A Conceptual Framework for Reforming the Corporate Governance of 
Saudi Publicly Held Companies: A Comparative and Analytical Study from a Legal Perspective 193 (Ph.D.) (2008) 
(unpublished dissertation University of Manchester). The only proposal for adopting the two-tiered board structure 
in Saudi Arabia was suggested by Mohammad al-Jabor. See Mohammad al-Jabor, Musahama fi dirasht tashga’a 
kiyam sharikat musahamah fi almamlakah, vol. 6, JOURNAL OF THE COLLEGE OF ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCES IN 
RIYADH UNIVERSITY 105, 109–10 (1978). 
14 See CADBURY, supra note 8, at 72. 
15 For the role of the trade union in the adoption the codetermination in Germany, see generally Oscar 
Weigert, Co-determination in Western Germany, 73 Monthly: The Provisions of the Law on Labor Participation in 
Management in the Steel and Mining Industries and the Inherent and Prospects, LAB. REV. 649, 649–51 (1951). 
16 See ADRIAN CADBURY, THE COMPANY CHAIRMAN 65 (1990). 
17 Id. at 46. That does not mean a single-tiered board cannot realize that the French governance system has 
a codetermination in a single-tiered board. See French Commercial Code (FCC) Article § (L225-22). 
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tiered boards, both of which exist in the French corporate governance system.18 The Netherlands 
has a two-tiered board system with no (formal) participation by workers on either board.19 
Nonetheless, the formal division of a board’s managerial and supervisory functions is the 
real advantage of a two-tiered board over a one-tiered board.20 Such formal division permits the 
board members at each level to focus on a specific mandate and to facilitate the allocation of 
liabilities. As Sir Adrian Cadbury remarks, “directors of supervisory and of management boards 
know precisely what their duties are and do not have to remember which of the two hats they are 
wearing.”21 Otherwise, the collegial nature of a one-tiered board may “blur” the process of 
allocating mandates.22 
The British system has addressed this issue by suggesting that independent directors hold 
regular meetings in the absence of the executive directors.23 Good supervision requires an open 
discussion among the supervisors (independent directors) without the supervised (the executive 
members) being present. 
Accordingly, Saudi policy makers should consider the incorporation of the two-tiered 
board structure into the Saudi corporate governance system. However, the two-tiered board 
structure should not be imposed mandatorily as Mohammad al-Jabor had insisted on in the 
1970s.24 The adoption of an elective two-tiered board, such as French system has, may offer 
Saudi companies more options for governance. For instance, a two-tiered board structure may 
18 See French Commercial Code (FCC) Article § (L225-27). 
19 See CADBURY, supra note 16, at 66. 
20 See id. at 64. 
21 See id. at 66. 
22 See id. 
23 See MALLIN, supra note 11, at 168. 
24 See al-Jabor, supra note 13, at 105, 109. 
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suit companies with major government holdings. Accordingly, public officials (with no business 
experience) who normally represent the government on the board may be better positioned as 
part of a supervisory board. 
7.3 DECISION MAKING FRAMEWORK 
The Saudi governance system suggests that the board of directors ought to organize regular 
meetings, without specifying a minimum number of such meetings.25 Empirical data gathered 
recently by the CMA has revealed that Saudi listed companies conducted 774 board meetings in 
2011, with an average of over five meetings per year for each board.26 By comparison, during 
the same period 58% of large U.S. companies held between 6-9 meetings per year.27 
The size of a corporation and the complexity of its business are the determining factors as 
to which role the board should play. In today’s business world, most boards of directors in 
publicly held companies insulate themselves from the daily management of the company, 
devoting their attention to strategic, supervisory and advisory matters.28 The U.S. system of 
corporate governance, for instance, observes this reality. To this end, the Model Business 
Corporate Act (MBCA) provides that, “[a]ll corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the 
authority of directors of the corporation, and the business and affairs of the corporation shall be 
25 SCGRs Article § (16) paragraph (1) and see C.L. Article § (80). 
26 The Saudi Capital Market Authority (CMA), the Annual Statistical Report on Corporate Governance of 
the listed companies (2011/2012) [on file with the author]. 
27 Spencer Stuart Boards Index, 26 (2013). 
28 See generally STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 44–50 
(2012). 
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managed by or under the direction, and subject to the oversight, of its board of directors.”29 
Based on this and similar statutory commands, a board of directors is the ultimate controller of 
the decision-making in a corporation.30 The nature of ownership may affect the extent of de facto 
powers that the board has, but statutes always reserve de jure (statutory) powers for the board.31 
Saudi corporate governance, however, does not observe the afore-mentioned shift with 
regard to the governance of large companies. For instance, Article (66) of the CL provides that, 
“the joint stock company shall be managed by a board of directors.”32 Furthermore, the CL lacks 
any provisions with regard to the role of executives in the company. Developed legal systems, 
such the U.S. and the French, recognize that the position of executives in the company, 
especially top executives, is a key source of agency cost problems.33 Accordingly, the CL needs 
to fill this regulatory vacuum by regulating the role of executives in the company’s governance. 
29 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b); Del. § 141(a); Cal. § 300(a). 
30 A good summary of the board functions by Professors Cox and Hazen is as follows: 
(1) setting the course of the enterprise by determining the company’s general objectives, goals, 
and philosophies; (2) selecting the chief executive and senior officers and seeing that able young 
executives are developed; (3) determining executive compensation, pension, and retirement 
policies; (4) delegating to the chief executive and subordinate executive authority for 
administrative action; (5) providing advice, counsel, and assistance to corporate officers; (6) fixing 
policies relating to such matters as pricing, labor relations, expansion, and new products; (7) 
determining the dividend payments financing, and capital changes; (8) monitoring the company’s 
progress, exercising vigilance for its welfare, and taking appropriate action in light of its progress; 
(9) submitting for shareholder action proposals requiring their approval; and (10) creating 
adequate machinery for conducting the board’s business. 
JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, CORPORATION 149–50 (2d ed. 2003). 
31 It is important to note that under corporate law the broad authority possessed by the board of directors is 
a default rule, able to be modified. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b); Del. § 141(a); Cal. § 300(a). Such limitations 
on board of directors’ power may occur either through amending the articles of incorporation or the bylaws. 
32 The C.L. Article § (66). 
33 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.42 and see Russian Law on Joint Stock Companies Article § (71). 
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The board of directors of Saudi publicly traded companies has “full powers in the 
administration of the company.”34 As in France and other civil law countries, the board may 
make any decision that falls within the company’s objectives.35 No approval from the 
shareholders’ GM is required, even if that decision is not in the ordinary course of business.36 
For instance, the board of a company with the objective of trading in real estate is not required to 
seek permission from the GM to sell real estate owned by the company because such a 
transaction falls within the objective of the company.37 Conversely, U.S. company law utilizes 
the ordinary course-of-business criteria to evaluate board actions.38 The wide scope of power 
granted to the Saudi board may decrease the power of shareholders and, accordingly, weaken 
checks and balances mechanisms within the company. The adoption of the U.S. model of 
ordinary and extraordinary criteria for board power may enhance the power of shareholders and 
enhance checks and balance in the Saudi companies. 
34 The C.L. Article § (73). The actions of the board of directors under the Saudi system are divided into 
actions of management and actions of disposable, which refer mainly to the transfer or pledge of the company’s 
assets. The board has full authority over the first kind of actions and has restricted power on the latter ones. See 
TAHA, supra note 4, at 268. Whenever an issue about the board of director’s power or liability arises, the trace of 
agency law is found in the answer of these issues. The board of director’s power is almost a copy of the agent 
obligations in Arab countries civil codes. See, e.g., the agency contract under the Egyptian Civil Code Articles 
§ (699-717). For instance, article describe the administrative (management) powers of the agent by saying: “[a]n 
agency which is mentioned in general wording, without particularization even of the type of the legal work for 
which the agency is granted, shall not vest the agent with a quality other than in acts of management.” the Egyptian 
Civil Code Article § (701) paragraph (1). Therefore, the act of administration are limited to the “preservation and 
maintenance works.” the Egyptian Civil Code Article § (701) paragraph (2). Conversely, the agent actions of 
disposable includes the action that is beyond the administrative actions scope which requires a special kind of 
authorization from the principal as the Egyptian Civil Code states: 
A special proxy shall be provided for every work that is not an act of management particularly for 
an act of sale, mortgage, donation, composition, declaration, and arbitration, putting an oath, and 
pleading before the courts. 
The Egyptian Civil Code Article § (702) paragraph (1). 
35 The C.L. article § (73). 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 See ARTHUR R. PINTO & DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE LAW 115 (2013). 
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Best practice asserts that the management of the company must be answerable to the 
board, given that the board will bear the ultimate responsibility for the company’s success or 
failure.39 This issue represents a high risk factor in Saudi publicly traded companies with 
significant government control, a potential problem that needs to be addressed by the Saudi 
corporate governance. 
7.4 THE ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVE ON BOARD DECISION MAKING 
The decision-making model of the boards of Saudi publicly traded companies conforms with 
decision-making structures adopted in various other countries. Shareholders of Saudi companies 
have sole access to the company decision-making process through appointing and removing 
directors, whereas no other stakeholders enjoy such privilege, most notably employees.40 
Furthermore, the boards’ decision making structure is based on the majority decision making 
model.41 
However, this decision-making structure disregards Islamic decision-making values, most 
importantly shura and consensus.42 Shuratic decision-making encourages the expansion of the 
decision making process to cover nearly all key elements connected to the decision. Accordingly, 
the Saudi corporate governance exclusion of key members of the production team in the 
39 See the OECD Guidelines, ch. (VI)A (“The boards of SOEs should be assigned a clear mandate and 
ultimate responsibility for the company’s performance. Each board should be fully accountable to the owners.”). 
40 See Fahad Mohammad Almajid, A Conceptual Framework for Reforming the Corporate Governance of 
Saudi Publicly Held Companies: A Comparative and Analytical Study from a Legal Perspective (Ph.D.) 251 (2008) 
(unpublished dissertation University of Manchester). 
41 C.L. Article § (80). 
42 For shura and consensus, see chapter (V). 
270 
                                                 
company undermines the value of shura. The formal incorporation of workers into the 
composition of the board of directors would bring board decision making closer to Islamic 
values. Alternatively, the installation of non-formal or binding mechanisms for consultation with 
employees and other major shareholders may comply with shura, as well. In this context, the 
Egyptian corporate governance permits direct participation of employees in the board of 
directors or indirect precipitation through forming an advisory committee to the board.43 
Saudi corporate governance should asserts the importance of the value of shura as best 
practice for the boards of Saudi publicly held companies, providing companies with a default 
legal structure which would permit companies to incorporate workers into the boards of 
directors. A transplant of the Egyptian model of labor precipitation to Saudi corporate 
governance may satisfy shura requirements.  
Beyond this measure, the value placed on consensus suggests that majority decision 
making should not be implemented if consensus over a board decision is achievable.44 
Accordingly, the view of the majority of directors should not be forced on minority directors 
before a sincere, consensus-seeking endeavor is undertaken. Such value carries great importance 
for minority representative on the board, who are elected through the cumulative method of 
voting. Saudi corporate governance should emphasize and promote consensus seeking as the first 
step in making any board decision. 
43 For labor participation under Egyptian corporate governance, see SAMIHA EL-KALIOUBY, AL-SHAREIKAT 
AL-TIJARIAH 952–60 (2008). 
44 The corporate governance structure of publicly held insurance companies recognizes consensus value. 
See article § (23) of the Mandatory Model Bylaws for Insurance Companies. 
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7.5 BOARD SIZE AND COMPOSITION 
7.5.1 The Size of the Board 
There is no agreed upon number for board members.45 Sir Adrian Cadbury suggests that board 
size should never exceed twelve members.46 Best practice reveals that “smaller boards allow for 
real strategic discussion and are less prone to become rubberstamping entities.”47 The SCGRs 
suggest that the board members of a listed company not exceed eleven,48 which falls within the 
range consistent with best practice. However, no mandatory upper limit on the number of board 
members has ever been adopted.49 Mohammad al-Jabor has taken issue with this lack of a 
mandatory upper limit for board of director membership because he asserts that this situation 
may encourage the unnecessary over-appointment of board members so as to benefit those 
persons through remuneration.50 This scenario is perhaps more likely in companies where the 
dominant shareholder is the government, under which the supervising bureaucrats of the 
45 See CADBURY, supra note 16, at 42. 
46 See id. at 43. 
47 OECD Guidelines, 48. 
48 SCGRs Article § (12) paragraph (a). The setting a limit of the board member maximum number is an 
appropriate move by the CMA authority which cope with corporate law scholars demand since the CL only specify 
the minimum number of the board of directors but has left the matter open for the maximum number. See 
MOHAMMAD HASAN AL-JABOR, SAUDI COMMERCIAL LAW 326 (4th ed. 1996) (al-Jabor argued that large boards my 
cause waste of the company resources of unneeded board members). 
49 C.L. article § (66). In fact, the board size of the Saudi publicly traded companies normally comprise of 7 
to 11 directors. See Fahad Mohammad Almajid, A Conceptual Framework for Reforming the Corporate Governance 
of Saudi Publicly Held Companies: A Comparative and Analytical Study from a Legal Perspective 247 (Ph.D.) 
(2008) (unpublished dissertation University of Manchester). 
50 See AL-JABOR, supra note 48. See Fahad Mohammad Almajid, A Conceptual Framework for Reforming 
the Corporate Governance of Saudi Publicly Held Companies: A Comparative and Analytical Study from a Legal 
Perspective 247 n.844 (Ph.D.) (2008) (unpublished dissertation University of Manchester) 
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company might appoint their friends or relatives (nepotism) in order to benefit financially or 
socially by means of the company. 
7.5.2 Ownership and Nationality 
The shareholders elect the members of the board of directors (by direct or cumulative voting 
methods).51 As in the French system,52 board members of Saudi listed companies must be 
shareholders of the company.53 Each board member is required to provide qualification shares.54 
The ownership condition conforms to best practices, tending to align the board member’s 
interests with those of the company.55 However, the small value of qualification shares (about 
$3000) is not likely to create genuine property interests within the company.56 For instance, the 
51 C.L. article § (66). For the voting methods for electing the board members, see chapter (VIII). 
52 French Commercial Code (FCC) article § (L 225-25). The size ownership is determined by the company 
bylaws. Id. 
53 C.L. article § (68). That does not mean the member has to be a shareholder at the time of his election to 
the board, but he has to acquire this status within the first thirty days of his appointment to the board. Id. 
54 The guarantee shares provision aims to ensure that any injured persons (from the board members’ 
actions) will find available assets of that board member to enforce his (the injured) rights. C.L. article § (68). 
55 See, e.g., French Commercial Code (FCC) article § (L 225-25). Also see AFEB-MEDEF, Corporate 
Governance Code of Listed Corporations, Principle 23.2.1. (2013) and Fahad Mohammad Almajid, A Conceptual 
Framework for Reforming the Corporate Governance of Saudi Publicly Held Companies: A Comparative and 
Analytical Study from a Legal Perspective 247 (Ph.D.) (2008) (unpublished dissertation University of Manchester). 
56 See ALI AL-ZAINI, USUL AL-ALQANOUN AL-TIJARI, vol. 1, pt. 2, 389 (1935). Mustafa Taha suggests that 
directors should be required to hold a significance percentage of the company’s shares as an alternative to the 
exiting  ownership scheme for directors. TAHA, supra note 4, at 257. Cf Mohammad al-Jabor argue against the 
abolition of liability guarantee shares of the board members because he thinks this might lead to appointing persons 
at the company board whom does not have a real tie with the company. See AL-JABOR, supra note 48, at 329. I take 
issue with al-Jabor position in this regard because the amount of shares this scheme requires is so minimal which not 
expected to create a real ownership interest in the company. Therefore, it seems more logical under this 
circumstances that any board member would care about his professional reputation more than the increase or 
decrease of three thousand dollars shareholding he provided as a guarantee of his managerial liability. In addition, 
insurance on the board members liability may serve as a more practical approach of guaranteeing the shareholders 
and the company will receive a compensation for any damages caused to any one of them by the wrongdoing 
director. 
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giant Saudi Telecom Company (STC), with $18 billion in market capitalization, requires its 
board members to provide only three thousand dollars’ in qualification shares.57 
Saudi nationality is not a prerequisite for being a board member in any of the Saudi-listed 
companies. Nonetheless, the boards of most listed companies consist of Saudi citizens (see 
Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1. Foreign Membership in the Boards of Directors of Saudi Listed Companies (2011) 
Source: the Saudi Capital Market Authority (CMA), the Annual Statistical Report on  
Corporate Governance of the listed companies (2011/2012) [on file with the author] 
57 See the Saudi Telecom Company STC bylaws article § (22). 
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7.5.3 Membership Ceilings 
7.5.3.1 Number of Board Memberships 
Although directors are obliged to devote time to fulfilling their responsibilities, they are not 
expected to commit all of their time to one board membership. Board membership is not a full 
time job, and moreover, board members normally have other equally important business or 
private commitments. Nonetheless, a number of corporate governance systems have imposed 
limits on the number of board memberships an individual may hold concurrently.58 Such a 
ceiling aims to insure that board members will have ample time and singularity of focus to 
perform their duties.59 
The Saudi corporate governance system does not permit board members to hold positions 
on more than five listed company boards at the same time.60 Historically, the prohibition was 
against joining more than five joint stock companies, listed or not listed.61 In 2011, however, the 
Council of Ministers has retained this restriction only on listed companies.62 For instance, a 
58 For instance the French Commercial Code (FCC) provides: 
Any natural person who is in breach of the provision of the present article shall resign from one of 
his directorships within three months of being appointed, or from the directorship in question 
within three months of the occurrence of the event which resulted in a condition of the previous 
paragraph no longer being met. Upon expiry of that period, he shall be deemed to have resigned 
either from his new directorship or from which no longer meets the conditions laid down in the 
previous paragraph, whichever applies, and shall return the remuneration received. This shall not 
affect the validity of the deliberation in which he participated. 
French Commercial Code (FCC) Article § (L 225-21). 
59 See MOHAMMAD KAMIL AMIN MALISH, AL-SHRIKAT 307 (1957). 
60 Article (1) of the Saudi Council of Ministers Resolution No. 284 in 22 Ramadan 1432 H, corresponding 
to 22 August 2011. 
61 Article (2) of the Saudi Council of Ministers Resolution No. 55 in 28 Safar 1419 H, corresponding to 
23 June 1998. 
62 See the Saudi Council of Ministers Resolution No. 284 in 22 Ramadan, 1432 corresponding to 22 August 
2011. 
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person may have a membership of twenty joint stock companies, but no more than five of those 
can be listed companies.63 
Furthermore, such a ceiling on board memberships increases the opportunity for more 
people to participate on listed companies’ boards, an action which will broaden the experience 
base of board members in the country. Otherwise, board membership may stay closed, limited to 
a small circle of persons.64 
7.5.3.2 Age of Directors 
Most of the large U.S. companies have no set retirement age for directors (only 16% of the S&P 
500 companies impose such a limit).65 The French system advocates that fewer appointments to 
the board be elders,66 recommending that no more than a third of the board members should be 
over seventy years old.67 Moreover, the age of the board chairman of the company should not be 
more than sixty five.68 In contrast, Saudi corporate governance has not considered this matter at 
all. Adopting the French retirement age limit for directors might be advisable as a means of 
63 The SCGRs is still advocating the old stricter policy by suggesting that: “[a] member of the board of 
directors must not act as a member of the board of directors of more than five joint stock companies at the same 
time.” SCGRs Article § (13) paragraph (h). 
64 See MALISH, supra note 59. See also Fahad Mohammad Almajid, A Conceptual Framework for 
Reforming the Corporate Governance of Saudi Publicly Held Companies: A Comparative and Analytical Study 
from a Legal Perspective (Ph.D.) 250 (2008) (unpublished dissertation University of Manchester). 
65 See Spencer Stuart Boards Index, 15 (2013). 
66 French Commercial Code (FCC) Article § (L 225-19). 
67 Id. French Commercial Code (FCC) Article § (L 225-19). Although the FCC left the retirement age 
designation for the company, “[i]n the absence of an explicit provision …. in the bylawss, the number of directors 
over the age of seventy years may not be more than one third of the directors in office ... [,] the oldest director shall 
be deemed to be retiring from office when the age limit for the directress specified in the ... bylaws specifying anther 
procedure, the oldest director shall be deemed to be retiring from office when the age limit for the directors ... is 
exceeded.” Id. 
68 French Commercial Code (FCC) Article § (L 225-48) and § (L 225-54). The bylaws may raise the age 
limit for both functions. Id. 
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ensuring injection of new blood into boards of directors. A generational mixture among board 
members may bring to the board both the energy of younger members and the experience and 
wisdom of elder members. 
However, in an emerging market like the Saudi capital market, which aims to encourage 
family businesses to go public, imposing an age restriction on the board chairman, as in the 
French system, may discourage many family businesses from having themselves listed. Hence, 
retaining the current approach, which indirectly deals with this issue by preventing the board 
chairman from serving more than two consecutive terms in that position, is more advisable.69 
 Saudi Arabian society is a socially connected society, that has a strong respect for 
seniority among family members, a practice which has a significant impact on the choice of the 
board chairman.70 In this regard, a western observer remarked “[t]he authority, wisdom, and 
counsel of elder family members are still to a great extent accepted, and the young family 
members must wait sometimes far into middle age before being accorded that status.”71 
Accordingly, on the boards of family-controlled companies, the seniority factor more likely will 
determine who is going to chair the board of directors, with complete disregard for differences in 
competence or skills. The restriction on the renewal of the board chairman indefinitely may 
facilitate solving this social issue by allowing more competent members of the family or other 
elected board members to assume this position without any embarrassment or insult, which 
might otherwise ensue from asking the senior family member formally to hand over the position. 
69 C.L. article § (79). This restriction aims to offer opportunity for other board members to serve in this 
function. See the Legal Memo of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry No. 11/1283 in 27/6/1407 [on file with the 
author]. 
70 See DAVID E. LONG, CULTURE AND CUSTOMS OF SAUDI ARABIA 38 (2005). 
71 Id. 
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7.5.4 Women’s Representation 
A well structured board should contain a group of members with diverse and balanced 
experiences.72 Diversity, also, requires a fair representation of both genders on the board,73 
insuring fairness especially for women. For instance, French corporate governance advocates 
representation by women at a level of not less than 40% of the board’s membership.74 At the 
most recent count, 18% of the seats on boards of U.S. companies are occupied by women.75 
Gender diversity on the boards of Saudi companies is not part of the Saudi corporate 
governance reform agenda. A few years ago, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry declared 
that women are eligible to be appointed to boards of directors.76 The resolution stresses respect 
for Islamic values when women are fulfilling membership duties, especially as to the refraining 
from intermingling with unrelated males.77 However, the intermingling part of this resolution has 
never come to the point of actual enforcement. Clearly, that part of the resolution was inserted 
merely for the sake of satisfying the conservative elements of Saudi society, who generally stand 
against women’s empowerment in the business sphere.78 
72 See AFEB-MEDEF, Corporate Governance Code of Listed Corporations, Principle 6.1. (2013). 
73 See Recommendation (10) of the Finish Corporate Governance Code (2010) which provides that “[b]oth 
genders shall be represented on the board.” 
74 AFEB-MEDEF, Corporate Governance Code of Listed Corporations, Principle 6.4. (2013). 
75 Spencer Stuart Boards Index, 17 (2013). 
76 See Section 1 of the Circular No. 222/ 1732 in 12/6/ 1432 H; Issued by the General Directorate of 
Companies in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. [on file with the author]. 
77 See Section 1 of the Circular No. 222/ 1732 in 12/6/ 1432 H; Issued by the General Directorate of 
Companies in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. [on file with the author]. 
78 The conservative elements of the society base their reject of work of women in public realm on solid 
justifications issued by well respected Islamic scholars. See Fatwa No. 25164, the Permanent Committee in the 
General Presidency of Scholarly Research and Ifta, vol. 2, pp. 327–28, n.d., available at 
http://www.alifta.net/Search/ResultDetails.aspx?languagename=ar&lang=ar&view=result&fatwaNum=&FatwaNum
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In practice, the representation of women on the boards of Saudi listed companies is 
minimal: four women.79 The recent social distress triggered by the Ministry of Labor’s decision 
to permit women to work as cashiers in shopping centers- and the political pressure placed on the 
government to repeal that decision80 strongly suggest that Saudi women have a prolonged 
struggle ahead of them in expanding their share of membership on the boards of Saudi publicly 
traded companies. Accordingly, Saudi corporate governance should emphasize the importance of 
the participation of women on the board, treating it as best corporate governance practice and 
suggesting for the time being that at least one director on each board should be female.81 Such a 
ID=&ID=15293&searchScope=3&SearchScopeLevels1=&SearchScopeLevels2=&highLight=1&SearchType=exact
&SearchMoesar=false&bookID=&LeftVal=0&RightVal=0&simple=&SearchCriteria=allwords&PagePath=&siteSe
ction=1&searchkeyword=216185217133217132032216167217132217133216177216163216169#firstKeyWordFou
nd (accessed on Sept. 6, 2013). Recently, the Saudi Ministry of Labor mandatory appointment of Saudi women the 
retail sector (i.e. sellers and cashers) triggers a strong wave of rejection against such move by the Ministry. For 
nature of the struggle over this issue, see, e.g., The financial Times, Twitter war over writer’s call to molest Saudi 
Women Cashers, by Abeer Allam Michael Peel (May 28, 2013. 4:33 PM), available at 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f195a62e-c798-11e2-be27-00144feab7de.html#axzz2e9CHSxJU (accessed on Sept. 6, 
2012). Furthermore, the Permanent Committee in the General Presidency of Scholarly Research and Ifta, which 
chaired by the Mufti (the highest Islamic authority in Saudi Arabia), issued fatwa (opinion) that prohibit women 
from working cashers in place attended by men See Fatwa No. 24937, the Permanent Committee in the General 
Presidency of Scholarly Research and Ifta, Vol. 2, P. 326, n.d., available at 
http://www.alifta.net/Search/ResultDetails.aspx?languagename=ar&lang=ar&view=result&fatwaNum=&FatwaNum
ID=&ID=15292&searchScope=3&SearchScopeLevels1=&SearchScopeLevels2=&highLight=1&SearchType=exact
&SearchMoesar=false&bookID=&LeftVal=0&RightVal=0&simple=&SearchCriteria=allwords&PagePath=&siteSe
ction=1&searchkeyword=217131216167216180217138216177216167216170#firstKeyWordFound (accessed on 
Sept. 6, 2013). 
79 The four women are; Lubna al-Olayan (Saudi Hollandi Bank), Rasha al-Hoshan (Kingdom Holding 
Company), Maha Fitaihi (Fitaihi Holding Group), and Najla abu-Nayyan (Ash-sharqiyah Development Company). 
Saudi Stock Exchange homepage, 
http://www.tadawul.com.sa/wps/portal/!ut/p/c1/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP0os3g_A-
ewIE8TIwP3gDBTA08Tn2Cj4AAvY_dQA_3g1Dz9gmxHRQCHg5RU/ (accessed on May 2, 2013). 
80 See generally Saudi Gazette, Supermarket snub fatwa against women cashiers on November 7, 2010, 
available at 
http://www.saudigazette.com.sa/index.cfm?method=home.PrintContent&fa=regcon&action=Print&contentid=2010
110786939&simplelayout=1 (accessed Feb. 21, 2014). 
81 The suggested number of women holding positions on the boards of director should be increased 
gradually, taking into account the difficulty of finding well qualified women for board positions in Saudi Arabia. 
The encouragement of appointing well-qualified non-Saudi females at the beginning may facilitate societal 
acceptance of women’s participation on boards of directors and may raise the aspiration of young Saudi females to 
assume such positions in the future. 
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move by itself may not have an immediate effect on the status of women’s participation in Saudi 
companies, but rather will at least draw attention to this governance issue. 
7.6 INDEPENDENCE OF THE BOARD 
7.6.1 Separation of Leadership Posts 
Best practice suggests that the Board chairman should not serve as a chief executive officer 
(CEO), as the OECD principles explain: 
Separation of the two posts [chief executive and board chairman] may be regarded 
as good practice, as it can help to achieve an appropriate balance of power, 
increase accountability and improve the board’s capacity for decision making 
independent of management.82 
The French governance system pursues a different approach, which requires companies with 
single-tiered board structures to choose between two “formulas” of board governance, separating 
the function of the CEO from that of the board chairman or combining both functions in the 
hands of the chairman.83 
Under the Saudi governance system, the CL permits the board chairman to combine the 
position of managing director (board member) with his position or to elect other board members 
to serve in such a position (managing directors).84 The SCGRs, however, reject this practice, 
82 See OECD Principles, at 63–64. 
83 FCC article § (L225-51-1) and AFEB-MEDEF, Corporate Governance Code of Listed Corporations, 
principle 3.1. (2013). French governance system “does not favor either formula and allows the board of directors to 
choose between the two forms.” Id. 
84 The bylaws should articulate the powers of the board chairman and the managing director and in absence 
of such articulation the board has the power do so. C.L. article § (79). Historically, the vague language of CL with 
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suggesting that the chairman of the board should not perform any managerial role or “conjoin” 
the board chairman and managing director positions or any other executive posts.85 This 
suggestion contradicts the management structure delineated by the CL, which assumes that day-
to-day management should be vested in the managing director (either as a separate person or in 
combination with the chairman). The elimination of the managing director’s position from the 
CL may eradicate this policy contradiction in the Saudi corporate governance system with regard 
to this issue (the separation of the chairmanship from executive positions). 
7.6.2 Independent Directors 
It is anticipated that the participation of independent directors in the decision-making process 
will raise the governance standards of the company.86 The lack of personal interests on the part 
of such directors increases the expectation that they will serve the company’s best interests.87 
The inclusion of independent members on the board raises the confidence of the stakeholders 
concerning the company’s governance.88 Professor Jeffery Gordon believes that 
regard to the appointment of managing directors in joint stock companies has caused some troubles for lawyers and 
joint stock promoters because the language of article (76) of the CL law was not clear about whether the 
appointment of the managing director for the company was mandatory or optional. See AL-JABOR, supra note 48, at 
327–28 n.2; See Fahad Mohammad Almajid, A Conceptual Framework for Reforming the Corporate Governance of 
Saudi Publicly Held Companies: A Comparative and Analytical Study from a Legal Perspective (Ph.D.) 257-258 
(2008) (unpublished dissertation University of Manchester). 
85 SCGRs Article § (12) paragraph (d). The chairman and managing directors are regarded as agents of the 
board and exert their delegated power under the supervision and responsibility of the board as principals. See 
YOUNES, supra note 3, at 276. The managing director position should not be confused with the executive manager of 
the company, as the former is a member of the board of directors, an organ of the company, while the other is an 
employee of the company, governed by labor law. See AKTHAM AMEIN AL-KHOULI, DOUROUS FI AL-QANOUN AL-
TIJARI AL-SAUDI 235 (1973). 
86 See OECD Principles, at 64. 
87 See id. at 64–65. 
88 See id. at 65. 
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Independent directors solve three different problems: First, they enhance the 
fidelity of managers to shareholder objectives ... Second, they enhance the 
reliability of the firm's public disclosure ... Third, and more controversially, they 
provide a mechanism that binds the responsiveness of firms to stock market 
signals.89 
The number of non-executive directors determines the ability of the board to exert “objective and 
independent judgment on corporate affairs.”90 The proportion of independent directors 
represented on the board depends on the degree of control in the company. The boards of non-
controlled companies should contain at least 50% independent directors, while controlled 
companies should allot one third of their seats to independent directors.91 The New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) applies these same standards for the appointment of independent directors.92 
In contrast, the Saudi system provides that Independent directors need only comprise 
one-third of the board of directors.93 However, “the majority of the members of the board of 
directors shall be non-executive members.”94 The concentration of ownership in most Saudi 
listed companies justifies this deviation from the best practice rule of maintaining a majority of 
89 Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950–2005: Of Shareholder 
Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 No. 6 STANFORD L. REV. 1465–1568 (Apr. 2007) (cited page is 1469). 
90 OECD Principles (VI)E. 
91 AFEB-MEDEF, Corporate Governance Code of Listed Corporations, Principle 9.3 (2013). 
92 Both NYSE listing rules and French corporate governance have exempted companies with a 50% level of 
ownership concentration. 
93 SCGRs Article § (12) paragraph (e). The SCGRs does not provide an exclusive definition for the 
independent director; however, it does provide examples of several violations that infringe the expected independent 
standards. The board member is not considered independent, for instance, if the member possesses a shareholding of 
five percent of the company’s outstanding shares. Previous senior executives of the company or of one of its group 
companies are considered not independent directors unless that relationship ended two years before serving as an 
independent director in the board. Likewise, if the member is an employee of a party who has an affiliation with the 
company, “such as external auditors or main suppliers,” he will not be deemed an independent. Also, an independent 
director cannot have a close family member occupying an executive position in the company. The violation of 
independence is not, in fact, limited to those examples, as article (2) of the SCGRs is also applicable to any scenario 
that may violate the “complete independence” of the board member. See SCGRs Article § (2). 
94 SCGRs Article § (12) paragraph (c). “Non-executive director” under Saudi corporate governance system 
refers to any “member of the board of directors who does not have a full-time management position at the company, 
or who does not receive a monthly or yearly salary.” SCGRs Article § (2). 
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independent directors.95 Data collected recently by the CMA indicates that the majority of the 
listed companies’ boards consist of non-executive and independent members (see Figure 2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The Composition of the Saudi-Listed Companies’ Boards of Directors in 2011 
Source: the Saudi Capital Market Authority (CMA), the Annual Statistical Report on 
Corporate Governance of the listed companies (2011/2012) [on file with the author] 
Furthermore, the inclusion of independent directors from the private sector on the boards 
of SOEs may increase the independence of the board from political interference.96 Moreover, 
members from the private sector “will help in making boards [of SOEs] more business 
oriented.”97 Accordingly, the appointment of independent directors conveys an extra value on the 
Saudi corporate governance system, given that it is dominated by government ownership. 
95 Both NYSE listing rules and French corporate governance have exempted companies with a50% level of 
ownership concentration. 
96 OECD Guidelines, page 49. 
97 Id. 
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On the other hand, the inclusion of independent directors from the private sector on the 
boards of SOEs may increase the independence of the board from political interference.98 
Moreover, members from the private sector “will help in making boards [of SOEs] more 
business oriented.”99 Accordingly, the appointment of independent directors conveys an extra 
value on the Saudi corporate governance system, given that it is dominated by government 
ownership. 
7.6.3 Independence and Board Committees 
The OECD suggests that a board of directors should face the issue of conflicts of interest by 
establishing specialized committees consisting of a majority, if not totality, of independent 
directors to deal with matters in which the ability of individual executive members to make 
independent judgments might be impaired by their personal interests. 100 Otherwise, for instance, 
executive members on specialized committees such as the remuneration committee may “serve 
each other’s” interests.101 Needless to say, an accurate delineation of the functions, formation, 
and standards of operation for each of the board’s committees is crucial for the good 
performance and accountability of the committees.102 The French system, for instance, suggests 
98 OECD Guidelines, page 49. 
99 Id. 
100 See OECD Principles, at 65. 
101 See id. 
102 OECD Principles (VI)E(2). A precise definition of the specialized board committees’ functions and 
responsibilities would facilitate the assessment of their performance. Id. at 65. 
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that auditing, nomination, and remuneration committees need to be filled so that independent 
directors are in the majority.103 
The Saudi governance has proposed that each board committee should contain a 
sufficient number of non-executive board members if that committee’s mandates are connected 
to the supervision of “conflicts of interests” in general, or have the tasks such as the “ensuring of 
the financial and non-financial reports, reviewing the deals concluded by the related parties, 
nomination to membership of the board, appointment of the executive directors, and 
determination of remuneration.”104 
 
 
Figure 3. The Composition of the Nomination and Remuneration Committee in Saudi Listed 
Companies (2011) 
Source: the Saudi Capital Market Authority (CMA), the Annual Statistical Report on 
Corporate Governance of the listed companies (2011/2012) [on file with the author] 
103 See AFEB-MEDEF, Corporate Governance Code of Listed Corporations, Principle 16.1 & 17.1 & 18.1 
(2013). 
104 SCGRs article (13) paragraph (c). 
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Executive board members are excluded from joining the audit committee.105 In 
accordance with influence from the U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the Saudi system requires that one 
of the non-executive committee members have financial and accounting expertise.106 
 
 
Figure 4. The Composition of the Audit Committee in Saudi Listed Companies (2011) 
Source: The Saudi Capital Market Authority (CMA), the Annual Statistical Report 
on Corporate Governance of the listed companies (2011/2012) [on file with the author] 
7.7 THE BOARD MEMBERS’ DUTIES AND LIABILITY 
7.7.1 The Duty of Care 
The CL did not set a statuary standard for the director’s behavior when directing the company. 
The statutes of nearly all other Arab countries companies also fail to address this issue. The 
literature of company law indicates that most Arab counties apply the standard of care laid down 
105 SCGRs article (14) paragraph (a). 
106 Id and Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § (407)(a). 
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in the agency contract (agency is a contract in the civil law tradition).107 Accordingly, the board 
member, as an agent of the company, is obliged to perform his duties in conformity with the civil 
code standard of care, which is normally the ordinary person standard.108 
However, Saudi Arabia does not have a civil code. Accordingly, this matter is governed 
by the general theory of agency contract as delineated in Islamic jurisprudence. The restatement 
of the Hanbali jurisprudence, Majallah al-Ahkam al-Shyariyah, indicates that the agent, 
volunteer or paid, is a trustee, not liable for the loss or damages that happens to the deposited 
assets under his control unless the loss or damages were a results from his fault or negligence.109 
The SCGRs attempt to cover this loophole in the Saudi statutory framework by laying 
down several provisions requiring standards of performance from board members. Board 
members should discharge their duties in a “good faith, responsible manner and with 
diligence.”110 The decisions of the members of the board of directors should be grounded in 
adequate “information.”111 Accordingly, board members should not rely on the information 
provided to them by the management alone; they should seek information “from any other 
107 For instance, The Egyptian Civil Code states: [a]n agency is a contract by virtue of which the agent shall 
carry out a legal work for account of the principal.” The Egyptian Civil Code Article § (699). See also Article 
§ (903) of the Moroccan Civil Code and Article § (833) of the Jordanian Civil Code. 
108 AL-JABOR, supra note 48, at 339. 
109 See Majallah al-Ahkam al-Shyariyah article § (1265). In the same meaning, see Majallah al-Ahkam al-
Adliyah (the restatement of the al-Madhab al-Hanafie which was a civil law of the Ottoman Empire) article (1463) 
which states that: 
Property received ... by a person, who is [agent] to sell or buy, or to pay or receive a debt, or to 
receive and existing specific thing is like a thing deposited for safe keeping. If it is destroyed 
without fault and there is no neglect, no compensation is necessary. 
THE MEJELLE: BEING AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF MAJALLAH EL-AHKAM-I-ADLIYA AND A COMPLETE 
CODE OF ISLAMIC CIVIL LAW (C.R. Tyser et al. trans., 2001). 
110 SCGRs article § (11) paragraph (c). 
111 See id. 
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reliable source.”112 Clearly, the standard of care proposed by the SCGRs is higher than the 
standard of care implemented by the civil codes of Arab countries.113 However, this is still not a 
binding standard of care, and case law is not available which would allow scholars to discern the 
trajectory of Saudi courts in this matter. The best hope is that the courts would adopt the SCGRs’ 
standard of care; if that is not possible, then no less than the ordinary person standard of care 
should be upheld by the judiciary. 
7.7.2 Duty of Loyalty 
The duty of loyalty obliges board members to devote their actions to “the best interest of the 
company and the shareholders,”114 putting the interests of the company ahead of their own 
interests.115 Each board member must represent all shareholders, not just those shareholders who 
112 Id. 
113 The ordinary person standard of care is the standard adopted by most Arab countries laws. The Egyptian 
Civil Code provides that “if the Agency is in return for remuneration, the agent shall always exert in executing its 
duties the ordinary person’s care.” Article § (704) paragraph (2) in the Egyptian Civil Code. See also Article § (840) 
of the Jordanian Civil Code; Article § (934) paragraph (2) in the Iraqi Civil Code. However, It should be noted, this 
standard of care is required from the agent who receives compensation for his work not the voluntarily one. The 
volunteer agent is only required to perform his agency as if he performing his own work and this standard care 
required here shall not exceed the limits of the ordinary person standard even if the volunteer agent tends to perform 
his own work in the ordinary or higher standards of care. The Egyptian Civil Code states: 
If an Agency granted, without remuneration being payable for it, the agent shall exert in 
performing its duties same care as he would do for his private work, without being required to 
exert for that more than an ordinary person’s care. 
Article § (704) paragraph (2) in the Egyptian Civil Code. See also Article § (840) of the Jordanian Civil 
Code; Article § (934) paragraph (1) in the Iraqi Civil Code; Article § (929) of the Yamani Civil Code. To the 
contrary, the Moroccan Civil Code imposes a reasonable standard of care on the agent with disregard if the agent is 
paid or not paid for his job. See Article § (903) of the Moroccan Civil Code. Nonetheless, the standard shall be 
higher than the reasonable standard care if the agent is compensated for his work. See Article § (904) paragraph (1) 
of the Moroccan Civil Code. 
114 OECD Principles, Principle (VI)A. 
115 See Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. OF FINANCE 737, 
742 (1997). 
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elected them to the board.116 However, in the real world, the case is different, whereby many 
board members may utilize their positions in the company to enrich themselves on account of the 
company.117 Such conflicts of interests between the board member’s personal interests and the 
company’s interests represent notable problems for modern corporate governance (the agency 
problem).118 The existence of conflicts of interests in any company may increase its agency 
costs, undermining the company’s efficiency and the shareholders’ value. In response to this key 
governance issue, the Saudi corporate governance system, like other such systems, prohibits 
board members from entering into any form of economic competition;119 receiving a loan from 
the company (or guaranteeing a loan to a board member);120 or having a personal interest in 
contracts that the company has concluded with other parties.121 
116 The equality principle among shareholders obliges board members to “carry out their duties in an even-
handed manner with respect to all shareholders.” OECD Principles, at 59. Otherwise, board members will be 
deemed agents for the controlling shareholders rather than for the company and all of its shareholders. 
117 For agency cost problem see chapter IV. 
118See generally id. 
119 C.L. Article § (70). The Ministry of Commerce and Industry provides several examples for this form of 
conflict of interests. For example, the board member has to refrain from forming any business enterprise that aims to 
conduct a business activity similar to the company’s line of business. In addition, the board member will be regarded 
as competing with the company if he serves in any managerial position in another business enterprise trading in the 
same line of business as the company where he is a board member. See The Minister of Commerce and Industry 
Circular No. (222/205/3800) in 26 thul-Hijjah, 1422, corresponding to 10 March, 2002. 
If the interested member would like to enter into an economic relationship covered under the 
noncompetition restriction, the member needs to notify the company about the competition situation and receive 
authorization from the shareholder meeting to pursue this business opportunity. C.L. Article § (70). 
120 C.L. Article § (71) and the SCGRs Article § (18) paragraph (c). Literal application of this restriction 
may deter group companies from furnishing loans or guaranteeing loans to their subsidiaries (and vice versa). A 
main objective of the holding company, normally, is to loan or guarantee the loans of its subsidiaries. Accordingly, 
such a legal restriction may cause a hardship to the corporate group enterprises. 
121 C.L. Article § (69) and the SCGRs Article § (18) paragraph (a). However, the shareholders’ general 
meeting may grant the interested member permission to contract with the company. Id. The board member is not 
allowed to sell or buy nor rent or lease the company assets. The board member may not represent the interest of any 
other business enterprise in front of the company in which he has board membership. The Minister of Commerce 
and Industry Circular No. (222/205/3800) in 26 thul-Hijjah, 1422, corresponding to 10 March, 2002. 
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The Ministry of Commerce and Industry expands the application of conflict of interest 
restrictions to include every contract the interested board member enters into with a company 
under his real name, or under another person’s name, 122 or for the benefit of persons with any 
special business relationship with the board member.123 
In any event, the issue of conflicts of interest in Saudi companies seems deeper than one 
might expect. In a country where many public officials own business enterprises disguised as 
joint venture companies (silent companies), or under other persons’ names, and with a lack of 
public scrutiny over the official assets, especially in absence of an individual income tax, it is 
difficult to discern who is contracting with whom.124 Accordingly, the real value of anti-conflict 
interest provisions in relation to Saudi companies is merely to keep these transactions on a low 
profile mode, avoiding public outrage.125 
122 The Minister of Commerce and Industry Circular No. (222/205/3800) in 26 thul-Hijjah, 1422, 
corresponding to 10 March, 2002. 
123 Id. 
124 See the press release issued by the Saudi National Anti-Corruption Commission in re the discovery of 
public servants grating public contracts to business enterprises owned by themselves under other persons’ names, 
available at http://www.nazaha.gov.sa/Media/News/Pages/news358.aspx (accessed on Sept. 11, 2013). 
125 That does not negate the Saudi government’s awareness of the positive impact of good corporate 
governance on the national economy. In 1999, King Fahd issued an order to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry 
to strengthen its supervision over joint stock companies’ boards of directors and to make sure that the board 
members of these companies are composed of persons endowed with expertise, ability, and trustworthiness. The 
order has rested its holding upon the Council of Ministers’ view on the importance of the protection of the joint 
stock companies and the need to keep these companies away from any financial problems that might cause 
bankruptcy. See The President of the Saudi Council of Ministers [Prime Minster] order No. 7/19772 in 22 thul-
Hijjah, 1410 H, corresponding to 15 July 1991. 
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7.7.3 Liability of Directors 
Any board member’s violation of his duties may trigger criminal and civil liabilities at the same 
time.126 Although the study of the criminal liability falls outside of the scope of this section of 
the paper, criminal liability arises normally when any board member intentionally commits 
fraudulent or deceptive acts, such disclosing false information.127 Whenever a civil liability 
arises, the board members will be held jointly liable for the board’s directorial wrong 
behavior.128 A civil liability action against the board members might be brought by the company, 
shareholders, or a third party, for example, creditors and liquidators.129 
From the perspective of corporate governance, an error in the administration of the 
company represents a key civil liability cause of action.130 Any error in administration inherently 
involves the existence of three elements: wrongful behavior (action or inaction), damages, and 
causation between the first two elements.131 However, not every error in the administration of the 
company triggers a civil liability. Only errors that do not comply with the relevant standard of 
126 See MALISH, supra note 59, at 334. 
127 See AL-JABOR, supra note 48, at 339. 
128 The C.L. Article (76). Even if the wrongful action has been rendered by a majority vote, the whole 
board will still be held responsible for that behavior unless the minority members stood against the action and 
documented their dissension in the minutes of the board meeting. Board member absence from a board meeting does 
not excuse a member from liability, except if the absent member proves that he did not know about the attention of 
rendering the decision which caused harm to the company, or the member was not enabled to record his dissension 
to the actionable decision. Id. 
129 The release of the board of directors from their liability by the shareholders’ annual meeting denotes a 
symbolic release from liability only, because the board members may be still be sued, unless three years lapse from 
the date of the discovery of the harmful acts committed by the board member. The C.L. Article § (76) and the Legal 
Memo of the Deputy of the Minister of Commerce and Industry for Technical (legal) Affairs No. 11/2566 in 
11/5/1412 [on file with the author]. The legal process for suing the board members will be discussed in details in the 
next chapter. 
130 Aside from this cause of action is the civil liability, which arises when there is a breach of the C.L. 
provisions, or violation of the company’s bylaws. The C.L. Article (76). 
131 AL-JABOR, supra note 48, at 339. 
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care may inflict such liability. The board members have to perform their responsibilities in 
conformity with the expected standards of care.132 By doing so, the board members will shelter 
themselves from any liability, even if their actions cause damage to the company.133 
Accordingly, the existence of damage, by itself, does not offer sufficient grounds for the civil 
liability: wrongful behavior has to exist as well.134 
Narrowing the board member’s liability for certain kinds of errors is a common practice 
implemented in most countries, a notable example of which is the business judgment rule in the 
U.S. legal system, which shields directors from liability for ordinary directorial faults.135 The 
real difference among countries in this regard is the standard of care imposed on the board 
members. Under Arab corporate laws, the ordinary person standard of care is the dividing line 
between the actionable error and the non-actionable error.136 By contrast, theoretically at least, 
U.S. company law applies a lower standard of care, which merely requires a decision to be made 
in good faith, based on sufficient information, and for the best interests of the company.137 
Satisfying these aforementioned criteria normally shields directors from being held liable for 
negative results of their decisions through a so-called business judgment rule, which refers to the 
courts’ precedent of refusing to second guess decisions made by boards of directors. 
132 See id. 
133 See id. at 340. 
134 Id. at 339–40. 
135 For the duty of care under the U.S. law, see generally ARTHUR R. PINTO & DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, 
UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE LAW 226–44 (2013). 
136 AL-JABOR, supra note 48, at 339, and TAHA, supra note 4, at 274. 
137 But Business judgment rule offers no protection for directors who do nothing. 
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Theoretically speaking, the lower standard of care system aims to encourage honest board 
members to take risks and increase the company’s return.138 Conversely, the higher standard is 
that of the ordinary person standard, under which board members are expected to be more risk 
averse. A comparative empirical investigation is required in this area to furnish better insights 
into Saudi policy makers and as to whether there is a need to formally adopt the ordinary person 
standards in the CL (as most Civil codes of Arab countries [and other Civil law tradition 
countries] have) or whether there is a need to shift towards a business judgment rule legal 
framework as in the U.S. 
On the other hand, Saudi corporate governance does not impose a duty of care and 
loyalty on key executives, especially the CEO. This situation might exist because the company 
was supposed to be managed by a managing director. The Ministry of Commerce and Industry’s 
interpretation of the CL has provided companies with some leeway in appointing a managing 
director.139 Apart from banks, most Saudi companies do not have managing directors. Most 
managerial affairs are in the hands of the CEO and top executives, not the directors. The 
expansion of the duty of care and loyalty to key executives represents a necessary step in 
reducing agency costs in Saudi publicly traded companies and in improving Saudi corporate 
governance. 
138 See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30 (official Comments). 
139 See supra note 83. 
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7.8 THE DIRECTORS AND EXECUTIVES REMUNERATION 
7.8.1 The “Pay Without Performance” Issue 
7.8.1.1 Introduction 
The excessive remuneration of directors and top executives represents a problem on the agendas 
of modern corporate governance systems, a problem which annoys shareholders and policy 
makers in both developed and developing economies.140 Directors and top executives who serve 
under a flat rate (salary) remuneration scheme normally lack the motivation to further the 
company’s interests to the greatest extent possible.141 The performance of such remunerated 
directors and key executives normally expected to stop at a point which enables them to retain 
their jobs. The amount of remuneration paid to such directors and executives normally exceeds 
the value of the work they convey to the company, “a pay without performance” problem.142 The 
underperformance of such directors and executives increases agency costs in the company and 
diminishs value for shareholders. 
Accordingly, best practices such as those enumerated in the OECD principles suggest the 
utilization of performance-based remuneration plans.143 Performance-based remuneration tends 
140 See JEAN JACQUES DU PLESSIS, JAMES MCCNVILL & MIRCO BAGARIC, PRINCIPLES OF CONTEMPORARY 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 127–28 (Cambridge University Press, N.Y. 2005). 
141 See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF 
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 19 (2004). 
142 Furthermore, such fixed remuneration schemes may decrease directors and executives desire to take 
risks out of concern for protecting their future fixed income. For outline of  “Pay Without Performance” problem in 
modern corporate governance see Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Pay Without Performance: Overview of the 
Issue 117, in PERSPECTIVES ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (Scott Kief & Troy A. Paredes eds., 2010). 
143 For different types of performance-based plans, see generally ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE 
LAW 202–09 (1986). 
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to unite the interests of directors and executives with the company’s interests,144 promoting a 
“sense of solidarity and motivation with the company.”145 The French corporate governance 
code, for instance, indicates that the inclusion of stock options and performance shares in the 
remuneration scheme of directors and executives is more likely to raise “the executive directors’ 
loyalty and promote the alignment of their interests with the corporate and shareholders’ 
interests.”146 
7.8.1.2 Remuneration in Saudi Companies 
Saudi corporate governance suggests linking directors’ and top executives’ remuneration to their 
performance.147 However, two issues are associated with the implementation of incentive-based 
remunerations in the country. First, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry has issued a 
resolution stating that each director shall not receive remunerations exceeding 200,000 SR (about 
$50,000).148 Such fixed ceiling may deter the designing of incentive-based remuneration plans 
for directors. No justification exists for keeping such a ceiling on remuneration which, moreover, 
144 OECD Principles, Principle (VI)d(4). 
145 AFEB-MEDEF, Corporate Governance Code of Listed Corporations, Principle 23.2. (2013). 
146 Id. To achieve its goals, granting stock options and performance shares to executives has to be 
conditioned on the achievement of specific operation objectives. Therefore, executive directors who fail to realize 
the intended targets should not be entitled to receive “termination payment upon departure.” AFEB-MEDEF, 
Corporate Governance Code of Listed Corporations, Principles 23.2.4 and 23.2.5. (2013). 
147 Article 74 of the CL provides: 
The company bylaws shall set forth the manner of remunerating the board members; such 
remuneration may take the form of a lump sum amount, attendance allowance, rights in rem of a 
certain percentage of the profits. Any two or more of these privileges may be conjoined. 
148 Article (1) on the Ministry of Commerce and Industry resolution No. 1071 in Thu al-Qadah 1412 H 
corresponding to May 5, 1992. Furthermore, the remuneration for attending the board meeting shall not exceed 
3,000 SR (about $800) Article (2) on the Ministry of Commerce and Industry resolution No. 1071 in Thu al-Qadah 
1412 H corresponding to May 5, 1992. 
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contradicts provisions in the CL.149 The CL permits the board of directors to receive up to 10% 
of the company’s net profits after distributing dividends to shareholders equal to at least 5% of 
the company’s capital.150 
Furthermore, the Saudi government has imposed a ceiling on the remuneration of 
government representatives on the boards of directors.151 This remuneration ceiling for 
government representatives is lower. In practice, most OECD countries remunerate their 
representatives to SOEs at a lower rate on average than other; non-SOEs remunerate their board 
members.152 The OECD suggests that governments must remunerate their representatives to the 
board adequately in a way that promotes the “long term interest of the company and can attract 
and motivate qualified professionals.”153 The remuneration of Saudi government representatives 
on boards of directors should be determined under the same process as that which determines the 
remuneration of other directors. 
Secondly, the underdevelopment of the Saudi capital market has prevented companies 
from implementing non-cash incentive plans. Remuneration plans are limited to cash bonuses 
because the Saudi capital market does not permit stock options. Accordingly, incentive plans 
focus mainly on persuading executives to improve the company’s financial results (not its market 
price). 
149 C.L. Article § (74). 
150 Id. This five percent distribution has to be from the net profits of that year, and not be fully or partially 
complemented from the retained profits. 
151 Council of Ministers resolutions No. (202) in Shaban 13, 1404 H correspondent to (May. 15, 1984) and 
No. (344) in Thul-Qadah 16, 1428H correspondent to (Nov. 26, 2007). 
152 OECD Guidelines, at 31. 
153 OECD Guidelines, ch. (II) F 5. 
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Recent data indicates that Saudi publicly held companies pay lucrative remunerations to 
top executive (see Table No. 1). 
 
Table 18. Executive Remuneration in the Ten Largest Saudi Publicly Held Companies in 2012 
No. Company Name Number of Top Executives 
Remunerations Million 
SR % of Profits 
1 SAPIC 5 34 .13 
2 AlRajahi 7 16.8 .21 
3 STC 5 13.7 .18 
4 Saudi Electricity 5 8.8 .34 
5 SAFCO 5 7.4 .19 
6 SAMBA 6 32.1 .73 
7 Etihad Etisalat 5 71 1.17 
8 Riyadh 5 20.3 .58 
9 Kingdom 4 16.7 2.16 
10 SABB 7 22.9 .70 
Source: Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul), Annual Statistical Report (2011): Financial 
Indicators 56-63 and Argaam Report on Top Executives’ Remunerations in Saudi listed 
companies in 2012 (2013). 
The executive remuneration is determined through arm’s length negotiation with the 
board of directors. Due to the existence of dominant shareholders in most Saudi companies, the 
board of directors is expected to be supervised to fulfill its obligation of representing the best 
interests of the company and shareholders.154 In the U.S., shareholders are too weak (dispersed) 
to compel the board to protect their best interests, as the statutory design envisaged. This, at least 
theoretically, exacerbates the issue of executives’ remuneration in dispersed ownership systems. 
Similarly, directors appointed by the government, as dominant shareholder, may lack the 
economic motivation (agency problem) to protect the interests of the company and its 
shareholders, including the government, even though the government is their (the directors’) 
154 See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A FRAMEWORK FOR IMPLEMENTATION VI, at 33 (Magdi R. Iskander & 
Nadereh Chamlou eds., World Bank Group 2000). 
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principal. At the same time, the government as major shareholder may not be able to supervise 
incumbent directors in comparison to major private shareholders. 
In such companies, shirking and conflicts of interest may accompany the process of 
hiring and remunerating top executives, in ways such as favoring less qualified relatives or 
friends to assume high ranking positions, or receive huge remuneration. In other words, an 
agency problem similar to that of determining remuneration for executives in defused ownership 
systems may arise in concentrated ownership systems in which the government is the dominant 
shareholder. 
Accordingly, special scrutiny over executive remuneration in companies with major 
government holdings is more urgent than in companies with a majority of private shareholders, 
such family and private institutional investors. For instance, comparing the remuneration 
packages of top executives in such companies (those with majority government holdings) to 
packages of executives in other companies (national and international), as an indicative 
benchmarking is recommended.155 Furthermore, shareholders should minimally have the right to 
speak their minds concerning executives’ remunerations, a concept referred to as “say on 
pay.”156 
155 French Corporate Governance suggests implementing a benchmarking procedure in determining all top 
executives. See AFEB-MEDEF, Corporate Governance Code of Listed Corporations, Principle 23.1. (2013) (“the 
compensation must be assessed within the context of a business sector and the benchmark European or global 
market.”). Id. 
156 See generally LISA M. FAIRFAX, SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY 145–46 (2011). 
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7.8.2 “Say on Pay” 
The OECD suggests that shareholders should have a say concerning the top executive 
remunerations (say on pay), at least in terms of issuing an “advisory vote.”157 French corporate 
governance adopts this best practice standard and proposes that shareholders’ meeting should 
issue an advisory vote on remuneration packages.158 For instance, the board of French companies 
should respect shareholders “negative” views and reconsider the remuneration scheme, 
informing the shareholders of the steps taken by the board to address the shareholders’ 
concerns.159 Recently, the U.S. Dodd Frank Act (2010) has incorporated “say on pay” into the 
procedures for governing American companies.160 
Conversely, Saudi corporate governance does not observe any right of “say-on-pay” for 
shareholders; therefore, under current practices top executives’ remuneration is left exclusively 
to the board of directors. Accordingly, Saudi corporate governance should comply with best 
practices and permit shareholders to issue an advisory vote on the remuneration of top 
executives. 
157 See OECD Principles, Principle (II)c(3) and OECD Principles, at 34. However, OECD suggests that 
approval from shareholders is required for “equity-based [remuneration] schemes.” Id. 
158 AFEB-MEDEF, Corporate Governance Code of Listed Corporations, Principle 24.3. (2013). 
159 Id. 
160 Section (951) of Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (2010). For an extensive 
discussion of say on pay under the U.S. legal system, see, e.g., Randall S. Thomas, Alan R. Palmiter & James F. 
Cotter, Dodd-Frank’s Say on Pay: Will it Lead to a Greater Role for Shareholders in Corporate Governance?, 97 
CORNEL L. REV. 1213 (2012). 
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7.9 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has examined the legal structure governing boards of directors in Saudi publicly 
traded companies. The better governed the boards of directors is, the more efficient the national 
corporate governance system will be. 
Comparative corporate governance has offered a number of insights to increase the 
governing efficiency of boards of directors in the Saudi publicly held companies. Accordingly, 
Saudi corporate governance should consider: 
• Permitting two-tiered board structures and setting a legal foundation for the two-tiered 
board in the CL. 
• Observing the shura value by promoting consensus over the board’s decisions and allowing 
labors to participate in decision making process at least in an advisory form. 
• Regulating the positions of top executives in the company. 
• Imposing a mandatory ceiling on the size of boards of directors, at no more than 12 
directors. 
• Recognizing the importance of gender diversity in boards of directors and suggesting 
appointing at least one female on each board. 
• Abolishing the position of managing director and imposing a restriction of conjoining the 
position of board chainman with that of CEO. 
• Incorporating the ordinary person standard of care in the CL. 
• Making express the applicability of the duties of care and loyalty to the CEO and other high 
executives. 
• Eliminating the ceiling on directors’ incentive-based remunerations. 
• Providing shareholders with an advisory voting right over top executives remunerations 
(say on pay). 
Implementing these reforms more likely will strengthen the mechanisms of internal 
corporate governance in Saudi Arabia and overall corporate governance in the country. 
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8.0  INTERNAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN SAUDI ARABIAN PUBLICLY 
TRADED COMPANIES: SHAREHOLDERS RIGHTS, DUTIES AND PROTECTION OF 
MINORITY 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
The inclusion of shareholders in the decision-making process of the company is justified by 
traditional (property) and modern (the residual claimant) theories.1 Corporate governance in 
Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia, is heavily influenced by traditional theory. This theory 
dominates the views of legal scholars, especially with regard to the hierarchy of the organs of the 
company. This view upholds the supremacy of shareholders, which thus provides the 
shareholders with residual jurisdiction over all matters that are not precisely assigned to another 
organ of the company.2 
The division of power between the board and the shareholders, as The OECD Principles 
indicate, is a crucial corporate governance tool, which generates a checks-and-balances decision-
making system.3 Checks and balances enhance the decision-making quality in the company and 
1 For more information on the traditional and modern theories theory see chapter IV. 
2 See the Legal Memo of the Deputy of the Minister of Commerce and Industry for Technical (legal) 
Affairs No. 11/1141 in 11/5/1415 [on file with the author]. 
3 See OECD Principles, at 33. 
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promote control over the actions of the board of directors. Generally speaking, the style of 
distributing power in the Saudi corporate governance system is similar to that of the French 
“shareholders centered” system, rather than the U.S. “board centered” system.4 
This chapter is devoted to the analysis of the position of shareholders under the Saudi 
corporate governance system, along with an evaluation of this position in light of comparative 
corporate governance, primarily in relation to the French and U.S. governance systems with 
reference to best practices as articulated by OECD corporate governance standards.5 One 
fundamental objective of this chapter is to open an avenue for discussion leading to reforms in 
Saudi corporate governance. To attain this objective, the chapter will examine a number of main 
topics: shareholders’ rights, collective power as exercised through shareholders’ meetings, 
shareholders’ duties, and the protection of minority shareholders. 
8.2 WHO IS THE SHAREHOLDER? 
Financing the corporation through issuance of equity rights is the basic way of forming a joint 
stock company. Equity financing is termed stock (shares) issuing.6 The outstanding shares 
4 See Klaus J. Hopt, Comparative Corporate Governance: The State of the Art and International 
Regulation, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 47 (2001). 
5 OECD standards refer here to the corporate governance principles expressed by the OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance 2004 (The OECD Principles) and the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-
owned Enterprises 2005 (The OECD Guidelines). 
6 A share could be issued in return for cash or in kind contribution. The issued shares may be nominal or 
bearer shares. CL. Article § (99). However, shares for bearer have never been issued in Saudi Arabia. Some 
countries such as the U.S. eliminate the issuance of bearer shares to prevent people from evading income taxes. See 
CL. Article § (99). 
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represent the company’s registered capital.7 The person who owns the issued share is called a 
shareholder. The shareholder has property rights over the company assets, which remain after 
company liquidation and the settling of all company debts.8 Such a position makes a shareholder 
a “residual” claimant of company assets, as opposed to the debt finance supplier, the creditor, 
who has a fixed but superior return claim against the company.9 
A joint stock company is authorized to issue several kinds of stocks:10 by tradition, the 
most notable kinds are the common and preferred stocks.11 A common share, as a dominant form 
of issued stock, entitles its holder to fundamental ownership rights, such as a vote in the 
shareholders’ general meeting and the receipt of dividends.12 On the other hand, a preferred 
stock holder concedes his control (voting right) for preferential treatment in receiving dividends 
and priority over common shareholders upon company liquidation.13 
7 The C.L. Articles § (48) which states that: “[t]he capital of a company shall be divided into negotiable 
shares of equal value.” 
8 The C.L. Articles § (222). 
9 For more information about residual claimant see chapter IV. 
10 Those kinds are the common, preferred, decreased, and enjoinment shares. However, upon information 
received from Ministry of Commerce and Finance, no company has ever issued shares other than common shares in 
Saudi company law history. 
11 See the C.L. Article § (103). 
12 The C.L. Article § (108)(1). Rights for the shareholder are stated as follows: 
The right to obtain a share in the profits declared for distribution, the right to obtain an equity in 
the company’s assets upon liquidation, the right to attend stockholders meetings and participate in 
the deliberations and vote on the resolutions (proposed) therein, the right to dispose of his shares, 
the right of access to the company’s books and documents, and the right to control the acts of the 
board of directors, to institute the action in liability against the directors, and to contest the validity 
of the resolutions adopted at stockholders’ meetings. 
However, these listed rights are not ultimate because the last part of the aforementioned article provides for 
the ability to restrict them in the company bylaws. 
13 See the C.L. Articles § (103) and (108)(2). 
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The CL prohibits the issuance of preferred stock for more than fifty percent of the 
company capital.14 The CL does not allow the issuance of multiple voting right shares.15 The 
shareholder’s rights and obligations depend on the kind of the share the shareholder holds. Saudi 
listed companies have never issued preferred stocks although a number of listed companies have 
bylaws which permit such issuance.16 
The avoidance of issuing preferred stocks might be connected to the negative view 
expressed by Islamic scholars toward these kinds of shares. Many Islamic scholars opine that 
preferred stocks, which provide a shareholder with preferential economic rights, are not 
compatible with Islamic principles17 because the fixed return guaranteed to preferred 
stockholders and the priority-upon-liquidation feature constitute unfair preferential treatment for 
this group of shareholders over other shareholders.18 Accordingly, most of this chapter is 
dedicated to the legal framework connected to the holders of common stocks.19 
14 The C.L. Articles § (103) and (108)(2). 
15 The C.L. Articles § (103). 
16 See, e.g. The Industrialization Company Bylaws article § (5.4). 
17 See, e.g., SALEH ZABIN AL-MARZOUQI, SHARIKAT AL-MOSAHAMAH FI AL-NIDAM AL-SAUD 358–61 (H 
1406), and Islamic figh International Academy resolution No. 63 (1/7) in May 9–14, 1992 (Jeddah), In re Capital 
Markets. However, multi voting rights shares are not prohibited. Id. 
18 See AL-MARZOUQI, supra note 17, at 359–61. 
19 Unless otherwise indicated. 
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8.3 THE SHAREHOLDERS’ RIGHTS 
Almost all corporate governance systems including the Saudi system confer a number of 
property rights to shareholders; these rights are called shareholder’s fundamental rights.20 They 
are fundamental because the company cannot deprive the shareholder of these rights. Company 
law literature often draws a comparison between the joint stock company (JSC) and modern 
democratic states.21 According to this comparison, a shareholder is comparable to the citizens of 
that state in that he (the shareholder) has legally protected rights similar to the political and 
economic rights of the citizen. The scope of these fundamental rights which the shareholders 
enjoy depends on the scope of entitlement conferred upon them by the national corporate 
governance system. Shareholders in systems with strong shareholders’ rights are better equipped 
to participate in the governance of the company and to reduce its agency costs. 
8.3.1 Shareholder Political Rights 
8.3.1.1 Right to attend the Shareholders’ General Meeting (GM) 
Generally speaking, every shareholder has the right to attend the shareholders’ General Meetings 
(GMs).22 However, a key issue with the Saudi corporate governance system is that the company 
20 See the C.L. Article § (108). 
21 See, e.g., MOHSIN SHAFIQ, AL-WASEET FI AL-QANOUN AL-TIJARI AL-MISRY, vol. 1., 622 (1955). 
22 The C.L. Article § (108)(1) and SCGRs Article § (3). 
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has the power to restrict this right, allowing only shareholders who possess a specific amount of 
shares to attend such meetings.23 
Shareholder apathy is a common tendency in both defused and concentrated patterns of 
ownership.24 The Saudi Corporate Governance principles recognize the shareholder apathy 
problem in listed companies, suggesting that the company take proper measures to encourage 
“the participation of the greatest number of the shareholders in the general meeting.” 25 Models 
of corporate governance in developed countries such as France and the U.S. promote the 
utilization of various forms of modern communication such as conference call to facilitate and 
increase the participation of shareholders in GMs.26 The Saudi corporate governance, however, 
does not provide shareholders with such rights yet.27 Saudi Arabia needs to consider the 
utilization of forms of distance communication in conducting GMs. 
Furthermore, French law permits the creation of a shareholders’ association to represent 
the interests of shareholders, especially the minority shareholders.28 For instance, a shareholder 
association has the right to call for a GM convocation, to add items to the meeting agenda, to 
vote in the general meetings, and to file direct and derivative legal suits. The shareholders' 
23 The C.L. Article § (83). If a shareholder owns twenty shares or more, the company has no authority to 
prevent that shareholder from attending the GM. The C.L. Article § (83). The shareholder who wants to attend the 
GM must communicate his desire to attend before the commencement of the meeting. The C.L. Article § (90). 
Furthermore, the shareholder has to arrive before the commencement of the GM, as no shareholder will be admitted 
to the GM after its commencement. See the Legal Memo of the Deputy of the Minister of Commerce and Industry 
for Technical (legal) Affairs No. 11/2722 in 28/12/1414 [on file with the author]. The shareholder has to adhere to 
the rules of conduct during the GM and not cause any disturbance. See the Legal Memo of the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry No. 11/556 in 18/7/1400 [on file with the author] (the chairmen of the GM may expel any 
shareholder from the meeting if the shareholder deviates from the expected code of conduct). 
24 See chapter IV. 
25 SCGRs Article § (5)(e). 
26 French Commercial Code (FCC) article § (L 225-107) paragraph II. 
27 The new Saudi Company Law Draft permits the use of modern technology. 
28 French Commercial Code (FCC) article § (L 225-120). 
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association functions as a corporate governance tool that can increase the shareholders’ 
involvement in the company’s affairs. Accordingly, incorporation of such association into the 
Saudi corporate governance system may strengthen the participation of shareholders in the 
company and enhance the protection of shareholders’ rights. 
The legal framework governing the exercise of shareholder rights by proxy in Saudi 
listed companies’ represents another impediment to the shareholders’ right to participate in the 
company governance. This framework aims to curtail the voting power controlled by the proxy, 
under which no proxy is permitted to represent more than 5% of the company outstanding shares. 
Such political interference deters a development of a culture of proxy contests in the country and 
favor incumbent boards of directors.29 Tender offers and hostile takeovers are prominent 
corporate governance tools in the U.S. and other corporate governance systems. Thus, the U.S. 
and other have implemented a more liberal approach to proxy solicitation, which aims to 
facilitate the removal of board members as a disciplinary tool for underperforming boards. 
The U.S. proxy framework is more complex and elaborate, being governed for the most 
part by the rules of the Securities Exchange Commission (STC), than is its Saudi counterpart.30 
This elaboration is primarily the result of the high number of proxy contexts triggered in 
connection with hostile takeovers.31 Such an acquisition technique does not exist in Saudi Arabia 
due mainly to the pattern of ownership and political interference which restrict proxy solicitation 
to no more than 5% of the companies’ shares.32 At any event, the rise in the market share of 
29 See Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. OF FINANCE 737, 757 
(1997). 
30 See article § (14) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and see article § (7.22) of the MBCA. 
31 See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 235–34 (2003). 
32 For takeover, see generally Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 29, at 737, 756–57. 
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institutional investors may increase the occurrence of proxy contests and necessitate a radical 
reform in Saudi proxy regulation.33 
8.3.1.2 Right to Vote 
Shareholders are the only stakeholders under Saudi corporate governance who have the right to 
vote in the GM.34 Voting right resides on the top of the shareholders’ political rights because 
voting provides the shareholder, theoretically, with the power to share in the governance of the 
company with the board of directors. In this context, the SCGRs provide: 
Voting is deemed to be a fundamental right of a shareholder, which shall not, in 
any way, be denied. The company must avoid taking any action which might 
hamper the use of the voting right; a shareholder must be afforded all possible 
assistance as may facilitate the exercise of such right.35 
A key problem with the Saudi governance system is that a company may impose 
restrictions on the shareholder’s voting powers.36 SAFOLA Company’s bylaws, for example, 
grant one vote for every ten shares.37 Accordingly, the Saudi corporate governance system 
permits deviations from the best practice principle of one vote per share.38 The World Bank has 
criticized the Saudi CL approach of providing the company with the right to impose a minimum 
ownership level for attending meeting and regards Article (83) of the CL “as a procedural 
33 Because such increase is normally coupled with increase of proxy contests. See Hopt, supra note 4, at 1, 
48. 
34 The C.L. Article § (108)(1) and SCGRs Article § (3). 
35 SCGRs Article § (6)(a). 
36 See the C.L. Article § (107). The shares voting power is assigned to the bylaws. Id. However, the CL 
mandates that every shareholder attending the shareholders’ GM is entitled to cast at least one vote. 
37 SAFOLA Joint Stock Company Bylaws Article § (34). 
38 See id. 
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obstacle that impedes entitled shareholders from participating and voting in [the shareholders’ 
GM].”39 
Nonetheless, experience in Saudi listed companies indicates that they tend to implement 
the one vote per share principle.40 Such practice is similar to U.S. corporate governance.41 Puig 
and al-Haddab advocate the formal inclusion of the one vote per share principle in the CL to 
increase the protection of minority shareholders: 
The codification of this principle [one vote per share], which would establish the 
right to call for poll and, with it, a count of vote by shareholders, would facilitate 
the participation of minority shareholders in the company decisions.42 
On the contrary, the true benefits of formal integration of the “one vote per share” 
principle seem more connected to the protection of the majority shareholders from the minority 
shareholders. In systems such as the French system, which permit the issuance of multi-voting 
rights shares, the company might be controlled by a shareholder who has voting power that 
exceeds his equity rights in the company.43 These “super stocks” are a problem that cannot occur 
in a Saudi listed company due to statutory ban on the issuance of multi-voting rights shares. 44 
Recently, however, a number of modern Islamic scholars have called for permitting the issuance 
of multi voting rights stock in Saudi Arabia, in lieu of preferred stocks that would confer 
39 The World Bank, Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC), Corporate Governance 
Country Assessment: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 19 (2009). 
40 Gonzal Villata Puig & Badar Al-Haddab, The Protection of Minority Shareholders in the Gulf 
Cooperation Council, 13 J. CORP. LAW STUD. 123, 136 (2013). 
41 See Hopt, supra note 4. 
42 Puig & Al-Haddab, supra note 40. 
43 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk el al., Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and Dual Class Equity: The 
Mechanisms and Agency Costs of the Separation Control from Cash-Flow Rights, in CONCENTRATED CORPORATE 
OWNERSHIP 295, 297 (Randall K. Morck ed.). 
44 See the C.L. Article § (103). 
309 
                                                 
financial advantages of a type which are prohibited in Islam.45 Adoption of such proposal will 
undermine shareholders voting right and decrease the efficiency of Saudi corporate governance 
system. 
8.3.1.3 Right to Have Access to Company Information 
Like the French and the U.S. systems, the Saudi corporate governance system grants the 
shareholder the right to have access to the company’s information.46 The SCGRs encourage 
listed companies to offer the shareholders “[a]ll information which enables shareholders to 
properly exercise their rights.”47 According to this view, a shareholder’s right of information is a 
passive right that requires the shareholder to wait for the information offered to him in 
accordance with the disclosure framework.48 Thus, the quality of the disclosure framework has a 
strong connection to the degree of fulfillment of the shareholders’ right to information. However, 
the disclosure of the company’s information represents a single flip of the “right to information” 
coin. 
The wording of the CL suggests that the shareholder has another positive right connected 
to the right to information.49 This positive right would entitle every shareholder to examine the 
documents and books of the company, especially the ones that are not covered by “affirmative 
disclosures.” The CL does not provide a method or scope for the implementation of shareholder 
access to the company’s documents and books, in contrast to the U.S. system, in which this 
45 See Mubark bin Sulaiman Alfowaz, alaswaq almaliyah min mandur islami, 18 (2010). 
46 The C.L. Article § (108)(1). 
47 SCGRs Article § (4)(b). 
48 For disclosure under Saudi system see Chapter VI. 
49 The C.L. Article § (108)(1). 
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access would be achieved by filing a lawsuit.50 Providing shareholders with a statutory right to 
access the company’s documents and books would fill any such loophole in the CL's disclosure 
framework, strengthening the shareholders’ right to supervise the company's performance.51 
Up to this point, the Saudi corporate governance system has disregarded the right of 
shareholders to have access to the list of shareholders. The lack of such a provision may 
undermine the ability of shareholders to communicate with each other and to form blocks that 
can form a united position at the shareholders meeting. In contrast, the U.S. and French legal 
systems, as well as the OECD principles, recognize the importance of and provide a process for 
granting shareholders the right to access the shareholders list.52 This difference in provision for 
the right to access shareholder lists may be to due to the absence of the practice of tender offers 
in the Saudi system. 
8.3.1.4 Right to Sue 
The shareholder’s right to seek judicial redress is a fundamental right secured for every 
shareholder.53 The shareholder’s entitlement to sue the company aims to allow the shareholder to 
protect his rights and interests from any prejudice inflicted upon him by the company. The 
company has no authority to eliminate or restrict this fundamental right, and any action in this 
50 See MBCA Article § (16.04) 
51 However, this right may have a negative effect on the company, especially if it is utilized to harm the 
company’s interests by “bad intent” parties. For instance, the company’s competitors may use this right as an excuse 
to access undisclosed information of the company. Therefore, the approval of the shareholder request to access the 
company documents and books should be implemented guardedly, permitted only under special circumstances. 
52 See MBCA Article § (7.20) French Commercial Code (FCC) article § (L 225-116) and the OECD 
Principles, Principle (II)G. Shareholders in Saudi companies, also, do not have the power to send their proxy by 
mail. See Fahad Mohammad Almajid, A Conceptual Framework for Reforming the Corporate Governance of Saudi 
Publicly Held Companies: A Comparative and Analytical Study from a Legal Perspective (Ph.D.) 232 (2008) 
(unpublished dissertation University of Manchester). 
53 The C.L. Article § (108)(1) and SCGRs Article § (3). 
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regard will be considered null.54 The law entitles the shareholder to sue the company to protect 
his personal interests and to sue on behalf of the company to protect the company’s interests (the 
derivative suit). 
i. Direct Suits 
The OECD Principles suggest that a corporate governance system has to offer a reliable and 
effective mechanism for redressing any injuries inflicted on shareholders.55 The direct suit is one 
of these mechanisms, aimed at enabling shareholders to protect their rights. This suit is filed by 
the shareholder against the board of directors to redress any damages caused to him (the 
shareholder) personally.56 Unlike French law, Saudi law does not provide shareholders with the 
statutory right to pursue direct suit.57 
In any event, the direct suit represents a pivotal tool for the shareholders to guard their 
fundamental rights in the company. The refusal to allow the shareholder to attend the 
shareholders’ GM, or to have access to the company’s information, provide examples of causes 
of action for a direct suit. Filing a direct suit is not conditioned on any permission from the 
company. If the company’s action has harmed a group of shareholders, for example by denying 
them any of the rights associated with holding shares in the company, these shareholders may 
collectively sue the company. A possible deficiency is that the Saudi legal system does not 
54 The C.L. Article § (85). 
55 See OECD Principles, at 40. 
56 See MOHAMMAD HASAN AL-JABOR, SAUDI COMMERCIAL LAW 342 (4th ed. 1996) [in Arabic]. Corporate 
law scholars in the Middle East argue that the plaintiff does not have to be a shareholder at the time of filing the 
direct suit as long as the plaintiff was a shareholder when the prejudice occurred. See THARWAT ABDELRAHEIM, AL-
GANOUN AL-TIJARI ALMASRI 443–44 (1982). 
57 See French Commercial Code (FCC) article § (L 225-252). 
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recognize a class action suit. Accordingly, in Saudi Arabia, filing a direct suit by large scale 
group of shareholders may face procedural obstacles. 
In fact, without the existence of an effective class action avenue for redress, given the 
low return expected from this endeavor, a shareholder who has been discriminated against is not 
expected to pursue any judicial redress. A class action in a developed legal system, such as in the 
U.S, relies on the risk-taking lawyers who normally earn out-sized legal fees out of such cases by 
charging a small percentage of the compensation granted to every shareholder.58 
ii. Derivative Suits 
Aside from the direct suit, the shareholder has a statutory right to file a derivative suit on behalf 
of the company against the board of directors.59 The cause of action in a derivative suit differs 
from that of a direct suit whereby, in the derivative suit, the shareholder sues to protect the 
interest of the company and the interests of all shareholders from the board’s wrongful actions, 
while in the direct suit the shareholder seeks a judicial remedy for his personal injuries.60 The 
distinction between the cause of action of the direct suit and that of the derivative suit is not 
always crystal clear. 
The derivative suit represents an extraordinary course of action because, under the 
normal circumstances, the company – and not the shareholder or anyone else – is responsible to 
protect its (the company’s) own interests by suing its own directors for violation of the duties 
they owe the company. However, since the board of directors, as the legal representative of the 
58 JOSEPH SHADE, BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 208 (2006). 
59 The C.L. Article § (108)(1) and SCGRs Article § (3). 
60 For the distinction between the direct and derivative suits, see MUSTAFA KAMAL TAHA, AL-SHARIKAT 
AL-TIJARIYAH 278–79 (1997). 
313 
                                                 
company, may not have the desire to bring a suit against itself or one of its members, 
shareholders are granted this right to fill this void and assist the company in defending its 
interests.61 A prominent example of a derivative suit cause of action is the case in which the 
board of directors fails in administering the company, an action which normally triggers civil 
liability on the part of the board members. 
The shareholder is obligated to notify the company about his intention to file a derivative 
suit.62 However, the company does not have the right to permit or deter the shareholder from 
filing a derivative suit.63 The suing shareholder has to prove that the board’s action caused 
damages to his personal interests. It is not enough to prove general harm caused to the company. 
The limitations imposed on the derivative suit are stated clearly in the CL: 
Every shareholder shall have the right to institute the action in liability against 
directors on behalf of the company if the wrongful act committed by them is of a 
nature to cause him personal prejudice. However, the shareholder may institute 
such action only if the company’s right to institute it is still valid and after 
notifying the company of his intention to do so. If a shareholder institutes such 
action, he shall be adjudged (compensation) only to the extent of the prejudice 
caused to him.64 
Permitting the shareholder to file a derivative suit without the approval of the company or 
offering the company, an opportunity to decide whether to take action or not against the board of 
directors, is in contradiction to the nature of a derivative suit. The company is the principal in 
this case, not the shareholder, as the shareholder is merely suing on the company’s behalf. The 
61 See AL-JABOR, supra note 56. 
62 The C.L. Article § (78). 
63 AKTHAM AMEIN AL-KHOULI, DOUROUS FI AL-QANOUN AL-TIJARI AL-SAUDI 244 (1973). 
64 The C.L. Article § (78). 
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CL's lenient requirements for derivative suits are consistent with the French legal approach.65 In 
contrast, U.S. law does not permit shareholders to file a derivative suit before requesting 
formally (the demand principle) that the company protects its interests.66 Only if the company 
fails to do so, may the shareholder file a suit on its behalf.67 
French law permits shareholders to sue for the entire amount of damages inflicted on the 
company,68 whereas Saudi law only permits suing for personal damages inflicted on the 
shareholder filing the suit.69 Limiting compensation granted in a derivative suit to personal 
damages represents another nonsense restriction, especially considering the fact that any 
compensation goes to the company, not the shareholder. 
8.3.2 Economic Rights 
The Saudi corporate governance provides shareholders with a number of economic rights. 
Remarkably, shareholders have the right transfer shares,70 obtain dividedness,71 and receive part 
65 The French Commercial Code (FCC) article § (L 225-253). See also James A. Fanto, The Role of 
Corporate Law in French Corporate Governance, 13 J. CORNELL INT’L L.J. 31, 82 (1998). Nonetheless, a cost-
benefit analysis by any small shareholder would lead that shareholder to shy away from pursuing a suit against the 
company. See Fahad Mohammad Almajid, A Conceptual Framework for Reforming the Corporate Governance of 
Saudi Publicly Held Companies: A Comparative and Analytical Study from a Legal Perspective (Ph.D.) 242 (2008) 
(unpublished dissertation University of Manchester). 
66 See Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA) Article § (7.42). 
67 See id. 
68 The French Commercial Code (FCC) article § (L 225-252). 
69 The C.L. Article § (78). 
70 Shareholders normally purchase stocks to resell for profit. The right to transfer ownership is a 
fundamental right that is guaranteed by the CL for every shareholder. See the C.L. Article § (108)(1) and SCGRs 
Article § (3).  However, the right to transfer shares is not an absolute right. Statutory and contractual restrictions 
may deter the transferability of public (listed) joint stock companies’ shares. There are statutory and contractual 
restrictions on the transferability of shares. The statutory restrictions on share transferability aim to protect lay 
people from investing in economically unviable enterprises. The founding shareholders have to prove that they are 
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of the assets that remain after liquidation.72 Generally speaking, the shareholders’ economic 
rights under Saudi corporate governance system are similar to the rights granted under most 
governance systems and conform to the OECD Principles. 
However, a number of issues are associated with the approach adopted by the Saudi 
system to implementing such rights. For one thing, the Saudi corporate governance is not aligned 
with the Islamic disapproval of preferred stocks, which provide the shareholder with the right to 
obtain a pre-determined amount of dividend or to have a priority over other shareholders in 
receiving company assets in the event of liquidation.73 Accordingly, such statutory rights, more 
than likely, will be disregarded by courts.74 
The Saudi corporate governance does not oblige the company to distribute dividends; 
however, if the company decides to distribute any dividends, the distribution has to be not less 
inviting investors to participate in a real project, not just a fraudulent scheme that intends just to collect assets from 
unsophisticated investors. For statutory restrictions see Article § (100) of the C.L. and LRs Article § (49)(a). 
Bylaws, on the other hand, may impose some restrictions on the transferability of shares, a practice called 
“contractual restrictions.” See C.L. Article § (101). However, contractual restrictions on share transferability 
represent an exceptional matter in listed companies because such restriction contradicts with the idea of listing, 
which aims to offer investors a liquid market of stocks. 
In this context, the LRs have stipulated for admission to the Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul): 
The securities must be freely transferable and tradable. Any restriction on transferability must be 
approved by the [CMA] and all investors must be provided with appropriate information to enable 
dealing in such securities to take place on an open and fair basis. 
LRs Article § (12)(b). 
71 The C.L. Article § (108)(1) and Article § (127) and SCGRs Article § (3). The shareholder right of 
receiving dividends emerges after the shareholders’ GM approves the proposed distributions. The C.L. Article 
§ (127). The shareholders’ GM role in this process is merely to approve or reject the payout proposal: the GM has 
no legal power to modify the board’s proposal. 
72 The C.L. Article § (108). 
73 The C.L. Article § (108)(2)b. 
74 For the importance of compatibility with Islamic rules under Saudi legal system see chapters II, V and 
VI. 
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than five percent of the company’s capital.75 This mandatory distribution percentage represents 
an investor protection tool. However, such an action may hinder the company’s plans to expand 
by reinvesting profits in new projects. The “five percentage distribution or nothing” policy may 
prevent many companies from distributing dividends at all. Additionally, the distribution of five 
percent of capital is high enough to discourage companies from raising their capital to avoid a 
rise in the required distribution threshold in the future. 
Accordingly, a shift from this “one size fits all approach” towards a more flexible 
approach of dividend distribution is recommended. The Saudi corporate governance may rectify 
this matter by instituting one of the following options: abolishing the mandatory distribution 
percentage entirely; lowering the mandatory of distribution threshold; or linking the mandatory 
percentage to the net profit, not the capital. It is worth noting, however, that such practices do not 
find support in the corporate governance systems of developed countries, which for the most 
part, have left this matter for words of duties to handle, with providing judicial protection for 
aggravated shareholders on a case by case basis. 
75 Although this is the adopted practice under Saudi law, the language of CL implies a mandatory 
distribution of five percent of capital: 
The company’s bylaws shall specify the percentage to be distributed among stockholders out of 
the net profits, after deduction of the statutory and the contractual reserves, provided this 
percentage is not less than 5% of the capital. 
The C.L. Article § (127). 
If the company does not realize enough net profits in any financial year, it could cover the shortage to the 
five percent with retained profits and thus pay out dividends to the shareholders. 
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8.4 THE SHAREHOLDERS' DUTIES 
The shareholder, as an element of the company’s production team, has several duties. For 
instance, the shareholder has to pay the full price of shares,76 major shareholders have to disclose 
their ownership in the company,77 and all shareholders must respect restrictions on 
transferability.78 
A shareholder must refrain from using his rights in a manner that may cause unfair 
prejudice to his fellow shareholders.79 Unfair prejudice is commonly inflicted by the majority 
shareholders on the minority shareholders, for example, by not paying dividends for several 
years while enjoining the merits of the company assets, such as board membership or contracting 
with the company. Islamic law is against all forms of unfair practice, whether inflicted by the 
majority or by the minority.80 Although such a duty does not imply that shareholders have a 
fiduciary duty to one another, this non-statutory duty has a key implication for the Saudi 
corporate governance system, especially with regard to the protection of minority shareholders. 
In any event, a shareholder in Saudi Arabia is expected to act in accordance with Islamic 
principles. Practices such as unfair prejudice, or provisions in the CL and other corporate 
governance documents that contradict Islamic principles will not excuse shareholders from their 
76 The C.L. Article § (110). The shareholder is required to pay at least twenty-five percent of the nominal 
value of the share and pay the rest upon demand from the company. The C.L. Article § (58). 
77 See chapter VI. 
78 See supra note (68). 
79 See KHALID AL-RWAIS & RIZG AL-RAYIS, ALMADKAL LEDRAST ALAULUM ALQANONIAH 341 (maktabit 
alshugri: 2002). Unfair prejudice occurs if the holder of the right exercises his right in a way that may cause harm to 
others, or if such exercise may inflict harm on others that exceeds the interests the holder of the right aims to 
achieve, and if this right is employed to realize illegitimate interests. See generally id. at 342–46. 
80 For the Islamic perspective on unfair prejudice, see generally FATHI AL-DURANI, NADARIYAH ALTAASUF 
FI ISTIMAAL ALHAQ FI ALFIQH ALISLAMI (4th ed. 1988). 
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obligation; moreover, any rights which stem from these conflicting provisions will not be 
recognized in Saudi courts of law. Any contradiction between statutes and Shariah (Islamic law) 
as the supreme law of the land, represents a major problem in the Saudi legal system and with 
the reliability of its corporate governance system. Finally, the government as a shareholder is 
expected to refrain from using its political power to interfere in company business.81 
8.5 SHAREHOLDERS’ POWER: THE ORDINARY SHAREHOLDERS’ GM VS. 
THE EXTRAORDINARY SHAREHOLDERS’ GM 
The CL recognizes two types of shareholders’ GMs, the ordinary shareholders’ GM and the 
extraordinary shareholders’ GM.82 Every company is obliged to hold at least one ordinary 
shareholder’s GM every year (the annual ordinary shareholders’ GM).83 Other ordinary GMs 
(exceptional ordinary GMs) may be held on an ad hoc basis.84 However, not every responsibility 
assigned to shareholders can be decided by the ordinary shareholder’ GM (annual or 
exceptional). A number of key decisions have to be decided by a special kind of shareholders’ 
meeting, the shareholders’ extraordinary GM. 
81 OECD Guidelines, Chapter (II)B and C. 
82 There is a shareholders meeting that is convened only once in the company’s life, during the 
incorporation period, and is called the "constituent shareholders’ meeting." This meeting is responsible for 
supervising and approving the incorporation process, including the valuation of in-kind contributions, the 
appointment of the first board members, and the designation of the first external auditor. See the C.L. Article 
§§ (60–62). 
83 The C.L. Article § (84) and SCGRs Article § (5)(a). 
84 The other regular meetings might be called by the board, shareholders, external auditor, or administrative 
authority. 
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Nearly all civil law countries have a similar organization for shareholders’ GMs.85 Such 
an organizational framework follows subjective criteria in differentiating between the functions 
of ordinary and extraordinary shareholders GMs. Matters concerning the regular course of 
business are assigned to the ordinary shareholders’ GM, whereas non-ordinary matters are 
assigned to the extraordinary shareholders GM. The U.S corporate governance system, by 
contrast, has adopted objective criteria, which designate an annual shareholder GM, which is 
held once a year, and special shareholders GMs that are convened on an ad hoc basis by request 
for the purpose of deciding on any matter that falls within the shareholders’ scope of authority.86 
The main goal in creating two different schemes of shareholders’ GMs is to increase the 
protection of shareholders. Accordingly, extraordinary shareholders’ GMs have a different scope 
of power, as well as stricter convocation and resolution quorums. Requiring that key decisions 
comply with higher procedural requirements conforms with best practice in corporate 
governance, as for example the OECD Principles suggest.87 
8.5.1 Scope of Shareholders’ Power 
Ordinary shareholders’ GMs (annual or exceptional) have a power of regular business matters. 
The ordinary shareholders’ GM is responsible, for instance, for appointing and removing board 
members,88 relieving board members of their liability for administrating the company at the end 
85 See, e.g., The French Commercial Code (FCC) Article § (L 225-38). 
86 See MBCA Articles §§ (7.01) and (7.02) 
87 See OECD Principles, at 40. 
88 The C.L. Article § (66). 
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of every financial year,89 and approving conflicts of interests in transactions connected to 
members of the board of directors.90 Recent data on shareholders’ GMs demonstrate that 
requests for approval of transactions involving conflicts of interest by the board of directors have 
increased recently (see Figure No. 5). This increase may have come as a result of improving the 
framework of corporate governance in the country. 
 
 
Figure 5. The Conflict of Interests Approval Requests to the Shareholders GM of the Saudi Listed 
Sources: The Saudi Capital Market Authority (CMA), the Annual Statistical Report on 
Corporate Governance of the listed companies (2011/2012) [on file with the author] 
On the other hand, the extraordinary shareholders’ GM has exclusive authority to 
approve any alterations of the company’s bylaws.91 Any increase or decrease in the company’s 
89 The relive has to happen at the end of every financial year. The C.L. Article § (77). 
90 The C.L. Articles §§ (69, 70, 71). 
91 Id. § (85). The power of the extraordinary meeting to modify the company’s bylaws has several 
limitations. The extraordinary meeting is not permitted to insert any change to the company’s bylaws that may lead 
to depriving a shareholder from any fundamental right, to change the nationality of the company, to move the 
company headquarters outside of Saudi Arabia, or enact modifications that may impose additional financial burden 
on the shareholder. In addition, the extraordinary GM is not permitted to change the company’s objectives. See id. 
That does not mean the meeting cannot add objectives that are connected directly or indirectly to the company’s 
original goals. If the company desires to change its objectives completely, it has to dissolve and start over again as a 
new enterprise. This strict restraint on alterations to the main objectives represents an outdated and impractical 
approach that hinders the perpetual survival of a Saudi company. Pursuing a more liberal approach in this regard 
will permit companies to adapt their businesses and pursue new objectives when such companies lose their 
competitive advantage in their original business objectives or find better, more lucrative business ventures to pursue. 
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capital requires approval from this meeting.92 The extraordinary GM is responsible for making 
decisions regarding dissolving or not dissolving the company, whenever the company loses three 
quarters or more of its capital.93 
A key issue in the Saudi corporate governance system is that no approval from 
shareholders is required before selling all or most of the company’s assets. This represents a 
legal deficiency, which conflicts with the good governance standards, which are recommended in 
the OECD Principles.94 The sale of assets is a tool commonly used to strip minority shareholders 
of their economic rights. Furthermore, such a loophole may increase the chance of an external 
entity acquiring the company without the shareholders approval, through a “triangular merger.”95 
By contrast, the U.S. corporate governance system requires shareholders’ approval for such an 
extraordinary action.96 Saudi corporate governance needs to adopt such a provision in order to 
prevent the board of directors (typically, dominant shareholders) from transferring the 
company’s assets to other pocket without the knowledge (stripping off assets) or assent (reverse 
merger) of shareholders. 
Accordingly, a remarkable company like Nokia, which started in the wood business and later evolved into one of the 
most important telecommunication companies of the world, would not have succeeded if it had been incorporated 
under Saudi law. For the story of Nokia object adaption. See Nokia website, available at 
http://www.nokia.com/global/about-nokia/about-us/the-nokia-story/ (accessed on July 10, 2013). 
92 The C.L. Article § (134) and § (142). 
93 Id. § (148). If the meeting is in favor of keeping the company in existence, the meeting has to reduce the 
company’s capital to the limit which reflects the company’s actual financial standing. See the C.L. Article § (142). 
94 OECD Principles, Principle (II)B. 
95 See Fanto, supra note 65, at 31, 37. 
96 See MBCA § (12.02)(a). 
322 
                                                                                                                                                             
8.5.2 B. Procedural Guarantees 
The Saudi corporate governance system has established number of procedural guarantees, which 
surround the convocation of shareholder’ GM, as well as the decision making process in the 
GMs. The main aim of these formalities is to ensure that decisions of the company represent of 
the will of majority of shareholders while protecting the interests of minority shareholders. The 
extent of procedural protection is linked to the nature of the decisions which the shareholders are 
expected to make. Accordingly, the Saudi corporate governance system implements higher 
procedural standards for extraordinary GMs in comparison to the standards required for the 
ordinary GM, due to the crucial function bestowed upon the extraordinary GM. 
8.5.2.1 1. Convocation of Shareholders’ GMs 
The valid convention of an ordinary meeting requires the attendance of a group of shareholders 
who collectively control at least half of the company’s capital.97 If that threshold is not met, 
another invitation for a second meeting is required.98 The second meeting will be valid no matter 
how many shareholders are in attendance.99 Official records indicate that most ordinary GMs are 
successfully convened the first time (see Figure No. 6). Conversely, extraordinary GM requires 
the attendance of shareholders who own at least fifty percent of the company’s capital.100 Not 
97 The C.L. Article § (91). 
98 Id. The company cannot issue an invitation to two meetings in the same invitation. For instance, the 
invitation to the first ordinary GM notes that if the attendance of the first ordinary GM does not reach the prescribed 
quorum for convention, a second ordinary GM will be held at other specified date. See the legal memo of the 
Deputy of the Minister of Commerce and Industry for Technical (Legal) Affairs No. 11/2589 in 25/11/1411 [on file 
with the author]. 
99 The C.L. Article § (91). 
100 Id. § (92). 
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satisfying this threshold requires an invitation for a second meeting, which will be valid only if 
shareholders owning at least a quarter of the company capital are present or represented in the 
meeting.101 
 
 
 
Figure 6. The Number of Ordinary GM Convened According to First and the Second Times 
Invitations 
Source: the Saudi Capital Market Authority (CMA), the Annual Statistical Report on Corporate 
Governance of Listed Companies (2011/2012) [on file with the author] 
8.5.2.2 2. Resolutions of Shareholders’ GMs 
The resolutions presented at the ordinary GM are adopted by a simple majority vote of the shares 
present or represented in the meeting,102 while at the extraordinary GM, resolutions require an 
affirmative vote of two thirds.103 Furthermore, a three quarters affirmative vote is required if the 
resolution is related to changing the company’s capital (increasing or decreasing it), extending 
the life of the company, dissolving the company before the time prescribed in the company 
101 Id. 
102 Id. § (91). 
103 Id. § (92). 
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bylaws, or merging the company with or into another company.104 The OECD Principles 
encourage imposing such higher voting thresholds in various crucial matters as a tool to protect 
small investors from the power of the majority of the shareholders.105 
The question of shareholders voting on measures in which they have a particular interest 
raises an issue under the Saudi corporate governance system. On one hand, there is no rule 
preventing interested shareholders from voting at any of the shareholders’ meetings.106 In 
practice, however, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry has banned interested shareholders 
from voting on relevant resolutions.107 In contrast, the French system merely prevents an 
interested major shareholder (owning 10% of the shares) from voting.108 In another approach to 
the issue, U.S. law does not prevent interested shareholders from voting on resolutions at 
shareholders’ meeting.109 
Deterring interested shareholder from voting seems a reasonable measure in a 
concentrated ownership system, such as the Saudi system, which also lack an effective judicial 
system to supervise such issues on a case by case basis. However, the current practice of 
preventing all interested shareholders from voting under any circumstance is without 
justification; shareholders are expected to vote in a manner that might further their personal 
104 Id. 
105 See OECD Principles, at 40. 
106 One exception of that is members of the board of directors are not permitted to vote on matters which 
could involve releasing them from liability. The C.L. Article § (93). 
107 For abstaining votes exclusion from voting quorum see the Legal Memo of the Ministry of Commerce 
and Industry No. 11/283 in 10/12/1405 [on file with the author]. 
108 See The French Commercial Code (FCC) article § (L 225-38). 
109 See ARTHUR R. PINTO & DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE LAW 278 (2013). 
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interests.110 Accordingly, limiting such restrictions to situations such as that of major 
shareholders as in the French system is more advisable. 
8.6 MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS’ PROTECTION 
8.6.1 Introduction 
The shareholders’ role in publicly held companies mainly refers to the role of the majority 
shareholders.111 The validity of the majority decision making model is not challenged here; it is 
deemed the best available governance model for large organizations such as listed companies, 
wherein the consensus decision making model could not effectively serve as an alternative 
governance model.112 
However, the majority shareholders may use this model as an opportunity to neglect the 
interests of the minority shareholders,113 for example, in event of a tender offer, excluding the 
110 See PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 109 (“[g]enerally a shareholder has no fiduciary duty when voting 
her shares because pursuing one’s economic self interest is the usual reason why one invests in shares”). Id. 
111 The rule of the majority is the commonly accepted decision making structure for joint stock companies. 
The shareholders who own more than fifty percent of company shares (in some cases two thirds or three quarters of 
the shares) have control of the decision making process in the shareholders’ GM. 
112 See ABDULFADEIL MOHAMMAD AHMED, HIYMAYIT AL-AGALEIH 13 (1987). 
113 The C.L. law does not provide a definition of minority shareholders. However, the SCGRs defines 
minority shareholders as the “shareholders who represent a class of shareholders that does not control the company 
and hence they are unable to influence the company.” SCGRs Article § (1). 
Similarly, the new Principles of Corporate Governance for Banks Operating in Saudi Arabia defined 
minority shareholders as the “shareholders who represent a segment of non-controlling investors of the bank and, 
therefore, they are not able to affect the bank’s policy and trends.” See the definition of “minority shareholders” in 
the Principles of Corporate Governance for Banks Operating in Saudi Arabia (2102). 
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minority from sharing in the company’s financial gains. The exploitation of minority 
shareholders may take various forms that aim ultimately to absorb the company’s resources, such 
as, contracting with the company for personal benefits, using the company assets for personal 
interests, or appointing relatives or friends to positions in the company). 
The general rights of shareholders provide modest protection for minority shareholders. 
The best practices, such as laid out in the OECD Principles, suggest conferring a special 
protection on minority shareholders.114 Today, providing minority shareholders with special 
statutory protection is an encouraged practice in nearly all corporate governance systems. 
However, the nature and scope of such protection vary from one system to another. The 
protection of minority shareholder aims to increase the confidence of the minority in the market 
and in companies, which will hopefully boost the equity finance supply for companies and 
allocate investor assets to a better wealth-production engine: the company. 
Saudi corporate governance contains a number of rules aimed at providing minority 
shareholders with special rights. The protection of minority shareholders represents one of the 
most significant and challenging issues for the Saudi corporate governance model due to the 
concentrated ownership pattern prevailing in the listed companies. 
The rule of the majority is the commonly accepted decision making structure for joint stock companies. 
The shareholders who own more than fifty percent of company shares (in some cases two thirds or three quarters of 
the shares) have control of the decision making process in the shareholders’ GM. 
114 See OECD Principles, at 40. 
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8.6.2 Protection through Specific Statutory Provisions 
8.6.2.1 Right to Call and Attend the Shareholders’ GM 
Like their counterparts operating under French and U.S. corporate laws,115 minority shareholders 
in Saudi listed companies are empowered to request the convention of an ad hoc (exceptional) 
ordinary GM.116 If this meeting had not been convened within the legally prescribed period, a 
minority shareholder with two percent ownership of the company’s capital has the right to 
request to the convention of a shareholder’s annual ordinary GM.117 The minority shareholders’ 
right to call an ad hoc GM provides the minority with the ability to participate in the governance 
of the company and to raise their concern through a formal process under which the “Saudi 
minority shareholders can exert pressure on the board of directors when their interests are at 
stake.”118 
Shareholders in the United State have to file a petition with the court in order to force the 
convention of a belated meeting.119 The French system grants minority shareholders the right to 
115 See French Commercial Code (FCC) article § (L 225-103) and the MBCA (7.02) paragraph (a) 
subparagraph (2). 
116 See the C.L. Article § (87). The CL does not explicitly require minority shareholders to provide a reason 
for requesting the convention of the GM. However, it is implausible that the minority shareholders would submit a 
request for calling the GM without enclosing a reason because no shareholders’ GM will be conducted without an 
agenda. If the reason provided for convening the shareholders GM is evidently beyond the ordinary GM powers, for 
example, amending the company’s bylaws, increasing or decreasing the company’s capital, or dissolving the 
company), the board may have discretion to reject the minority shareholder’s request. 
117 The C.L. Article § (87). 
118 Puig & Al-Haddab, supra note 40, at 123, 135. See also Fahad Mohammad Almajid, A Conceptual 
Framework for Reforming the Corporate Governance of Saudi Publicly Held Companies: A Comparative and 
Analytical Study from a Legal Perspective (Ph.D.) 233 (2008) (unpublished dissertation University of Manchester) 
(he said: “ Saudi legal system can be regareded as pro-shareholder, since the percentage required to call . . . [GM] is 
only 5%.” Id 
119 MBCA § (7.03)(a)(1). 
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request the convention of ordinary and extraordinary GMs.120 Unlike the French system, the 
Saudi governance system does not provide minority shareholders with the right to request the 
convention of an extraordinary GM. Accordingly, the minority shareholders’ right to call 
shareholders’ GM is truncated under the Saudi corporate governance system. The adoption of 
provisions based on the French approach will increase the protection of minority shareholders in 
Saudi companies and will increase of their opportunity for participation in the company’s 
decision making process. Without such provisions, minority shareholder in Saudi companies will 
be locked out of process of proposing major actions concerning company business such as 
decrees, increasing company capital, or even dissolving the company. 
One the other hand, Saudi corporate governance system does not guarantee every 
shareholder the right to attend the shareholders’ GM.121 Only shareholders with at least twenty 
shares have such a guarantee.122 Many companies have imposed the twenty-share threshold as 
the qualification for attending the shareholder’s meeting (see figure 7). 
 
120 French Commercial Code (FCC) article § (L 225-103) paragraph II subparagraph 2. 
121 The attendance requirements of the shareholders GM are outlined in the company’s bylaws. The C.L. 
Article § (83). 
122 The C.L. Article § (83). 
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Figure 7. Number of Shares Required for Shareholders GM Attendance in the Largest 20 Saudi 
Listed Companies (Based on Market Capitalization) 
 
Source: The Companies’ Bylaws [on file with the author] 
This restrictive approach may impede many minority shareholders from attending general 
meetings.123 Permitting shareholders in Saudi listed companies to form shareholder’ associations, 
as in the French system,124 may decrease this problem in the corporate governance of the Saudi 
system. 
8.6.2.2 Right to Add Items to the GM Agenda 
Agenda preparation for the shareholders’ GM is the responsibility of the board of directors.125 
Although the CL, theoretically, intends to exclude shareholders from agenda preparation, 
economic reality indicates that this goal may not always be appropriate. In a concentrated 
ownership system, like the Saudi pattern of ownership, the majority of the shareholder controls 
the board of directors, and their actions include indirect control of the shareholders GM 
agenda.126 Accordingly, several corporate governance systems, specifically the French system 
and the OECD Principles compensate for such problems by providing minority shareholders with 
123 See the World Bank, Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC), Corporate Governance 
Country Assessment: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 19 (2009). Nonetheless, shareholders who do not meet the 
attendance threshold and who express an interest to attend may collaborate and collect the required amount of shares 
for attending the meeting. TAHA, supra note 60, at 294–95. 
124 See French Commercial Code (FCC) article § (L 225-120). 
125 The C.L. Article §§ (87) and (88). 
126 It should be noted this problem exists in dispersed ownership systems. 
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a specific holding percentage the right to add items to the GM agenda.127 Unfortunately, the 
Saudi corporate governance system has not pursued the same path. 
The SCGRs complement this vacuum in the Saudi corporate governance system by 
suggesting that “shareholders holding not less than 5% of the company’s shares are entitled to 
add one or more items to the agenda.”128 The scope of implementation of this nonbinding 
principle is not relevant if enough protection is provided for minority shareholders or if 
mandatory empowerment of this group is necessary. Accordingly, the Saudi corporate 
governance system should grant minority shareholders the explicit mandatory right to add items 
to the agenda of the shareholders’ meeting. 
8.6.2.3 Right to Request Dividends 
The company is not obliged to pay out dividends to the shareholders.129 The majority 
shareholders, through their elected board, could retain the company’s profits, reinvesting the 
profits indefinitely. The CL does not include any statutory protection which might allow 
minority shareholders to compel the company to distribute dividends under certain conditions. 
Similarly, the French and U.S. legal systems do not provide shareholders with a statutory right to 
request dividend payouts. 
127 French Commercial Code (FCC) article § (L 225-105) and OECD Principles, at 40. 
128 SCGRs Article § (6)(f). See Fahad Mohammad Almajid, A Conceptual Framework for Reforming the 
Corporate Governance of Saudi Publicly Held Companies: A Comparative and Analytical Study from a Legal 
Perspective (Ph.D.) 233 (2008) (unpublished dissertation University of Manchester) ( Almajid argues that: “ such 
right can help to support the position of small shareholders against that of the state or of families which have a 
powerful stake in the companies through their heavy investment.” Id 
129 The profits realized by the company are for the company, not for the shareholders. Shareholder rights 
over this profit appear at the time of the shareholders GM approval of the dividends payout. See the C.L. Article 
§ (127). 
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Brazil is a rare example of a country that provides shareholders of publicly held 
companies with mandatory annual payouts of dividends.130 The adoption of such a right may 
work for countries with patterns of concentrated ownership and weak institutional frameworks, 
such as that of the Saudi system. Providing shareholders with mandatory dividend payments may 
not prevent the majority shareholders from exploiting company assets and reinvesting company 
profits, but it may decrease such abuse of minority shareholders rights. 
8.6.2.4 Cumulative Voting in Board Elections 
In Saudi Arabia, the appointment of the board members comes through regular voting 
mechanisms which give all of the board seats to the majority shareholders. However, the SCGRs 
strongly recommend the adoption of a cumulative voting mechanism for electing board 
members.131 Cumulative voting aims to allow minority shareholders to elect one or more board 
members to represent their interests on the board, a situation that would be almost impossible 
under conventional “straight” voting mechanisms.132 The board members elected by the minority 
shareholders are expected to be whistleblowers, whose function is to ensure that board members 
are exerting the board’s power for the interests of the company and all the shareholders, not 
solely those of the interests of the dominant shareholders or the board members’ personal 
130 See Daniela Mesquita, Brazil, in GOVERNANCE AND RISK: AN ANALYTICAL HANDBOOK FOR INVESTORS, 
MANAGERS, DIRECTORS, AND STAKEHOLDERS 424, 432 (George S. Dallas ed., 2004). 
131 SCGRs Article § (6)(b). 
132 Id. § (2). See Fahad Mohammad Almajid, A Conceptual Framework for Reforming the Corporate 
Governance of Saudi Publicly Held Companies: A Comparative and Analytical Study from a Legal Perspective 
(Ph.D.) 238 (2008) (unpublished dissertation University of Manchester) (he remarked: “ [w]hether this new tool 
[CV] will work in favor of minority shareholders remain to be seen. However, at least, in a theoretical sense, the 
position of minority shareholders has been reinforced by the introduction of cumulative voting.”) Id 
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interests. The inclusion of a mandatory cumulative voting method in a national corporate 
governance system complies with the best practices suggested by the OECD Principles.133 
In contrast to these Principles, the French corporate governance system takes issue with 
the use of cumulative voting as a tool for enabling minority shareholders to have representation 
on the board and thus a window (not control) on corporate affairs.134 This position leads directly 
to the formation of the board exclusively in the hands of the majority shareholders, despite the 
fact that the board is required to observe the interests of the company which includes the interests 
of all minority shareholders.135 
Today, many listed companies adopt cumulative voting, and it is expected that most 
listed companies will be implementing this voting method within a very few years (see Figure 8). 
The rapid pace of adopting this voting method is surprising because it is not supported by any 
legal sanction or listing requirements. In any case, the formal incorporation of mandatory 
cumulative voting rules for board member election is advisable under the CL. 
 
Figure 8. The Adoption of Cumulative Voting in Electing the Board Members (2010–2012) 
133 See THE OECD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES 42 (2004).  
134 AFEB-MEDEF, Corporate Governance Code of Listed Corporations, Principle 9 (2013). 
135 Id. 
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Source: the Saudi Capital Market Authority (CMA), the Annual Statistical Report on Corporate 
Governance of the listed companies (2011/2012) [on file with the author] 
8.6.3 Equal and Fair Treatment of Shareholders and its Implications for Minority 
Shareholders 
8.6.3.1 Preemptive Rights 
The company has the power to increase its capital through the issuance of new stock.136 This 
method of obtaining new capital may cause an alteration of the ownership structure of the 
company.137 To protect shareholders’ ownership stake and prevent any dilution of their 
ownership rights, the CL provides existing shareholders with a priority right, called a 
“preemptive rights”, to buy the newly issued stock.138 U.S. law does not grant a mandatory 
preemptive right to shareholders.139 
Under these provisions, the company bylaws may restrict the shareholders’ preemptive 
rights and possibly eliminate this right completely.140 More importantly, the government has the 
136 The C.L. Article § (135)(1) and (2). 
137 See KHALID AL-SHAWI, QANUN AL-SHARIKAT AL-TIJARIYAH AL-IRAQI 360 (1968), cited in Mohammad 
al-Jabor, The Capital Increase in Joint Stock Companies and the Preemptive rights in Subscribing in the Saudi 
Companies Law, 9 J. OF THE COLLEGE OF ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCE OF KING SAUDI UNIVERSITY 37, 52–53 (1984–
1983). 
138 See the C.L. Article § (136). For detailed analysis for preemptive rights under Saudi law, see al-Jabor, 
supra note 137, at 37. Preemptive rights arise in the event of a proposal to issue shares in return for cash. Shares 
issued in return for in kind contributions do not give rise to preemptive rights. C.L. Articles § (135)(1) and § (136). 
See also Fahad Mohammad Almajid, A Conceptual Framework for Reforming the Corporate Governance of Saudi 
Publicly Held Companies: A Comparative and Analytical Study from a Legal Perspective (Ph.D.) 243 (2008) 
(unpublished dissertation University of Manchester). 
139 See Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA) Article § (6.30)(a). 
140 The C.L. Article § (136). 
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right to restrict shareholders from using their preemptive rights and, in some cases, to eliminate 
this right.141 
Although preemptive rights equally benefit all shareholders, this right may have a special 
meaning to the minority shareholders.142 Preemptive rights protect minority shareholders’ 
position in the company by allowing them to keep their shareholding stake intact, leading to the 
retention of minority voting power.143 For instance, a minority shareholder who has shares 
sufficient to entitle him to request the convention of a shareholders’ GM may find himself below 
the required threshold because of the decrease in his percentage of ownership, as a result of 
increases in the outstanding share size of the company.144 Accordingly, the recognition of 
preemptive rights in the CL increases the protection of the minority shareholders by permitting 
minority shareholders to safeguard their ownership from dilution. 
8.6.3.2 Compulsory Purchase (Tagalong) Rights 
The OECD Principles assert that shareholders are entitled to a fair price for their shares at the 
time of acquisition.145 The CL lacks any provision to protect the interests of the minority 
141 See article 136 of CL which provides: 
The Council of Ministers ... may cancel or restrict the preemptive rights in respect of the following 
companies: (a) Concessionary companies; (b) Companies that manage a public utility; (c) 
Companies that receive subsidy from the Government; (d) Companies in which the Government is 
a shareholder; (e) Companies engaging in banking services. 
142 See THE OECD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES 42 (2004). 
143 The World Bank, Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC), Corporate Governance 
Country Assessment: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 24 (2009). 
144 This is known as “dilution of shareholders rights.” The exercise of preemptive rights may open a door 
for minority shareholders to increase their shareholding on account of other shareholders who relinquish the exercise 
of their preemptive rights. Therefore, a minority shareholder who has an ownership level that does not permit him to 
request a convention of shareholder meeting may increase his ownership share to reach a level that permits doing so. 
145 See OECD Principles, at 42. 
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shareholders at the time of acquisition, except for the general provision that requires the 
treatment of all shares of the same class equally.146 However, the Capital Market Law (CML) 
and the Implementing Regulation for Merger and Acquisition (MAR) fills in this crucial gap. 
Under the CML, the acquirer of the fifty percent or more of a listed company may have to buy 
the shares of the other shareholders, as Article 54 of the CML provides: 
If any person increased its ownership of shares in a given company through a 
restricted purchase of shares or restricted offer for shares so that such person ... 
become the owner of (50%) fifty percent or more of a given class of voting shares 
listed on the Exchange, The [CMA] Board shall have the right ... to order such 
person to offer to purchase the shares of the same class.147 
This mandatory purchase requirement of minority shares is called a “compulsory 
purchase right.” The problem with this arrangement is that the CMA has no power to oblige the 
acquirer to buy the remaining shares (the minority shareholders stocks) at a price higher than the 
price the acquirer paid or offered ex-shareholders. Not bestowing minority shareholders with 
mandatory compulsory purchase rights would undermine the protection of minority shareholders 
and violate the shareholders’ right of equal treatment. 148 Conversely, U.S. law does not 
recognize any compulsory purchase right; instead, the U.S. legal system has an appraisal right 
for minority shareholders who reject the merger or acquisition.149 This appraisal right provides 
146 See the C.L. Article § (103). 
147 Id. § (54). 
148 The C.L. Article § (103) and MAR Article § (3) paragraph (b) which states: “[a]ll shareholders of the 
same class of an offeree company must be treated equally by an offeror.” Additionally, the wide scope discretion 
granted to the CMA in regard with compulsory purchase right may open a window for corruption and bias treatment 
among minority shareholders in various companies. Accordingly, the Saudi corporate governance model has to 
guarantee the unconditional tag-along right for every minority shareholder. 
149 See Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA) Article § (13.02)(a). 
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these shareholders with right to sell their shares for fair value. However, this right is not 
available for shareholders of listed companies.150 
8.7 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has examined the shareholders’ position in Saudi listed companies, noting the 
various similarities and differences between their rights, roles, and protections under the Saudi 
system and equivalent provisions in the OECD principles, as well as in other corporate 
governance models such as the U.S. and French systems. The Saudi corporate governance 
system provides shareholders with a number of basic political and economic rights; however 
most significantly, it does not impose the one vote per share principle on all companies, and it 
allows the company to limit the minority shareholders’ right to attend the shareholders’ GM. 
The shareholders’ GMs have, inter alia, the power to appoint and dismiss members of the 
board of directors and the external auditor; to approve any increase or decrease in the company’s 
capital; to review transactions which involve director’s or manager’s conflicts of interest 
restrictions; and to amend the company bylaws. 
The Saudi framework governing derivative suits needs to undergo major reform. The CL 
should adopt the “demand principle” from the U.S. legal system.151 Shareholder should only be 
required to prove that some kind of injury was inflicted on the company, as opposed to being 
150 See id. § (13.02)(b). 
151 Otherwise, shareholders may overuse this mechanism. Such reform is not an urgent matter due to the 
currently small number of derivative suites. However, any future increase in the number of such suits will 
necessitate the adoption of such provisions. See Fanto, supra note 65. 
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required to substantiate a personal injury. In addition, the company should compensate the 
shareholder for any expenses incurred during this suit process. Incorporating such reforms may 
increase the use of derivative suits in Saudi corporate governance as an extra enforcement 
mechanism. 
The Saudi corporate governance provides minority shareholders with special protection, 
such as the right to call a convocation of the ordinary shareholders GM (annual and exceptional); 
the right to request the appointment of an external inspector; the protection of their ownership 
from dilution (preemptive rights); and the right to compulsory purchase (tagalong rights). 
The framework of minority shareholders’ protection, however, suffers from drawbacks 
that need to be addressed by the Saudi government, especially when taking into account the 
pattern of concentrated ownership in Saudi listed companies and the prospect of controlling 
shareholders exploitation of the minority shareholders. 
To enhance the confidence of small investors in the Saudi capital market, the CL should 
incorporate several mandatory rights for minority shareholders: 1) the right to put items on the 
shareholders’ GM agenda; 2) the right to request payment of dividends under special 
circumstances, such as the arbitrary reluctance by the board of directors (the majority 
shareholders' appointees) to distribute dividends; 3) the cumulative voting method of electing the 
board of directors; 4) the right of every shareholder to attend the shareholders’ GMs, regardless 
of ownership stake; 5) the right to call extraordinary meetings of shareholders; 6) the right to one 
vote for every share; 7) the full enjoyment of preemptive rights with no restrictions and 
limitations; and 8) the right to compulsory purchase (tagalong rights) by the acquirer, without 
any discretionary power on the part of the CMA. 
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More importantly, the Saudi CL should allow the formation of shareholders’ associations, 
as French law does; this feature of corporate governance will increase the power of minority 
shareholders in the company. Such associations must be granted the right to represent the 
minority shareholders and to exercise, on their behalf, those rights as are normally granted to the 
minority shareholders, including the right to request the convention of shareholders’ meetings, to 
add items to the meeting agenda, to vote in the general meetings, and to sue either the company 
itself (direct suite) or another entity on behalf of the company (derivative suite). 
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9.0  CONCLUSION 
Saudi Arabia is under pressure to diversify its economy and to expand the private sector’s 
role. Such an agenda will not be easily achieved without the government creating a suitable 
regulatory and legal environment, and, moreover, specifically implementing an efficient system 
of corporate governance. 
Corporate governance is a subject that has received focused interest only recently within 
Saudi Arabia. Until then the CL was the primary tool for addressing governance as well as other 
corporate issues in the country. Social and governmental attention to corporate governance was 
triggered after a formal capital market was established in 2003, to be followed by its subsequent 
collapse in 2006. Since then, the Capital Market Authority (CMA) has issued a set of principles 
and other regulations to enhance corporate governance in the country. Nonetheless, the Saudi 
corporate governance system is still widely deemed to be suboptimal. For instance, two studies 
conducted by respected international institutions have indicated that the Saudi corporate 
governance system needs rigorous reforms in order to comply with international benchmarks. 
There is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ formula for corporate governance reform. Any system of 
corporate governance involves a complex framework and processes that are inextricably part of 
the legal, political, and economic structure of the country. Given this interconnectedness, a 
detailed examination of the Saudi corporate governance system can reveal only some of the 
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elements that may explain the nature of existing Saudi governance structure. And these same 
elements will most likely play a determining role in the Saudi system’s evolution. 
First, the Saudi system has an agency cost problem caused by the high concentration of 
ownership in Saudi publicly traded companies. Such dominant shareholder agency problems 
produce different corporate governance issues and require different governance solutions than do 
the U.S. (and U.K.) dispersed ownership systems. A chief goal of corporate governance in 
concentrated ownership systems is to guard the company’s assets and protect the minority 
shareholders from the power of the controlling shareholder(s). 
Second, the Saudi corporate governance system lacks the requisite institutions to 
implement corporate governance effectively. The Saudi judicial system, in particular, is 
underdeveloped in comparison to judicial systems in developed nations, as well as the legal 
systems of numerous other developing countries. Judges may decide not to enforce statutes that 
they view as contradicting Islamic law, such as the limited liability of shareholders and debt 
financing payment of interests. Furthermore, the adjudication process is time-consuming, and 
neither transparent nor predictable. Accordingly, the judicial system in Saudi Arabia cannot be 
expected to fill gaps in the corporate governance system in contrast to, for example, the U.S. 
judicial system, which has contributed positively to the cause of corporate governance. 
Thirdly, the teachings of Islam represent the supreme law of the land, constituting an 
unassailable foundation for moral and ethical behavior in all facets of Saudi Arabian society, 
including business conduct. Religions such as Islam, along with moral codes, may provide 
effective tools for reducing agency costs, especially in societies composed largely of strong 
believers with compatible creeds. However, Saudi corporate governance, as it has developed, has 
ignored the Islamic view of governance and its implications for modern corporate ideology. 
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Connecting Saudi corporate governance principles with their Islamic counterparts would increase 
the acceptance of such principles in Saudi Arabia. People will adhere to principles of governance 
when such principles are seen to be part of their religious duties. 
When constructing an agenda for reform of corporate governance, policy and law makers 
in Saudi Arabia must consider the aforementioned elements. Accordingly, Saudi corporate 
governance reform should focus on internal corporate governance, namely, on the board of 
directors and shareholders (including protection for minority shareholders). Improvements in the 
quality of internal corporate governance would expedite the process of corporate governance 
reform in this country. In contrast, development or reform of external corporate governance 
normally takes an extended period of time before it becomes capable of playing an effective role 
in agency costs’ reduction. 
Comparative corporate governance, including the benchmarks promoted by international 
organizations, namely, the OECD with its Corporate Governance Principles, in conjunction with 
the Islamic principles, have furnished valuable insights into the formation of this dissertation’s 
proposals for improving internal governance in Saudi Arabia. Among other recommendations, 
this dissertation argues that Saudi corporate governance needs to shift its emphasis from 
shareholder primacy towards stakeholder primacy. Notably, publicly traded companies ought to 
be entitled to join labor in the decision-making process. Permitting a two-tiered board structure 
has the potential to increase board performance due to the clear division of managerial and 
supervisory functions. Companies should also have the right to set incentive based remunerations 
for directors. The powers granted to shareholders should include the right to issue an advisory 
vote over the remuneration of directors and key executives, known as “Say on Pay.” Moreover, 
the sale of all or substantially all of the company’s assets should not be permitted without 
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shareholders’ approval. Guarantees on the political rights of shareholders must be clarified and 
strengthened, including the right to attend shareholders’ meetings and the one-vote-per-share 
principle. Furthermore, minority shareholders should be permitted to form associations to 
represent their collective interests in the company. The imposition of mandatory cumulative 
voting in the election of directors may increase the power of minority shareholders in the 
company, reducing agency costs caused by dominant shareholder’s control. Statutory protection 
for minority shareholder’s, including the right to equal treatment, must be strengthened, 
especially during any process of merger or acquisition. 
This dissertation has little devoted attention to the governance of Saudi publicly owned 
companies, controlled by the government or by semi-government institutions. Further 
investigation into so called SOEs (State Owned Enterprises) is needed, especially with regard to 
the nature of the agency problem and its implications for the Saudi corporate governance system. 
The degree of engagement by the government in the decision-making processes of controlled 
companies, along with the degree of divergence between governance and private business 
agenda, would be the determining factor of agency problem type in such companies.1 
Overall, the adoption of the proposals recommended in this dissertation is imperative to 
achieving the goals of improving corporate governance in Saudi Arabia and attracting greater 
investment in the country's capital market.   
1 See OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises 10 (2005). For instance, if 
participation by the government and semi-government institutions in decision-making is minimal, the agency 
problem would be similar to that which is found in dispersed ownership systems, namely that of management v. 
shareholders. Hence, agency costs reduction in such exceptionally concentrated systems would require the adoption 
of the corporate governance solutions that are promoted by dispersed ownership systems with the management v. 
shareholders agency problem. Or encourage the government and semi- government institutions to be engaged in the 
decision-making process and to supervise the management of the company. See also CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A 
FRAMEWORK FOR IMPLEMENTATION VI, at 35 (Magdi R. Iskander & Nadereh Chamlou eds., World Bank Group 
2000) (which states: “the governance issues in state-owned enterprise are more complex because of the lack of 
clarity about who the owner is, who is able to exercise the rights of the owner, and who is accountable.”). Id. 
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APPENDIX A 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGULATIONS IN THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI 
ARABIA 
Issued by the Board of Capital Market Authority 
Pursuant to Resolution No. 1/212/2006 
dated 21/10/1427AH (corresponding to 12/11/2006) 
based on the Capital Market Law issued 
by Royal Decree No. M/30 dated 2/6/1424AH 
 
 
Amended by Resolution of the Board 
of the Capital Market Authority Number 1-10-2010 
Dated 30/3/1431H corresponding to 16/3/2010G 
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PART 1 
PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS 
 
Article 1: Preamble 
 
a) These Regulations include the rules and standards that regulate the management of 
joint stock companies listed in the Exchange to ensure their compliance with the best 
governance practices that would ensure the protection of shareholders’ rights as well 
as the rights of stakeholders. 
 
b) These Regulations constitute the guiding principles for all companies listed in the 
Exchange unless any other regulations, rules or resolutions of the Board of the 
Authority provide for the binding effect of some of the provisions herein contained. 
 
c) As an exception of paragraph (b) of this article, a company must disclose in the Board 
of Directors` report, the provisions that have been implemented and the provisions that 
have not been implemented as well as the reasons for not implementing them. 
 
Article 2: Definitions 
 
a) Expression and terms in these regulations have the meanings they bear in the Capital 
Market Law and in the glossary of defined terms used in the regulations and the rules 
of the Capital Market Authority unless otherwise stated in these regulations. 
 
b) For the purpose of implementing these regulations, the following expressions and 
terms shall have the meaning they bear as follows unless the contrary intention 
appears: 
 
Independent Member: A member of the Board of Directors who enjoys complete 
independence. By way of example, the following shall constitute an infringement of such 
independence: 
 
1. he/she holds a five per cent or more of the issued shares of the company or any of its 
group. 
 
2. Being a representative of a legal person that holds a five per cent or more of the issued 
shares of the company or any of its group. 
 
3. he/she, during the preceding two years, has been a senior executive of the company or 
of any other company within that company’s group. 
 
4. he/she is a first-degree relative of any board member of the company or of any other 
company within that company’s group. 
 
5. he/she is first-degree relative of any of senior executives of the company or of any 
other company within that company’s group. 
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6. he/she is a board member of any company within the group of the company which he 
is nominated to be a member of its board. 
 
7. If he/she, during the preceding two years, has been an employee with an affiliate of the 
company or an affiliate of any company of its group, such as external auditors or main 
suppliers; or if he/she, during the preceding two years, had a controlling interest in any 
such party. 
 
Non-executive director: A member of the Board of Directors who does not have a full-time 
management position at the company, or who does not receive monthly or yearly salary. 
 
First-degree relatives: father, mother, spouse and children. 
 
Stakeholders: Any person who has an interest in the company, such as shareholders, employees, 
creditors, customers, suppliers, community. 
 
Accumulative Voting: a method of voting for electing directors, which gives each shareholder a 
voting rights equivalent to the number of shares he/she holds. He/she has the right to use them all 
for one nominee or to divide them between his/her selected nominees without any duplication of 
these votes. This method increases the chances of the minority shareholders to appoint their 
representatives in the board through the right to accumulate votes for one nominee. 
 
Minority Shareholders: Those shareholders who represent a class of shareholders that does not 
control the company and hence they are unable to influence the company. 
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PART 2 
RIGHTS OF SHAREHOLDERS AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
 
Article 3: General Rights of Shareholders 
 
A Shareholder shall be entitled to all rights attached to the share, in particular, the right to a share 
of the distributable profits, the right to a share of the company’s assets upon liquidation; the right 
to attend the General Assembly and participate in deliberations and vote on relevant decisions; 
the right of disposition with respect to shares; the right to supervise the Board of Directors 
activities, and file responsibility claims against board members; the right to inquire and have 
access to information without prejudice to the company’s interests and in a manner that does not 
contradict the Capital Market Law and the Implementing Rules. 
 
Article 4: Facilitation of Shareholders Exercise of Rights and Access to Information 
 
a) The company in its Articles of Association and by-laws shall specify theprocedures 
and precautions that are necessary for the shareholders’ exercise of all their lawful 
rights. 
 
b) All information which enable shareholders to properly exercise their rights shall be 
made available and such information shall be comprehensive and accurate; it must be 
provided and updated regularly and within the prescribed times; the company shall use 
the most effective means in communicating with shareholders. No discrepancy shall 
be exercised with respect to shareholders in relation to providing information. 
 
Article 51: Shareholders Rights related to the General Assembly 
 
a) A General Assembly shall convene once a year at least within the six months 
following the end of the company’s financial year. 
 
b) The General Assembly shall convene upon a request of the Board of Directors. The 
Board of Directors shall invite a General Assembly to convene pursuant to a request of 
the auditor or a number of shareholders whose shareholdings represent at least 5% of 
the equity share capital. 
 
c) Date, place, and agenda of the General Assembly shall be specified and announced by 
a notice, at least 20 days prior to the date the meeting; invitation for the meeting shall 
be published in the Exchange’ website, the company’s website and in two newspapers 
of voluminous distribution in the Kingdom. Modern high tech means shall be used in 
communicating with shareholders. 
 
1 The Board of the Capital Market Authority issued resolution Number (3-40-2012) Dated 17/2/1434H 
corresponding to 30/12/2012G making paragraphs (i) and (j) of Article 5 of the Corporate Governance Regulations 
mandatory on all companies listed on the Exchange effective from 1/1/2013G. 
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d) Shareholders shall be allowed the opportunity to effectively participate and vote in the 
General Assembly; they shall be informed about the rules governing the meetings and 
the voting procedure. 
 
e) Arrangements shall be made for facilitating the participation of the greatest number of 
shareholders in the General Assembly, including inter alia determination of the 
appropriate place and time. 
 
f) In preparing the General Assembly’s agenda, the Board of Directors shall take into 
consideration matters shareholders require to be listed in that agenda; shareholders 
holding not less than 5% of the company’s shares are entitled to add one or more items 
to the agenda. upon its preparation. 
 
g) Shareholders shall be entitled to discuss matters listed in the agenda of the General 
Assembly and raise relevant questions to the board members and to the external 
auditor. The Board of Directors or the external auditor shall answer the questions 
raised by shareholders in a manner that does not prejudice the company’s interest. 
 
h) Matters presented to the General Assembly shall be accompanied by sufficient 
information to enable shareholders to make decisions. 
 
i) Shareholders shall be enabled to peruse the minutes of the General Assembly; the 
company shall provide the Authority with a copy of those minutes within 10 days of 
the convening date of any such meeting. 
 
j) The Exchange shall be immediately informed of the results of the General Assembly. 
 
Article 6: Voting Rights 
 
a) Voting is deemed to be a fundamental right of a shareholder, which shall not, in any 
way, be denied. The company must avoid taking any action which might hamper the 
use of the voting right; a shareholder must be afforded all possible assistance as may 
facilitate the exercise of such right. 
 
b) In voting in the General Assembly for the nomination to the board members, the 
accumulative voting method shall be applied. 
 
c) A shareholder may, in writing, appoint any other shareholder who is not a board 
member and who is not an employee of the company to attend the General Assembly 
on his behalf. 
 
d) Investors who are judicial persons and who act on behalf of others – e.g. investment 
funds – shall disclose in their annual reports their voting policies, actual voting, and 
ways of dealing with any material conflict of interests that may affect the practice of 
the fundamental rights in relation to their investments. 
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Article 7: Dividends Rights of Shareholders 
 
a) The Board of Directors shall lay down a clear policy regarding dividends, in a manner 
that may realize the interests of shareholders and those of the company; shareholders 
shall be informed of that policy during the General Assembly and reference thereto 
shall be made in the report of the Board of Directors. 
 
b) The General Assembly shall approve the dividends and the date of distribution. These 
dividends, whether they be in cash or bonus shares shall be given, as of right, to the 
shareholders who are listed in the records kept at the Securities Depository Center as 
they appear at the end of trading session on the day on which the General Assembly is 
convened. 
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PART 3 
DISCLOSURE AND TRANSPARENCY 
 
Article 8:Policies and Procedure related to Disclosure 
 
The company shall lay down in writing the policies, procedures and supervisory rules related to 
disclosure, pursuant to law. 
 
Article 92: Disclosure in the Board of Directors’ Report 
 
In addition to what is required in the Listing Rules in connection with the content of the report of 
the Board of Directors, which is appended to the annual financial statements of the company, 
such report shall include the following: 
 
a) The implemented provisions of these Regulations as well as the provisions which have 
not been implemented, and the justifications for not implementing them. 
 
b) Names of any joint stock company or companies in which the company Board of 
Directors member acts as a member of its Board of directors. 
 
c) Formation of the Board of Directors and classification of its members as follows: 
executive board member, non-executive board member, or independent board 
member. 
 
d) A brief description of the jurisdictions and duties of the Board's main committees such 
as the Audit Committee, the Nomination and Remuneration Committee; indicating 
their names, names of their chairmen, names of their members, and the aggregate of 
their respective meetings. 
 
e) Details of compensation and remuneration paid to each of the following: 
 
1. The Chairman and members of the Board of Directors. 
 
2. The Top Five executives who have received the highest compensation and 
remuneration from the company. The CEO and the chief finance officer shall be 
included if they are not within the top five. 
 
 For the purpose of this paragraph, “compensation and remuneration” means 
salaries, allowances, profits and any of the same; annual and periodic bonuses 
2 The Board of the Capital Market Authority issued resolution Number (1-36-2008) Dated 12/11/1429H 
corresponding to 10/11/2008G making Article 9 of the Corporate Governance Regulations mandatory on all 
companies listed on the Exchange effective from the first board report issued by the company following the date of 
the Board of the Capital Market Authority resolution mentioned above. 
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related to performance; long or short-term incentive schemes; and any other 
rights in rem. 
 
f) Any punishment or penalty or preventive restriction imposed on the company by the 
Authority or any other supervisory or regulatory or judiciary body. 
 
g) Results of the annual audit of the effectiveness of the internal control procedures of 
the company. 
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PART 4 
BOARD OF DIRECTORS Article 103: 
 
Main Functions of the Board of Directors Among the main functions of the Board is the 
fallowing: 
 
a) Approving the strategic plans and main objectives of the company and supervising 
their implementation; this includes: 
 
1. Laying down a comprehensive strategy for the company, the main work plans 
and the policy related to risk management, reviewing and updating of such 
policy. 
 
2. Determining the most appropriate capital structure of the company, its strategies 
and financial objectives and approving its annual budgets. 
 
3. Supervising the main capital expenses of the company and acquisition/disposal 
of assets. 
 
4. Deciding the performance objectives to be achieved and supervising the 
implementation thereof and the overall performance of the company. 
 
5. Reviewing and approving the organizational and functional structures of the 
company on a periodical basis. 
 
b) Lay down rules for internal control systems and supervising them; this includes: 
 
1. Developing a written policy that would regulates conflict of interest and remedy 
any possible cases of conflict by members of the Board of Directors, executive 
management and shareholders. This includes misuse of the company’s assets and 
facilities and the arbitrary disposition resulting from dealings with the related 
parties. 
 
2. Ensuring the integrity of the financial and accounting procedures including 
procedures related to the preparation of the financial reports. 
 
3 The Board of the Capital Market Authority issued resolution Number (1-33-2011) Dated 3/12/1432H 
corresponding to 30/10/2011G making paragraph (b) of Article 10 of the Corporate Governance Regulations 
mandatory on all companies listed on the Exchange effective from 1/1/2012. The Board of the Capital Market 
Authority issued resolution Number (3-40-2012) Dated 17/2/1434H corresponding to 30/12/2012G making 
paragraphs (c) and (d) of Article 10 of the Corporate Governance Regulations mandatory on all companies listed on 
the Exchange effective from 30/6/2013G. 
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3. Ensuring the implementation of control procedures appropriate for risk 
management by forecasting the risks that the company could encounter and 
disclosing them with transparency. 
 
4. Reviewing annually the effectiveness of the internal control systems. 
 
c) Drafting a Corporate Governance Code for the company that does not contradict the 
provisions of this regulation, supervising and monitoring in general the effectiveness 
of the code and amending it whenever necessary. 
 
d) Laying down specific and explicit policies, standards and procedures, for the 
membership of the Board of Directors and implementing them after they have been 
approved by the General Assembly. 
 
e) Outlining a written policy that regulate the relationship with stakeholders with a view 
to protecting their respective rights; in particular, such policy must cover the 
following: 
 
1. Mechanisms for indemnifying the stakeholders in case of contravening their 
rights under the law and their respective contracts. 
 
2. Mechanisms for settlement of complaints or disputes that might arise between the 
company and the stakeholders. 
 
3. Suitable mechanisms for maintaining good relationships with customers and 
suppliers and protecting the confidentiality of information related to them. 
 
4. A code of conduct for the company’s executives and employees compatible with 
the proper professional and ethical standards, and regulate their relationship with 
the stakeholders. The Board of Directors lays down procedures for supervising 
this code and ensuring compliance there with. 
 
5. The Company’s social contributions. 
 
f) Deciding policies and procedures to ensure the company’s compliance with the laws 
and regulations and the company’s obligation to disclose material information to 
shareholders, creditors and other stakeholders. 
 
Article 11: Responsibilities of the Board 
 
a) Without prejudice to the competences of the General Assembly, the company’s Board 
of Directors shall assume all the necessary powers for the company’s management. 
The ultimate responsibility for the company rests with the Board even if it sets up 
committees or delegates some of its powers to a third party. The Board of Directors 
shall avoid issuing general or indefinite power of attorney. 
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b) The responsibilities of the Board of Directors must be clearly stated in the company’s 
Articles of Association. 
 
c) The Board of Directors must carry out its duties in a responsible manner, in good faith 
and with due diligence. Its decisions should be based on sufficient information from 
the executive management, or from any other reliable source. 
 
d) A member of the Board of Directors represents all shareholders; he undertakes to carry 
out whatever may be in the general interest of the company, but not the interests of the 
group he represents or that which voted in favor of his appointment to the Board of 
Directors. 
 
e) The Board of Directors shall determine the powers to be delegated to the executive 
management and the procedures for taking any action and the validity of such 
delegation. It shall also determine matters reserved for decision by the Board of 
Directors. The executive management shall submit to the Board of Directors periodic 
reports on the exercise of the delegated powers. 
 
f) The Board of Directors shall ensure that a procedure is laid down for orienting the new 
board members of the company’s business and, in particular, the financial and legal 
aspects, in addition to their training, where necessary. 
 
g) The Board of Directors shall ensure that sufficient information about the company is 
made available to all members of the Board of Directors, generally, and, in particular, 
to the non-executive members, to enable them to discharge their duties and 
responsibilities in an effective manner. 
 
h) The Board of Directors shall not be entitled to enter into loans which spans more than 
three years, and shall not sell or mortgage real estate of the company, or drop the 
company's debts, unless it is authorized to do so by the company’s Articles of 
Association. In the case where the company’s Articles of Association includes no 
provisions to this respect, the Board should not act without the approval of the General 
Assembly, unless such acts fall within the normal scope of the company’s business. 
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Article 124: Formation of the Board 
 
Formation of the Board of Directors shall be subject to the following: 
 
a) The Articles of Association of the company shall specify the number of the Board of 
Directors members, provided that such number shall not be less than three and not 
more than eleven. 
 
b) The General Assembly shall appoint the members of the Board of Directors for the 
duration provided for in the Articles of Association of the company, provided that 
such duration shall not exceed three years. Unless otherwise provided for in the 
Articles of Association of the company, members of the Board may be reappointed. 
 
c) The majority of the members of the Board of Directors shall be non-executive 
members. 
 
d) It is prohibited to conjoin the position of the Chairman of the Board of Directors with 
any other executive position in the company, such as the Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) or the managing director or the general manager. 
 
e) The independent members of the Board of Directors shall not be less than two 
members, or one-third of the members, whichever is greater. 
 
f) The Articles of Association of the company shall specify the manner in which 
membership of the Board of Directors terminates. At all times, the General Assembly 
may dismiss all or any of the members of the Board of Directors even though the 
Articles of Association provide otherwise. 
 
g) On termination of membership of a board member in any of the ways of termination, 
the company shall promptly notify the Authority and the Exchange and shall specify 
the reasons for such termination. 
 
h) A member of the Board of Directors shall not act as a member of the Board of 
Directors of more than five joint stock companies at the same time. 
 
4 The Board of the Capital Market Authority issued resolution Number (1-36-2008) Dated 12/11/1429H 
corresponding to 10/11/2008G making paragraphs (c) and (e) of Article 12 of the Corporate Governance 
Regulations mandatory on all companies listed on the Exchange effective from year 2009. 
– The Board of the Capital Market Authority issued resolution Number (3-40-2012) Dated 
17/2/1434H corresponding to 30/12/2012G making paragraph (g) of Article 12 of the Corporate 
Governance Regulations mandatory on all companies listed on the Exchange effective from 
1/1/2013G. 
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i) Judicial person who is entitled under the company’s Articles of Association to appoint 
representatives in the Board of Directors, is not entitled to nomination vote of other 
members of the Board of Directors. 
 
Article 13: Committees of the Board 
 
a) A suitable number of committees shall be set up in accordance with the company’s 
requirements and circumstances, in order to enable the Board of Directors to perform 
its duties in an effective manner. 
 
b) The formation of committees subordinate to the Board of Directors shall be according 
to general procedures laid down by the Board, indicating the duties, the duration and 
the powers of each committee, and the manner in which the Board monitors its 
activities. The committee shall notify the Board of its activities, findings or decisions 
with complete transparency. The Board shall periodically pursue the activities of such 
committees so as to ensure that the activities entrusted to those committees are duly 
performed. The Board shall approve the by-laws of all committees of the Board, 
including, inter alia, the Audit Committee, Nomination and Remuneration Committee. 
 
c) A sufficient number of the non-executive members of the Board of Directors shall be 
appointed in committees that are concerned with activities that might involve a 
conflict of interest, such as ensuring the integrity of the financial and non-financial 
reports, reviewing the deals concluded by related parties, nomination to membership 
of the Board, appointment of executive directors, and determination of remuneration. 
 
Article 145: Audit Committee 
 
a) The Board of Directors shall set up a committee to be named the “Audit Committee”. 
Its members shall not be less than three, including a specialist in financial and 
accounting matters. Executive board members are not eligible for Audit Committee 
membership. 
 
b) The General Assembly of shareholders shall, upon a recommendation of the Board of 
Directors, issue rules for appointing the members of the Audit Committee and define 
the term of their office and the procedure to be followed by the Committee. 
 
c) The duties and responsibilities of the Audit Committee include the following: 
 
1. To supervise the company’s internal audit department to ensure its effectiveness 
in executing the activities and duties specified by the Board of Directors. 
 
5 The Board of the Capital Market Authority issued resolution Number (1-36-2008) Dated 12/11/1429H 
corresponding to 10/11/2008G making Article 14 of the Corporate Governance Regulations mandatory on all 
companies listed on the Exchange effective from year 2009. 
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2. To review the internal audit procedure and prepare a written report on such audit 
and its recommendations with respect to it. 
 
3. To review the internal audit reports and pursue the implementation of the 
corrective measures in respect of the comments included in them. 
 
4. To recommend to the Board of Directors the appointment, dismissal and the 
Remuneration of external auditors; upon any such recommendation, regard must 
be made to their independence. 
 
5. To supervise the activities of the external auditors and approve any activity 
beyond the scope of the audit work assigned to them during the performance of 
their duties. 
 
6. To review together with the external auditor the audit plan and make any 
comments thereon. 
 
7. To review the external auditor’s comments on the financial statements and follow 
up the actions taken about them. 
 
8. To review the interim and annual financial statements prior to presentation to the 
Board of Directors; and to give opinion and recommendations with respect 
thereto. 
 
9. To review the accounting policies in force and advise the Board of Directors of 
any recommendation regarding them. 
 
Article 156: Nomination and Remuneration Committee 
 
a) The Board of Directors shall set up a committee to be named “Nomination and 
Remuneration Committee”. 
 
b) The General Assembly shall, upon a recommendation of the Board of Directors, issue 
rules for the appointment of the members of the Nomination and Remuneration 
Committee, terms of office and the procedure to be followed by such committee. 
 
c) The duties and responsibilities of the Nomination and Remuneration Committee 
include the following: 
 
1. Recommend to the Board of Directors appointments to membership of the Board 
in accordance with the approved policies and standards; the Committee shall 
6 The Board of the Capital Market Authority issued resolution Number (1-10-2010) Dated 30/3/1431H 
corresponding to 16/3/2010G making Article 15 of the Corporate Governance Regulations mandatory on all 
companies listed on the Exchange effective from 1/1/2011G. 
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ensure that no person who has been previously convicted of any offense affecting 
honor or honesty is nominated for such membership. 
 
2. Annual review of the requirement of suitable skills for membership of the Board 
of Directors and the preparation of a description of the required capabilities and 
qualifications for such membership, including, inter alia, the time that a Board 
member should reserve for the activities of the Board. 
 
3. Review the structure of the Board of Directors and recommend changes. 
 
4. Determine the points of strength and weakness in the Board of Directors and 
recommend remedies that are compatible with the company’s interest. 
 
5. Ensure on an annual basis the independence of the independent members and the 
absence of any conflict of interest in case a Board member also acts as a member 
of the Board of Directors of another company. 
 
6. Draw clear policies regarding the indemnities and remunerations of the Board 
members and top executives; in laying down such policies, the standards related 
to performance shall be followed. 
 
Article 16: Meetings of the Board 
 
1. The Board members shall allot ample time for performing their responsibilities, 
including the preparation for the meetings of the Board and the permanent and ad hoc 
committees, and shall endeavor to attend such meetings. 
 
2. The Board shall convene its ordinary meetings regularly upon a request by the 
Chairman. The Chairman shall call the Board for an unforeseen meeting upon a 
written request by two of its members. 
 
3. When preparing a specified agenda to be presented to the Board, the Chairman should 
consult the other members of the Board and the CEO. The agenda and other 
documentation should be sent to the members in a sufficient time prior to the meeting 
so that they may be able to consider such matters and prepare themselves for the 
meeting. Once convened, the Board shall approve the agenda; should any member of 
the Board raise any objection to this agenda, the details of such objection shall be 
entered in the minutes of the meeting. 
 
4. The Board shall document its meetings and prepare records of the deliberations and 
the voting, and arrange for these records to be kept in chapters for ease of reference. 
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Article 17: Remuneration and Indemnification of Board Members 
 
The Articles of Association of the company shall set forth the manner of remunerating the Board 
members; such remuneration may take the form of a lump sum amount, attendance allowance, 
rights in rem or a certain percentage of the profits. Any two or more of these privileges may be 
conjoined. 
 
Article 18. Conflict of Interest within the Board 
 
a) A Board member shall not, without a prior authorization from the General Assembly, 
to be renewed each year, have any interest (whether directly or indirectly) in the 
company’s business and contracts. The activities to be performed through general 
bidding shall constitute an exception where a Board member is the best bidder. A 
Board member shall notify the Board of Directors of any personal interest he/she may 
have in the business and contracts that are completed for the company’s account. Such 
notification shall be entered in the minutes of the meeting. A Board member who is an 
interested party shall not be entitled to vote on the resolution to be adopted in this 
regard neither in the General Assembly nor in the Board of Directors. The Chairman 
of the Board of Directors shall notify the General Assembly, when convened, of the 
activities and contracts in respect of which a Board member may have a personal 
interest and shall attach to such notification a special report prepared by the 
company’s auditor. 
 
b) A Board member shall not, without a prior authorization of the General Assembly, to 
be renewed annually, participate in any activity which may likely compete with the 
activities of the company, or trade in any branch of the activities carried out by the 
company. 
 
c) The company shall not grant cash loan whatsoever to any of its Board members or 
render guarantee in respect of any loan entered into by a Board member with third 
parties, excluding banks and other fiduciary companies. 
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 PART 5 
CLOSING PROVISIONS 
 
Article 19: Publication and Entry into Force 
 
These regulations shall be effective upon the date of their publication. 
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